programs and solutions. This however will likely be a farce until the number of women representatives escalate dramatically.
TABLE 11
COMPOSITION OF THE POLITBURO 1977-2012
Congress/Year Total Number of women % of women
11th (1977)+ 26 0 0%
Sources: Data corresponding with + are derived from Stanley Rosen (1995, 318), Women and Political Participation in China. Table 1 Data marked with * are derived from Miller (2011, 2), The Politburo Standing Committee under Hu Jintao Table 1. Data marked with ǂ, see Cheng Li (2013, 3-4) A Biographical and Factional Analysis of the Post-2012 Politburo. Table 1
Between 1977 and 2012, there have been 181 full members of the Politburo, out of which 5 were women thus representing 2.7% of the membership. 1977 was the year with the largest PB membership but it had no woman just like the 13th (14), 14th (20) and 15th (22) which are Politburos with the least membership. In addition, 1977 was immediately after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution. The allegations against his widow Jiang Qing for the
“excesses” of the Cultural Revolution and her roles (Yu & Liu 2010) might have affected the recruitment of women into the organization as she was a member from 1969 until 1976 (Rosen 1995).
The following badge (1982) witnessed the entrance of one female (Deng Yingchao)27, not because of her gender but by virtue of her relation with Deng Xiaoping and a sort of political
26 In Li’s calculation, Wu Yi was included as a full member in the 15th PB but she actually was an alternate member at the time. See Li 2013 (p3) for details and China Vitae at: http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Wu_Yi|33 for Wu’s full official biography.
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compensation as a widow of a veteran party leader (Rosen 1995). A 15 year vacuum period existed before another female member entered through the 16th PB. The 16th and 17th both had one, Wu Yi and Liu Yandong respectively. As Cheng Li noted, 2012 is the peak of women’s entrance into the PB since the Cultural Revolution. When viewed critically, Liu maintained her position may be because she failed to be elevated to the PBSC as it was widely speculated among China spectators and even some scholars (Bo 2012(b); Li 2012; The Economist 2012;
McDonell 2012). Having been in the PB for five years already, some of her male counterparts she entered with were elevated to the PBSC as in the cases of Wang Qishan or Zhang Gaoli2829. Instead of a lift to the PBSC, Liu got a political compensation of Vice-Premiership thus granting her an elevation somewhere else.
On the other hand, it is also important to note that China is not immune to the practice of political dynasty. In fact, China has an institutionalized practice of political hereditary system where the children of former communist veterans have opportunities of excelling in the political system in modern Chinese politics. Liu Yandong is considered a “princeling” (Chen 2013; Bo 2007). Liu of course does not achieve her political success entirely based on her political inheritance but clearly this must have played an important role.
Sun Chunlan on the other hand, did not gain her entrance into the PB because of the drive for gender inclusiveness. She became a member by virtue of her position as the Party Chief of Tianjin Municipality which now has an “elite” status with a privilege membership into the PB starting in the 1980s (Bo 2007). The lack of women’s access to the most important political
27 Stanley Rosen notes that Deng Yingchao, entered the PB in 1978 and resigned in 1985. What must have been the cause of her resignation is not known while the 12th Politburo came into existence in 1982. The ambiguity about her late entrance and early exit is not known to the researcher.
28 For details of the membership of the 17th Politburo, see: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22767.pdf
29 For a full list of the 18th PBSC, see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/15/c_131976451.htm
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organizations reflects a disadvantaged position of women in China’s elite political life. It is ironic that the CCP proclaims to be a proponent of women’s political advancement-at least this is true to some extent- with the gender equality policies and laws initiated for women’s equality.
Interestingly, these initiatives are only meant for lower level politics and the party’s most important institutions become sacred-no-go-areas for women. The case of Sun Chunlan links to the finding that women’s leadership at provincial level has a close link with access to other party organizations.
In addition, the 15th Party Congress was held in 1997, two years after China’s landmark hosting of the FWCW. Mentioned earlier, the Beijing conference was a moment of push-up for parity. Basically, it was the language spoken and promoted during the span of the conference.
What women wanted was not a political surrogating but real commitments and actions that grant them and men as equals in the determination of the affairs of their societies by occupying not only low level seats in party organizations, village committees or heads of social establishments.
Indeed it is undeniable that Beijing listened to the calls of the UN and the global feminist or gender equality movement but it did so according to the wish of the CCP.
From the case of the PB, the CCP regime is not yet prepared to share its most prestigious positions with women; not even China’s educated and economically reliant women who are as skilled and exposed as men. Indeed China has many Liu and Suns but the data confirms a tendency of political prestige being mostly kept for men who have been socialized and prepared for the most parts of their lives for these responsibilities.
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