Huaneng and Hydrolancang’s Impact Science Stance

The Huaneng Group’s stance on downstream impacts of the Lancang decidedly falls on the side that views development as both a net benefit to both China and the region, and having minimal impact. These views are perhaps best encapsulated by the repeated statements by Hydrolancang’s former head engineer, now senior consultant and leading academic at the Chinese Academy of Engineering since the early 2000s, Ma Hongqi (馬洪琪). In 2003, Ma Hongqi described hydropower in the west being of “vital importance to the country”, while also backing the above mentioned policy trope of hydropower utilization being relatively high in developed countries, “often more than 60 percent and even amounts up to 80 percent”, versus China’s 20 percent (China Daily 2003). Ma described hydropower as “regenerative and much cleaner and has a bigger development potential” than thermal power, a relatively consistent claim through to today (China Daily 2003). Ma Hongqi described an improving awareness of environmental issues, “while designing and constructing a hydropower station, we have paid more and more attention to environmental issues. In the 1960s and 1970s, we didn’t consider environmental protection. In the 1980s, we launched the construction of a project fist and then conducted work related to environmental protection. Since the 1990s, we usually complete this work during the construction phase” (China Daily 2003). Although, in

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terms of the Upper Mekong cascade, there is good evidence that dams were and still are being developed first before any environmental impact assessment was made (Yan 2012).

This idea of continued improvement and mitigation of environmental impacts from Ma Hongqi continues through to today. In the early 2000s, Ma Hongqi and Hydrolancang’s claims regarding the cascade have remained relatively consistent, with shifts in emphasis towards the value of green development and mitigation techniques from roughly 2010 to the present. In 2002, the claims focused on the Xiaowan dam (then just beginning construction), stating that after an extensive study, it was found the dam would have limited impacts and help with both irrigation and navigation downstream.

Claims relating to impacts to hydrology typically fell along the following claims: as the Upper Mekong (Lancang) basin represents only 13.5% of total outflow at the Mekong’s mouth, and the dams non-consumptive water use, the cascade (the Xiaowan and

Nuozhadu dams especially) will have a very limited impact on downstream flow volume (China news 2011; Wang 2013), a claim oft repeated by government bodies. In fact, the cascade itself will offer a net benefit to the region as a means of control of floods and droughts up to once in 20 to once in 100 year severity (Liu and Guan 2011), not to mention improved navigation (Liu and Guan 2011). Xiaowan itself will increase water flow by 39.7% from November to May during the dry season, helping with both saline intrusion and navigation.

Indeed, these concepts are not just stated by Ma Hongqi, but by other

representatives such as Zhao Meng, senior engineer (MacLeod 2010) and Kou Wei, CCP party member and chairman of Hydrolancang (Wang 2007). These claims align with some of the scientific findings in the previous chapter backing a positive interpretation of the wet-to-dry season flow shift. In addition, repeated statements from the company in response downstream countries’ concerns of the cascade’s contribution to the floods of 2008 and drought of 2010, said that the existing dams of Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong had little impact on those events (Wang 2007; Liu and Guan 2011; Huanqiu 2012; Hexun 2012). A statement relatively consistent with the available science reviewed in the previous chapter. Concerns about potentially rapid changes in flow volume seems to have prompted the company to shift the Ganlanba dam, the soon-to-be southern most

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dam of the cascade, from a primarily electricity producing dam into a regulator reservoir (Yang 2011).

Surprisingly, relatively little statements from other company representatives address the issue of sediment flow downriver, but Ma Hongqi did state that the Upper Mekong does not provide the primary source of downstream sediment, but rather the primary contributor is Laos (Zhongguo Xinyong 2012). In 2002, Ma Hongqi stated that the Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Xiaowan’s combined influence will reduce sediment flow downstream by 10%, thus preventing soil erosion along the Mekong, while also

acknowledging “this may decrease food supply for fish living at the mouth of the river”

(Chen 2002b). This seems to suggest that the power company perhaps does not consider sediment flow to be a significant issue for downstream nations. This sentiment, however, seems to derive from a rift in the science regarding sediment sources on the river

Ecosystem impacts found the most salience with the company, as a number of statements described the Hydrolancang’s commitment to mitigate the impacts of the dams, especially after 2011. Wang Yonxiang, Huaneng CCP party secretary

acknowledged hydropower having impacts, stating “Hydropower development cannot avoid impacting the natural environment. The key is to reduce impacts to as small as possible” (Liu and Guan 2011, translation by the author). Of all the negative impacts, it seems as though immediate impacts to the ecosystem around the dams and fisheries downstream gained the most salience with the company. This manifests through the Nuozhadu dam spending 240 million RMB to create a tiered reservoir system to raise the temperature by 4.3C of out-flowing water so as to be better suited to fish populations (Liu and Guan 2011; Zhongguo Xinyong Wang 2013; Huanqiu 2012); the establishment of fish incubators to catch, raise, and breed local fish populations to then be released at both the Nuozhadu and Xiaowan dams (Liu and Guan 2011; Huanqiu 2012); the construction of fish ladders next to the dams (unspecified) (Liu and Guan 2011; Huanqiu 2012); the construction of rare botanical gardens at the Nuozhadu, Jinghong, and Gongguoqiao dams, including and an elephant sanctuary at the Jinghong dam site; construction of sewage treatment plants at each respective dam site to ensure “zero emissions” from the reservoir; and the cancellation of the Mengsong dam because of potentially blockages to migratory fish (Liu and Guan 2011). Judging from the above-mentioned measures, it

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seems as though negative impacts to relatively local fisheries gained the most traction within the company. However, they the only acknowledgement of potential impacts to fisheries farther south, i.e. the Tonle Sap lake in Cambodia, comes from a brief statement from Ma Hongqi in 2002 suggesting reduced silt flow may negatively impact fisheries populations downstream (Chen 2002b).

The development of the Upper Mekong has been described as clean, renewable means of development that not only relieves poverty in Yunnan and the GMS, but offers a “mutual, multiple-win” in terms of development, environmental protection, improved local economies, and helping develop the region (China Daily 2003; Wang 2007; Liu and Guan 2011; China news 2011). During the early 2000s the emphasis seemed primarily on the idea of “scientific development” in both Yunnan and the GMS (Wang 2007). Since 2007, a particular emphasis has been placed on carbon emissions reduction and energy savings, stating that 1kW of large-scale hydropower saves roughly 380 grams of coal, and reduces sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides following the policy of “protecting while developing, developing while protecting” (在保護中開發，在開發中保護) (Wang 2007;

Zhang 2012). Much of the energy industry’s framing of the Lancang hydropower development comes with the idea of abiding by “scientific development” and “green development” with corporate responsibility (e.g. changing the Ganlanba dam’s function to flow volume regulation).

The Huaneng Group and Hydrolancang’s framing of downstream impacts seems to have emphasized only certain aspects of the scientific findings and debate explored in the previous chapter. Unsurprisingly, the company emphasized the benefits to navigation and flood control for downstream hydrological impacts, a positive view of the wet-to-dry season flow shift. While the science seems to generally back the relative insignificance of Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong dams on the hydrological regime, company

representatives go on to say that both the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu dams will have limited impacts downstream. This claim is highly dependant on basin management techniques, and is discussed further below and in chapter 5. In addition, much of the science

reviewed suggests that both the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu will have significant impacts on the flow regime by limiting floods and providing more water in the dry season. While not explicitly acknowledged, a concern over impacts to drastic changes in flow volume

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clearly seen in the changing of the Ganlanba dam into a regulatory reservoir to better mimic more natural flow volumes. This, along with those measures taken towards fish populations and ecosystem impacts, suggests that the hydropower industry is aware of most of the potentially negative impacts the cascade may have downstream, but views them with one important distinction: the impacts can be mitigated to the point of having nearly no impact downstream. This is made all the easier by the emphasis on science that states the primary sources of sediment and water deriving downstream from China, a claim based on the murky ambiguity of certain sediment measurements in science and seemingly clever misdirection in water source facts.

While China’s contribution to water flow at the mouth of the Mekong is indeed only a portion of the total, it is ignores China’s relative contributions further upstream.

China annually contributes 66.6% of flow at Chiang Saen, Thailand, 47.4% of flow at Luang Prabang, Laos, 39.3% at Vientiane, Laos, and 24.2% at Thaket, Laos (He et al 2006). At Vientiane, the “Yunnan Component” of the Mekong provides over 75% of the flow during the dry season months of April and May, to over 50% during wet season months from July to September (Adamson et al 2009). Further downstream at Kratie, Cambodia, the “Yunnan Component” contributes over 40% of flow during April (Adamson et al 2009). These are far more significant numbers than the mere 13.5%

espoused by the company, and indeed large government bodies, described below. In addition, of those statements that do address potential impacts on sediment, they state that China’s contribution to downstream sediment is low, and much less than those sediment contributions in Laos.