Implications and Scholarly Contributions

In this study I endeavored to understand and explore what I saw as a missing piece in literature surrounding the hydropower development of the upper Mekong: the use of science by decision-makers. While a number of studies discussed the issue from a number of different angles – from regional security to geographical constructs – they all discussed the different claims of proponents of hydropower development versus

opponents of the dams. From what I could gather, however, I saw little exploration of the issue of why these different conclusions over impacts existed. I hypothesized that

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perhaps, like the discourse over climate change science in the United States congress, the differences may derive from an emphasis of differing scientific claims, with each side favoring specific conclusions.

While this research has not offered a complete understanding of all the nuances of the role of science in decision-making, I believe it is a good stepping stone to

understanding its role among a river of varying discourse and frameworks with which science is just one factor. As such, this research offers two important contributions to the study of hydropower development in China: the use of science within decision-making and discourse, and the potential theoretical use of domestic epistemic communities as a descriptor of science research organizations and their interaction with China’s

government.

The most important contribution, as I see it, is the problem of perspective in the use of science among decision-makers supporting hydropower development, and the other actors who oppose hydropower, or at the very least doubt its benefits. As seen both in this research and in, Brown et al 2008, Tullos 2009, Tullos et al 2010, there is a fundamental difference in how the groups understand and value the impacts that arise from dams. As seen in Tullos et al (2010), stakeholder perceptions changed based on quality of information, suggesting that stakeholder evaluations may be based on quality of information. This is an important factor in the objective evaluations of the magnitude of downstream impacts, because if stakeholders perceive the quality of the data lacking or unreliable, they are less likely to accept its conclusions. As my research shows, the

ambiguity of some of the downstream impact science may have created an opening for an emphasis of different scientific information. This implies that as information becomes more refined as well as an equalization of data quality and methodology becomes more widespread and spread out among both decision-makers and the public, it seems more likely that the views of objective data may become more uniform.

The second contribution is the use of Haas’s concept of epistemic communities as an analytical tool for domestic politics. I believe the framework of ECs work as insightful analytical tool into China’s domestic political process, and seems to be a topic

infrequently examined in research looking into the decision-making process in China.

ECs also represent a distinct difference from those policy entrepreneurs and coalitions as

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described by Mertha (2008). Rather than actively promoting a specific framework, these groups (in the case of this research the AIRC and engineers in the hydropower industry) influence policies by being consulted for their knowledge. As such, the specific expertise and scientific research coming out of these ECs, are more likely to be prioritized by decision-makers. As was shown in this research, the decision-makers for the development of hydropower on the Upper Mekong are essentially the hydropower companies

themselves – The Huaneng Group and its subsidiary Hydrolancang. Insomuch that approval for a given project has in the past been met with broad support from the Yunnan and Guangdong governments (Yang 1998; China News 2009), directly appealed to the central government (Magee 2006a), and/or simply begun without initial approval (Yan 2012), the viewpoints of and science used by the EC of engineers within those companies gains significant importance in the framing of downstream impacts. With the consultation another EC, the AIRC, it becomes clear that the science and viewpoints of these two pointedly not politically active ECs puts them in a position of great influence over the framing of downstream impacts. A position of influence not afforded the other non-governmental policy entrepreneurs in a political environment of shrinking “cracks” for viewpoints emphasizing the negatives of hydropower in China’s development. As such, ECs may offer a better understanding of the creation of future frameworks around the Upper Mekong cascade as for the foreseeable future; the consensus among decision-makers is that the cascade’s impacts are minimal, as supported by science.

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Figure 14: The contributions to the literature made by this research.

This research also brings about two important implications. First, with the establishment of what seems a “marginalized” set of scientific information among

decision-makers in this research, its potential re-emergence may offer important insights.

Specifically, should certain scientific claims generally only the purview of actors outside the decision-making process (i.e. NGOs, certain academics, etc.) begin to appear in statements from the Huaneng Group, MWR, NDRC, etc., it may signal a pending hydropower development change. However, given the development priorities set in the 12^th FYP, coupled with the gradual infilling of the Nuozhadu and Xiaowan dams, I believe it is unlikely that major development plan changes will occur over the next decade until the potential negative impacts become more prominent. Second, this research suggest that of the science used by decision-makers, it is likely to favor an

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engineering and mitigable impact perspective due to parallel policy streams, confirmation bias, international selection, scientific uncertainty, and the decision-making bureaucratic structure itself.