Climate Change, Scientific Development, and Low-Carbon Development

Climate change mitigation, and the related and more recent “low-carbon development”, as a policy stream is arguably an important victory for epistemic

communities (ECs), both international and domestic, that fought for China’s government to seriously address the issue. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is one such EC (Wang and Tuo 2012). China has a clear desire to maintain current and future domestic growth as a means of poverty alleviation and governmental legitimacy (Wang and Tuo 2012). That said, the government understands the environmental impacts

associated with climate change and current development models, and is actively trying to address the issue. Wang and Tuo describe China’s greater participation in climate talks as motivated by international pressure to lower their significant current and future

contribution to climate change, its pursuit of a reputation as a large responsible country, and from the pressures of international and domestic epistemic communities.

Generally speaking, China’s involvement in the climate negotiations and related domestic policies can be divided into three stages: from the 1970s until the Kyoto

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Conference in 1997; from the Kyoto conference to 2007; the third stage from 2007 to present (Tian and Whalley 2008). The first stage saw the rise of China’s first law for environmental protection in August of 1973, although the expressed primary concern of China remained (that remains through to today) the continued development of China to alleviate poverty. By the early-90s, however, the government had begun funding

scientific research into climate change with the State Council. Since the 7^th five-year plan (FYP), major research projects were put into research climate change impacts on China, although these remained largely scientific fact-finding ventures and a bolstering of domestic laws rather than significant changes in the energy producing make-up of China.

By the early-2000s, China had shifted from a general attempt to shift away from older, and dirtier energy producing plants to specifically focusing on new technologies and development strategies. In 2003, the State Council created the “National Climate Change Coordination Committee”, a multi-bureau body made specifically to address climate change. The “National Science and Technology Program”, aimed at addressing climate change and related development issues, was allocated RMB 2.5 billion in funding in the 10^th FYP (2001-2005), and RMB 70 billion towards energy conservation and climate change research in the 11^th FYP (Tian and Whalley 2008).

During that same period “sustainable development”, and the seemingly

synonymous “scientific development” (Magee 2006) campaigns began in earnest, with the 10^th FYP claiming sustainable development embodied China’s economic and social development strategies (Tian and Whaley 2008). In 2003, the NDRC put out an “Action Guideline of the Early 21^st Century Sustainable Development”, citing hydropower among a mixture of alternative energy options, with a follow-up the next year stating that China should “vigorously develop hydropower” as part of a long-term development framework (Tian and Whaley 2008). Perhaps the best sign of the importance climate change

mitigation and adaptation has taken root within the government was the creation of the

“Department of Climate Change Response” within the NDRC in 2008 (Tian and Whaley 2008).

The central government has essentially tied hydropower as an essential piece to the continued growth under sustainable development. More recently this manifested in the promotion of a “low-carbon economy” since China passed the US as the largest

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emitter of carbon in 2009, and with the oft-repeated “save energy and cut emissions”

slogan coined in the 11^th Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2006-2010) (Magee 2011). Indeed, this trend has since continued in the 12^th FYP, with a set goal reducing carbon-intensity by 17% by 2015, and to reduce energy intensity a further 16% (HSBC 2011), while meeting 15% of primary energy from renewable energy by 2020, and 20% by 2030 (Hennig et al 2013). This equates to a 1.15 Gt planned rise in CO² emissions over those five years, compared to the 2.2 Gt emitted in 10^th and 11^th FYPs, with an expected emissions peak before 2030 (HSBC 2011). In addition, the 12^th FYP expects 63 GW of new hydroelectric capacity to help meet renewable energy goals (HSBC 2011). This also resulted in the closer of 77GW worth of old, small, or inefficient thermal power plants (Hennig et al 2013).

Over the 10^th, 11^th, and 12^th (2010-2015) FYPs, low-carbon development became a centerpiece of national policy, potentially pushing the former measures of maintaining social order, attracting investment, and meeting family planning targets with local officials to also include a reduction in carbon output (Magee 2011). The plans calls for energy demands to be met by “clean coal” and the low-carbon alternatives of

hydropower, nuclear, wind, and solar projects. Hydropower is a fundamental component not only of low-carbon development, but of the Western Development Campaign, with the Upper Mekong cascade forming an integral component of that development with the central and Yunnan provincial government. Given an estimated nationwide total potential of 676 GW (State Power Information Network 2008), the NDRC has set a goal of 380 GW from hydropower by 2020 (Magee 2011).

The problem stream of climate change has undoubtedly gained traction within the central government, through an obvious and growing interest within the government to address the problem, along with an initial recognition of climate change science in the late 1970s. Over time the matter grew more pressing, with more rapid changes in the past 15-20 years as the domestic policy stream clearly moved towards the concept of

“sustainable development”. Specifically in regards to hydropower, it became clear that the concept originally seen as a means of poverty alleviation and general development easily integrated within the general consensus (politics stream) in China of a need to address climate change while maintaining its development. These were in no small part

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born out of the massively funded climate change research projects funded by the government since the 7^th FYP, e.g. “Global Climate Change Predictions, Impacts, and Coping Strategies”, “Research on Global Climate Change and Environmental Policy-Countermeasures and Support”, and so on. These, along with a number of international research projects, created a strong basis for scientific discourse and reference for decision-makers regarding climate change. The epistemic communities (ECs) of the IPCC and those within China found a government desiring to address the issue and fund science surrounding it. This particular policy stream progressed through a series of

“focusing events”: the 1979 World Meterological Organziation’s (WMO) first world assembly, acknowledging climate change; the subsequent climate talks culminating in the first IPCC climate report in 1990 (and subsequent reports in 1995, 2001, 2007, and 2014), which in turn lead to domestic policy restructuring, bureaucratic restructuring and

creation, and massively funded science research projects; and a number of smaller

focusing events establishing the need for cleaner energy production, e.g. the recent policy and science responses to the dangerous 2.5 smog over many Chinese cities, especially Beijing (Lee 2014). Each event, while causing major shifts, followed the same general trend of pushing towards sustainable development via large-scale dams. This meant a further cementing of the concept of hydropower as a key component to continued development, as each successive focusing event not only clearly showed the need for clean energy, but also seemingly confirmed with decision-makers that hydropower development is indeed the correct course of action.

While the above does not have an exhaustive list of the other competing

frameworks and policy stream that cascade impact science is up against, it does offer an understanding of the general domestic political environment in which it exists and competes with. Below, the research will examine these various policy streams and frameworks, including impact science, in relation to the actors involved in the decision-making process.

  96   2. Actors in the Decision-Making Process

The next step is to establish what actors are present in the decision-making process, and to what degree they have control over the decision-making process. After identifying the primary actors involved, the section will describe their stance on and use of the dam cascade’s impact science over time.