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and the only institution that has performed better is the parliament. The graph below shows an informative summary of the average of all the institutions analyzed above. As portrayed, women never achieved even an average of one forth in an institution for the period under review.
Anyway, state institutions perform relatively better than the party. In addition, as the branches of the pyramid move upward, especially with regards to party institutions, the slimmer the chances of their presence. This means that prestigious bodies at the apex of the pyramid are the most unwelcoming organizations in terms of gender equality.
Graph 1
SUMMARY OF WOMEN IN ELITE INSTITUTIONS
The fact that Chinese politics remains highly patriarchal does not mean men in general but those who have affiliation with the CCP. Indeed it is true that the communist party has relaxed to a great extent from a more aggressive control of the lives and livelihoods of its people since the beginning of the reform. However, the party seems to be more pre-occupied with the
SC- 0%
Politburo-2.7%
Central Committee-5.2%
State Council- 6.3%
Chinese People's Consultative Conference 15.3%
National People's Congress- 21.4%
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improvement of its legitimacy both domestically and externally and its actions reflect more of a party-interest than real power sharing.
In addition, the relation between the regime and the women’s movement is complex as the former continues to show patterns of “state feminism”. This is because of the CCP’s orientation of class and gender equality. The state’s engagement as the sole institution interested and charged with the empowerment of women is hard to remedy in case it fails to perform as expected and yet it does not provide room for others to hold it accountable for such failure or assist it to objectively improve as might be needed. To an extent, this limits initiatives from non-government bodies to tackle women’s subordination whether in the form of capacity building or simply networking them with others for sharing best practices.
In addition, Chinese politics is more interconnected and stratified than expected. There is greater tendency that political offices are accessed based on one’s membership in a grassroots party-cell or other party organizations thus granting opportunities for election or selection to bodies at the provincial or national level. Therefore, those who argue for more female presence at local level politics, (such as Zeng 2014) indeed have good reason for their position. Even though it has been argued in the paper that women’s presence in high level politics provides them with ample opportunities of accessing platforms where final decisions are made, if they can reach such positions only through starting their careers from the very bottom of the political ladder, it is worthy of the process. This is unlike other relatively democratic countries where individuals might not be limited from contesting or partaking in the political life of their countries due strict stratification. While beginning as a representative of a county or district is of advantage to a female Swedish politician, she might be able to choose to run as candidate for a
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parliamentary seat directly at the central level with or without a party backing. This situation is of little possibility for her female Chinese counterpart.
If more females are heading party institutions (party secretaries) at provincial levels such as elite ones, it will directly increase their chances of entrance into the Central Committee and Politburo membership (Bo 2007). Taking Sun Chunlan as a case, her entrance into the 18th Politburo is as a result of her position as the Party Secretary of Tianjin province. Therefore, this also corroborates Zeng’s (2014) argument that there is need for greater women inclusion in grassroots political participation.
Furthermore, the data shows a very weak intra-party democracy practice. True, to an extent, the party has initiated an electoral participation process in the selection of candidates making it to the CCP’s congresses, but the required gender make-up for a fair representation seems missing. As a result, party institutions perform very weakly in the inclusion of women as leaders or in the most prestigious bodies such as the Politburo or its Standing Committee. In fact, in all party institutions studied here, none has attained a significant portion of political power shared between the genders. The Central Committee attained an average female membership of 5.2% and the Politburo got 2.7% during the period under-review. The Standing Committee never witnessed a female membership. The CCP does not share its power according to its gender composition but a tendency of men with elitist backgrounds or technocrats seems to be the unchallenged norm.
It is also interesting to unveil the fact that China has many more “Princelings” than princesses. The idea of “princelings” became relevant after the Mao era when past revolutionary leaders are replaced by their children in contemporary Chinese politics. Anyway, there is a
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serious tendency that sons are more expected and prepared for such future responsibilities than daughters. If this identity is relevant as an analytical concept, women are lesser prepared for such future engagements thus dynasty politics in China seems not to be a major opportunity for women to ascend the throne of power as might be more evident in other Asian countries such as Burma, India, Thailand, Sri Lanka or Pakistan.
Are there frameworks that support genuine institutional arrangements for gender-related demands in the “new” China? To say that the regime does not initiate affirmative actions to enable women’s political involvement is not a fact. The 1982 constitution, the special law on women’s human rights of 1995, the gender equality policies initiated in 2001 and 2005 are all tangible examples aimed at accelerating women’s political progress. However, the CCP focuses more on the parliament than any other elite institution that really carry true political power in the Chinese context. Unfortunately, not even the legislature’s case shows dramatic changes as might be expected. Indeed, women’s gains in parliamentary membership give greater opportunities for constructive policies and programs to be initiated. With the presence of women in the legislature, laws become engendered and their impacts on men and women are analyzed from those with such social experiences. This is where gender mainstreaming finds its way into national programs.
Anyway, considering the inter-locking nature of the state and party in China, it is imperative, that women’s inclusion in party-institutions will even provide more gains for their empowerment as they will be able to directly influence the agenda making process of the country.
It turns out that in China, anything that is not the CCP is of little influence except if the party gives its direct blessing or support to it. Several political pronouncements, commitments and
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laws exist but they are the least effective to result to any dramatic increase of the number of women in the country’s most relevant institutions.
Moving to the economic framework, growth does not necessarily guarantee an equitable society. Therefore, to equate a high GDP productivity and gender equality is not helpful.
Presently, in China, economic growth and stability tops the national agenda as the regime’s primary tool of political maintenance because such growth will lead to greater achievements in social and economic standing of the citizens. With regards to women, good and inclusive economic policies enable them to work outside their homes, to contribute directly to the country’s economic output while they are able to live financially independent and achieve the necessary resources needed to run for public office. Despite these benefits, economic growth does not automatically grant women equality in the political process except when growth is combined with practical policies that enable full and non-discriminate enjoyment of political rights. Indeed there will be need for more economic justice to women as demands in the sector for gender-friendly laws and policies will be necessary tools to guarantee the different fiscal needs of men and women in a country that pursues even greater economic relevance in the world.
How greater international opening will continue to affect both government and women regarding the demand for more political rights and positions in the country’s elite institutions?
To be seen as a responsible state within the global community indeed goes along with the fulfillment of certain responsibilities and expectations. Even states that are theocratic or have extremely isolated themselves from the influence of non-state actors and social movements are somehow not immune from the pressure to adjust to the need for women’s inclusion in all processes of governance. With the influence of such a global social movement, it is getting harder to ignore the power of advocacy for gender equality. For instance, while global rankings 99
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matters especially at a time that there is a specific and time bound target such as the 30%
benchmark, intense monitoring over performance is a critical engagement of the UN, women’s rights organizations, scholars and the media.
More actors are adding to the long list of women’s organizations, the UN and other social justice movements for a global gender norm that maintains women’s political participation key on the international human rights agenda. In case women are not able to make the demands locally, international pressure could lead to positive response. The male leaders of the CCP cannot continue to lack concern on how far women are able to share or rotate political offices with men. The authoritarian system will also require some adjustments because of the need for some forms of adherence and responsiveness to global agreements. The habit of ignoring demands that do not match the interest of the party will obviously not continue as a political strategy in the long run. It will be interesting how the CCP will maneuver these pressures if not domestically but internationally as it poses further as an economic prowess and a modern state with a high sense of social and political advancement. The regime will likely have to prove this through a compromise even if it will be by reluctance in the future.