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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN STATE INSTITUTIONS
The level of women’s access to a country’s top political institutions is an important indication of how far that country has attained equal influence between the genders over the determination of the affairs of their society. Considering the party-state nature of China, this research does not aim to dwell unto the differences between government entities and those of the party because of the inevitable overlap between the two. As such, the elite institutions to be analyzed in this chapter are those under the state or not exclusive to the party alone. The NPC, CPPCC and the State Council will be examined here. The roles, responsibilities and delegated powers of these institutions will be analyzed with a focus on the level of gender parity with regards to their access and the inner-workings within them. By order of relevance according to the 1982 constitution of the PRC, I will first analyze the NPC. The CPPCC will come second because of its closeness to the parliament. The final one will be the cabinet.
THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (NPC)
Like legislative bodies of other countries, the National People’s Congress is the institution for law making in the PRC (Ranade 2013; Lawrence and Martin 2013; Yu and Liu 2010; Wang 2002; Otto, et al. 2000; Rosen 1995; BBC 2012a). This responsibility is a mandate according to Article 57 of the 1982 constitution (Constitution 2014). Despite this legitimate obligation from the supreme law of the country, critics have doubt the true status of the NPC in various forms. The BBC for instance labels it as nothing more than a “rubber stamp” of the CCP and that it only displays “spectacle” rather than “power”. Ding (2013) describes it as a powerless entity that only fast tracks and willingly nods to approvals or decisions set by the CCP while Su 50
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(2006) says that it does not equate to a parliament at all by definition and practice and must not be treated as one. However, not all scholars agree with the perception of the NPC being totally weak and without any sense of power exercise. At least to Wang (1995), there have been instances when the NPC challenged the very core of the CCP. Despite these doubting perceptions about the institution, it is interestingly the highest body of governance (Otto, et al.
2000) in the country with extra-ordinary powers vested upon it perhaps more than many of its equals around the world can enjoy. The NPC is constitutionally mandated for electing the country’s president, leader of the Supreme Court, the head of the military and approving the premier (Constitution 2014; Lawrence and Martin 2013; Wang 1995; BBC 2012a). In case the parliament is toothless, it seems to be so by action but not by mandate.
According to Wang (1995) the first NPC was convened in 1954. According to the rules that govern its operations, the NPC is selected every five years and meets once in a year for deliberation. During the same period, the CPPCC also convenes for its annual deliberation hence the moment is known as the “Lianghui” (two meetings) - an important event on China’s
“Political calendar” as one commentator notes. Every spring, Beijing hosts the parliamentary sitting for a period of two weeks during which deliberations are usually made on the approval of reports, budgets, and policies, among others (Brunswick Group 2014; Lawrence & Martin 2013
& Ding 2013). For instance, the 12th congress (incumbent) has just ended its annual sitting in March of 2014. Its almost 3000 membership is drawn from the country’s 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and the 4 direct municipalities of the central government, special administrative regions and the armed forces (ChinaCulture.org 2014; Xiaoli 2012; Chiu n.d.).
This large number, coupled with the once-in-a-year sitting means that the tasks assigned to the parliament are not realistically exhaustible within such a work schedule. As a result, it is 51
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not surprising that the constitution provides for a Standing Committee to the NPC that meets occasionally for the execution of duties of the overall institution. Scholars and commentators on China have also noted that such a large body cannot efficiently exert real power on its assigned duties as a lively and authoritative institution both in a timely and strategic fashion. This means that the Standing Committee is the administrative body of the NPC, tasked with the continuous business of the institution.
Parliaments are crucial institutions for the balance of power among the traditional three arms of governments in many countries around the world. As the entry point of almost all national policies, programs or laws (except otherwise delegated to some other bureaus), legislative power and influence directs a society’s position from politics to social change to economic advancement and cultural matters. Therefore, the controllers of this institution are likely the determiners of government allocations of resources and opportunities. If this is the norm in domestic power politics, then there is no better place for a fair representation among a country’s population segments than the legislature.
Mentioned elsewhere, women’s level of participation in parliamentary bodies increases their voices in the governance process of their nations. In addition, it also gives them an extra opportunity to demand for government allocation of resources into sectors that directly impact their lives and or their dependents. Markham (2012) emphasizes the participation of women in parliaments in bridging the gap of inequality between men and women with regards to access to and allocation of resources and authority. Of the nearly 300017 (a somewhat usual number) parliamentarians of the NPC, minority groups such as women, peasants, ethnic minorities and
17 The number has been more or less like this for the past 50 years. For more details, see:
http://www.allcountries.org/china_statistics/23_1_number_of_deputies_to_all.html for detailed information.
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young people tend to be less represented (Bo 2010 & Ming 2008). This phenomenon is an old age practice of the party system where present changes about minority involvement and representation become more of a “political drama” than a quest for equality. Ming (2008, 102) says that “a democratic tendency seems weak, whereas pattern of elitist politics run by male communist rulers in their sixties is evident”.
From the discussion above, it is true that the NPC (despite its claimed weaknesses) is an extremely important institution through which women will enhance their democratic participation and their inherent right to the determination of their society. Feminist Drude Dahlerup reaffirms that women’s exclusion from high political institutions such as parliaments only reinforces a democratic flaw and marginalization that is capable of wasting potential human resource for governance. There is ample scholarly evidence (see Marhakam 2013, 2012;
Dahlerup 2009, 2008; 2005, Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2005; Ballignton 2002; Chodhurry 2002;
Christensen 1999) that shows that women’s roles in parliament have very practical results on the agenda of national interests be it domestic or outside. Also Dahlerup says that their presence does not only address previous inability to demand for equal investment on issues that affect their lives but the “redistribution” of power has very practical results on the recreation of gendered institutions that have so long disadvantaged women. Further, Susan Markham of the NDI also says that the gender of lawmakers has different forms of effects on their perceptions and even the concern they attach to the types of policies or programs they initiate, lobby or vote for.
For China, it is statistically expected for women’s lesser control and influence over the affairs of the NPC considering the number of women parliamentarians. Therefore, a checks and balance system is required not only from a party or provincial affiliation but from a gender 53
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perspective as well. While there is a dramatic demand for equal representation in the number of women entering legislatures (Dahlerup 2008) in the global feminist movement, especially since the ratification of the CEDAW and the adoption of the BD and BPA, Zeng (2014) says that China failed to take a similar commitment to seriously add more women in its legislature.
Affirmative actions exist, but they seem not to be aggressively important to achieve anything like the historic achievements that have for instance taken place in Rwanda, South Africa (Herndon and Randell 2013; Dahlerup 2008; Powley 2005) and the rest of the Nordic world (World Economic Forum 2013). Edwards (2007) says that a serious achievement of more than the global average of women in parliament is not a pride to work for among China’s masculine elites who do not perceive an overwhelming achievement of rates more than the global average as instrumental numbers in their power politics (see below for further analysis).
On a different note, Markham (2012) says that looking beyond numbers matters as this will shift attention to the quality of impacts women make in parliamentary processes and policies produced. This brings me to the discussion about the conflict between constitutional power vested on the NPC versus the real power it displays with regards to governance and holding the executive and the rest accountable. It is without doubt that the NPC is given enough mandates to execute these functions but there seems to be an agreement that the opposite persists. However, Dumbaugh and Martin (2009), Xia (2008) and Wang (1995) maintain that the NPC over the years is metamorphosing into a real legislature that do not always act in accordance to party expectations and have even refused to adopt certain reports, policies and the passage of laws as might be wanted by the CCP elites. Yet, it seems that there is a long way for the NPC to be a trusted institution that represents the diverse interests of China’s more than one billion citizens without the CCP’s not-so-hidden influence. It is indeed misleading to only focus on institutional
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barriers. A critic once note that among parliamentarians, some place the interest of the party first before that of the NPC meaning that personal preferences and incentives also contributes to the seemingly weak image of the NPC. Therefore, it is time that Chinese women battle for both increase in the number of representation as well as the quality of agenda women submit to the institution.
This leads to the point about the interests that dominate the agenda of the parliament. It is important to note that it is almost always the larger group (whether in party form, gender or region) that has a greater opportunity of domination of others. After all, if gender equality is placed closer to democratic governance than any other system, it is also crucial to note that the tyranny of the majority is an unavoidable tendency. Mentioned earlier, the party is alleged to be the main agenda setter of the NPC, which clearly shows that any subject related to women’s issues, concerns or interests should be first related to the desires of the CCP if there should be any relevance attached to them. Therefore, the advancement of women’s interests in the forms of new policies or laws through the parliament should perhaps first be related to the interests of the CCP’s broad gender policies.
If there should be a possible reform for women’s greater empowerment for representation and relevance in the NPC, this will depend on the agenda set ahead for China in its engagement for greater reform- not only economically but socio-politically also. The possibility for women’s membership in the NPC to move to a higher level depends on the future agenda of the party and how both domestic needs and international pressure are directed to it. It is conclusive that there is no better governance engine- by constitutional definition at least- than the NPC to enable women to demand for the desired changes they need. The reasons analyzed above show the eminence of women’s representation in the legislature in a society where they are positioned between the 55
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forces of tradition, modernity and ideological shift which are all encompassed in a deeply patriarchal order.
TABLE 1