researchers conclude that the PBSC weaves the Chinese society. The institution provides the most important governance responsibilities of a modern nation state being “responsible for the country’s political and ideological affairs, economic and financial administration, foreign policy, public security, and military operations” (Li 2012, p1-2). The PSCB embodies and decides all policy matters that are to be initiated, governed or not by all other organs of the government and the party.
Mentioned earlier, the seven most powerful individuals of China are the PSCB members but since its founding, it has been an exclusive men’s club. Zhongnanhai as a state house glorifies the power of China today mostly because of its occupation by the PBSC dealing with matters that they believe stitch China together as a nation while also posing to the world as a powerful state that can influence global affairs through its wealth as well as a unique political system.
TABLE 12
COMPOSITION OF THE POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE 1978-2012
Congress/Year Total Number of women % of women
11th(1977) ǂ 8 0 0%
Data marked as *, see: Allice Miller (2011, 2), The Politburo Standing Committee under HU Jinta,. Data marked as + See: Cheng Li (2013, 3-4) A Biographical and Factional Analysis of the Post-2012 Politburo. Table 1 Data marked as ǂ, see, China Today at http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/cpc_11th_congress_standing_polibureau.htm (Accessed: 25th May, 2014)
During the period under review, the PBSC performs worse than any other organization with regards to women’s membership. Between 1977 and 2012, there were 58 entrances into this 89
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powerful institution but none was a woman. The reason for the lack of entrance seems to be inter-connected but prominently, this has to do with the positions that fill the PBSC and the Chinese political system’s inner-power struggle instead of public competition. Bo Zhiyue outlines certain positions that give an automatic entrance opportunity to the PBSC (although few exceptions might exist).
They include the Party Secretary General, Premier, Chairpersons of the NPC and CPPCC, Chief of the Party Secretariat, Head of the Central Party Discipline Commission and the first Vice Premier (Lawrence 2013; BBC 2012a & Bo 2007). From this breakdown, women have hardly held these positions in the period under review if not the entire history of the PRC.
Notably, China’s legislature never has a female Speaker/Chairperson, a female never rose to the party’s highest leadership position as Secretary General and the limited data available on the cabinet shows all Vice-Premiers during the period under review are men except Wu Yi and Liu Yandong. Perhaps this exclusion also reinforces the CCP’s habit of granting female politicians with positions deemed as women’s issues. If there were a position dealing with family planning and child nutrition in the PBSC, perhaps the party will enthusiastically welcome women on board.
The first PBSC immediately after the Cultural Revolution was larger than the 4 succeeding ones. Therefore, it is evident that entrance into the SC must have been based on competitive power struggle and compromise on the sides of those who entered and their fractions or political protégés that enabled their entrance into the organization. This period coincided with Deng’s membership in the 12th PB but she was not granted an opportunity to sit in the PBSC.
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An expansion happened in 2002 and 2007 in the PB and both periods received 1 female member. Similar expansion happened in the PBSC, the number moved upwards (9 people) but no opportunity of entrance took place. Despite an opportunity of membership expansion in the 16th batch, Wu Yi, did not make it to the PBSC because she was not the First Executive Vice-Premier at the time.
A similar repetition followed in 2012 by Liu Yandong failing to enter the body. One could have argued in 2007 that because of a possible norm constraint (as a State Councilor) limited her entrance to the PB. In reality, State Councilors do not generally enter the PB (Lawrence & Martin 2013; Bo 2007). Regardless of this, there could be little possibility if any for her entrance into the 18th SC because Zhang Gaoli is the 1st Vice-Premier (and he therefore sits together with the Premier in the PBSC) while Liu comes second on the Vice-Premiership list.
Therefore, the highest post she could reach at the moment is membership in the general PB. Hence in November 2012, 7 men in matching dark suits were paraded on the stage of the People’s Great Hall as members of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP. This moment marked the formal closure of anticipation for a female membership. China’s “most powerful” woman does not have an equal weight with her male counterparts. Indeed, the core of power in the CCP has neither a reserved seat nor a competitive one for women throughout the party’s existence. Not even Madam Mao passed the line into the PBSC.
A chance of turning a lifelong exclusion and undermining women’s contribution at the top echelon of politics is yet to have an opportunity to change. One thing is apparent is the fact that exclusion of women from the PBSC has a direct effect on the morality of the female politicians who have made it closer to the top as well as a limitation to those on the grassroots.
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Indeed the glass ceiling is a reality in the CCP hierarchy and it happens in a formidable way against its victims.
For the next five years (from 2012), Liu will continue in her position as a PB member with a legacy like her predecessors who were close to the core but the glass-ceiling barred them from reaching the highest level. As she steps down in 2017 both due to her age and term limit, Sun Chunlan will be 67 by then. Even though her fate will clearly depend on this, she would not have reached the age limit (68) that would have warrant an exit.
In case of her retention, the world will watch yet again an opportunity of ascendance to the inner-cohort of the supreme power. For the entrance of members in the 19th PB and its Standing Committee, it will depend on which women are able to enter the CC as full members, their professional backgrounds, the connections they share with which political figures at the moment and the positions they will be recruited for, and of course the economic and political climate the country will be experiencing around such a period. Whatever might be the case, the data shows that as of 2013, women’s participation in all the elite political institutions do not meet the global 30% benchmark as it ranges between an average of 0% and 21.4%, the least found in the PBSC while the parliament has the highest.
Data of this magnitude provide an in-depth understanding of power distribution within the society. The parliament and its affiliated committees for example have to be shared with a more diverse representation; more women from various backgrounds have to share the negotiating table with men. As for other state institutions such as the cabinet, membership should not be determined by other factors such as party affiliation in absent of a balanced gender reflection. It is useful to note here that despite women’s present in the cabinet, it is important that
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portfolios are shared based on expertise and not gendered roles of men and women. In other organizations of the party also, especially the PB and PBCS, representation has to be broaden to reflect the different social and economic classes of the society. Therefore, political institutions should be shared by men and women to determine how their society should be governed as equal members.
The last two chapters have analyzed some of China’s most important political institutions and the possible factors that have limited women’s greater presence in them. From a theoretical perspective, the country does not lack the potential of improving political parity between men and women. Practically, on the other hand, the CCP as well as the Chinese society seems to be extensively constrained by gender stereotypes and socio-cultural practices that reinforce women’s subordination to men even though the party has declared countlessly that it supports gender equality. In reality, the efforts seem to be too slow.
Indeed, this point to the fact that China is moving too fast economically but slowly in its political advancement that will guarantee the citizens an equal opportunity to determine the affairs of their society without structural and ideological barriers. Investment in women’s political presence is indeed a “smart investment” the regime cannot continue to ignore. Such venture also should not be used as a strategy to achieve other vested interests and it must be done in a reflective way that includes women of all backgrounds as in level of education, geographical difference, economic and social classes.
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