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233 were headed by men and women were in control of 39 (IPU 2013b). For the case of China, the interlock between the party and state apparatuses can make it even tougher for women to hold some of the nation’s most important posts, even though this is not always the case. Bo (2007) says that the Speaker of the NPC should be a Politburo member and without PB membership, certain important government posts cannot be held.
Deng Yingchao was Speaker of the CCPPC when she was in the PB (thus she could not obviously head the NPC) but Wu Yi was in the 10th PB but was given the position of a State Councilor and the same applied to Liu Yandong in the 11th badge. In the 12th congress, she has become a Vice-Premier. All these women’s presence did not qualify them against their male counterparts for the Chairperson position of the NPC, at least from a theoretical perspective.
From the data, while women’s representation is increasing in the parliament and its executive standing committee, the position of Speaker is the least reachable.
CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE (CPPCC)
By virtue of proximity according to the NPC’S functions is the CPPCC. Due to this reason, it cohosts the annual “lianghui” (two meetings) that is simultaneously held for each parliamentary sitting giving it an opportunity to closely work with the parliament (Roberts 2014;
Ding 2013 & Lawrence & Martin 2013). It is also an elite institution that was founded in 1949 to function as a multipurpose group until the stabilization of the nation (Chinese Government's Official Web Portal 2012). Prior to the formation of the NPC, the CPPCC was China’s national parliament until the latter came into existence in 1954 (Yu and Liu 2010). The institution describes itself as the “united front organization” thereby providing an opportunity for reunification, stability and “democracy” for the country. According to one description by the
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University of Minnesota, the CPPCC is an umbrella body that has always played crucial roles in the founding of the PRC such as the promotion of stability; moving between cultural, economic, social and political duties to ensure a united and progressive society. This means that the body is an important institution that somehow gives political legitimacy to the CCP through its diverse membership supposedly seen as just and balanced.
It is interesting that the CPPCC has shaped the future of modern China, when it approved its first constitution, declared the national anthem, adopted Beijing as the country’s administrative center, and most importantly, it declared the founding of the PRC (CCPPC 2012;
University of Minnesota n.d.). Scholars divided the functions of the institution into three main categories as a forum that provides political discussion; democratic observation and participation in the debate; and administration of state matters (University of Minnesota n.d.). The communist regime boasts of the composition of the CCPPC and its functions as its “socialist democracy”
that reflects the diverse groups of the entire country (Lawrence & Martin 2013). Yu and Liu (2010) see it as a political advisory organization to the NPC but unfitting to be treated as the Upper House of a legislature in the current Chinese political hierarchy even though it might seemingly serve such a purpose. The CPPCC has a similar set-up like the parliament. It has a combination of national and local levels but only the national level is of importance to this research.
In a very important way, the CPPCC seems to implement part of the roles of the parliament. Some of the deliberations that should have been taken up by parliamentarians are said to be first conducted in this bureau which has reduced the power of the parliament in many ways as debates about national policies or programs are expected to be held in the legislature (at least according to the Western democratic criteria). For this reason, it seems to corroborate critics’
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views that the parliament is a “rubber stamp” that only approves policies, report and programs that have passed through previous deliberations from the PB or the CPPCC. “The relation between the CPPCC, the NPC and the government is that the CPPCC holds discussions before policy decisions are made, the NPC votes on policy decisions after the discussions are finished, and the government carries them out after policy decisions are made” (University of Minnesota n.d.). In addition, some people see it as a “retirement home” for politicians (Yu & Liu 2010), meaning, it might not have as much authority as discussed above.
Like the NPC, it is said that members of the CCPPC are selected once in every five years.
It has a membership of more than 2000 people with members drawn from a diverse background (CCPPC 2012). Its 2000 plus members are from the CCP, China’s lenient democratic parties, the corporate sector, independent political activists, the academia, technocrats, the All-China Women’s Federation, representatives of young people, overseas Chinese people, ethnic minority people, religious organizations and other social groups or movements (CCPPC 2012; University of Minnesota n.d.). Indeed the list of participants is a rich combination of individuals and organizations from “all walks of life”.
Referred to as “political advisors” by the regime itself, the CPPCC gives platform to ordinary citizens who might not have a party backing to participate in the policy deliberation process of the country (Lawrence & Martin 2013). Anyway, it is stated on the official site of the institution that its policies even when adopted by the regime are not legally binding and this view is shared by analysts Lawrence and Martin. Although the CPPCC is a “powerless” institution, it is nonetheless treated as a high level platform within the country’s political setting. But then, it seems that all other political establishments of the country are secondary to the communist party
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by relevance. Then, why must it be relevant for women’s proper representation in this important yet “powerless” platform?
It seems there are no governments or political institutions that are more powerful than those that are exclusively composed of the CCP members. Therefore, where possible, it is important that citizens access all others in order to put some sort of balance and articulate their needs in a much organized manner. It is important to note that monopolizing power- no matter how little it might be- especially in the absent of watch dog institutions is a possible tendency be it in hybrid systems or full fledge democracies.
In addition, it seems that issues discussed within this institution are sort of reflective of those close to the interests of the regime. Therefore, more women representatives in the CPPCC could serve as a good catalyst to dialogue policies equally. If one has to go with the claim of the Minnesota University report that the CPPCC first has deliberations about policies before forwarding them to the parliament for approval for executive implementation, then one might boldly hold that it is an institution with possibly ample opportunity for women to put forward their needs, aspirations and issues affecting them. If this is a primary stage for policy negotiation, then it serves in their interest to have a high level membership. It is fact that the organization might be able to provide opportunities for women but this is mostly possible through their presence.
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COMPOSITION OF THE CHINESE PEOPE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE