Summary of Findings

The first major finding of this research, was a distinct difference in the scientific evidence used and emphasized between hydropower companies and government bodies (e.g. NDRC, WRB, MOFA, Yunnan provincial government, etc.) and the academics, NGOs, and opponents of hydropower development both domestically and internationally

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(e.g. Qin 2010a,b,c; the IRN). The primary decision-makers behind development on the Upper Mekong, the Huaneng Group, the NDRC, and WRB all have show a clear emphasis on the same scientific claims over downstream impacts from the dam. All of which promote the benefits the cascade to navigation, irrigation, and flood/drought control downstream through the alteration of the hydrology, while also claiming that China is not a significant source of downstream sediment. Impacts to the ecology and fish populations seem to be an accepted risk, which is viewed as being minimized to

manageable levels. Interestingly, socioeconomic impacts, in terms of impacts to

downstream nations, seem to go relatively unacknowledged. Typically the framing with which those impacts are framed from the abovementioned government body and the hydropower industry all falls under economic integration for the region, and poverty relief both for Yunnan and the region through improve infrastructure and consistent electricity. More importantly, because of the Huaneng Group and Hydrolancang’s and NDRC’s relative dominance over the decision-making process in the development of the Upper Mekong, the science they use and emphasis becomes the dominant explanation and possibly the dominant understanding of downstream impacts.

The research suggests that there is an intentional framing of changes to

hydrological flow towards the positive by decision-makers. This is supported by the fact that the above organizations have repeatedly over the past two decades stated that

China’s impact to hydrology will be minimal as China’s overall contribution is relatively little, 13.5%. This ignores both seasonal and geographic differences in China’s water flow contribution. However, the cancellation of the Mengsong dam and the modification of the plans for the Ganlanba dam indicate an outward acceptance of biophysical

downstream impacts, and perhaps a tacit acceptance of negative hydrological impacts from each dam respectively.

This may also be seen with impacts to fisheries. While since the early-2000s officials and hydropower company representatives acknowledged potential impacts to fisheries downstream, the statements almost invariably included the means by which this impacts were either over-exaggerated or minimalized (favoring towards minimalization in the late-2000s). This goes against a majority of the scientific literature researching the issue covered in chapter 2. While the impacts vary depending on the scope of the research

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(less of an impact on migratory populations in the Upper Mekong without the Mengsong dam, major impacts on fisheries in the Lower Mekong), they invariably conclude that there are and will be significant ecosystem impacts from the cascade. Decision-maker statements, however, emphasize only the mitigable impacts to fish populations, again suggesting an intentional selection of certain science and policy solutions.

The claims made by the MWR and Hydrolancang on China’s contribution to sediment load to the lower Mekong, on the other hand, suggests a different understanding of the available science and/or the passive selection of different dataset. Given the

research in chapter two, I am fairly confident that a majority of international researchers, and a minority of Chinese researchers agree that China is responsible for roughly 50% of the Lower Mekong’s sediment load. However, due to the difficulty of obtaining full, reliable, long-term data sets in the region, the possibility for uncertainty, and varying conclusions seems to have left China’s sediment load with some ambiguity. While the international and Chinese sources supporting this derive from a wide number of sources, a smaller grouping of Chinese and English language articles coming from the AIRC as well as government statements suggest that in fact the majority of the sediment in the lower Mekong derives from northern Laos. This suggests the information being used by Hydrolancang and the MWR is being selected from a larger pool of research as the primary understanding of impacts on sediment flow. Although whether this occurred due to simple confirmation bias or intentional selection is unclear. However, the relative lack of emphasis on the negative downstream ecological implications from a modified

hydrology and sediment flow seems to suggest that the role of sediment in terms of impacts to ecology and sociopolitical impacts have not been factored into the

understanding decision-makers have surrounding the cascade’s downstream impacts. The AIRC’s findings on sediment flow, along with their acknowledged consultations with Hydrolancang, suggests that this particular epistemic community may be a significant contributor to decision-makers understanding of downstream impacts.

The second and related finding of this research is the predominance of mitigated impacts versus the marginalization of certain negative impact science. As discussed in both chapters three and four, the downstream impact science policy stream seems to have made a split in the years since Wen Jiabao’s retirement. Those actors and scientific

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frameworks stating that the negative impacts of the cascade are not only limited, but can be reduced to the point of a manageable and minimal impacts have been brought in to the decision-making process. While this has not, to my knowledge, taken the form of sitting down with representatives of the NDRC to discuss the specifics of new dam development in the upper Mekong in Tibet, actors like the AIRC and He Daming are included in the process through consultation and research collaboration²⁸. Through this, the AIRC has the opportunity to influence the hydropower industry and government’s understanding of downstream impacts. The selection of the AIRC for these consultations seems to derive in part from He Daming’s and the organization’s relative silence during the Nu river controversy of the mid-2000s. That, along with their reputation as a legitimate, respected source of good empirical evidence put them in the prime position to remain a relevant actor in the decision-making process. This is contrasted with, as far as I could see, a backing away from the support of NGOs and other anti-dam actors after the end of Wen Jiabao’s tenure. This offers an important split in the downstream impact science stream, as those epistemic communities (ECs) pushing the idea of careful mitigation of the dams impacts (e.g. the AIRC) have remained present, active members of the decision-makers understanding of the cascade’s impacts, while those actors which emphasized the

negative, not-easily-mitigated impacts (e.g. NGOs: Yu Xiaogang, Friends of Nature, etc.) have been increasingly excluded from decisions on continued development on the Upper Mekong. This again suggests a selection of specific information based on intentional choices, confirmation bias, or both within decision-making circles.

As discussed in chapter 3, decision-makers likely have the same access to, if not more access to, the scientific data on downstream impacts. As such, the differences in the conclusions on hydrology, for example, suggest a difference in perspective as well as confirmation bias. That is to say, the viewpoints of pro-hydropower development

government officials, hydropower company representatives, and an epistemic community of dam engineers in both sectors specifically view the importance (salience) and

magnitude of impacts described in the science in a fundamentally different way than do critics of hydropower development (typically NGOs and academics). This difference has                                                                                                                

28  Interview  01:  Fu  Kaidao,  senior  researcher  at  the  AIRC;  Interview  05:  AIRC   researcher;  Interview  06:  AIRC  researcher  

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the potential of being a very strong determinant of how the available scientific data is interpreted. In addition, the scientific data on downstream impacts is riddled with the vagaries of differing data sets, with varying methodologies and quality. Therefore, decision-makers emphasize scientific evidence stating that the primary source of sediment for the lower Mekong is in northern Laos over another set of science claiming China is the source of roughly half of downstream sediment. In a similar vein, the research also shows that changes to the hydrology of the Mekong will have strong, negative consequences on the downstream ecology and therefore livelihoods, seems to be intentionally downplayed in favor of studies emphasizing both a limited hydrological change and improved navigation, flood control, and drought relief.

The only suggestion of an acknowledgement of downstream biophysical impacts are in the mitigation techniques employed immediately around reservoirs, and the steps taken to ensure migratory fish populations. I believe this to be suggestive of a potential

“blind-side” in decision-maker’s analysis of downstream impacts, and of a different understanding of impacts. As the statements seen in chapter three and four suggest, the conclusion reached by developers is that of limited downstream impacts, and as such impacts to the ecology derived from changes to water and sediment flow is just as minimal. This is coupled by the other seeming consensus among developers that

hydropower construction is one of the best means of poverty reduction. As such potential economic losses incurred by this limited impacts are then ameliorated by the increased economic opportunities afforded the region through more electricity, navigation,

improved irrigation, and protection from droughts and floods. This leaves the region in a bit of a catch-22. There are no doubt benefits to be had from improved navigation and the flattening of the hydrological cycle. The possibility of protection from floods and

droughts is an appealing prospect to many downstream, and improved navigation will no doubt bring trade, jobs, and money to riparian nations. This must be balanced against the negative impacts described and predicted in much of the available science. What remains to be seen in the next coming decade is to what extent the negative impacts of the now growing cascade can indeed be mitigated.

Mitigation will depend greatly on how the cascade itself is managed, as discussed above. Again, this creates another balancing act for the dam operators: the priorities of

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electricity production and the priorities of flood prevention and drought relief. For now, while both the Xiaowan and Nuozhadu reservoirs continue to in fill, the current operation method seems to be that of strategic filling – not filling during the dry season while intermittently filling during the wet season (Yang 2011). Currently this method is billed as a reassurance to downstream countries that the water levels will remain consistent for the purposes of navigation and hydropower electricity production (Yang 2011; Zhang 2012). After the reservoirs finish infilling, it remains to be seen as to how, if possible, the cascade operators will strike a balance between electricity production and flow

regulation. Given the high levels of sedimentation in the mid- upper Mekong basin (see:

Fu et al 2006, 2007b, 2008) and history of difficulty in striking this balance on the Three Gorges Dam and Sanmenxia dams (Qin 2010a, 2010b), it will no doubt be a difficult road ahead.

The final major finding was the emergence of a discourse of mitigation of impacts that seemed to evolve over the course of the mid-2000s and the Nu river controversy. In the early 2000s the statements from Hydrolancang, MWR, and Yunnan governor all framed the cascade, and the more pressing project at the time the Xiaowan dam, as a means of relieving regional poverty through the green energy of hydropower. At the time, as far as I could tell, there was very little talk of mitigating the impacts of the cascade.

Instead, statements focused on the lack of impact derived from the current dams (at the time the Manwan and Dachaoshan), and the expected benefits from Xiaowan’s regulatory capacity.

With the passing of the Water Law in 2002 and the EIA law in 2003, the changing laws afforded NGOs, activists, and the media a greater foothold in the hydropower

development framework than previously experienced. With Wen Jiabao’s halting of major projects in 2004, and SEPA’s “EIA storm” crackdown in 2005, the major policy streams, and their respective actors, pushing for hydropower development were forced to recalibrate their development priorities. While chapter 3 and 4 showed evidence that the NDRC and hydropower companies intended to continue forward with hydropower development, the actions of Wen Jiabao, public and media support of a reexamination of development projects, and SEPA’s bureaucratic flexing forced the major decision-makers on the Mekong to reevaluate development projects based on their potential environmental

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impacts. This is evidenced the cancellation of the Mengsong dam because of concerns over impacts to migrating fish populations in 2010 (Yan 2012; IRN 2013), and the modification of Ganlanba into a regulatory dam in 2011 (IRN 2013).

These changes occurred after another focusing event, the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, in which China committed itself to dropping coal consumption as a percentage of primary energy to below 65% by 2017, while constructing an additional 160 GW of hydropower in the same time period, in order to drastically reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Li et al 2014). The exiting of the State Council government

championing “scientific development” and a reexamination of hydropower projects in 2012, saw in its transition period a merging of the wider concerns of the now termed

“low-carbon development” and environmental impact concerns in the mid-2000s. This is evidenced by the co-authored NDRC and MEP law calling for EIAs to be an integral part of hydropower development in 2011 (Yi 2013). Therefore, while the dominant policy streams of low-carbon development, poverty alleviation, energy demand, and regional integration inexorably moved large-scale dam projects to the forefront achieving these goals, the reexamination of development in the mid-2000s caused a change in tone of developmental discourse. This change in discourse afforded those actors in the downstream impacts science stream offering a favorable addition to the solution of continued development through mitigation a chance to remain, and perhaps expand, their influence on the decision-making process. While those actors that pushed for the ideas not favorable to continued development effectively lost their seat at the table.