從奧古斯丁談世界觀的構成：從他的轉宗觀點來看 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學哲學系碩士學位論文. 治政政治大大立立從奧古斯丁談世界觀的構成：從他的轉宗觀點來看 ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. The Constitution of St. Augustine’s Worldview: From His Viewpoint. er. n i on Naatti o N. s iitt yy. ‧ ‧. of Conversion. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 指導教授：汪文聖研究生：林郁翎. 博士撰. 中華民國一Ｏ九年七月. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(2) Acknowledgement I would like to thank those people who help, support, and inspire me in completing my thesis. Each of them is so admirable and respectful that I cannot detail them here, so I can only note their names below in order to show my appreciation. National Chengchi University: Department of Philosophy: Prof. Wen-Shen Wang, Kuo-Shen Chang Oral Committee Members: Qiang-Bao Zeng, Shu-Fen Lin. 治政治大Huang, Yuan-Lin Tsai 政 Graduate Institute of Religious Studies: Prof. Po-Chi 大立立 Department of English Literature: Wendy Hu, Brendan Huang, Alice Lin Members of Study Group: Da-Kuan Liu, Yi-Wun Lai, Roseric Li. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. Department of Psychology: Yu-Tzu Yang, Fang-Yu Hu. ‧ ‧. Kyudo Club: Yu-An Chen, Shan-Yun Shin, Ying-Lin Huang, Masters of Kyudo. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. Tunghai University:. er. Department of English Literature: Prof. Shu-Chu Wei. Ariel Wu, Alice Zheng, Adeiv Tsai, Huang, Mavis Chen aalRachel v i l n n CCShing-Shang Department of Philosophy: Prof. Wen-Pin Chiang, I-Chung Chang hheennggccLin, hhii UU Department of Chinese: Prof. Jin-Tang Peng, Fenling Zhou. Yan-Chen Lin Department of History: May Hsu Finally, I need to thank my mother Yu-Li Lin, my sister Chia-Hsuan Lin and the other relatives for their generosity and patience during the phase of my thesis writing. Also, I have to thank Augustine and Heidegger because they lead me into a world that I would have never thought about before.. 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(3) 摘要. 本篇論文想離開傳統哲學或神學觀點，重新理解作為事實性此有(Factical Dasein)的奧古斯丁是如何從存有論的科學(ontological science)轉向存有者的科學(ontic science)來建構自己的世界觀。筆者主要透過海德格早期在《宗教生活現象學》中所提及的形式指引(Formal indication)方法討論聖奧古斯丁的轉宗經驗(conversion experience)。其主要論述的走向為，根據奧古斯丁在《懺悔錄》第十冊當中描述世俗世界的三種誘惑(desire of flesh, curiosity, be feared and loved) 配合海德格的事實性生活經驗(Factical life experience). 治政治大政存有論式(ontological)的語言踐行(the enactment of language)逐步在共同世界中建構一個大立立屬己歷史(ownmost history)的前信仰世界觀(pre-faithful worldview)，接著又如何因為好奇的三層世界(surrounding world, communal world, self-world)，爬梳奧古斯丁如何透過自身. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. 的踐行(the enactment of curiosity)逐漸消耗屬己歷史的可能性(possibility)，最後接納非屬. ‧ ‧. 己的歷史－基督的歷史事件以及其共同世界(communal world)的語言，進而以存有者式. er. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. 的語言踐行構成傳統意義上基督神學的世界觀。. 關鍵字:奧古斯丁、轉宗、海德格、形式指引、事實性生活經驗、世界觀. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(4) Abstract This thesis wants to leave the traditional philosophical or theological viewpoint and rediscover how Augustine, as factical Dasein, turned from ontological science to ontic science to constitute his own worldview. I mainly discuss St. Augustine’s conversion experience through the method of formal indication mentioned in Heidegger’s early work Phenomenology of Religious Life (1921). The main thread of my discussion is based on Augustine’s description of the three temptations of the secular world in the tenth book of Confessions in conjunction with Heidegger’s three-level lifeworld reading through how. 治政治 the possibility of his ownmost 政 because of the enactment of curiosity gradually consumed 大大立立 history, and finally accepted the Christian history, and then having the verbal enactment to Augustine uses the verbal enactment to constitute his pre-faithful worldview. Eventually,. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. constitute a traditional theological worldview.. ‧ ‧. s iitt yy. er. worldview. n i on Naatti o N. Keywords: Augustine, conversion, Heidegger, formal indication, factical life experience,. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(5) Table of Content Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................ 2 摘要................................................................................................................................ 3 Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 4 Table of Content ........................................................................................................... 5 Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................. 7 1.1 Research question .................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Rationale ................................................................................................................ 8 1.3 Chapter organization ............................................................................................ 15 Chapter Two: Historical Reviews and Position Reflections ........................................ 17 2.1 The general arguments on Augustine’s conversion ................................................... 17 2.1.1 Religious viewpoint ........................................................................................ 17. 治政治大政大 2.1.2 Theoretical viewpoint ................................................................................... 19 立立 2.1.3 Reflection on the two perspectives ................................................................. 20 ‧ ‧. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. 2.2 Heidegger’s phenomenological method .................................................................... 21 2.2.1 Factical Life Experience and Historical Phenomenon .................................... 22 2.2.2 Formal indication ............................................................................................ 26 2.2.3 Historical enactment and situation .................................................................. 28 Chapter Three: The Reflections on Augustinian Study ............................................... 31. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. er. 3.1 The Reflections on Heidegger’s Augustinian study................................................... 31 3.1.1 Heidegger’s Historical reviews on Augustinian study .................................... 31 3.1.2 Reflections on Heideggerian interpretation .................................................... 32 3.2 A possible access to Augustine’s conversion ............................................................. 37 Chapter Four: The Constitution of Augustine’s Worldview ........................................ 40 4.1 The ontological science as consumption.................................................................. 40 4.1.1 The temptations of worldly significance ......................................................... 40 4.1.2 The falling tendency to trouble (molestia) ...................................................... 44 4.2 The ontic science as redemption ................................................................................ 48. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. Chapter Five: Conclusion ............................................................................................ 51 References ................................................................................................................... 53. 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(6) May I not be my own life. On my own resources I lived evilly. To myself I was death. In you I am recovering life. Speak to me, instruct me, I have put faith in your books. And their words are mysteries indeed. Confessions XII, x, 10. 治政政治大大立立 ‧ ‧. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學 er. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(7) Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Research question Confessions is St. Augustine’s own reminiscence about his profound reflection on quest of truth, belief and happiness during his early life. In this work, he not only narrated his inquiring experience in several relevant groups but also confessed his intimate desire for both secular and spiritual contentment. Because of Augustine’s multifarious background, the process of becoming a Christian has been historically depicted as “conversion” in many respects. According to that, scholars have held various opinions and titled as different. 治政政治大立立 1966); others have大 Manicheanism to Christianity (Mourant, highlighted his theoretical positions on that. Some have mainly concerned the change of his belief that was from. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. relevance in between Neoplatonism and Christian theology (Dobell, 2009). These available literatures are implied that number of scholars have dealt Augustine’s conversion with either. ‧ ‧. his religious or theoretical position. Honestly, following Augustine’s chronological narrative. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. in Confessions, we can simply infer the moment for his conversion in accord with any notable. er. events such as the enlightenment by bishop Amborse or the mystic revelation in garden, and. aal l v i n n CChh U eennggcchconversion hii U track, we may lose a chance to observe Augustine’s in an alternative viewpoint. It we will thus conclude it with similar commentary. However, once we follow the foregoing. is said that if Augustine was under the process of forming his authentic self no matter in the identity of a Manichean hearer or a wholehearted Christian, is it still proper to name this process conversion? Furthermore, if this conversion, in Heidegger’s term, can be defined as the process of ontological to ontic, in what way does Augustine complete his ontological phase? Is there any falling tendency within Augustine’s quest to make him anchor himself with those Christian materials? In this thesis, I will aim at these questions and provide an alternative interpretation about Augustine’s conversion.. 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(8) 1.2 Rationale Conversion has two-folds meanings: one is “as the process of converting something from one thing to another;” and the other one is “a process in which someone changes to a new religion or belief” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). Historically speaking, Augustine’s conversion has been dealt with either in the view of theology or philosophy. These inconsistent viewpoints are derived from Augustine’s orthodox status in the context of Christian history. Around that time, the Christian orthodoxy openly forbad paganism, and the related authorities held a strong faith to debate those heretic voices. 治政政治大大his Christian life. It is no composed numerous works to 立 admonish those heresies during 立. sounding around Christian territory. Regarding to that, Augustine as the bishop of Hippo. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. surprise that as one of his renowned works, Confessions is written in the same purpose.. However, following Augustine’s own narration, we can find out that no matter how he tried. ‧ ‧. to diminish and criticize his ill-fitting past, this work still explicitly delineates his early. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. heretic phase from Manichaeism to the Academics, hence to Neo-Platonism. Moreover, in. er. this work Augustine (1991) even stresses the “Neoplatonism’s assistance” on his Christian. aal l v i n n CChh to theology. This Augustine’s crossing over from philosophy eennggcchhii UU process is further transformed approach (p. 26).1 Therefore, many scholars pinpoint this interaction and emphasize on. and extended to be how scholars argue this conversion with the historical dispute of philosophy and theology; meanwhile, it also narrows our vision on the issue of Augustine’s conversion. To better understand the historical situation, Pannenberg (1996) concludes philosophy and theology’s interaction with the following patterns: (1) they confront to each other; (2) they are equal with each other; (3) theology is superior to philosophy; (4) theology is subject to philosophy.2. For more information on Augustine’s Neo-Platonic thought, see chapter VII of this book. Wolfhart Pannenberg. 1996. "Theologie und Philosophie. Ihr Verhältnis im Lichte ihrer gemeinsamen Geschichte". Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p.15. 8 1. 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(9) In the first one, Tertullian (A.C.160-220) and Damiani (1007-1072) are the examples of this confrontation, in which Tertullian affirms that “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem” and Damiani even depresses philosophy’s status and names it as “the Handmaiden of Theology” to separate theology from the influence of philosophy.3 As to the second genre, “Christian as true philosophy” is the main advocacy, in which the earliest Church Fathers such as Justin (100-165) holds this status and announces that belief shall take over the position of reason.4 Third, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) considers that there is no conflict in between philosophy and theology, yet mankind needs the grace given by God to transcend the. 治政治 the rationality gradually replaces 政 the situation is reversed. During the Age of Enlightenment,大大立立 the power of belief and becomes the measurement of Christian credibility, and Kant (17241804) is the representative at that time.6. 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. margin of natural reason for the sake of living in perpetual happiness.5 In the fourth category,. ‧ ‧. In fact, following the above categories, we can observe that Augustine also holds the. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. position about Christian is true philosophy, which is same as Justin. Because of these multiple. er. historical impacts,7 the main argument amid philosophy and theology has been focused on the domination of rationality and Christian belief in mankind’s transcendent8 as well as the. aal l v i n n CChh offers a caseUU secular world. To mediate them, Pannenberg pertinent to the compatibility in eennggcchhii relation to the objectivity of rationality and the subjectivity of belief in modern secular. society, to which Heidegger (1889-1976) is an outstanding one.9 Based on the issue of the individual compatibility, Heidegger succeeds the term “resoluteness” from Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and transfigures the idea of “leap of faith” so as to advocate that the belief is as. Ibid, p.16-17. Ibid, p.18-20. 5 Ibid, p.21-23. 6 Ibid, p.24-25. 7 Including political, religious, as well as economic reasons in history, but we will not deeply discuss that in this thesis. 8 This term here indicates the mystic and religious authority rather than the rational authority. 9 Ibid, p.26-28. 9 3 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(10) one of existential possibility among different human conditions.10 This existential possibility, here, can be said as an extended perspective for us to observe this historical competition between theology and philosophy. We can further obtain this perspective in accord with Heidegger’s classic lecture Phenomenology and Theology (1927). In this work, Heidegger challenges the traditional categorical terminology, arguing that the relationship in between theology and philosophy is more of “two sciences” than of “two worldviews.”11 Following that, ontic and ontological science hitherto become an alternative category rooted on this issue. Among this. 治政治大existence of human Dasein that, 政 the faith in Christianity. It is precisely “sketched as a way of 大立立 according to its own testimony－itself belonging to this way of existence－arises not from 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. differentiation, as ontic science, theology mainly deals with those beings that are related to. Dasein or spontaneously through Dasein, but rather from that which is revealed in and with. ‧ ‧. this way of existence, from what is believed”.12 This testimony, here, indicates the historical. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. event about the revelation of crucifixion, and which discloses the existence to that Dasein13. er. who has Christian faith and brings himself “part-taking” in the foregoing historical situation. Conversely, as ontological science, philosophy mainly deals with the issue of Being and “is. aal l v i n n CChh corrective of U the possible, formally indicative ontological the ontic and, in particular, of the eennggcchhii U pre-Christian content of basic theological concept”.14 Taken together, we shall say that. Heidegger slightly gets around the worldview difficulty amid theology and philosophy by determining them as different kind of sciences. In other words, Dasein becomes a formal indicator of this categorical science. With the way of ontic science, Dasein can sublate his 10. Ibid, p.29.. 11. However, they are different ways to consitute an individual’s lifeworld, which we will discuss in chapter 3.. Heidegger, M., & McNeil, W. (1998). Pathmarks: Cambridge University Press, p.40-41. Ibid, p.43-44. Dasein, in Heideggerian term, has multiple definitions, but we here only adopt the following one: Dasein as an individual who has recognizing his transcendental situation in himself and chose to be responsible his own possibilities by succeeding his own social surrounding. 14 Ibid, p.53. 10 12 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(11) pre-faithful existence and obey a specific belief to estimate the worldly beings; while Dasein can either be illuminated spontaneously through Dasein himself via ontological science.15 Nevertheless, this new category would turn Heidegger himself a similar quarrel, that is what kind of science can be in the driver’s seat when it comes to the authority of science. We will not fall into this controversy again, for, our purpose in this section is to obtain a new perspective on the foregoing issue. Therefore, though this antique argument has hitherto remained divergent, we at least attain an alternative thread to observe Augustine’s conversion.. 治政治大Hortensius, and since then his 政 on conversion was originated from the time he read Cicero’s 大立立 passion for seeking the “immortality of wisdom” was lasted for almost twelve years. For. Following the line of Augustine’s narrative in Confession, we could find out that his way. 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 16. Cicero has mentioned “love of wisdom” is the meaning of the Greek word philosophia,17 we. ‧ ‧. could depict that this thinking underlies Augustine’s way of life at this time. Meanwhile,. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. since Cicero askes his readers “not to study one particular sect” when they are pursuing the. er. wisdom,18 based on the passion for Cicero’s words, Augustine experienced his multiple philosophical journey from Manichaeism to the Academics, hence to Neo-Platonism, and. aal l v i n n CCtohhour previous discussion, ultimately to Christianity. According this phase could also be eennggcchhii UU taken as Augustine’s ontological period if we infer that the main cause for Augustine’s. departure is he as Dasein could not content himself with those sectarian wisdoms.19 Though this perception of wisdom would be Augustine’s hindsight after his conversion, it still embodied the twofold meanings during his ontological way of life. After he recognized that the Christian wisdom is his destination, he said “ when I seek for you, my God, my quest is. Ibid, p.44, 51-p53. Augustine, Aurelius. Confessions. Trans. by Henry Chadwick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, Vol. VIII. vii. (17). 17 Ibid, III. iv. (8). 18 Ibid, III, iv. (8). 19 This ontological seeking will be elaborated concretely in chapter 4. 11 15 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(12) for the happy life”20and defined that “the happy life is joy based on the truth”.21 Hence, this wisdom in man should be able to actualize the happiness in one’s life as well as have an unshakeable theoretical foundation. Moreover, Augustine would keep seeking this wisdom he guaranteed unless he confirmed that “it is enough, it is there”.. 22. As Mourant (1966) stresses, the “fundamental motive for Augustine’s acceptance of Manichaeism was its rationalistic attraction ”.23 In this, we should examine the theory in Manicheanism, for which is the foundation to measure the Manichean wisdom. Though we cannot obtain Mani’s complete canon in Confessions explicitly, we can derive its essential. 治政治 to which Mani considers that the 政 main theories of substance. The first one is its materialism,大大立立 substance should be visible and touchable in its own shape. More specifically, Mani doctrine from Augustine’s refutation.24 According to Augustine’s narration, Mani has two. 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 25. believes that the celestial bodies are divine in themselves, and these holy planets more or less. ‧ ‧. have connection to Mani’s saint and so the saint could breathe out “bits of God” after eating a. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. fig.26 Second, Mani holds the belief of dualism, which assumes that good and evil are as two. er. conflicting substances. This idea embodies in Mani’s theodicy, to Mani, God in itself is undoubtedly good while darkness－they call it earth－is able to weaken the good.27 By the. aal l v i n n ChGod, same token, since mankind is madeC by cannot have U complete good mind in heenthey nggcchhii U. themselves so they are often weak-willed.28 This Manichean dualism leads a controversy to young Augustine in both practice and theory, that is mankind can never win a happy life because the portion of man’s good may be far lower than his evil.29 In the meantime, to. Despite of the calling for God here was in Christian status, the happy life as wisdom’s destination should be universal in philosophical level. Ibid, X, xx. (29). 21 Ibid, X, xxiii. (33). 22 Ibid, X, xx. (29). 23 Mourant, J. A. Augustine and the Academics, 4, p.67-96. 24 Ibid, V. vii. (12). 25 Ibid, III. vii. (12). 26 Ibid, III.vi. (6) and III. x. (18) 27 Ibid, VII. ii. (3). 28 Ibid, VIII. x. (22). 29 Because of it, Augustine can blame his own moral failure on the “unidentifiable power”. Ibid, V. x. (18). 12 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(13) Augustine, Manicheans consistently depreciated Christianity about its superstitious ritual, but they could not defend their own theory with scientific evident either.30 We can obtain this conclusion from the conversation between Augustine with the Manichean figure Faustus, in which Augustine contended that Faustus had no persuasive knowledge for his Mani doctrine at all.31 With these proofs, Augustine determined that the Manichean wisdom is so fragile as to endure his test and he then gradually withdrew the Manicheanism from his thought as well as private life. Around that time, Augustine did not provide any Academics theory except for this. 治政治大 of doubt, and that an 政 He was overwhelmed by the thought of “everything is a matter 大立立 understanding of the truth lies beyond human capacity”. For that reason, he soon departed skeptical saying so he concluded that there is no truth among the Academics philosophers.32. 33. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. from the Academics, and one day, he accidentally heard the spiritual interpretation on Old. ‧ ‧. Testament by Ambrose the bishop. This sermon seeded the chance for Augustine to find a. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. way out of his materialism, and he “decided for the time being a catechumen in the Catholic. er. Church.”34 Consequently, the Academics dialect and Ambrose’s hermeneutic guided Augustine the way of the Neo-platonic idealism.35 To Neo-Platonism, the substance, namely. aal l v i n n CChhlight from itself.UUBy “learning them to seek for the One, creates every being by shedding eennggcchhii. immaterial truth,” Augustine turned his attention to the “invisible nature understood through the thing which are made” and acknowledged that the substance is “always the same “ and “never become other or different in any part or by any movement of position.36” With this understanding, Augustine further solved the problem of evil in theory, to which he concluded. 30 31 32 33 34 35 36. Augustine, Confession, V. v. (6) Ibid, V. vii. (12). Ibid, V. xiv. (25) Ibid, V. x. (19) Ibid, V. xiv. (25) Ibid, VII. ix. (13). Ibid, VII. xx. (26). 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(14) that the evilness cannot exist alone because “if it were a substance, it would be good.”37 However, Neo-Platonism still failed to cease Augustine's ontological seeking even though it could convince him of its theory. As Augustine had confirmed in Academics, he rejected the ambiguous proofs about God, and Neo-Platonism committed the failure at the same part, in which it advocated of the Pantheist in its sectarian history.38 We then jump to the key moment of Augustine’s conversion. At the famous scene of garden, the sing and the doctrines from bible revealed the limitation of the ontological way of life for Augustine as Dasein,39 and which is Augustine had been striving for since the time he. 治政治大on the Lord Jesus Christ and 政 in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put 大立立 make no provision for the flesh in its lusts (Rom. 13:13-14)” announced the invalidity of his. decided to obey Cicero’s lesson. To Augustine, this line “not in riots and drunken parties, not. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. wordly history, where he has strived for his pre-faithful life. In other words, he could not. ‧ ‧. thoroughly combine his theoretical thinking and practical action with what he had learnt from. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. those sects,40 or, rather, they are unable to force Augustine to actualize his ideal wisdom.. er. This also raised the issue pertaining to the will’s initiative under Augustine’s inquiry. As Augustine recalled, “the willing itself was performative of the action,” but if the will in mind. aal l v i n n CCitshhcoherent action will is not wholehearted, the willing with not be completed either. eennggcchhii UU. 41. To. Augustine, the reason for the incomplete willing is that there are two wills within human’s soul: “one carnal, the other spiritual”, and they” were in conflict with one another.”42 The carnal will has been bound by the accumulation of Augustine’s past habitual life, and as long as his soul wanted to escape from these carnal habits, they would warn him like this saying: “do you think you can live without these.43” Therefore, unless the spiritual will could be 37 38 39 40 41 42 43. Ibid, VII. xii. (18). Ibid, VII. ix. (15). Ibid, VIII. vii. (17). Ibid, VIII. xii. (29, 30). Ibid, VIII. ix. (21). Ibid, VIII. v. (10). Ibid. VIII. Xi. (24-27). 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(15) strengthened or regulated by a more powerful authority, his mind would never follow it so as to complete his ideal wisdom. At that converted time, the Holy scripture seemed to be a trigger to determine Augustine’s belief in Christian, but we need to note that this revelation may be more of Augustine’s ontic hindsight than of his pre-faithful life. If we are meant to disclose Augustine’s factical life experience of conversion, we must find out the limitation around his ontological way of life, for, it is the key on leading Augustine way toward his ontic science. Moreover, this limitation could only be illuminated by Augustine’s ontic hindsight, which is Confessions X. Here,. 治政治大doing so, as ontic Dasein, 政 enigma looks like as if he was still in it. In the meantime, by 大立立 Augustine intertwined his pre-faithful life experience with Christian viewpoint and jointed 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. Augustine not only officially advocated his ontic position but delineated how the ontological. their time structures together so as to constitute a specific time and space in his own. In other. ‧ ‧. words, when Augustine converted to Christianity, he was experiencing a constitution of his. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. new worldview.44 And in this new worldview, his ontological life experiences were. er. transfigured to God’s implication, in which it intended to lead him having a faithful life. In my thesis, in order to delineate this “turning-around,” I will attempt to discover the authentic. aal l v i n n CCtwo form of Augustine’s quest during his of enactment. U For, if the new worldview is hhesciences ennggcchhii U. Augustine’s authentic perspective, what does the situation look like at the time of Augustine’s conversion? Though we are not able to fathom Augustine’s endurance in his secular life though, we can somehow demonstrate the process of finding his own compatible truth regarding those pre-faithful experience he had encountered.. 1.3 Chapter organization As I indicated above, this thesis is meant to discover Augustine’s internal formal structure. Noted that, to Heidegger, both theology and philosophy do not belong to the term worldview, neither do the ontic and ontological science, but this saying may not be proper when it comes to the constitution of Dasein’s lifeworld, to which we will provide a more specific discussion in the next chapter. 15 44. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(16) during his shift from ontological to ontic way of life. However, since this process has been termed as conversion historically, the task we confronted first is to determine what position we hold to this issue. In chapter one, I delineated how the historical disputation about the theology and philosophy had impacted on the perspective of this issue, and further adopted Heideggerian way as an eclectic thread reviewing the process of Augustine's conversion briefly. In chapter two, I will first demonstrate a few references about Augustine’s conversion related to Manichean and Neoplatonic viewpoints, and in the second part I will give a summary of Heidegger’s lecture The Phenomenology of Religious Life as my main concerned. 治政治大 on Augustine’s 政 provide a few criticisms and conclude a neutral way of interpretation 大立立 conversion in chapter three. As to chapter four, I will manifest Augustine’s inquiry has. thread on this issue. Moreover, to examine whether Heideggerian way is proper, I will also. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. brought during his ontological phase, discuss how does Augustine constitute his pre-faithful. ‧ ‧. life with ontological science, and what situation did he confront at that conversion moment.. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. In conclusion, I will try to support an alternative viewpoint on Augustine’ conversion issue to. er. gauge the difference in between ontological and ontic way of life.. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(17) Chapter Two: Historical Reviews and Position Reflections 2.1 The general arguments on Augustine’s conversion As I have mentioned before, the discussion of Augustine’s conversion issue has been occupied by the perspective of religious or theoretical among this historical context. Under these perspectives, scholars will focus on either the transformation of Augustine’s religious belief or his philosophical thought. To better know these perspectives, I will survey each case in the following discussion.. 2.1.1 Religious viewpoint45. 治政政治大立立 the connection between大 conversion mainly aim at analyzing Augustine’s Manichean belief 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. Scholars who treat the religious belief as Augustine’s central impulsiveness of. and the acceptance upon the other sectarian thoughts. Mourant (1966) advocated that Augustine has never held any position of philosophical sectarian even after reading Cicero’s. ‧ ‧. n i on Naatti o N. s iitt yy. Hortensius. To Mourant, Augustine is more of a religious thinker than of a philosopher in every respect. However, it is like that Augustine cannot deny his philosophical background,. er. Mourant cannot ignore the influence of philosophy upon young Augustine either. Hence, in. aal l v i n n CChh U eennggthe hii U cchAcademic Augustine’s early philosophical writing Against (396) and Confession (398). his study, Mourant pinpoints on Augustine’s Manichean tendency through comparing. Initially, Mourant emphasizes that Augustine’s disappointment at Manicheanism is the major force upon his conversion (p. 68). He supposes that Manicheanism can appeal to Augustine and become his belief because its doctrine is composed of the convincible philosophies and the Catholic belief about the salvation in Christ. That is to say, Manicheanism has collected most of the religious and philosophical advantages at that time. Consequently, compared to the Church, Manicheanism is more persuasive and attractive to. In this, I need to clarify that the religious viewpoint mainly indicates the sectarian groups as well as theirs related doctrine practiced in one’s own secular life. 17 45. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(18) young Augustine and it can even become Augustine’s lifetime faith if it has raised its authority as its grounding and lowered down its intellectual convince. In Mourant’s view, the turning point is that after meeting with the Manichean chief Faustus, Augustine was frustrated by Faustus for he could not prove Mani’s doctrines with any scientific proofs, so he needs an alternative rationalism to take him away from Manicheanism. Thus, the appearance of the Academics replaces the rationalism as well as a specific philosophical sect at that time, and it contributes the skeptical method and “truthlikeness” idea to Augustine. To Augustine, rationality and its consequential theory are nothing. 治政治 found, Augustine has held a strong 政 with departing Manichean belief a lot. As Mourant’s study大大立立 belief on Mani’s materialism: 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. but an assistance to overcome his Manichean belief. To be honest, it truly helps Augustine. In view of our contention that his Manicheism was far more persistent than is usually. ‧ ‧. accepted, the major doubts of Augustine were directed against their doctrine, and. s iitt yy. er. (p. 96). n i on Naatti o N. especially their materialism, rather than to any acceptance of the Academic position.. Though Against the Academic has determined as Augustine’s “farewell letter to philosophy”,. 46. aal l v i n n CChh that AugustineUUhas never held any philosophical it is rather an announcement eennggcchhii. position in his lifetime. To him, this writing is meant to remove all the obstacles to Christian truth, which are the “philosophy that had the aim to justify doubt as to one’s ultimate attitude” (p. 86). Furthermore, even when Augustine adopts the Neo-Platonism as his. standpoint, comprehends the non-materialism, he just treats them as an approach to Christian belief. In this, it can evidently say that Augustine’s philosophical background is merely a mean to sublate his false belief upon the Manichean thought. Therefore, Augustine waits for a rather persuasive intellectual system to conquer Mani’s doctrine while he is still in this cult.. Fathers of the Church, Writings of St. Augustine, Volume 1, translated by- Denis J. Kavanagh, O. S. A. (New York: 1948), p. 89 18 46. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(19) In this, we can infer that Mourant disregards Augustine’s own position to philosophy and religion, merely considered his religious-central motivation, which underestimates Augustine’s preference of philosophical significance in his own existence.. 2.1.2 Theoretical viewpoint. 47. Apart from the religious viewpoint, the change of Augustine’s philosophical thought is another main argumentation. One of the argumentations is that whether Augustine converted to Christology in 386 or not (Alfaric, 1918; Courcelle 1950). A notable departure from the previous discussion of ambiguity, Dobell (2009) assumes that what Augustine really converts. 治政治大 in his works from 386 to 395. 政 argument by comparing Augustine’s knowledge of Jesus Christ 大立立 First of all, he points out that young Augustine may think that his knowledge to Jesus 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. in 386 is Neoplatonism, not Christology. To prove this assumption, Dobell continues his. Christ is similar to Manicheanism, in which they both believe that the Old Testament is. ‧ ‧. incompatible with Catholic belief. Because of that, Augustine even treats Mani as the true. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. Christianity at that time. Not until listening Ambrose’s spiritual sermon, Augustine realizes he. er. misunderstood the Church and the Bible. At this stage (it can also be defined as the Academics period), Augustine begins to admit the authority of Catholic belief, but he is still. aal l v i n n CChhthe idea of “WordUUmade flesh”. Even when uncertain of Christ’s identity, especially eennggcchhii Augustine learns the saying of Emanation from the “books of Platonist”, he merely. recognizes Christ as a sage rather than the “eternal Word of God” (p. 17). To Dobell, Augustine finally correct his knowledge about Christ is the time when he reads St. Paul’s Scripture. In doing so, Augustine finds that Platonic thought does not have a mediator between God and man while Catholic has Jesus Christ filled this absence. It is St. Paul’s exegesis that helps young Augustine learn that Catholic belief can see “the way leading to the country of the blessedness,” but Platonist only “see the goal but do not see the way” (p. 18).. 47. This mainly demonstrates the change of Augustine’s theory in his Christian commitment. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(20) Dobell terms this acquisition process about Catholic belief as Augustine’s intellectual conversion, but to him it still needs to be completed with volitional conversion in the garden scene. In Dobell’s view, Augustine’s conversion must combine intellectual and volitional transition at the same time, and the conversion scene in Confessions can thus be coherent to history. In this, Augustine must first experience the intellectual changes and later the volitional one, then he can complete the whole conversion. Dobell suspects that Augustine may not write Confession in line with his historical fact and he thinks it better “to regard the narrative. 治政治大early writings (386-c. 95), and 政 that there are amount of Platonic thoughts among Augustine’s 大立立 therefore he doubts that Augustine possibly first accepted his baptism and then progressively. as the story of Augustine’s intellectual development from 386 to c. 395” (p. 26). He discovers. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. completed his intellectual conversion until 395. This means that, in the historical 386 (the. ‧ ‧. year Augustine withdraw his secular life and decided to have a celibate church life), young. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. Augustine did not convert to Christology, but to Platonism instead. Moreover, through. er. comparing Augustine’s factual understanding about Christ with his narration in Confessions, Dobell points that “the early Augustine has a great deal in common with Porphyry, much. aal l v i n n C more than the later Augustine wouldC care to admit” (27). To hheennggcchhii UUconclude, if we follow Dobell’s. theoretical viewpoint, our perspective may tie to Augustine’s historical position and conclude Augustine is not a complete Christian until he finished the intellectual conversion in 395. This is an arbitrary and simply judgement to observe Augustine’s conversion, for it just ostensibly acknowledges Augustine’s historical identity and ignore his factical situation. To further gauge its deficiency, I will discuss it in the following section.. 2.1.3 Reflection on the two perspectives Based on the discussion of Mourant and Dobell, we can gain two different threads on observing Augustine’s conversion. On one hand, by way of religious perspective, Mourant argues that all Augustine’s philosophical investigations are nothing but a mean to transfigure 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(21) his Manichean belief into Catholic belief. On the other hand, with theoretical perspective, Dobell suggests that Augustine’s historical conversion event is not coherent to his autobiography. To him, the truth is that in 386 Augustine accepted Neoplatonic thought first, and until 395 he did complete his intellectual conversion to Christology. However, these studies seem to show a similar approach to the conversion issue. That is, they all ostensibly take Augustine’s garden scene as the key to infer his conversion retrospectively derived from different philosophical or religious stages. Consequently, things like what Mourant (1966) has mentioned in his own study that scholars largely agree that Augustine’s conversion is out of. 治政治大 obstacles he mentioned in 政 scholars would assume that Augustine need to overcome some 大立立 Confessions, and then he could convert to Christianity. A possible implication amid these. some necessary motivations such as “moral, intellectual, and religious” (77). In other words,. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. argumentations is that Augustine’s authentic quest may be dissipated when it is simplified to. ‧ ‧. a philosophical or religious answer. This is true that as the bishop of Hippo, Augustine needs. er. narration can only be concluded in terms of these perspectives.. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. to write an autobiography in line with his orthodox historicity, yet it does not mean that all his. In my opinion, these viewpoints should be transcended by means of phenomenological. aal l v i n n CChAugustine’s method. In this method, we can detect quest and explore during the heennggccauthentic hhii UU. process of his conversion. In the following section, I will introduce the Heideggerian terms－ factical life experience and formal indication－ to support our main discussion.. 2.2 Heidegger’s phenomenological method As we have discussed before, under the context of the historical dispute about theology and philosophy, the viewpoint of Augustine’s conversion issue has been narrowed. As long as scholars assume that there are no exceptional perspectives, this issue will not come to an authentic response. In this, Heidegger’s definition to ontic and ontological sciences can be an alternative way of interpretation. Notably, this interpretation will not lead into another 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(22) either/or perspective because it merely demonstrates the varied scientific attitudinal enactment that Augustine had experienced amid his lifeworld other than what philosophical thought he has. In a few words, this Heideggerian way can minimize the related distractions from its historical context, discovered an extended thread, and view Augustine's experience as a Dasein’s case solely.48 In the following discussion, I will demonstrate this methodology in Heidegger’s The Phenomenology of Religious Life (1921).. 2.2.1 Factical Life Experience and Historical Phenomenon In order to manifest the original divergence of philosophy and science, Heidegger. 治政治 straightly. To him, factical life 政 phenomena that are inappropriate to define or philosophize大大立立 experience can only be delineated through the enactment of pure taking-cognizance-of other (1921) raised the term—factical life experience—as an assistance to illuminate those. 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 49. than the objective taking-cognizance-of. The difference is that the former one points out the. ‧ ‧. straightforward significance, namely, the experienced activity of “confrontation-with” while. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. the latter is meant to transform this significance into an object-domain (p. 11). In this, it. er. shows that factical life experience is the grounding of every object-domain, but only through these straightforward significances derived from “self-assertion of the forms of what is. aal l v i n n Chh we can approach experienced” and “the experiencingC itself” it (p. 7). With the accumulation eennggcchhii UU of these experienced activities, these straightforward significances can progressively. constitute a passive scientific-objective worldview together. Notably, this constitution does not occur at the process of the cognizance of “object” but at the experience of confronting with the “world” (p. 8). Heidegger (1921) delineated the sense of “world” in the following three-level: “World” is that in which one can live (one cannot live in an object). The world can be. However, this Heideggerian interpretation also confronts some critiques, to which we will discuss them in the next chapter. 49 This inappropriateness, to Heidegger, is that the traditional scientific methodology has disturbed the naive factical life experience in which he is trying to discover. 22 48. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(23) formally articulated as surrounding world (milieu), as that which we encounter, and to which belong not only material things but also ideal objectivities, the sciences, art, etc. Within this surrounding world is also the communal world, that is, other human beings in a very specific, factical characterization: as a student, a lecturer, as a relative, superior, etc., and not as specimen of the natural-scientific species homo sapiens, and the like. Finally, the “I”-self, the self-world, is also found within factical life experience. Insofar as it is possible that I am absorbed by the arts and sciences such that I live entirely in them, the arts and sciences are to be designated as genuine. 治政治大 world that mutually 政 Therefore, it is the self-world, communal-world, and the surrounding 大立立 construct the overall lifeworld where Dasein lives in. Moreover, factical life experience owns life-worlds. (p. 8). ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. the characteristic of “attitudinal, falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for. ‧ ‧. significance” which makes the straightforward significance connect and relate each of the. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. experienced activities among the three-level world (p. 11). This kind of connection is termed. er. as “relational sense” and it is initially characterized from the self-world’s indifferent factical life experience (p. 11-12). This process of the passive apprehension of the “I” can be. aal l v i n n C experienced differently in his variedC experienced content:U hheennggcchhii U. I am in a different mood at a concert than in a trivial conversation constitutes a difference which I experience merely from the content. I become conscious of the diversity of experiences only in the experienced content. Thus, the manner of participation within and of being taken along by the world of the “I” is an indifferent one. (p. 11). This indifferent manner keeps constituting the factical life experiences related to the I’s “falling tendency” of “attitudinal determination” and “regulation of objects.” To be noted, there is a “turning around” between the indifferent factial life experience and the factical life experience of object (p. 12). Based on this “turning around”, we can signify one’s motive of 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(24) philosophizing and demonstrate his falling tendency related to his own history. However, before giving a demonstration of “turning around,” we should elaborate the concept “historical” first, for we can only observe this “turning around” through a “historical situation.”50 According to Heidegger, the concept “historical” cannot be separated from the concept “factical,” and it is not the other way around (7). It is because that every factical experience is first experienced among the three-level world, and this kind of world is embodied in an objective historical world which is already formed by a specific scientific-objective. 治政治大政 conglomeration, and thus we can always find a scientific characterization from any of 大立立 historical object. In addition, “historical means here becoming, emergence, proceeding in enactment (7-8). The concept “historical” comes from the foregoing process of. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. time, a characterization that befits a reality” (22). Due to this definition, on one hand,. ‧ ‧. “historical” indicates the becoming phenomena that is preserved or maintained by any. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. scientific-objective viewpoint. On the other, this historical consciousness will constrict the. er. dimension of factical Dasein’s concern because of its tendency-to-secure (35-36). To gauge this historical attitudinal tendency and its boundary, Heidegger compared three types of. aal l v i n n CCthem philosophy of history and categorized as (1) platonicU way, (2) the way of selfhheen nggcchhii U. extradition, and (3) the compromise of the first two ways (28). In Platonic way, the form of temporality is its main concern. When Dasein adopts this kind of historical perspective, he will content his insecure reality by assuming that he temporality is the “after-copy” of the extra-temporal “paradigm.” As Heidegger points out (1921), Platonic way presents a way that one chooses non-temporal falling tendency during his lifetime: These images signify an objective connection of Being between the two worlds of the temporal and the extra-temporal…the mode, the sense of securing fulfills itself. 50. The term “situation” will be discussed with the “enactment” together at 2.2.3. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(25) through the development of a theory about the sense of reality of the temporal. In recognizing what kind of sense of reality the temporal has, it ceases to disturb me, because I recognize it as a forming-out of the extra-temporal. (Heidegger 1921, 31) As to the second one, Spengler’s philosophy of history is the representative: For in Spengler, the historical world is the foundational reality, the single reality; we know only cultures, that is to say, the process of becoming of world destiny. My recognizing as a foundational reality the historical in which I myself stand and which disturbs me results in my having to enter into the historical reality, since I cannot. 治政治大reality of the historical has a 政 ensues. Thus also in Spengler the interpretation of the 大立立 liberating effect. (Heidegger 1921, 31) resist it. For us today, a conscious participation in the declining occidental culture. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. The third is a compromising one:. ‧ ‧. On the basis of a theory of historical reality, it seeks to fulfill the tendency toward. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. securing…On the one hand, I am within history; on the other, I am oriented toward. 1921, 31). er. the ideas; I actualize the extra-temporal by entering into the temporal. (Heidegger. aal l v i n n CChways Heidegger noted that all the three actually based U on the platonic view to heenare nggcchhii U. confront with the historical context. That is, the first (platonic way) attempts to fight against the “historical” through positing the “absolute norm as a reality,” the second treats “the historical” as the reality itself, and the third “recognizes a minimum of absolute values, but ones given only in relative forms in the historical” (32). Collectively, they all treat “historical reality” by means of typology. From varied theses tendencies, we can find out that each of them represents related attitudes among their historical context, and this related attitude can be termed as “attitudinal relation” (33). However, how we determine the form of “attitudinal relation” is that Heidegger wanted to discuss and clarify in his phenomenological method. Through the determined “attitudinal relation,” the “I” takes factical life experience itself as an 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(26) “object,” and “as object it is placed within the historical objective reality” (34). Consequently, we may fail to reflect the tendency-to-secure of the “I” and his concern of his lifeworld for they are all occupied by the objective history. In a few words, “the worry” of factical Dasein itself makes the straightforward significance “[become] the attitudinal fore-conception of an object” (34).. 2.2.2 Formal indication Retrospectively, the factical Dasein is Dasein who experiences the content his factical life experience formed by an attitudinal relational sense derived from his concern of life. 治政治大around him. It can be 政 related attitudinal relation toward a specific historical context 大立立 simplified to the following consequence: the concerned Dasein will be leaded to against the. among his three-level world. When factical Dasein is distressed by his worry, he will have a. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. historical object itself either by way of transcendental meaning, or back to Dasein himself by. ‧ ‧. a “new meaning that exceeds the one of earlier life” (p. 35). In this, “historical” (the. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. temporally-becoming) and “facitcal” (something temporal) are both produced by Dasein’s. er. worry and its consequential falling tendency-to-secure (p. 38). According to that, “formal indication” is Heidegger’s phenomenological method to access this process (p. 35).. aal l v i n n C Given that the term “formal” inC the “formal indication” hheennggcchhii UU can only be illuminated orderly. from the enactment of “general” and “generality,” the term “general” needs to be determined first (p. 38). Historically speaking, “generality” is taken as the object of philosophy. Since Aristotle, the “totality of beings” has been distributed to different scientific regions in accord to the historical philosophizing. As the time marches on, the content of beings is changed to the consciousness, and the ontological study also becomes to how the specific consciousness can be conscious of and what modes of consciousness “[constitute] themselves” (p. 39). Consciousness hitherto turns out to be the most general grounding in both the scientific principle and every related region, yet Heidegger did not testify whether the consciousness is the ground of everything. Rather, he preferred to infer an appropriate phenomenological 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(27) method through delving the sense of “general.” Succeeded from Husserl’s works,51 Heidegger continued this approach in determining the differentiation of “formalization” and “generalization.” Normally, “formalization” is constructed on the “grounding of a pure logic of objects” while “generalization” is a sort of “formal ontology” (p. 39). Among “generalization,” the “formal ontology” is a way of deduction, in which one can infer an objective material to its basic material that one can acquire from its related order of “generalities (genus and species).” For instance, one can infer an apple to “red,” to “color,” and final to the “sensuous quality,” but one cannot conclude its essence from above all;. 治政治 ones’ attitudinal relation such as 政 not constrict itself to any material content but only concern大大立立 how the “sensuous quality” can be motivated as “essence” (40). In short, generalization is 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. conversely, “formalization” can infer the “sensuous quality” to the “essence” because it does. merely an order that determines the object of material while formalization is the order of. ‧ ‧. forming-out of a divergent attitudinal relation (41-42). More specifically, formalization at. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. least includes three progressive dimensions among its application. That is: (1) formalization;. er. it is the initial connection toward an object and it can derive the “formal-logical” and the “formal-ontological” from one’s related relation meaning, from which it also “[makes]. aal l v i n n CChh operations. (2) U possible the performance of mathematical “formal-ontological (mathesis eennggcchhii U universalis)”; through it, each theoretical region has been prescribed as individual. (3). “phenomenology of formal;” it directly demonstrates the “original consideration of the formal itself and explication of the relational meaning within its enactment” (43). To conclude, both “generalization” and “formalization” are the enactment of attitudinal or theoretical order, but “formal indication” is an enactment that can “indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon” (44). That is to say, all determined phenomena are already constructed in a determined formal-ontological way before its philosophizing. In this, we can. 51. Logical Investigations and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(28) find out that there are some pregiven scientific-objective viewpoints correlated with those prescribed attitudes when it comes to any phenomenon. To manifest this transformation, we need to develop the other two procedures of formal indication— “situation” and “turning around”— in the next section.. 2.2.3 Historical enactment and situation In Heidegger’s explication, we can obtain “situation” from “the manner of enactment” because it is the transition that connects “the object-historical” and “the enactment-historical” before one’s “turning around,” in which Dasein makes “the givenness of the surrounding. 治政治 the constitution of a factical 政 In this, the “manner of enactment” is the essential trigger to大大立立 Dasein’s lifeworld. However, according to Wang (2016), Heidegger does not explain the term 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. world, the communal world, and the self-world [flow] into each other in factical life” (62-63).. “enactment” and its “relation” to “content” in this lecture, he completes them in both The. ‧ ‧. Problem of Phenomena (1919/1920) and The Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. (1920) instead. Frist of all, as the tendency of enactment to one’s motive, “relation” is more. er. of an enactment of relational sense with a related object than of an objective or theoretical attitude to a related object (14).52 Through actualizing the “relation,” “enactment” can thus. aal l v i n n CChh be functioned like the description below: eennggcchhii UU. An enactment is primordial if, as enactment of a relation that is at least. codirected in a genuinely self-worldly way, it requires, according to its sense, an always actual renewal in a self-worldly Dasein. It does so precisely in such a way that this renewal and the 'necessity' (requirement) of renewal inherent in it co-constitutes self-worldly existence. (Heidegger 1920, 57) Relationship is the relationship between motivation and trend. Life directly lives in the meaning of this relationship. The meaning of relationship directly experiences the life change caused by motivation. Therefore, this is not the relationship between two objects, but the life self (Selbst) practice. The meaning of action...Relationship does not take an objectified attitude (Einstellung) to what it is related to, nor does it say to the establishment statement (Aussage) of its relationship, so it is not a relationship in a theoretical or epistemological attitude. On the contrary, the "object" to which it relates is experienced (erfahren werden) or possessed (gehabt werden) in practice. (Wang 2016, p. 14) 28 52. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(29) Consequently, the “content” can be fulfilled with the renewal requirement, but in the same time, “content” also has both the occasional and divergent characteristics because it is constituted by Dasein’s daily transient confrontation of his communal world and surrounding world.53 Collectively, these elaborations not only pre-delineate the pregiven “situation” but exhibit its correlation with Dasein’s historicity in his factical life experience. In a similar vein, Wang (2016) synthesizes Heidegger’s surveys on the divergence of Dasein’s internal sense, depended on Dasein’s relational tendency to history: (1) Dasein does not have a genuine relationship to history, (2) Dasein has a genuine relationship to history.54. 治政治大have an enactment renewal 政 treated as “objective past” by Dasein, so factical Dasein will 大立立 without his existence and thus will lead himself be absorbed in the history and “[filled] out” 學學. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. Accordingly, in the first kind of tendency, Heidegger (1920) states that the history is merely. as an “objective historical process” (49, 61). In contrast, in the second one, Dasein treats. ‧ ‧. history genuinely in the following way:. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. …here past is had as the ownmost one and this having, in fact, enacts itself in such a. er. way that the ownmost past also loses the environing worldly character into which the self-worldly instances of meaningfulness constantly fall back…I seize my own past so. aal l v i n n Chhthe first time and U that it again and again is hadC for that I myself am always affected eennggcchhii U anew by myself and 'am' in renewed enactment (Heidegger 1920, 64).. The “situation,” coupled with the two tendencies toward Dasein’s own history, can draw to The content of the object is not the self-knowing object, but the one experienced and possessed in practice... The content of the object should be directly related to the life of the self. They follow the encounter between each actual self and the surrounding world and the common world. Different and one-off. (Wang 2016, p. 17) 54 If we read Heidegger’s citing a few examples of the relationship between history and us, we can have a more specific understanding of the meaning of the relationship: such as “someone reads history”, “someone knows more about history than philosophy”, and the person in the example has no real relationship to history. Another example is "A certain nation has no history (tradition)", "Someone said that history is the teacher of life (such as politics)", "Someone said that Zhang San has a sad history", "Someone said that his unhappy past Up". These four examples show that a certain person or a certain nation has a real relationship with history. Because the term "history" in the first two cases is an objective past, it is not related to the existence of factual people (this existence) because the term "history" in the first two cases is an objective past, not for factual people Existence (this existence) is implicated. Although the "history" of the last four examples is related to this, there are differences between strengths and weaknesses. The last example shows the heaviest relationship with one's personal past, and the originality of the relationship meaning is also the heaviest. (Wang 2016, p. 14-15) 29 53. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(30) the inference that Dasein’s “turning around” occurs when he is determining to have either a genuine enactment or ingenuine from his self-world. In regard to this, the foregoing discussion undertaken here extends our knowledge of factical Dasein’s situation; meanwhile it also draws our attention to the process of Augustine’s conversion as his enactment of “turning around” in his lifeworld. Nevertheless, a caveat needs to be noted that Heidegger does not reveal Augustine’s historical turning around in his interpretation on Confession X. In the lecture Augustine and Neo-Platonism (1920), he preferred to concern his own phenomenological methodological development on the human’s worry, so he does not. 治政治 historical situation. To better 政 neglects is also the fracture he misinterprets in Augustine’s大大立立 understand his misinterpretation, I will delineate the pros and cons of Heidegger’s. provide an explicated discussion on Augustine’s conversion. In fact, the point that Heidegger. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. interpretation and find a way to forge this fracture in the next chapter.. ‧ ‧ er. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. aal l v i n n CChh eennggcchhii UU. 30. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(31) Chapter Three: The Reflections on Augustinian Study 3.1 The Reflections on Heidegger’s Augustinian study So far, our exploration about the theological and philosophical viewpoints of Augustinian study leads us into Heideggerian approach. The present task we confront is to necessitate the legitimacy of this Heideggerian interpretation for there are plenty of disagreements among his phenomenological position, especially the way he dealt with Augustine’s relation with God in Confessions. Given that our discussion comes to whether this Heideggerian way can manifest Augustine’s conversion authentically or not, here I will. 治政政治大大立立 his position. the other scholars’ reflection toward. first discuss Heidegger’s commentary on the Augustinian studies at his time, and then provide. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. 3.1.1 Heidegger’s Historical reviews on Augustinian study. To make his own interpretation of Augustine, Heidegger (1920) distinguishes his. ‧ ‧. position from Troeltsch’s “cultural philosophical orientation”, Harnack’s “the emergence of. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. the dogma of the old Church and its development”, and Dilthey’s “the development of the. er. human science in European cultures” (120). In this, Troeltsch thinks that Augustine is the. aal l v i n n CChh eeand nggbecome cchhii aUUcharacteristic of Medieval culture Christian ethic has penetrated Rome societyn representative of the whole Middle Ages culture because the effort Augustine put onto. at that time, but, to Heidegger, Troeltsch also simplifies Augustine’s factual lifeworld into “the broadest, universal-historical framework” (116). As to Harnack, he is meant to sets Augustine as an institutor of the Catholic faith and a “reformer of Christian piety” so as to bridge the theological understanding among the inconsistent Church history (117). Compare to Troeltsch and Harnack, Dilthey pinpoints the side of human science upon Augustine’s study, noted that with the certitude of the idea of God, Augustine reconciles the Platonic skepticism with the Christian doctrine and “[ascertains] the absolute reality of internal experience;” for this, Heidegger does not think that Dilthey has profoundly dedicated on the 31. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(32) “inner problem of Augustine” (118). Taken together, these scholars suggest that there is an object-historical attitude impacted on their inference on Augustine, which consequently makes “they subject themselves to philosophical or theological criticism” (119-122). For now, Heidegger’s diagnosis on the current Augustinian study is coincide to our previous discussion to the position of Augustine’s conversion. It is like how Dobell and Mourant make effort to the Augustine’s theological or philosophical thought, Troeltsch, Harnack, and Dilthey also adopt this object-historical attitude to Augustinian study. Heidegger, on the contrary, focuses on Augustine’s factical life experience irritated by. 治政治大 science that Augustine has 政 the clue of the historical turning around of the ontic (theological) 大立立 formed with the Neoplatonic thought (125, 128). However, in his lecture, Heidegger not only the worldly temptations around his surrounding and communal world so that he could find. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. fails to achieve his expected goal but also be criticized for his misinterpretation of. n i on Naatti o N. reflection on the other commentaries.. er. 3.1.2 Reflections on Heideggerian interpretation. s iitt yy. ‧ ‧. Augustine’s theological position, which we will discuss together in the next section after our. Scholars who consider Heidegger misinterpreting Augustine’s Confessions mainly hold. aal l v i n n CChhreligious position U the opinion that he ignores Augustine’s and his ascending experience eennggcchhii U. toward God. By the same token, Fleteren (2005) states that Heidegger is so indulged by his own consideration about the “forgetfulness of being” of “Western metaphysic” that he neglects Augustine’s Neo-Platonic ascending experience, which is however the core Augustine emphasizes in Confessions X (8). On the purpose of adjusting Heidegger’s misinterpretation, Fleteren advocates that Confessions is the “confession of truth about self before both God and man,” not in the other way around. In doing so, he first clarifies the approach of Augustine’s epistemology, which also makes Augustine able to confess in front of God. Though at the beginning Augustine seems to refer Plato’s Republic V-VII as his “literary antecedent,” he mainly adopts Paul’s Epistle as the way of understanding his ascend 32. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(33) to God. In fact, to Augustine, the “divine grace” descended from God is the main source that Augustine obtained his self-knowledge and conscience to compose Confessions. Augustine starts his ascent journey of with the Augustinian ontological and axiological order, which brings him from the cognition of material being, human soul, and to God step by step. Fleteren emphasizes that despite there are a few impacts of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus upon Augustine’s self-knowledge about memory he has a profounder reflection than these pioneers. To Augustine, memory is a space where stores the object of happiness, but only God is the one who can lead Augustine to the happinest way among these objects;. 治政治大and pride. 政 which are the worldly temptations such as curiosity, pleasure, 大立立 Here Fleteren (2005) stresses that Augustine’s ascent theory which derived from Pauline meanwhile, memory also keeps the hindrances that avoided Augustine’s way toward God,. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. background may be bizarre to modern philosophers because most of them are strange to the. ‧ ‧. situation of this Catholic saint. In fact, Fleteren mainly regards Heidegger as one of these. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. modern philosophers. Though Heidegger’s phenomenology provides a thoughtful. er. understanding to Augustine’s self-knowledge, his interpretation is unlikely to comprehend the Augustinian ontology and ethics. In a few words, Heidegger underestimates the importance. aal l v i n n Chh in Confessions. of Neoplatonic ascending tendency C occupied In this, Neoplatonic thought eennggcchhii UU. plays a role that guides Augustine finding Jesus Christ as the proper mediator between God and man and creating an integrated thought connecting Greek philosophy and Christianity. Thus, Fletetern draws a conclusion that, for Augustine, Confessions X sets an accessible approach to ascend to the triune God, which is absent in Heidegger’s interpretation. That is to say, Augustine has paid more attention on the ontological axiology in his Confessions while Heidegger is unwilling to see this dimension, as Fleteren (2005) mentions here: Obviously, Heidegger’s definition of ontology is at odds with Augustine’s. For Heidegger, phenomenology is ontology. Sadly, Heidegger considers ontology in its traditional form a deceptive Greek remnant, to be cast away as misguided. Whereas 33. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.

(34) Augustine finds fundamental harmony between the best of Greco-Roman philosophy and Scripture, concerning man’s final destination and many other matters as well, Heidegger denied such accord. For Augustine, God is the center of reality－the focus of Augustine’s life. One searches in vain for such centrality in Heidegger－eventually an unknowable Sein takes his place. (p. 18) Apparently, Fleteren strongly defends this Augustinian ontology for his own theological position, but he is too engrossed in Augustine’s ascending experience to observe Heidegger’s interpretation neutrally. Unlike Fleteren, Barizza (2005) treats Heidegger’s interpretation in a. 治政治大experience and his self-world, 政 Heidegger to delve the relation between an individual’s inner 大立立 which can trace back to his earlier work The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (1919/1920). rather neutral way. She finds that the exploration of Augustine’s self-revelation has inspired. ‧ 國 ‧ 國. 學學. However, Heidegger fails to succeed this Augustinian research in Augustine and Neo-. ‧ ‧. Platonism (1921), in which he mainly dedicates his phenomenology to understand. s iitt yy. n i on Naatti o N. Augustine’s existential situation, especially his self-actualization. In this regard, Barizza. er. demonstrates this observation to her Heideggerian and Augustinian approach with two different sides: one is the primordial Christian religious experience as an individual’s. aal l v i n n C dynamic process of the constructionC of self-world; the other hheennggcchhii UUis the “care” in Augustine’s secular life as the occupation of his self-world.. At first, Barizza (2005) points that “waiting for the return of Messiah” is the primary significance to every Christian. It is a guideline that as a Christian one should resist the worldly temptation and hold the expectation of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ in his lifeworld at the same time. Therefore, as Barriza (2005) observed, Heidegger considers that Augustine not only inherits the same history and. transfigures Christian’s “life feeling” to. the concrete of esse, nosse, and amare “(existing, the consciousness of existing, and the love we have knowing this),” meanwhile, “the themes of knowing oneself and taking care of oneself blend with the inward struggle and the inquietude of Christian religious experience.” 34. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001695.