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for more female representation could be on the basis of each according to proportional requirement than a demand for equal representation of 50-50 for instance.
Taking the 18th CC as a case, 4.8% of power is entrusted with women (who are 10 out of 205 members) while men took more than 95% of representative power. When analyzed from this perspective, there is a power in-balance as female membership in the party was 23.8% at the time of the 18th National People’s Congress but a mere 4.8% of the total number of the Central Committee membership is granted to them. This shows that the intra-party governance structure is undemocratic where leadership does not “mirror” a full picture of the membership characteristics, gender inclusive.
THE POLITBURO (PB)
Drawn from the CCCCP, the Politburo is a grand elite institution according to the power pyramid of the CCP. This usually twenty-plus member organization is supposedly elected by the CC even though scholars and Chinese political experts Bo Zhiyue (2007), Joseph Fewsmith (2003) and Lawrence and Martin (2013) claim that it does not have an entire control on the formation of the Politburo. The argument is about the not-so-hidden hands of party elders and veterans on who gets into the Politburo and who is turned down. Negotiations and compromises are likely the most important features of the process of selection and election while the PBSC is getting to be a little more predictable perhaps due to what Bo calls the “political institutionalization” of rules presently unfolding in Chinese politics especially with regards to the portfolios that require an automatic seat in the PBSC than the PB itself.
Despite this, the political “black box” might still be a barrier for a definitive assumption of the selection, election and approval process as the Central Committee does not have the 81
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overarching power it should have asserted. Whatever the selection process might be, the PB’s functions are overwhelmingly important to the country’s political system. This organization derives its legitimacy from Article 22 of the CCP constitution which states that: “When the Central Committee is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the functions and powers of the Central Committee”.
This specification is somehow vague without tangible explanations about all the expectations and functions of the organization but Wang (1995, 2001) summarizes the primary responsibilities of the PB, as: an institution of policy initiator ranging from security, political ideology, education, domestic stability to the economy. Sullivan (2012) calls it the “chief political decision-maker of China”. According to Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution, the Politburo is a combination of the highest ranking officials of the party, military and government bureaucracy (2013). This is what I call the Cream of the Chinese nation. Additionally, in the words of Dumbaugh and Martin (2009, 3): “[t]he Party’s most powerful policy- and decision-making entity is the Politburo and its Standing Committee”. It seems that the CCP has likely stayed in power for the past 65 years while maintaining its dominance largely due to how power-politics is played by the PB. It seems to be the political body that perhaps maintained communist rule in China with a combination of ease and vulnerability.
The establishment of the PB finds its roots from the Lenin doctrine of centralized democracy through which decision-making power resides in the hands of few (Wang 1995).
Scholars have indeed agreed that the PB serves as the over-arching crown of the party with the Secretary General (president of the country) as its head (Lawrence & Martin 2013; Bo 2012, 2007; Li 2013; Dumbaugh & Martin 2009). However, it must also be noted that despite the assumption that Chinese politics is hierarchical, politics is now shifting to a more “complex,
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diffused and at times highly competitive” where tiered contacts among political institutions might not be any more enough (Dumbaugh & Martin 2009, 1).
Membership for the PB is associated with dynamic qualifications that are both strictly and flexibly adhered to depending on the particular political climate of the time (Bo 2007). In addition to CCCCP membership to qualify for politburo entrance, another requirement is a “party standing” of five years. These rules are stipulated in the CCP constitution25 (Article 22). Lawless says that six elite regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing municipalities) and Guangdong and Xinjiang provinces, Chairpersons of the NPC and CPPCC, few top ranking military officers, among others have become automatic members to the PB, some through written policies while others through informal unwritten norms. In addition to membership of the PB, all these individuals are said to be full holders of key positions within the state apparatus and execute those duties concurrently. Perhaps this is why Bo (2007) defines politburo membership as more of status than work; yet, these people are the real movers of the Chinese society.
With regards to the operations of the Politburo, experts, spectators and the media share a common view that it is “opaque” with little outside influence over subject matters (Lawrence 2012). Perhaps this is related to the whole political landscape as a system and not exclusive to this organization. Despite its modus operandi, the PB and its SC run China both politically and economically. It is said to meet monthly to deliberate issues felt eminent to the country and perhaps more importantly, to the party. Whatever the case, the members act uniformly on many of the issues they are faced to deal with as decisions are not taken based on majority-based rule but mostly through consensus (Lawrence & Martin 2013, 2009).
25 An English version of the CCP constitution is available here: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738_3.htm
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Throughout its existence, only few women have made it to the PB. On the other hand, it is interesting how the very few women who have made breakthroughs in extremely male dominated circles are use as political cosmetics to hide the reality of inequality. Despite the fact she was perhaps the most renowned female politician both domestically and internationally during her time, she was only became a full member of the PB in 2002. Known as the “Iron Lady”
or Margret Thatcher of China, Wu Yi exerted great influence in Chinese politics but it seems not due to her membership in the PB but in other posts such as Vice Premier, Ministers of Health and Foreign Trade and Economy.
Since the Cultural Revolution, the 18th PB registers more female membership than any other (Li 2013). Deng Yingchao became member of the PB between 1983 and 1988 (Rosen 1995) because of her chairperson position of the CPPCC (although Rosen claims that some people credited her entrance to Deng Xioping’s influence). In addition, Jiang Qing, wife of Mao and Ye Qun, wife of Mao’s then-heir apparent were members in 1969 (Yu and Liu 2010 & Rosen 1995) not in their own rights but because of the status of their husbands, Rosen continues. This shows that some of the women access elite institutions through political lineages or dynasties.
As the political hierarchy places the PB and its PBSC at the apex, women are not expected to be better heard anywhere else than the very organization that sets China’s national agenda. It is through serious representation in such bodies that women’s interests ranging from economic equality to social justice will be placed on the national agenda for important government action. The likelihood that China will divorce from its socialist notion of women’s empowerment taking place as the country develops will only shift when female representatives are able to command for greater commitment both in principle and practice for gender specific
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programs and solutions. This however will likely be a farce until the number of women representatives escalate dramatically.
TABLE 11