International Relations Theory
and Cross-Strait Relations
Amitav Acharya
（Associate Professor of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada）Abstract
This paper examines the future of cross-strait relations by using three major theoretical perspectives on international relations: Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism, and Constructivism. Some strands of international relations theory, especially Neo-realism, support the argument that the time is now right for Taipei to make a decisive bid for independence. But this view could be misleading. The paper highlights different material and normative structures within which leaders both in Beijing and Taipei view and interpret each other's decisions and actions. It also highlights the expectations of the international community about what would be regarded as "proper" conduct by the leaders of both mainland and Taiwan in handling cross-strait issues. These expectations, rooted in Liberal and Constructivist perspectives, indicate that Taipei perhaps can and should wait longer if it really seeks either peaceful reunification or even peaceful separation from mainland China.
International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations1
Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently,one must admit, with good, reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policy-makers who are contemptuous of "theory" must rely on their own (often un-stated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one's basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories -- whether he or she knows or not - and disagreements about policy usually rest on the more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes.
Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many theories", Foreign Policy (Spring 1998), p.29
It is perhaps necessary to begin this essay with an explanation as to why theory may help us to develop a better understanding of world events, and I dare say, devise better solutions to problems of world order. I suggest the following reasons as to why policy-makers can benefit from the insights of international relations theory. First, my key assumption here is that theory is not simply an abstraction. Nor does it exist in isolation from the policy realm.
In preparing this essay, I have benefited tremendously from the web-site, Taiwan Security Research 〈http://taiwansecurity.org〉, maintained by Professor Philip Yang of National Taiwan University.
Theory-building closely follows the course of world politics. It often reflects our desire not only to explain change, but also to provide better solutions to problems of world order. Second, theory reflects the accumulated wisdom of a discipline by building on comparisons between actors, events and outcomes in many different parts of the world. As such, theory can help us learn from the experience of others, and overcome the parochialism that often characterises the policy-maker's mental universe.
Third, theory provides us with alternative lenses for explaining events and responding to them. Take, for example, the crisis over the Taiwanese President's remarks that China-Taiwan relations are now being considered as relations between two states. One theoretical lens would see these remarks as a product of domestic imperatives, especially President Lee's desire to leave a legacy as the man who brought Taiwan closer to independence while at the same time undermining the pro-independence opposition Democratic Progressive Party's electoral prospects. Another theoretical lens would suggest that President Lee's remarks reflect his understanding of the changing balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. In this view, which reflects Neorealist assumptions, the Taiwanese president is pushing for independence now before China could acquire the military capacity to take over Taiwan forcibly and deter any US intervention to prevent such an outcome.2 Yet another lens would see President
Lee's remarks as having been inspired by an assessment of the changing global norms concerning freedom and non-intervention. See Denny Roy, "Taiwan Takes a Strategic Gamble," The Straits Times, 16 July 1999, p.54.
Since these norms are now supposed to favour democratic regimes against their autocratic rivals, could they have emboldened the President into making these remarks?
While theory cannot provide neat answers to all these questions, it helps to organise our thinking about them and formulate our reaction. If we accept the Neo-realist logic, then the President of Taiwan should be understood as a pro-active leader willing to take bold and timely action to defend Taiwan's autonomy and interests. If we take the domestic politics argument, then the President may be criticised for being reckless and irresponsible, without regard for the consequences of his action for Taiwan's long-term interests and for regional stability of Asia Pacific as whole.
Finally, theory can help us anticipate, if not always predict accurately, the course of events in world politics. For example, Neo-realist theory tells us that multipolar international systems are likely to prove less stable than bipolar ones.3 The more the number of
major actors, the greater the room for uncertainty, misperception and miscalculation. Could this explain some of the tensions in Sino-US relations today? Chinese leaders and analysts insist that the emerging trend in the international system is towards multipolarity. Yet, from Kuwait to Kosovo, American strategic primacy has been Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, No.3, 1964; Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). An opposite view can be found in Karl W, Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Richard N. Rosecrance, " Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," in ibid.
confirmed repeatedly since the end of Cold War. The mismatch between Beijing's belief systems and what many independent analysts would consider to be the "reality" of international order today creates considerable scope for Chinese miscalculation, setting the stage for a more confrontational relationship with the US.
In the sections that follow, I outline three major theoretical perspectives on international relations, and use them as analytical frameworks to study the prospects for cross-strait relations. These theories are Neorealism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Although they do not exhaust the range of theoretical perspectives available, I would limit myself to these three, as I believe they capture what I believe to be the key forces shaping cross-strait relations today.
Neo-realism: Balancing and Concerting
Neo-Realism explains international relations in terms of the structural properties of the international system, especially the distribution of power.4 Unlike classical realism,it does not see human
nature as an important variable in war and peace. Neither does it pay much attention to domestic politics, which is central to Liberal theory's explanations of international relations. Neo-realists take a dark view of international relations. Conflict and war are unavoidable because the international system is anarchic, i.e. having no higher authority above the state. In anarchy, states seek security through self-help, either by increasing their own military and economic capabilities, and/or through alliance with stronger powers. But security can only be achieved in a limited way, because of the
operation of the "security dilemma", whereby attempts by any state to improve its security by acquiring the means of power provokes other states to follow suit, thereby rendering the initiating state as insecure as before.
Neo-realists dismiss the role of international institutions in regulating state behaviour and promoting peace.5 Institutions are
creatures of self-interested great powers. They simply reflect, rather than shape, the prevailing distribution of power. In terms of international stability, institutions matter only in the margins. What really matters is the balance of power. All self-help systems tend to be governed by a balance of power dynamic maintained by the great powers. States tend to balance their rivals domestically, by acquiring greater military and economic power, or by building alliances with stronger powers.
As noted at the outset, Neo-realist theory may suggest why it makes sense for Taiwan to make a bid for independence now, (if that is how we read President Lee's infamous remarks), rather than at some point in future, when the growth of the PRC's military capabilities could change its professed intention to seek peaceful reunification with Taiwan and when its long-range second strike capability would deter US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Yet the same perspective would also indicate why a pro-independence posture by Taiwan driven by balance of power considerations may not work, and even prove to be highly dangerous, at this juncture. Neo-realist theory tells us that the balance of power involving more John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol.19, No.3, 1994/95, pp.5-49.
than two actors tends to be inherently unstable because of the difficulties in making a reliable calculation of the balance. In the context of the cross-strait balance, the difficulty stems from its essentially "triangular" nature (the US being an actor). The current mainland-Taiwan military balance would perhaps allow Taipei to raise the costs of a mainland military takeover to a level high enough to deter such action by Beijing. But this assessment may prove over optimistic. A more realistic scenario would be to see Taipei holding out against a mainland invasion for long enough for the US to come to its aid. A prolonged conflict without US intervention, or a limited US involvement in support of Taipei, could end with victory for Beijing.
But can Taipei be certain about the nature and scale of US military support in the event of a mainland attack? Despite Bill Clinton's warnings to Beijing that he would "take very seriously" any attempt by Beijing to resolve the current crisis by force,6 and
despite the current anti-China mood in the US (where a growing number of Americans now see Beijing as a major threat to US national security, as recent opinion polls show), US military support for Taiwan would be constrained by a host of political and operation considerations. Domestic public opinion may be against Taipei if the latter is seen to have deliberately provoked a confrontation with Beijing. Moreover, US forces are exhausted from the Kosovo operation and there are good reasons to doubt their ability to handle contingencies simultaneously in the Taiwan strait and other theatres (the Gulf or
"Clinton Urges Taiwan-China Calm," Associated Press, 20 July 1999, p. 1.〈http://taiwansecurity.org/.AP/Ap-ClintonUrgesTaiwanChinaCalm.htm〉.
North Korea, for example). Thus, Taipei is liable to miscalculate if it assumes, as some reports have suggested,7 that the US government,
backed by a swelling of anti-China sentiments in the Congress in the wake of the Kosovo-related episodes as well as the espionage charges, would now be more motivated and able to support Taiwan in a confrontation with China.
Neo-realist theory thus alerts us to the risks of Taipei misreading the balance of power that could contribute to a dangerous escalation of the cross-strait conflict. But it also suggests ways in which tensions could be managed and the potential for escalation defused. While Neo-realists are generally skeptical of the prospects for cooperation among the great powers, one form of cooperation that could be consistent with their thinking is the idea of a concert of powers. A concert is a managed balance of power system through which the great powers undertake a joint management of international order. The classical concert system which operated in early 19th century Europe was based on the principle of "equal status" of the great powers, no humiliation of any of them, the maintenance of the territorial status quo except with the consent of the all members of the concert, and frequent consultations among them to coordinate their strategic policies. An Asian concert involving the US, China, Japan and Russia, and resembling the relatively institutionalized European model is unlikely for a number of reasons.8 But as Brian
Job, Susan Shirk and myself have argued, an ad hoc and issue-specific concert relationship aimed at defusing high-level regional "Taiwan Takes Big Risk in Rejecting One-China Policy," Reuters, 12 July 1999.〈http://tawainsecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990712.htm〉, p.2.
tensions might have already been evident in the management of bilateral relationships among some of the great powers and with respect to regional conflicts such as the Korean peninsula.9 A
concerting "element" in Sino-US relations can be derived from Washington's willingness to recognise China's great power status (by agreeing to a joint response to the South Asian nuclear tests last year) and minimize its sense of humiliation from the Kosovo episode. It should be noted the Sino-US "constructive strategic partnership" was born out of the ashes of the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis (just as detente was born out of the Cuban missile crisis). The current Taiwan strait crisis could mark the stage for a new understanding between Washington and Beijing over the cross-strait issue. This might have already been evident in the prompt American action in reassuring Beijing about its continued adherence to the " one China" policy while simultaneously restraining Taipei from aggravating the crisis. It might also explain Beijing's cautious response to President Lee's "state-to-state" remarks, reflecting perhaps a desire not to risk any further deterioration of its ties with the US after the spate of recent setbacks.10
ibid.; Brian L. Job, "A Matter of Delicate Diplomacy: Prospects for a Concert of Powers in the Asia Pacific," Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Diego, USA, September 1996; Susan Shirk, "Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?" in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp.245-270.
Paul Eckert, "Limits Seen to China's Rage at Taiwan," Reuters, July 16, 1999.〈http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990716.htm〉.
Liberalism: Interdependence and Democratic Peace
As a theory of international relations, liberalism has several strands, at least two of which (interdependence and Democratic Peace) are noteworthy here (a third strand, liberal institutionalism, will be discussed in the next section, as it relates more closely to the Constructivist position). The first, dating to the days of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Cordell Hull, argues that economic in-terdependence (originally free trade) creates peace by increasing the costs of war.11 The interdependence argument is often held tobe Taiwan's best hope for discouraging a military takeover by Beijing. According to this logic, a cross-strait war would be so severely damaging to Beijing that it would be effectively deterred from launching a military attack on Taiwan except as a very last resort. Apart from bilateral trade, it will affect China's trade and business climate as a whole, while economic disruptions and the threat to the sea-lanes would draw in the world's other major powers who are likely to be more sympathetic to Taipei than Beijing. This line of thinking remains popular in the region today. The latest support for the argument came from an editorial in the Hong Kong Economic Journal in the wake of the Taiwanese President's "state-to-state" remarks. Giving reasons why it thought a mainland attack Ernst B. Haas, "War, Interdependence and Functionalism," in Raimo Vayrynen, ed., The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War among Societies, Cultures and States (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1987); For a critique of the Liberal position see: Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization, Vol.38, No.4, 1984.
on Taiwan was unlikely, the Journal argued:
Once war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the bulk of China's economic achievements that have been built up painstakingly over the last 20 years will become history and China's national fate will henceforth be reversed. Even after it has wrest (sic) control of Taiwan, China's coastal provinces and even Hongkong - left in ruins by the conflict - will have to be rebuilt. Is Beijing really willing to go to war at such expense?12
The economic stakes behind Beijing's apparent restraint, the Journal argued,include US $20 billion worth of cross-strait trade, (up from a mere US $77 million in 1979, registering an average annual growth rate of over 40 per cent), over 5,000 Taiwan-funded companies with a total investment of over US $10 billion (the actual figure is probably considerably higher) in the Mainland's Fujian province, and 9,300 Taiwanese companies with a total investment of US $11.2 billion in the Guangdong province. (According to other estimates, total Taiwanese investments in the mainland amount to US $30 billion).13
While disruptions of such proportions may seem intolerable for Beijing, the interdependence argument cuts both ways. Cross-strait trade and investments are as much a boon to Taiwan as a bane. Critics argue that it makes Taiwan overly dependent on the mainland, and as such a hostage to Beijing's manipulation.14 Although Beijing's
This editorial in the Hong Kong Economic Journal was translated and reprinted in The Straits Times, 22 July 1999, p.46.
"Taiwan Takes Big Risk in Rejecting One-China Policy," Reuters, 12 July 1999.〈http://tawainsecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990712.htm〉, p.2.
efforts to draw a wedge between Taiwanese investor's and its President have not worked in the past, this could change in a future crisis in which Taiwanese leaders are seen by their business groups as being rash and unduly provocative towards Beijing. Moreover, economic interdependence perhaps constrains China less (in taking over Taiwan by force) than it constrains Taiwan from pursuing outright secession. This message came through clearly during the recent crisis, when the Taipei's stock index recorded its steepest one-day point drop in nine years and the Taiwan dollar lost value because of fears of war.
To lessen its economic dependence on the mainland, Taipei has encouraged its businesses to go south. This forms another aspect of the interdependence argument, whereby Taiwan's economic links with Southeast Asia may be seen as an additional diplomatic tool against the mainland. These investments increases the stake of the regional neighbours in cross-strait stability, hence any military action by the mainland that disrupts Taiwan's investments in the region would generate regional anger against Beijing. (It should be noted that Taiwanese investments in Southeast Asia have lost their net value owing to the Asian economic crisis.) But Taiwan's interdependence with Southeast Asia means that its own actions with regard to cross-strait relations will be viewed by its neighbours in terms of their regional impact. While countries which have received Taiwanese investment will have a stake in stable Mainland-Taiwan relations, they would also expect Taipei to behave "responsibly" in handling See: Tse-Kang Leng, "A Political Analysis of Taiwan's Economic Dependence on Mainland China," Issues & Studies, Vol. 34, No. 8, 1998.
cross-strait relations.
While economic interdependence is thus a double-edged sword for Taiwan, its leaders surveying the international scene have much to be heartened about the other key element of liberal international order: the democratic peace argument which is supposed to guide the foreign relations of western countries. The view that democracies are more "pacific" than autocracies, or at least that they do not fight one another, has become the major axiom of Western policy.
15 As such, "enlarging" democracy has followed the Cold War policy
of "containing" communism. Taiwan is perhaps the only political entity in the world where the West, especially the US, could pursue both goals simultaneously; supporting democratic Taiwan also means "containing" communist China. This is how many Americans, especially in the US Congress, view the US role in the cross-strait conflict.
But the Taiwanese defence planners can hardly rest on the Democratic Peace"logic. Whether it would translate into Western public support for Taiwan in a confrontation with China is questionable, given the heavy material and human cost of any Sino-US war, especially if Taipei's actions are seen as a severe provocation to Beijing. Moreover, the US and other major Western powers are
The important literature on Democratic Peace includes: Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Foreign Affairs, Vol.12, 1983, pp.205-235; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-86," American Political Science Review, Vol.87, 1993, pp.624-638.
constrained by their own economic interests in mainland China as well as by a sense of geopolitical pragmatism in dealing with cross-strait issues. The US needs Beijing's support in dealing with a range of other issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Korean peninsula and South Asia. While cross-strait stability is a key area of US global strategic concern, the US would weigh its gains from a confrontation with Beijing against the costs in others areas of mutual concern.
Critics of democratic peace theory would also argue that democratization has been responsible for the current instability in cross-strait relations. Democratic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s might have been partly responsible for Taiwan's decision to drop its claim to be the legitimate government representing all of China. Moreover, democratization has contributed to the erosion of the traditional "consensus" in Taiwan on relations with the People's Republic of China. The ongoing process of democratization has created the space for bureaucrats and officials to articulate positions on important policy matters which do not necessarily correspond with stated official positions. In this situation, relations with mainland China could be undermined by officials who seek to pursue the traditional rivalry between the two states, or by those who, because they support the establishment of an independent Taiwanese state, do not wish to facilitate a process of reconciliation that could reintegrate Taiwan into the Chinese polity.16
Democracy creates a new identity for Taiwan, one that many I am grateful to J.D. Kenneth Boutin for sharing his insights into the bureaucratic politics aspects shaping Taiwan's mainland policy.
of its citizens may find to be incompatible with reunification with a mainland that remains a communist dictatorship. As such, Taiwan has taken the position that reunification with the mainland would be possible if the latter went through a democratic transition (as well as renounce the use of force against Taiwan). President Lee has himself urged Beijing to carry out democratic reforms so as to create better conditions for peaceful reunification.17 One assumes
that this policy has not been overtaken by his "state-to-state" remarks, which has effectively changed the discourse of cross-strait relations from reunification with mainland to independence from it.
It is perhaps more reasonable to see democratization in Taiwan as having a dual effect; it aggravates and moderates the mainland - Taiwan rivalry. On the one hand, the stance of Taiwan's President reflects the normal domestic political dynamics of a democratic state. In this sense, the key to stabilizing cross-strait ties lies not just in constraining China or persuading it abandon the use of force, but also in constraining Taipei, which for domestic reasons is likely to adopt policies that Beijing would find provocative. But democratization already to some extent constrains Taiwan from resorting to rash action in pursuing autonomy from China. Opinion polls in Taiwan show that the people of Taiwan generally expect their government to maintain better ties with China, which now drives a growing portion of Taiwan's economic growth. This means actions on the part of the Taipei government which are perceived by its public as being too rash may not receive widespread domestic support, even "Taiwan Redefines China Relations," Associated Press, 10 July 1999, p. 1.〈http://taiwansecurity.org/Ap/AP-990710.htm〉.
if they are designed to further the goal of independence that the people of Taiwan generally cherish.
Finally, democratization in mainland China does not offer a guarantee of peaceful reunification as some leaders in Taiwan expect. Available evidence suggests that the peaceful conduct of relations among democracies as claimed by the Democratic Peace theory applies mainly to "mature" liberal democracies, not nascent or illiberal systems pretending to be democracies or still in the process of democratic transitions.18 A democratized China could still pursue
an aggressively nationalist agenda towards Taiwan, as its new political factions seek to exploit the issue to gain domestic advantage.
Constructivism: Socialization and Institutionalism
Constructivism19 explains the causes of war partly, if not
exclusively, in terms of the conflicting identities (self-perceptions) of states. Constructivism would see the conflict between Taiwan
Bruce Russett, "A Neo-Kantian Perspective on Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations in Building Security Communities," in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.368-394; Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "The Effects of Democratization on War," International Security, Vol. 20, No.4, Spring 1996, pp.196-207.
On Constructivism, see, Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol.88, No.2, 1994, Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol.20, 1995, pp.384-396; Jeffrey T. Checkel, " The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics, Vol.50, 1998, pp.324-348.
and the mainland in terms of a clash of two distinct identities, between an inward-looking, intensely nationalist, acutely historically-minded, highly sovereignty-bound, and monolithic state vis-a-vis an outward-looking, democratic and "internationalized" state relatively at ease with ideas and influences from the outside world because of its commitment to globalization. Because of their differing identities, the two entities have different understandings of the cross-strait relationship, and different ideas about how to handle and resolve it.
Constructivists see cooperation not in the minimalist game theoretic terms, nor as the byproduct of purely utility-maximizing behaviour by states (as Neo-Liberal theory would), but rather as a process of social learning in which interactions produce shared understandings of reality, redefine interests and may even lead to the development of collective identities that could ameliorate the security dilemma. For Constructivists, state interests are not pre-given or a constant, but subject to modification and redefinition as a result of mutual constitution between agents (states) and structures (norms).
Constructivists have argued that socialization in the Asia Pacific region through multilateral institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) would gradually lead to the development of norms of peaceful conduct that would reorient the regional actors from resorting to war as a means of problem-solving. As such, the Constructivist perspective would see President Lee's "state-to-state" remarks as being counterproductive, because should it lead to a cross-strait
war, the ongoing process of regional security dialogues, aimed at "socializing" China into a regional community, would be severely damaged. This perhaps explains why reactions in the region to President Lee's comments have been generally negative, suggesting that a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan will not be welcomed by its regional neighbours.
But the Constructivist argument has obvious weaknesses. What sort of socialization is taking placing across or involving the Taiwan Strait? Bilateral exchanges between the two have not been very fruitful. Ralph Cossa argues that the President Lee's two state theory shows his growing frustration with the mainland's refusal to accord Taiwan a politically equal position in the cross-straits talks, which the Taiwanese President finds politically unacceptable and personally insulting.20 If this assessment is correct (as I think it to be), then
Beijing must be held responsible for not giving the cross-strait talks a fair chance, and this itself reflects its unwillingness to take the "social" route to resolving problems with Taiwan.
From the Taiwanese perspective, the Constructivist argument looks even weaker.Most multilateral security dialogues exclude Taiwan (except the South China Sea workshops, and CSCAP) where Taiwanese participation is restricted). Most significantly, Taipei is outside the region's main multilateral security framework, the ASEAN Regional Forum. To make matters worse, President Lee's proposal for an Asian collective security (wrong choice of phrase, even the ARF cannot aspire to collective security) system has evoked no Ralph A. Cossa, "Cross-Straits Relations: Now What?" PacNet #28, July 16, 1999.
sympathetic response from Asia Pacific governments who are ostensibly committed to multilateralism and cooperative security. Thus, Taipei is entitled to register frustration with the institutionalist approach to regional order. Not long ago, President Lee did exactly that, with the following words:
After the end of the Cold War, all the countries in the world have strengthened dialogue and cooperation to reduce tensions and maintain safety. However, to this day the security of Taiwan Strait [sic] and the South Seas, important air and sea passageways in the West Pacific, cannot yet be ensured. The major reasons are the refusal of Peking authorities to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, the rapid expansion in their military budget year after year, the acceleration of their deployment of missiles and other offensive weapons, and their unilateral suspension of institutionalized cross-strait consultations. These actions delay the establishment of normal relations between the two sides and present a threat to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region.21
Neorealist thinking dismisses the impact of multilateralism in constraining the behaviour of great powers in the Asia Pacific.22
Their critique acquires greater force at a time when the Asian economic crisis is seen to have weakened the prospects for multilateralism in the region.23 Critics also point to the fact that
Lee Teng-hui, "Normalizing Cross-Straits Relations: Closing Remarks to the 14th Plenum of the National Unification Council by President Lee Teng-hui," Exchange, No.45, 1999, 4.
Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper No.302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).
Beijing itself continues to have reservations about multilateralism, despite having warmed to the concept considerably since the early 1990s. Refusal to rule out the use of force is the main reason why Beijing has adopted an extremely cautious attitude towards preventive diplomacy. At a CSCAP meeting aimed at drafting a definition of preventive diplomacy that would be acceptable to the ARF members, China's objections succeeded in defining the concept as strictly being applicable to "inter-state" conflicts. China does not want the ARF to develop a role in handling regional conflicts, and this position is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future.24
But as I had argued elsewhere, even a process of institution-building that excludes Taiwan offers "spill-over" benefits for its peace and security.25 This is because Beijing's attempt to justify
use of force against Taipei by claiming that it was an internal affair of China is unlikely to fully reassure its neighbours, who would see it as a sign of Chinese militarism. Thus, any use of force by Beijing against Taiwan is bound to make its neighbours nervous, even if they do not support Taiwan's cause, and even if Beijing makes a strenuous distinction between use of force in its "domestic" affairs and forcible action internationally. It will call into question Amitav Acharya, "Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic Crisis," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.21, No.1, April 1999, p.21.
Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, eds., The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999). Amitav Acharya and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "An Elusive Partnership: Canada and Asia Pacific Security," Canadian Studies 1997 (Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, 1998), in Chinese.
China's adherence to the norm of peaceful conduct in the region, which multilateral interactions are seeking to promote. While the ARF as an institution may not be able to address the Taiwan issue, multilateralism and cooperative security as a normative framework does create dilemmas for Beijing in using force against Taiwan. For example, Beijing's adoption of a more restrained attitude over President's Lee's "state-to-state" comments than many had anticipated may be based on a realisation that a degree of self control would gain it sympathy from the regional and international community that it has been socialising with through multilateral fora.26 Taipei,
a Constructivist might argue, would do well to take note of these effects of multilateralism, even as it remains excluded from most such fora.
Conclusion
Since international relations theory often reflects evolving trends in world order, it provides a good snap shot of the principles that would affect the perceptions and responses of the international community with respect to challenges to international peace and stability. The cross-strait situation is no exception. Some strands of international relations theory, especially Neo-Realism, may support the argument that the time is now right for Taipei to make a decisive bid for independence. But suggesting when and how Taipei should act and predicting the future course of cross-strait relations are not the real points of this exercise. International relations theory has John Pomfret, "Beijing Power Struggle Clouds the Issue," Washington Post, July 18, 1999.
another, perhaps more important contribution to make in explaining cross-strait relations. This is to illuminate the different material and normative structures within which leaders both in Beijing and Taipei would view and interpret each other's decisions and actions. It also highlights the expectations of the international community about what would be regarded as "proper" conduct by the leaders of both mainland and Taiwan in handling cross-strait issues. These expectations, rooted in Liberal and Constructivist perspectives, indicate that Taipei perhaps can and should wait longer if it really seeks either peaceful reunification or even peaceful separation from mainland China.
Paper Presented to the International Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait, Taipei Taiwan, July 26-28, 1999
Hosted by the 21st Century Foundation, Co-Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute
