The MWR’s Stance on Impact Science

The MWR, both nationally and provincially, seem to fall along the same findings of general pro-hydropower development actors within the government that of emphasizing the benefits of both flood control and navigation for downstream nations. For example, in                                                                                                                

5  Interview  03:  Darrin  Magee,  Associate  Professor  of  Environmental  Studies,  Hobart   and  William  Smith    College.  

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a speech as the 7^th Annual Mekong Flood Forum in a speech by representatives of the Ministry of Water Resources, they stated the importance of flood management from the main hydropower projects on the Lancang river, stressing that “in case of contradiction between the economic profit of power generation and flood control security, the principle of ‘security first’ prevails” (Yong and Bo 2009). Within the same statement, the MWR stated an expressed interest in “the flood prevention security and the interest of

downstream countries in upstream flood management” (Yong and Bo 2009). In the speech, the MWR representative uses specific measurements from the Jinghong hydro station, citing the minimum discharge volume of the dry season as a minimum of 504 m3/s. Specifically addressing the 2008 floods in the Lower Mekong, describing the maximum discharge from Yunjinghong hydrostation with peak discharge on September 7^th at 6,390 m3/s, rnaking 35^th in the data series over 53 years (Yong and Bo 2009)

Typically statements from the MWR derived from responses to concerns over the dams impact on the floods of 2008, and the drought of 2010. Like the hydropower companies, the MWR promoted the positives of a wet-to-dry season shift, i.e. better navigation, flood and drought prevention, improved irrigation, and reliable water flows for downstream dams. During the 2009-2010 droughts, they claimed no water impounded in the Xiaowan reservoir, and in fact its outflow was greater than its inflow by 500

million square meters, despite an area decrease of -320m3/s in water flow (Chen 2010).

The MWR later claimed that the Xiaowan’s output increased water flow by 66% of natural flow volume (Gao and Zhong 2014). Chen Mingzhong, deputy director general of the MWR, described the Upper Mekong as contributing only 13.5% of total Mekong outflow, and as such cannot and will not significantly impact downstream nations (Chen 2010). Simply put, “the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages” (Gao and Zhong 2014). The MWR claims that the cascade enhances several different security aspects:

first, food security by enhancing water supply to lower reaches during the dry season, and reducing flooded areas in the wet season; second, energy security by the cascade’s output itself and by steady outflow levels during the dry season providing both water supply and water flow for downstream dams; and third water security by “scientific regulation” of the cascade thus providing dry season flows will increase 70%, with a wet season decrease of 30%, helping with flood control and navigation.

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The MWR seems to primarily deal with the hydrological impacts of the of the Lancang cascade. Like the Huaneng Group and Hydrolancang above, the MWR framework emphasizes the cascade as a means of regulation, and in face of climate change, a means of ecosecurity and adaptation. As stated in a speech to the MRC, the MWR stated that climate change will bring about more droughts and floods, and as such the cascade will be a means by which to adapt to those changes.

2.3 National and Yunnan Development and Reform Commission (NDRC & YDRC)

2.3.1 The NDRC and YDRC’s Role in the decision-making process

Formerly the State Planning Commission (SPC), the SPC was renamed in 1998 to the State Development Planning Commission, and eventually merged with the State Council Office for Restructuring the Economy and parts of the State Economic and Trade Commission in 2003, to become the NDRC (Mertha 2008). The NDRC’s authority, as a commission, outranks the ministries through their coordinating functions, essentially giving them an administrative “half-step” above ministries and provincial-level governments.

According to Mertha (2008), the NDRC tends towards informal meetings among ranking cadres and issues approval for projects within which they have a personal stake, rather than the former procedure of annual meetings discussing national projects. The cadres within the NDRC have been deriving from non-experts – former military and unqualified CCP cadres – that frequently cannot be fired for corruption, negligence, or incompetence because of their relative power (Mertha 2008). This is an important factor in terms of the scientific discourse used within the commission as it holds the potential for a certain scientific finding to take hold in a relatively powerful decision-making position, as described below.

The power of the NDRC derives authority from its coordinating power. In order to coordinate across ministries, the NDRC director must have a higher administrative rank (Lieberthal 1995; Mertha 2008). On the local level, the NDRC and local level DRC bureaus can compete with local level initiatives, due in large part to its administratively

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decentralized position in the governmental hierarchy. Since the NDRC encompasses administrative units on leading edge of development in China, other bureaus that handle social welfare do not encumber their administrative processes. Rather, the NDRC

coordinates those bureaus directly related to hydropower construction – water resources, hydropower, and the communication/infrastructure agencies, among others (Mertha 2008). Given this powerful position, any local project related to power stations musts then go through the local DRC Energy Bureau (能源局) at the equivalent administrative level. “This is a second-tier (fu ting ji) unit within the DRC; it ranks a half-step above the Irrigation and Water Conservancy Department, which is a third-tier unit within the DRC at the national and provincial levels; this means that hydropower concerns effectively trump those of irrigation and water conservancy to some degree” (Mertha 2008, 44).

2.3.2 The NDRC, YDRC and Stance on Impact Science

Both the NDRC and YDRC, despite decidedly having influence over the

development process of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) River, NDRC statements offered very little in terms of specific scientific claims. Most of them centered around a call for further research into downstream impacts of the cascade. In one statement, then NDRC deputy director, and National Energy Bureau bureau chief, Zhang Jinghong, described the cascade as an important power base for the “west to east” transfer project, while

emphasizing that as a transboundary river, the Upper Mekong required rational

development and effective use (Xinhua 2008b). As has since become common parlance in discussing the cascade and its impacts among pro-dam actors, Zhang called for a called for “long-term monitoring, and systematic, comprehensive, and objective evaluation of the scientific and rational development of Lancang river hydropower resources”

(translation by the author); going on to promote the “scientific” operation management of the cascade to give take full advantage of power production, flood control, and navigation (Xinhua 2008b). However, from the statements gathered fro this research, the NDRC gave no outright positional statements on certain scientific claims downstream.

Therefore, the NDRC’s views towards downstream impact science are perhaps best encapsulated by policy changes guiding development over the past twenty years. This is

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discussed more in chapter 4. Throughout the past two decades, unsurprisingly, the

NDRC’s position has remained, as one senior NDRC official put it, that “hydropower is a must” (Si 2011).

2.4 The Yunnan Provincial Government

2.4.1 Local Government Incentives for Hydropower

The Yunnan provincial government is generally supportive of hydropower projects, as they are seen to add a significant amount of local economic, infrastructural investments, and tax revenue for the province (Magee 2006a; Mertha 2008; Beijixing Dianli Wang (2013). Local government officials tend to hold a significant amount of control over information surrounding the dams. Another demographic with some subtle, but likely significant pull, are those million or so people whose livelihoods are specifically

connected to dam construction – engineers, construction workers, etc. Indeed, as Mertha (2008) found in interviews, the engineers behind hydropower development frequently find a sympathetic ear in the higher ups in the Chinese government as many them too started out as engineers. This is an important point, as will be discussed in below and in chapter 4, the evidence suggests the preferences of engineering epistemic communities may hold significant sway in the provincial and central government. Because the Mekong is a transnational river, as well as the size of dams, the province does not technically have the final say in the development of the river. As was seen above, however, the province does much to incentives development and views them as a potentially huge source of tax revenue.

2.4.2 Yunnan Provincial Government Stance on Impact Science

Yunnan’s governors have repeatedly come out in support of hydropower development within their province. In the early 2000s, like with the power companies, the emphasis for hydropower development seemed to remain on local, as well as regional, development and integration. In 2002, Xu Rongkai stated it was vital to develop certain reaches of the

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Upper Mekong by “rationally utilizing and protecting local natural resources to

strengthen economic ties among southeast Asian countries” (Xinhua 2002). Governor Xu went on to state that Upper Mekong outflow will remain consistent and unchanged throughout the year because of the cascades reservoir, thus benefitting shipping businesses. Ten years later, Governor Li Jiheng, when describing the Nuozhadu emphasized a slightly different set of benefits from the dam, saying it would increase electricity supply, optimize the energy mix, and help flood control and water use downstream (Xinhua 2012). Again, much like the MWR and the Hydrolancang, an emphasis on environmental impacts seems to have remained relatively constant in the past 20 years, but the tones and emphasis have shifted. Namely, statements have shifted away from a development and regional integration focus, towards a focus on energy security, green energy, and promotion of impact mitigation. In addition, in 2011 Yunnan province awarded Ma Hongqi the “Yunnan National Technological Innovation Award”

because of his significant contributions to Yunnan through his work in hydropower development (Yan and Wu 2012). Over Ma Hongqi’s 40 year career, Yunnan has award Ma Hongqi 12 times for his contributions to science, development, and “raising the stability of the Yunnan people’s government” (Yan and Wu 2012). While this is hardly proof of a definite connection, it seems likely that these awards function as a tacit endorsement of Ma Hongqi’s views towards hydropower development in the Yunnan provincial government.

2.5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

The MOFA decidedly holds very little sway over the decision-making processes behind hydropower development decisions on the Upper Mekong. However, their

statements in dealing with the MRC and Southeast Asian governments is indicative of not only the central and Yunnan’s provincial government’s stance towards the cascade’s impacts, but also what scientific information the government body is using to frame, and perhaps understand, hydropower development.

In 2010, Song Tao, the vice foreign minister, told the prime ministers of Southeast Asian countries that as the Upper Mekong was only responsible for 13.5% of the total

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output at the mouth of the Mekong, and thus the no-water-use reservoirs already built had no impact downstream. Again, like the MWR and hydropower companies, the foreign minister cited a commissioned study by China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower, the AIRC, and the Dillon Consulting Canada Inc. that concluded that the hydropower development on the Upper Mekong “do no consume water, and have scarce effect on the water volume flowing across the border” (China Daily 2010). This study seems consistent with the most of the science regarding existing impacts, in that of the impacts of the Manwan, Dachaoshan, and Jinghong dams on hydrology are either unnoticeable on larger timescales, or relatively insignificant. However, it ignores the potential impact of the now Xiaowan reservoir that is currently in the process of filling.

These various government bureaus seem to base, at least publicly, their claims of limited impacts on a scientific study only examining the impacts of the cascade before the completion of its largest dams, the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu.

Other statements from MOFA focus on other developmental incentives, and are relatively consistent with other government statements on the subject. More recent statements seem to have followed along with the actors mentioned above, as seen with MOFA spokesperson, Hun Sen, emphasizing the recent development of the importance of mitigating negative dam impacts through building fish habitats, rare animal and fauna sanctuaries and so on (Hui 2010a). In addition, a number of various statements focus on using water resources as a means using low-impact renewable energy of hydropower to drive development, eradicate poverty, and deal with climate change for China and the GMS (Hui 2010a, 2010b; CED 2010; Son 2010). A number of MOFA officials have stated China’s opening up of hydrological flow information, especially in light of the 2010 drought, stating the release of relevant flood information since 2002, and even the release of 5 million cubic meters of water in 2010 to help with dam impacts, a claim substantiated by the MWR (Son 2010).

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2.6. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)

2.6.1 The MEP’s role in the Decision-Making Process

With its rise to ministry status in 2008, the MEP (formerly the State Environmental Protection Bureau, SEPA), has gained more power relative to dam construction within China. The issue most often emphasized by the MEP has been an adherence to environmental impact assessments (EIAs). In 2009, the MEP ordered all work on Huaneng’s hydropower sites to cease because of a failure of Huaneng to secure environmental impact assessment approvals for the Ludila Hydroelectric Project in the upper reaches of the Yangtze (Si 2011).

On the national level the MEP holds more power over larger development projects, and therefore theoretically holds some more sway over the cascade’s

construction process. Below the provincial level, the environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) are relatively weak, holding the title of “huanbao ju” (環保局) at the prefecture and county levels, and “huanbao yuan” (環保元) at the township and village levels (Mertha 2008). In Yunnan, the EPB was a second-tier bureau until 1993, when it was promoted to first-tier bureau status at the same time that SEPA in Beijing became a ministry-level as a “zong ju” or “bu ji bumen”. This, however, does not necessarily equal the same level of influence because “as mentioned earlier, some bureaus are more equal than others” (Mertha 2008). Provincial-level EPBs are first-tier bureaus, and so

technically on equal footing with the MWR. However, provincial-level administrative organs are divided into the following subtypes: administrative offices, directly

administered special offices, directly administered offices, longstanding offices for coordinating and discussing official business, managing offices/units, and the more powerful organizational units.

The EPBs are directly administered offices, while the MWR is an organizational unit. Therefore while both have formal administrative rank, the MWR is considered more influential and possesses the ability to edge out the EPB (Mertha 2008). EPBs historically have held a secondary position relative to more powerful, and frequently development

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oriented bureaus. At the prefecture level, EPBs were separated out of the construction bureaus into separate independent units in 1997, but still shared the same offices frequently with the construction bureau. Despite a efforts to centralize the bureaucracy, the provincial-level EPB still receives personnel and budgetary resources from the provinicial-level government, “which has sole authority relations over the provincial-level EPB” (Mertha 2008). Promoted to ministry status in 2008, the MEP has struggled to flex its bureaucratic muscles when dealing with more powerful entities like the NDRC.

As will be seen in chapter 4, with the advent of the EIA Law in 2003, the then SEPA used its authority to stop a number of non-compliant development projects, which in turn may have shifted the dialogue surrounding hydropower development.

2.6.2 The MEP’s Stance on Impact Science

Like the NDRC, the MEP and is position towards downstream impact science is perhaps best understood through policy-actions, rather than limited government statements on specific scientific claims. As such, the MEP’s stance will be discussed further in chapter 4.

2.7. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Epistemic Communities (ECs)

2.7.1 The Asian International Rivers Center (AIRC)

Founded in 2000 and based out of the Yunnan University, the AIRC has

published widely on the Lancang and the dam cascade, offering a substantive amount of information on the basin. The director, Professor He Daming, trained originally as a hydraulic and hydroelectric engineer, and later completed advanced degrees in geography and environmental science. He worked as an engineer at the Kunming Institute of

Hydropower Survey and Design during the early-1980s while the Manwan dam was designed (Magee 2006a). Spending most of the 1990s at the Yunnan Institute of

Geography in Kunming, He and his colleagues published “some of the earliest and most comprehensive physical geographic work on the Lancang watershed” (Magee 2006a).

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Indeed, in 1995, a full issue of the Yunnan Geographic Environment Research journal and a subsequent issue of Acta Geographica Sinica in 1999, detailed this research.

The AIRC has published over the years a fairly nuanced and wide-ranging set of scientific articles regarding the dams on the Lancang-Mekong and its impacts.

Frequently, as is true with most any scientific article, they extrapolated little from what could be parsed out from the data. While acknowledging some impacts from current dams, the articles tend to find that the impact of the (at least currently existing dams) cascade extend little beyond China. This research found little written criticism of the dams out of the AIRC, and is supported as Magee (2006) describes:

“With regard to the Lancang, neither He nor his colleagues, to my knowledge, have ever directly opposed the dams in writing. They have, however, based on many years of research and He’s own background as a hydropower engineer, been publicly critical of the ecological and social impacts of hasty, disorderly hydropower development. For that have gained a degree of notoriety, especially He” (Magee 2006a, 234).

That said, however, in two different interviews with researchers at AIRC⁶, both described both He Daming and the researchers at the AIRC as truly committed to just putting out good science. Their goals, as Fu Kaidao put it, are not advocacy, but rather the most accurate scientific understanding of what is happening in the Upper and Lower Mekong.

They are essentially Yunnan’s most preeminent, oldest, and cautious domestic epistemic community researching the Upper Mekong. As will be discussed in chapter four, this seems to have put the center in a prime position to have influence over the discourse surrounding hydropower development on the Lancang and on-going management and mitigation techniques.

Much of the scientific position of the AIRC and He Daming was covered in chapter 2 in the various conclusions made by scientists on downstream dam impacts. To summarize, they typically fall along similar lines as much of the science stating that a complete cascade will have drastic downstream impacts, both beneficial and negative.

6  Interviews  01:  Fu  Kaidao,  senior  researcher  at  the  AIRC;  Interviews  05:  AIRC   researcher;  Interview  06:  AIRC  researcher  

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The important distinction is that it is suggested in some of their studies that careful

mitigation of the potential downstream impacts will limit negative impacts. In addition, in the early 2000s He Daming has stated that a decrease of 35% of sediment flow from a completed Xiaowan will be beneficial to navigation and flood water expulsion, while also stating that due to the coarse, heavy silt of the Upper Mekong, its silt does not reach too far south (Xinhua 2002b, 2002c). As such, reduced sediment flow will have limited impacts on agriculture in the Mekong Delta (Vietnam) (Xinhua 2002c). This seems to support the notion of ECs making the best determination given the science at the time,

mitigation of the potential downstream impacts will limit negative impacts. In addition, in the early 2000s He Daming has stated that a decrease of 35% of sediment flow from a completed Xiaowan will be beneficial to navigation and flood water expulsion, while also stating that due to the coarse, heavy silt of the Upper Mekong, its silt does not reach too far south (Xinhua 2002b, 2002c). As such, reduced sediment flow will have limited impacts on agriculture in the Mekong Delta (Vietnam) (Xinhua 2002c). This seems to support the notion of ECs making the best determination given the science at the time,