The MEP’s Stance on Impact Science

Like the NDRC, the MEP and is position towards downstream impact science is perhaps best understood through policy-actions, rather than limited government statements on specific scientific claims. As such, the MEP’s stance will be discussed further in chapter 4.

2.7. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Epistemic Communities (ECs)

2.7.1 The Asian International Rivers Center (AIRC)

Founded in 2000 and based out of the Yunnan University, the AIRC has

published widely on the Lancang and the dam cascade, offering a substantive amount of information on the basin. The director, Professor He Daming, trained originally as a hydraulic and hydroelectric engineer, and later completed advanced degrees in geography and environmental science. He worked as an engineer at the Kunming Institute of

Hydropower Survey and Design during the early-1980s while the Manwan dam was designed (Magee 2006a). Spending most of the 1990s at the Yunnan Institute of

Geography in Kunming, He and his colleagues published “some of the earliest and most comprehensive physical geographic work on the Lancang watershed” (Magee 2006a).

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Indeed, in 1995, a full issue of the Yunnan Geographic Environment Research journal and a subsequent issue of Acta Geographica Sinica in 1999, detailed this research.

The AIRC has published over the years a fairly nuanced and wide-ranging set of scientific articles regarding the dams on the Lancang-Mekong and its impacts.

Frequently, as is true with most any scientific article, they extrapolated little from what could be parsed out from the data. While acknowledging some impacts from current dams, the articles tend to find that the impact of the (at least currently existing dams) cascade extend little beyond China. This research found little written criticism of the dams out of the AIRC, and is supported as Magee (2006) describes:

“With regard to the Lancang, neither He nor his colleagues, to my knowledge, have ever directly opposed the dams in writing. They have, however, based on many years of research and He’s own background as a hydropower engineer, been publicly critical of the ecological and social impacts of hasty, disorderly hydropower development. For that have gained a degree of notoriety, especially He” (Magee 2006a, 234).

That said, however, in two different interviews with researchers at AIRC⁶, both described both He Daming and the researchers at the AIRC as truly committed to just putting out good science. Their goals, as Fu Kaidao put it, are not advocacy, but rather the most accurate scientific understanding of what is happening in the Upper and Lower Mekong.

They are essentially Yunnan’s most preeminent, oldest, and cautious domestic epistemic community researching the Upper Mekong. As will be discussed in chapter four, this seems to have put the center in a prime position to have influence over the discourse surrounding hydropower development on the Lancang and on-going management and mitigation techniques.

Much of the scientific position of the AIRC and He Daming was covered in chapter 2 in the various conclusions made by scientists on downstream dam impacts. To summarize, they typically fall along similar lines as much of the science stating that a complete cascade will have drastic downstream impacts, both beneficial and negative.

6  Interviews  01:  Fu  Kaidao,  senior  researcher  at  the  AIRC;  Interviews  05:  AIRC   researcher;  Interview  06:  AIRC  researcher  

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The important distinction is that it is suggested in some of their studies that careful

mitigation of the potential downstream impacts will limit negative impacts. In addition, in the early 2000s He Daming has stated that a decrease of 35% of sediment flow from a completed Xiaowan will be beneficial to navigation and flood water expulsion, while also stating that due to the coarse, heavy silt of the Upper Mekong, its silt does not reach too far south (Xinhua 2002b, 2002c). As such, reduced sediment flow will have limited impacts on agriculture in the Mekong Delta (Vietnam) (Xinhua 2002c). This seems to support the notion of ECs making the best determination given the science at the time, while placing an emphasis on the benefits of the cascade. This is discussed at length in chapter 4.

2.7.2 Green Watershed (GW)

Founded in 2002 by Yu Xiaogang, at the time an anthropologist at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences. In 2001, Yu took part in a study with Professor He Daming on the resettlement outcomes for residents forced to relocated after the construction of the Manwan dam (Magee 2006a). Although previously never involved in research or

advocacy in relation to dams, he’s research into Manwan “convinced him that large dams, poorly built, could have immediate and long-lasting negative impacts on

individuals whose livelihoods depended on the bottomlands that are frequently flooded by dams” (Magee 2006a, 225). The problems derived from the Manwan dam’s rather sloppy construction in terms of socioeconomic and biophysical impacts, thus galvanizing the organization to use unorthodox means to advocate for the plight of villagers displaced by large dams in Yunnan.

GW’s role in the decision-making process relies heavily on the success or failure of its advocacy. As will be discussed in chapter 4, during the mid-2000s under Wen Jiabao, GW achieved a relatively significant impact in influencing public opinion, and arguably some policy. However, these avant-guard techniques as of late seem to have landed Yu on the “black list”, whereby researchers interviewing him will quickly be

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approached by police⁷. During one researchers research in China, he was warned that if he wanted to continue his research, he should avoid contacting Yu Xiaogang again. This researcher went on to state that Yu now conducts relatively “quiet” work on the dams above the current cascade of dams in Tibet⁸.

2.7.3 International Rivers Network (IRN)

The IRN is an international organization that has conducted extensive research into the downstream impacts of the lancang cascade. While excluded from the decision making process, IRN is an advocacy organization that frequently uses the both investigative techniques to exposes Hydrolancang’s illegal construction of dams on the upper Mekong before approval from the NDRC and MEP. In addition, the IRN frequently cites scientific findings that show the negative impacts downstream on water and sediment flow, and ecological impacts (Yan 2012; Bosshard 2014). While having decidedly very little influence over the decision-making process, the IRN utilitzes more of the international science seen in chapter two that suggests current and significant future negative

downstream impacts (IRN 2002a, 2002b). In addition, through their own field work they have shown Huaneng and Hydrolancang’s continued construction and development of the Upper Lancang (in Tibet) in more recent years, despite not yet conducting and EIA and thus without getting approval from the central government (Yan 2012; Bosshard 2014)⁹.

3. Conclusion

This chapter sought to discover and elaborate upon the competing policy streams with which the impact science policy stream interacts with in China’s domestic politics.

While the research does not offer an exhaustive understanding of the other policy streams and nor all the nuances of their interactions and influence upon development policy, I am confident that the above research offers a good understand of the primary drivers behind                                                                                                                

7  Interview  05:  AIRC  researcher  

8  Interview  05:  AIRC  researcher  

9  Interview  04:  Katy  Yan,  International  Rivers  Network,  Upper  Mekong  dam   researcher  

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hydropower development in Yunnan, China. I believe this chapter also successfully answered the questions of what counts as water science? Who decides what water science is, and who decides how much it counts in the decision making process?

3.1 What counts as water science and who decides what water science is?

In my research I found a distinct separation in the scientific reasons given by government actors, particularly Hydrolancang and the MWR, and science given by actors largely outside of decision-making circles, i.e. the IRN, other Chinese scholars, NGOs, and to a lesser extent the AIRC (for the purposes of this research, it is considered an epistemic community). In the early to mid-2000’s, the emphasis by Ma Hongqi, at the time the head engineer of Hydrolancang and head of the Chinese Academy of Engineers, simply stated that given a project review of downstream impacts, the dams on the

Lancang would have either no, or very limited, impact downstream, as the Yunnan component of total Mekong outflow only accounts for 13.5% (China Daily 2002; China Daily 2003). Specifically in regards to the Xiaowan project, Ma Hongqi stated, “we concluded that the Xiaowan project will have limited impacts on the lower reaches of the river. Instead, the dam project will help with irrigation and navigation in the lower reaches” (Chen 2002). He went on to claim that the Xiaowan will increase dry season flows by 39.7% (Chen 2002). Ma focused on the developmental benefits to Yunnan and the region, and to navigation, irrigation, and flood and drought control. While remaining relatively consistent in their claims, more recently both the MWR and Hydrolancang have stated that through “scientific regulation”, the cascade will increase long-term average the dry season flow by 70%, and decrease the wet season by 30% (Gao and Zhong 2014). In other statements, Ma Hongqi, then a senior consultant to Hydrolancang and head of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, stated that the Nuozhadu (to be fully complete later this year) will also have fundamentally no impact as China’s contribution to the Lower Mekong is relatively small (China News 2011; Huanqiu 2012; Wang 2013;

Zhang 2012a; Zhang 2012b). Again, like the claims surrounding the Xiaowan and the rest of the cascade, the Nuozhadu brings about the ability to handle droughts and floods categorized to occur only once in 20 or even as high as 100 years (Hexun 2012).

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By 2012, the dominant beneficial claims surrounding the cascade center around energy saving and lower emissions – frequently equated with environmental protection (Zhang 2012a; Zhang 2012b), improved navigation (Hexun 2012), and flood and drought control (China news 2011; Hexun 2012). Nuozhadu alone is claimed to save 9.6 million tons of standard coal a year, along with a reduction of 18.8 million tons of CO²/yr (Xinhua 2012). In addition, Xiaowan is claimed to likely save 10 million tons of CO² annually (China News 2009). While these are significant reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, some scholars cast doubt on just how much of an impact these reductions will have. The potential protein loses in Mekong fisheries may force Laos and Cambodia to invest in industrial, carbon intensive livestock raising, and as such China’s carbon footprint “will simply have been sent downstream” (Eyler 2013).

Figure 10: Shifts in what policy streams/frameworks were emphasized from the early 2000s to present among decision-makers (Hydrolancang, MWR, NDRC, and Yunnan provincial government)

Hydrolancang, the MWR, and MOFA repeatedly since 2010 cited a study conducted by the China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower, the AIRC, and Dillon Consulting Canada Inc. (Liu and Guan 2011; China Daily 2010). However, this study, among other commonly cited studies only looked into the historical and potential impacts of the Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong reservoirs on hydrological flow, ignores the two largest mega-dams on the Upper Mekong, the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu.

This suggests a few possibilities. First, this could be willful obfuscation of the scientific consensus. By promoting a study that suggests low impacts downstream, the government

1. Regional  integration   2. Poverty  alleviation   3. Improved  irrigation    

&  navigation  

4. Flood/drought  control   Early-­2000s  

1. Lower  CO²  emissions   2. Energy  saving  

3. Flood/drought   control  

4. Poverty  Alleviation   Late-­2000s  to  present  

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holds better position in regards to addressing concerns of downstream impacts, especially during the 2010 drought, when this study first began to be cited. Officials repeatedly referred to the “3 reservoirs on the Lancang” during this time, ignoring the Xiaowan with a reservoir five times greater than the Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong reservoirs combined (Hui 2010a). Had the reservoir cut the river off completely to impound the reservoir, it would still take four and a half months to fill from empty, while the Mekong in a dry spell with half its normal flow volume could be restored to full for 10 months,

“you could call that quite a substantial ‘impact’” (Hui 2010a).

In addition, Xinhua reported a foreign study through a “scientific and reasonable study” that the cascade on the whole does not cause unusual water level fluctuations, although without naming the study (Yang 2011). While a majority of the science on the Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong dams suggests relatively low impacts on

hydrological levels (indistinguishable from the norm on weekly to monthly timescales), ignoring the current and future impacts of the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu seems to

intentionally misguide. Qin Hui, a Chinese academic, derided this apparent muddling of scientific claims, stating that although China is indeed only contributing 13.5% at the Mekong mouth, it ignores the varying contributions of the upper Mekong to places further upstream like Luang Prabang in Laos.

“Talk of small surface areas low evaporation and hydropower not consuming water are transparent attempts to fob off China’s critics. The impact of a reservoir downstream has nothing to do with “water consumption” or “evaporation”, but the impoundment and release of water. Opening or closing floodgates has a huge impact on downstream flow.

Otherwise, how could we talk about reservoirs preventing floods and relieving drought?”

(Eyler 2013).

The industry itself praises the benefits of the Xiaowan’s multi-year regulatory ability, but still claims “virtually no impact” (Eyler 2013). As Qin Hui points out above, it seems very unlikely that the government is unaware of potential impacts on downstream flow volumes. The above claims by the hydropower industry and parts of the government regarding the low impacts of the cascades two largest dams – the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu,

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along with the reconstituting of the Ganlanba dam into an anti-regulation reservoir, seems to suggest a sort of middle ground between the intentional reframing of hydrological impacts and belief in science suggesting only minor impacts. Of the potential impacts from the entirety of the cascade, both the hydropower industry and government decision-makers believe them to be able to be effectively mitigated so that they truly produce no significant impacts. This seems to be a relatively more recent development. While originally the cascade was billed as having no significant impacts, it seems as though there has been some tacit acceptance of potential hydrological impacts through the planned changes to the Ganlanba dam to function as a regulatory reservoir to more accurately mimic natural flow volumes, in addition to providing consistency for downstream hydropower projects by the MWR (Gao and Zhong 2014).

In addition, the protection of fish populations and biodiversity seems to gain a distinct amount of salience among decision-makers. As mentioned above, Hydrolancang has built fish sanctuaries to both capture and raise local fish at most of the dams including the Nuozhadu (Xinhua 2012), stratified the reservoir at Nuozhadu to allow for increased water temperature more conducive to fish populations (Zhang 2012), and cancelled the Mengsong dam due to concerns over impacts to migratory fish. In addition, rare botanical gardens and animal sanctuaries have been constructed at the Nuozhadu and Jinghong dams, as well as waste water treatment plants build at the Gongguoqiao, Manwan, and Xiaowan dams to ensure “zero emissions” (Xinhua 2011; Zhang 2012). While good news for the local ecology and migratory fish, these measures and other statements have put forth no obvious concern or recognition of impacts to downstream ecologies.

One particularly concerning difference in the scientific literature reviewed and the claims of hydropower and government representatives is the issue of sediment flow. The science behind the changes to water flow, while disagreeing on the extent of the benefits and costs of seasonal shifts, all agree that China contributes 13.5-20% of the Lower Mekong’s flow volume in the delta. However, the science surrounding China’s

contribution to downstream sediment flow is decidedly split. A large number of studies (typically from scholars outside China, although not exclusively) found that China contributes roughly 50% of downstream sediment, while others (exclusively Chinese scholars and research) found that the main sediment source is in Northern Laos. Multiple

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statements from those representatives, as seen above, suggest a clear preference for science that claims that China is a relatively insignificant contributor to downstream sediment flow, with the majority of the sediment coming from Laos (China Daily 2002, Hexun 2012). As discussed in chapter two, this very well could derive in a fundamental difference in certain Chinese sources and other, typically international, researchers. A number of studies found that China’s portion of the Mekong likely contributes roughly 50% of the lower Mekong’s sediment load (See: Roberts 2001; MRC 2010, Walling 2009), a fact confirmed and/or repeated in both Chinese and English language research articles. Other Chinese articles, however, suggest that the primary source in northern Laos (See: Chen and He 2000, Fu et al 2006; He et al 2009). Of the literature reviewed, the majority supports the approximation of 50%. While this should be understood in the context of the difficulty of accurately estimating sediment loads, as discussed in chapter two, it should be noted that Walling’s (2009) research is considered the best estimate among a number of researchers, which estimates China’s contribution to be around 50%.

This suggests that the information likely comes from both the scientific research suggesting northern Laos as the contributor and possibly “in house” researching from Hydrolancang, an apparently common practice, especially in terms of EIAs on dam projects¹⁰. The only similar information that this may have been misconstrued with decision-makers is that much of the science seems to suggest that rainfall in the eastern mountain region of the lowland area in the lower Mekong (Laos) are significant

contributors to lower Mekong water flow volume, which carries with it sediment into the mainstream (He et al 2006; Xue et al 2010).

This has an important implication for downstream impacts. China’s contributions to sediment flow in the lower Mekong could very well have drastic ecological impacts downstream, as discussed in chapter 2. As such, a lack of acknowledgment of this contribution could have drastic consequences downstream. Unlike hydrological impacts, and some more local ecological impacts, hydropower and government representatives’

emphasis on low sediment contributions does not fit with a large portion of the science reviewed. That said, however, it does follow along with the findings of the prominent research center, the AIRC. This suggests an incomplete assessment of the science                                                                                                                

10  Interview  06:  AIRC  researcher  

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available on impacts caused by changes to sediment flow, and/or an intentional misrepresentation of scientific fact, and/or as Haas suggested in his EC theory, an emphasis of science already favorable to the initiatives taken by the organization.

The above research suggests that among the hydropower industry and government representatives there is a selection bias towards science that suggests the minimal amount of downstream impact selected from a potentially incomplete set of scientific information.

In addition, of that information there seems to be intentional obfuscation of the hydrological impacts of the dam, intentionally highlighting China’s relatively small hydrological contribution to the lower Mekong while purposefully ignoring seasonal, temporal, and geographical flow volume differences when addressing downstream nations.

3.2 Who decides how much water science counts in decision-making?

Given decision-making structure described above, it seems that the actors

primarily determining what science counts in relation to hydropower development is the Huaneng Group, Hydrolancang, and their related engineering staff, the NDRC, and to a lesser extent the MWR. While undoubtedly a massive force in the decision-making structure surrounding hydropower development, the NDRC seems to generally support the conclusions coming out of the hydropower industry, as will be seen in chapter 4.

Given how much the MWR and CWRC are excluded from the decision-making process and the lack of waiting for approval of projects by the MEP and NDRC on the Lancang

Given how much the MWR and CWRC are excluded from the decision-making process and the lack of waiting for approval of projects by the MEP and NDRC on the Lancang