Negative Impact Science versus Mitigated Impacts

As was seen in chapter three and above, the downstream impact science policy stream exists next to much larger, and much more dominant policy trends and focusing events that have effectively pushed one subset of the policy stream out of the discourse among decision-makers in China: the negative impact science policy stream. This is not to say that all science regarding the negative impacts has been pushed out of development decisions in China. Rather, a distinct set of science showing negative impacts has been prioritized and emphasized over other science. Specifically, the negative impacts derived from decreased sediment flow (e.g. floodplain fertility, fish and vegetation habitats, especially the Tonle Sap lake), the negative implications of an increased dry season flow and shaving off peak flood flows (e.g. agricultural productivity, fish spawning activity, sediment transport, etc.), and related ecosystem impacts have effectively been

unacknowledged by decision-makers. Rather, the science emphasizing impacts that may be mitigated have gained prominence.

Importantly, since the mid- to late-2000s, He Daming and the AIRC have been put in a position to consult with Hydrolancang, and seem to represent a position of careful mitigation of downstream impacts. In He et al (2006), they warn that with the addition of the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu dams, the cascade will have a seasonal regulation capacity of 23% and a annual regulation capacity of 23%, thus having obvious effects on the distribution of water volumes throughout any given year, with impacts on the dry season reaching as far south as the Mekong delta. As such, “care will be need to be taken to ensure that the filling of these two large reservoirs does not bring harmful impacts downstream” (He et al 2006, 24). In other media He Daming is quoted as saying the upper Mekong dams will have limited impact, and that “with the planned construction of the Ganlanba reservoir, with its primary function to regulate the unstable daily

fluctuations in water flow coming the Jinghong dam, it will satisfy the needs of

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downstream transportation demands, while simultaneously meeting electricity production and ecological water use needs” (Xinhua 2011, translation by the author).

He Daming and the AIRC offers an interesting insight into the role of epistemic communities (ECs). By remaining relatively quiet during the early- to late- 2000s, He and the AIRC remained a relatively untouched compared to those actors who chose a

politically active course of action (e.g. Yu Xiaogang). He’s choice to remain quiet seems to be based on an awareness of the potential ramifications of political activism (losing funding to the AIRC, or worse) and because of a desire to conclusions based on straight-forward empirical evidence, a distinguishing characteristic of ECs. This, along with being one of the few organizations with extensive information and expertise on the river basin, left both He and the AIRC in a unique position to become a potentially important

consultant to the development and management decisions behind the Lancang cascade.

Wang Yongxiang, the party secretary for the Huaneng Group, stated that dams will definitely have impacts on the natural environment, but can and are being minimized to the point of very limited impacts (Liu and Guan 2011). This, in addition to multiple statements from Ma Hongqi, the head engineer of Hydrolancang and leading academic at the Chinese Academy of Engineer, suggests that mitigation of manageable downstream impacts has become the dominant discursive discourse and scientific understanding of hydropower development impacts on the upper Mekong.

The information of negative dam science, including sociopolitical impacts championed by Yu Xiaogang, seems to have been pushed largely out of the discourse within decision-making circles. This information has been put decidedly in the hands of local and international NGOs, as well as academics seemingly without as much access to decision-makers. While there has been an increasing trend of acknowledgement of negative impacts within the government, as seen in the policy stream above, there no longer remains a policy entrepreneur of sorts within the central government. As such, negative impact science not recognized by the Huaneng Group and relevant government actors have effectively been marginalized in terms of influence over the decision-making process in the development of the Upper Mekong river basin. That is not to say NGOs and other civil society actors (ECs, etc.) are totally excluded on a nationally level. For example, several NGOs were brought into 3^rd Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist

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Party’s (CCP) 18^th National Assembly on November 2013 for 2 consultation meetings on the Yangtze River Basin’s planning and management, headed by the NDRC (Li et al 2014). At the same time, however the MEP has rejected NGO requests to submit reports on Upper Lancang dam impacts (Wang 2013). The space afforded by the “cracks”

described in the fragmented authoritarianism framework (Lieberthal 1995) and from the energy industry reforms in 2002 seem to have shrunk since the disputes of the mid-2000s.

The available spaces now seem to be for those actors with positions favorable to continued hydropower development.

5.2 The Wider Domestic Context and Focusing Events

As discussed in chapter 3, the impact science policy stream is competing with the larger policy streams of domestic energy needs, the Western Development Campaign and poverty alleviation, integration with the GMS, climate change mitigation, and low-carbon development. All of these policy streams pushed towards what the WRB referred to as the “inevitable choice” of hydropower development (Gao and Zhong 2014). The issue then becomes how impacts of this development are perceived, interpreted, and responded to within decision-making circles. As seen above, the conclusion in this respect has

clearly been that “the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages” (Gao and Zhong 2014).

A number of focusing events have guided the policy making process. Wen Jiabao’s call for stopping a number of development projects in 2004 shifted the national discourse by pushing the minimalization of environmental impacts in development projects. As seen with the NDRC above, it pushed hydropower decision-makers to push for projects with less impact. Even though this seems to have been a recalibration to better ensure the passage of future development projects, it still shifted the tone of national development towards factoring in environmental impacts into project designs.

The Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, and the subsequent 12^th FYP policy response committed China to a drastic decrease in CO² emissions. From this point forward it became clear that hydropower development had been identified as a key development strategy for China in order to reduce emissions.

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The two trends of mitigating development impacts and the necessity of reducing carbon dioxide emissions seems to have merged with new State Council government and the retirement of Wen Jiabao in 2012. After this a clear developmental mandate came from the new State council: hydropower will go forward as a key development strategy, and the negative impacts that will be dealt with as best as possible. This is evidenced by the MEP, formerly a bureau fighting to establish its power and willing to halt “chaotic”

(乱) development with the “EIA storm” of 2005, approving previously halted dam projects while acknowledging their downstream impacts. For example, MEP as approved construction of the world’s tallest dam, the Shuanjiangkou dam on the Dadu river in Sichuan, stating: "The project will affect the spawning and movement of rare fish species, as well as the growth of endangered plants, including the Chinese yew, which is under first class state protection", while proposing countermeasures to mitigate these impacts such as, "protecting fish habitats in tributaries, building fish ladders and increasing fish breeding and releasing” (Kaiman 2013).

As the research suggests, scientific information that meets or suggests impacts that may be mitigated seems to get prioritized over negative impact science. This may be

evidenced again by the rejection of various environmental NGOs request to be part of the discussion surrounding impacts from the newly approved Jinsha river hydropower

projects by the MEP, stating that they were “not interested parties” (Wang 2013). While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess how much a role science is playing in the decisions by the MEP and NDRC recently, the research in this thesis suggests that to the Huaneng Group, Yunnan government, and MWR, the science suggesting limited

downstream impacts is the dominant understanding of the Upper Mekong cascade.

Therefore, larger parallel streams and larger central-government level actors shape the contours of broader policy change within China, while epistemic communities (e.g. the AIRC and engineers within the Hydrolancang and government) seem to have the power to shape the understanding of the dams, and therefore the understanding of the cascades’

benefits and costs.

Separating scientific and political discourse may, in fact, be nearly impossible. As Magee describes in his description of political ecology literature in China, managers and

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engineers within development ministries, bureaus, and hydropower companies not only contribute regularly to academic and professional journals relating to water resource development and hydropower, but also see the environment and natural resources as inherently politicized. Within these articles, “questions of natural resource exploitation are usually, if not always, equated with questions of national development and party-state greatness” (Magee 2006, 52). Indeed, while scientific uncertainty already exists due to basic differences in methodology and data, there is also the issue of the “socialization” of science and its discourse. The interpretation of the science with decision-makers is out of the control of the scientists themselves, and is therefore inherently open to the vagaries of politics. As Haas (1992) suggests, this equates to certain sets of information finding a place only when there is a receptive audience. As Magee suggests above, even the creation of the science itself, especially in China, is difficult to tease away from political discourse. As such, many contributions to the scientific literature that derive from and circle around the decision-makers themselves seem to be inherently shaped by the dominant development discourse of the day. As such, the views of hydrologists like Pan Jiazheng at the Chinese Academy of Engineering describing hydropower as the “only viable way” of curtailing coal consumption in China suggests the potential for

confirmation bias among science already set among the backdrop of favoring hydropower development (Bezlova 2009).

For NGOs and academics, there is a grave concern over the impacts from dams on rivers, spurring the aptly named “The ‘Last Report’ on China’s Rivers” (Li et al 2014). In this report, a number of NGOS – Friends of Nature (FON), Institute of Public &

Environmental Affairs, Green Watershed, SHAN SHUI, and the Chengdu Urban Rivers Association – worked together to call on the government to “learn lessons from past development.” The report laments the lack of guidance the EIA laws have over this new

“dam rush”, ignored public participation laws, overly simplified EIAs (Wang 2013; Li et al 2014), and the allowance of site preparation before final project approval, effectively forcing the government to accept new projects (e.g. new dams on the Jinsha River). In addition, this report emphasizes a lack of proper placement for resettled communities in China, and, as they put it, the serious ecosystem damage caused by altered river flow on fish species, downstream fertility, purification properties of the river, and pollution. This

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research suggests that the solution, quite simply, has been found. These are important representative claims from the NGOs, as they echo the findings of certain downstream impact science that considers flow alterations a risky development for the Lower Mekong basin. This “negative downstream impact science”, as I see it, has been passed over in favor of scientific evidence favorable to continued hydropower development. These groups are not without alternatives. They propose focusing on existing dams, maximizing output and minimizing impacts while at the same time working on institutional flaws, the development of other renewable energy (solar, wind, etc.), setting “ecological red-lines”

(Wang 2013; Li et al 2014), and examining development in conjunction with the energy-intensive, polluting industries they support (e.g. mining in Yunnan). In the report, Li et al (2014) suggests that given the slowing of China’s nuclear program after the Fukushima meltdown, calls for the exploitation of 85-90% of China’s hydropower potential should be exploited, making their own push for non-hydropower renewables all the more pressing. This represents an alternative policy choice as expected in a policy stream in Kingdon’s analytical framework. Their requests, however, seem to be failing to find a sympathetic ear. With the MEP’s rejection of FON report submissions on both the Jinsha and Yangtze rivers, as well as the newly begun preparation of a new dam cascade on the Upper Lancang (in northern Yunnan and Tibet), it seems as though those emphasizing negative impacts have a much more limited influence over the decision-making process.

As Li Bo of FON put it, rivers are now only being valued for their electricity services, ecological value and ecosystem services are not being factored in (Wang 2013), a sentiment echoed in an interview with another researcher on this topic²⁷.

For decision-makers, however, the choice between environmental protection and economic development in the Upper Mekong is a false choice. As the scientific evidence pervading decision-maker circles shows, the potential impact of the cascade are relatively benign, and as such are issues that with proper planning may be adequately mitigated.

27  Interview  05:  AIRC  researcher  

  157   Domestic  energy  needs  

Poverty  alleviation  

Integration  with  GMS  

Low-­carbon  development    

Downstream  impact  science    

Negative  downstream  impact  science      

Mitigation  of  impacts   Environmental  protection    

2003~2008  • 2004  –  Wen  Jiabao  halts  multiple  projocts.  • 2005  –  “EIA  Storm”    • 2006  –  Development  projects  “recalibrated”  for  less  impacts  

2009  

Copenhagen   talks  

2010 – Present • 2011 – NDRC and MEP new joint EIA law• 2012 – Wen Jiabao retires • 2013 – State Council approves 12 th FYP for Energy

Hy d ro p owe r De ve lo p m en t o f t h e Up p er M ek on g

with minimal, manageable, and mitigable downstream impacts More Non-Hydro Renewable Energy

Figure  13:  Multiple  streams  framework  with  

opportunity  windows.  The  political  tumult  of  the  early-­‐  

to  mid-­‐  2000s  raised  a  previously  non-­‐prioritized   framework  of  limited  impact  development  projects  into   the  common  discourse  of  decision-­‐makers,  while  shifting   the  tone  of  other  policy  streams.  After  the  2009  

Copenhagen  talks,  hydropower  was  re-­‐prioritized  as  a   key  to  the  above  streams,  except  now  with  the  inclusion   of  mitigation  of  recognized  impacts.  With  Wen  Jiabao’s   retirement,  in  2012,  and  the  2013  FYP  for  energy,   development  those  emphasizing  negative  downstream   impact  science  effectively  lost  their  seat  at  the  table.  

  158   6. Conclusion

This research suggests that science is used both to support a preexisting

conviction (the need of hydropower development), and to understand potential impacts. It seems as though the conclusions reached by Chinese ECs – the AIRC and engineers both in the hydropower industry and Chinese Academy of Engineers – have mixed, coming to the conclusion that through careful planning and management of the cascade, the

negative impacts downstream can be minimized to the point of very limited negative impacts. The science used engineers and government officials seem to fit the biases towards the positive aspects of hydropower development. In addition, the decision-making structure – with Huaneng setting the development plan, and NDRC approving projects over the CWRC– has created a specific framework surrounding downstream impacts has been reached among those that call the shots: the cascade will of course have negative impacts both domestically and downstream, however, of those impacts that are possible, they are relatively mild and more importantly capable of being mitigated to the point of being insignificant. Instead, both the cascade and mitigation techniques allows for a greater net benefit to both China and the region through greater stability via better infrastructure, clean electricity production sold domestically and regionally, poverty alleviation, and flood and drought control bringing greater navigation and irrigation possibilities to the whole region.

This understanding of development has locked China on a specific developmental course that will play out over the next coming decade as the potential impacts, both positive and negative, of the now growing upper Mekong dam cascade will begin to be seen. In the next and final chapter, I will briefly examine the potential impacts of this developmental course, potential indicators of changes in scientific understanding among policy-makers, and how they all relate among the long-term climate changes.

  159   Chapter 5: Conclusion

1. Introduction

This thesis began as an attempt to establish an understanding of the science behind downstream impacts from the Upper Mekong (Lancang) dam cascade, and its use within decision-making behind the dams. My original hypothesis surmised that over time, a number of parallel policy streams and opportunity windows meant to address problems of development, energy demand, and climate change would effectively marginalize the science showing negative downstream impacts from the cascade. This process of marginalization would then also marginalize those actors championing a certain set of scientific data, and in turn, should the predicted negative impacts come to pass, push the enactment of solutions for such problems into the coming decade.

Over the past four chapters I have attempted to show what the science says about the impacts from the dam cascade, who decides what counts as impact science, and to what degree is it used. While addressing these questions, I placed them within the context of the wider domestic considerations of development to bring a better understanding of science’s role in China’s hydropower discourse. In this concluding chapter, I synthesize and sharpen the arguments I’ve made, discuss potential outcomes from my assessment of the negative impact science policy stream, explore their potential implications, and suggest areas of further research. I begin by examining possible outcomes from the conclusions made in chapter four.

2. The Cascade’s Impacts Going into the Future

The original cascade has since been modified to exclude the Mengsong dam, and has called for a smaller Ganlanba dam, which is currently being planned with basic preparatory work begun. This, along with the impending completion of the Nuozhadu dam later this year, means that the cascade is very nearly complete. The question, therefore, is no longer what should be done about possible future projects of the original plan, but rather how the impacts of the cascade will be dealt with going into the future.

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As stated in Rasanen et al (2012), the most significant impacts of the dam will be seen over the next decade, while the impacts of the climate change will be growing throughout the next half-century.

According to the fifth assessment report from the IPCC, over the past 30-50 years climate change in the lower Mekong basin has manifested through: an increase in

temperature, an increase in rainfall in the wet season and decreases in the dry season, intensified flood and drought events, and sea-level rise. In addition, according to the MRC (2009), agricultural output has noticeably been impacted by intensified floods and droughts, causing an almost 90% loss in rice production in Cambodia from 1996-2001.

Vietnam and Cambodia are the two countries most vulnerable to impacts on fisheries due to climate change, with sea level rise and decreased sediment in Vietnam and altered flood regimes in Cambodia (especially the Tonle Sap lake) (IPCC 2014). Studies on

Vietnam and Cambodia are the two countries most vulnerable to impacts on fisheries due to climate change, with sea level rise and decreased sediment in Vietnam and altered flood regimes in Cambodia (especially the Tonle Sap lake) (IPCC 2014). Studies on