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In addition, the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, received a total membership of 2, 478 from 1978 to 2013. Women took 271 of the seats thus representing almost 11%. Unlike the general conference, data for women’s membership in the CPPCC-SC, shows a tendency of flexible pattern. The lowest representation happened in 1978 with a female membership of 24 which was followed by an increase of 9 making the 1983 conference to have 33 women.
However, the figure dropped to 28 in the following one. A decrease- an insignificant one though- took place in the following two conferences thus 29 women were members in the 8th and 9 conferences. The 10th, 11th and 12th conferences all experienced an increase; with the 11th outperforming (57) while the 10th and 12th got 35 and 36 correspondingly.
According to Lawrence and Martin’s explanation, the Chairperson of the CPPCC could be safely defined as the CCP’s Public-Relations Strategist Officer between the party and non-CCP members and organizations. In addition, the position of Chairpersonship of the CPPCC is ranked high in the Chinese political system. For this reason, holding this position is linked with a PB membership (Bo 2007). Accordingly, out of the 6 Chairpersons of the CPPCC from 1978 to 2013, Deng Xiaoping, Li Ruihuan (Bo 2007) and Jia Qinglin (China Vitae n. d) all had SC membership while Yu Zhengsheng is a member of the incumbent one. Bo says that Deng Yinchao was a member of the PB while Li Xinian has never served in any of the two. This shows that women’s access to the Chairperson position requires firstly, a membership in the PB. This is the obvious reason why women constitute only 12.5% of the position since 1978 because of the only female Chairperson, Deng Yinchao’s leadership of the body from 1983 to 1988.
THE STATE COUNCIL
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China’s executive body is the State Council otherwise called the Central People’s Government. In the formative years of the PRC, the party and the state existed as a single organizational structure responsible for the day to day execution of governance until the 1970s when moves were taken to reform this style of operation (Lawrence & Martin 2013). The authors however observe that regardless of this structural change of the state apparatus, the CCP continues its domination in the executive council. Despite this, the State Council is bestowed with the highest executive power to administer the daily needs of the country (Wang 1995).
Article 85 of the 1982 Constitution, declares the State Council as the “highest organ of state power “ and “the highest organ of state administration”. It is China’s bureaucracy with a capacity that is perhaps unmatched in the modern world by virtue of the size and population of the country.
The constitution has decreed the executive bureuacracy to be composed of ministries, commissions and departments (Constitution 2014; Lawrence & Martin 2013; Wang 1995). As of 2013, the cabinet lists under its authority 2520 ministries, several commissions, administrations and bureaus, organizations and administrative officies of Specially Administered Regions such as Hong Kong and Macau (The Central People's Government of China 2013). These institutions are said to be headed differently but are all answerable to the Premier of the council. His or her Vice-Premiers come second and are followed by the State Councilors, Secretary General, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Auditor General. Due to its size, the cabinet has a similar division of hierarchy as the NPC and the CPPCC that enables its smaller standing committee to do more coordination of the affairs of the agency. Lawrence (2013) says that the executive
20 Note a disparity between the IPU and state records with regards to the cabinet composition. The former only relies on national ministries as part of a cabinet while the Chinese one is a little different with regards to other organizations under the cabinet. For the data analysis, I will rely on the IPU approach as the international norm to only analyze ministerial bodies and no other bureaus under the cabinet.
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committee of the cabinet is normally comprised of the Premier, State Councilors and the Secretary General. It is reported to meet more than once in a week while the larger body meets monthly (BBC 2012a).
Unlike the presidential system of governance in many countries, China’s party state system despite some political “reforms” does not fit the Westminster style also. The Secretary General of the CCP holds the highest position of state presidency of the country (Lawrence and Martin 2013) and it would have been traditionally expected that he heads the country’s executive organ too. Instead, as mentioned before, the Premier is constitutionally mandated to technically oversee the civil service. The Premier ranks second on the PBSC ladder meaning that he is the second most powerful holder of political position within the CCP on one hand, and on another, he is the number one man within the cabinet structure. Lawless and Martin (2013, 29) define the Premier as the “most senior economic official” of the country. Under his leadership, he and his team will jointly manage the execution of national policies.
The constitution has bestowed several responsibilities on the cabinet, ranging from economic policy development and implementation, management of the national budget, to the initiation and implementation of administrative rules and decisions, coordination and leadership of governance between the central government and all other levels, provision of technical manpower for national development to the management of China’s foreign relations. Those mentioned here are a mere summary of the vast roles this institution carries out for the Chinese government. Perhaps one of its most critical roles in modern times is economic advancement for the country thus making it more instrumental at a time of continuity of structural reform for continuous growth and stability. Hence the BBC (2012a) observes that there is a power shift
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between the State Council and the NPC as the former mostly initiates or drafts laws/policies whose approval by the parliament are mostly absolute.
Lawrence and Martin observe that the executive branch is administratively responsible for policy than political issues. However, a deeper look might suggest an otherwise different situation, considering the eminent rank of the Premier in the PBSC while all the four Vice-Premiers of the State Council are also members of the larger PB. In addition, the Vice-Premier serves as the Premier’s sitting-mate in the Politburo Standing Committee. For this reason, Zhang Gaoli (Vice-Premier of the incumbent cabinet) is also a member of the PBSC but this cannot also be conclusive, considering the intertwining nature of the government, the State Council could be seen as a technocratic, administrative as well as political organization.
Even though women’s parliamentary position holdings have become the most famous indicator of quick analysis of access and participation in politics, women holders of top executive positions is critical for weighing their political power within a government. Ministerial cabinets are major bureaus that determine the progress of meeting national goals be it in the economy, social sectors or political ambitions internally or externally. “Ministers control disproportionate shares of states’ resources, managing vast bureaucracies, overseeing the disbursement of funds, and projecting state power domestically and internationally” (Jacob, Scherpereel and Adams 2014, 322).
Therefore, ministerial positions, governorship, leadership in state executive institutions and managing national bureaus are all extremely important to gauge women’s advancement in the public life of their countries. Access to such organizations and being pivotal in their management does not only increase the legitimacy of state institutions as Dovi (2002) argues but
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it also gives women the opportunity of power to determine or suggest policies in the interest of fellow women or bring gender perspectives to policy-making and implementation processes.
Such presence gives opportunity in the forms of gender responsive budgeting or mainstreaming women and men’s different needs in a sector such as health or education.
Caution must be taken to consider the reality that these women in executive power might also be constraint with structural or institutional norms that are closely associated with societal prejudices thus limiting their influence or impacts. However, this possibility is not reason enough to glorify their exclusion from such positions. In addition, there has always been some sort of debates about the ministerial positions handled by women around the world (True, et al. 2012).
Although granting female ministers social offices such as health, welfare and education might be an extension of their prescribed feminine roles of the household into the public domain, such developments should not only be criticized but there must be policy provisions for improvement.
On the other hand, True, et al. (2012) observes that women holding such ceremonial and low level ministries will give them opportunities of mastering the art of politics, enable them to gather support and could boost up their esteems and those of their fellows to compete for higher positions.
This argument will of course not fit well with the expectations of the radicals within the women’s movement but there is need for practicality. In comparison to men, ministerial positions that are deemed more “prestigious” such as Foreign Affairs, Economics/Finance or Trade21 and Security are less accessed by women (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008), this, however, is not a global phenomenon. In the local context, China’s Wu Yi have broken an extremely
21 Wu Yi’s case is an unusual female top government personnel who has accumulated power and influence both in China and outside. Her management of the ministry that deals with China’s external trading evidently increased her reputation as tactful negotiator.
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important record as the only woman who served in several top government positions and held even traditionally male posts such the Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (Rosen 1995) and played crucial roles in the negotiation of China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (Chiu n. d.). Later on, her position as Vice-Premier has even brought greater responsibilities to execute on behalf of the Chinese government both within and outside the country. As Wu served as Vice-Premier, her continouos role as the government’s key reliant for international trade and economic negotiation has put her once again on the Forbes ranking of the
“100 Most Influential Women” as second position, coming after onlyAngela Merkel of Germany in 2007 (Forbes 2007).
As the State Council is the government’s as well as the CCP’s implementation mechanism, that executes the national laws of the former and the policies of the latter (Lawrence 2013), I have deliberately focused on a macro analysis of the institution for feasibility reasons.
Within the executive, I have considered only ministerial positions and the standing committee to provide a gendered situation of membership. It is very interesting that a politics of gender is not the only one at play within the executive bureaucracy but that of institutions as well. The constitution places the State Council to be directly accountable to the NPC by the former executing policies or laws that would have originated from the latter, but the opposite prevails even though not all state policies are directly initiated by the cabinet neither does the latter also accepts all policy proposals (Lawrence and Martin 2013). I perceive this has to do with the ambiguity of the constitution by virtue of placing too many responsibilities on the council, some of which are typically legislative functions. On the other hand, the interlocking nature of the Chinese governance structure does not also enable a strict form of separation of powers.
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According to a UN Women and IPU (2014) report, the number of women holding ministerial positions has increased from 16.1% in 2008 to 17.2% in 2014. This increase is neither dramatic and perhaps nor disappointing too considering the slow pace of change the politics of representation is driving with. In China, a similar situation persists. As of January 2012, only 3 out of the country’s 26 ministers were women thus positioning 66th on the IPU “Women in Ministerial Positions” ranking (Inter-Parliamentary Union; UN Women 2012).
The Chinese executive arm seems not to be as weak as some people perceived considering its proximity to the CCP as its implementing organ as well as that of the NPC. This situation might not be the best option for those concerned about the present context of governance in China but most worrying is China’s very low performance with regards to gender parity in its executive branch. As Lampton (2013) notes, modern Chinese society is increasingly a fractioned society with diverse groups contesting for their interests to be represented by state officials. This shows that socialist claims of citizen protection is not likely feasible but it is also wise that representation is done with lesser monopoly. This will not only enable marginlized groups such as women to be heard, but it will grant an opportunity of creating gendered policies and the national income will likely be budgeted according to the gender needs of the citizens.
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