以古典現實主義探討中國南海政策 - 政大學術集成

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(1)NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, TAIPEI, REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A Classical Realist Account of China’s Policy in the South China Sea 以古典現實主義探討中國南海政策 INTERNATIONAL MASTER’S PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES ADVISOR: PROFESSOR WANG DING-SHU 王定士教授. Vaclav Jilek (季方雷) | Thesis Writing | May 31, 2016.

(2) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Acknowledgements I am very much grateful to my advisor, Professor Wang Ding-shu, for his wisdom and knowledge when it comes to the field of international relations and geopolitics. He has decades of valuable experience and understands the underlying forces that propel the connection between politics and human nature. I would also like to thank Professor Pisarev and Associate Professor Shinn-Shyr Wang, both of whom have provided invaluable comments to aid the thesis to come to fruition. Secondly, my father has been very supportive throughout my studies not only at NCCU,. 政治大. but during my university stays in the UK, France and Finland and all of this has culminated in this very thesis. Although it is not the destination, but the journey that counts, because. 立. the quality of the journey determines the final outcome, or the destination, and because of. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. my parents this has been an incredible journey.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.

(3) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Abstract The primordial causal relationship within politics lies in the condition of our human nature, as classical realists argue. The constant exchange in power defines the relative relationships within the anarchical world, and shapes our pursuit of interests thereof. Such a change in power is occurring within China, and this is being reflected on its shifting policy and conduct in the South China Sea. Classical realism ought to shed light on and put forth a new perspective on the situation in the maritime sphere of international politics. The thesis scrutinizes, through interpretive analysis within a geopolitical approach, China’s policy and how it sees the world. The outcome of China’s increasing power,. 政治大 of the South China Sea. The importance of this method in seeing China’s rise is the 立. strategy and subsequent policy results in a China-led regional order starting in the waters. inconclusive in trying to contain China’s unprecedented rise.. 學. ‧ 國. relativity of power and how the balance of power, including US, may prove to be. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2.

(4) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 2 List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... 4 List of Figures.................................................................................................................................................5 Chapter I. Introduction................................................................................................................................ 6 Motivation and Purpose of Study ........................................................................................................ 6 Hypothesized Proposition .....................................................................................................................7 Framework of Study ...............................................................................................................................7. 政治大. Literature Review .................................................................................................................................. 8 Research Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 14. 立. Chapter II. Theoretical Analysis of Classical Realism .............................................................................. 18. ‧ 國. 學. II. i. The Principles of Classical Realism ............................................................................................. 18 II. ii. Distinguishing Classical and Neo-realist Methodology ........................................................... 23 II. iii. Limitations of Classical Realism ...............................................................................................24. ‧. Chapter III. China’s Policy in the South China Sea ................................................................................. 28 III. i. Analysis of China’s Power...........................................................................................................29. y. Nat. sit. III. ii. China’s Naval Strategy .............................................................................................................. 33. er. io. III. iii. China’s Island Building .............................................................................................................36 Chapter IV. Potential Outcomes of China’s Policy .................................................................................. 41. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. IV. i. ASEAN and International Law ................................................................................................... 41. engchi. IV. ii. US and Balance of Power ...........................................................................................................45 IV. iii. China’s New Regional Order and Legitimacy ........................................................................ 49 Chapter V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 54 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 57. 3.

(5) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. List of Abbreviations ADIZ. Air Defense Identification Zone. AFP. Armed Forces of the Philippines. ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. COC. Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. CPC. Communist Party of China. CSIS. Center for Strategic and International Studies. EDCA. 政治大 Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea 立 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. EEAS. European External Action Service. EEZ. Exclusive Economic Zone. ICJ. International Court of Justice. ITLOS. International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. PH. The Republic of the Philippines. PLAN. People’s Liberation Army Navy. PMS. Preparation for Military Struggle. PRC. People’s Republic of China. SCS. South China Sea. US. United States of America. UNCLOS. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 學 ‧. n. engchi. sit. io. Ch. y. Nat. al. er. DOC. China National Offshore Oil Company. ‧ 國. CNOOC. i n U. v. 4.

(6) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. List of Figures Figure 1: China’s Military Might, 2012................................................................................. 31 Figure 2: Chinese Detection/Defense Capabilities in the South China Sea ............... 32 Figure 3: First and Second Island China Strategy ........................................................... 34 Figure 4: China’s Land Reclamation.................................................................................. 37 Figure 5: Land Reclamation on Fiery Cross Reef ............................................................ 38 Figure 6: UNCLOS Maritime Law ....................................................................................... 42. 政治大 Figure 8: Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific ................................................................46 立. Figure 7: Attitude Towards China ......................................................................................44. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 5.

(7) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Chapter I. Introduction Motivation and Purpose of Study This author proposes this topic following an unprecedented rise in both the material and the perceived power of China in most recent years. In an era of intensified international relations, the South China Sea (SCS), inter alia, proves a heavy burden on the international community in the face of uncertainty and regional rivalry. Amidst all the propositions to resolve this nebula of individual interests, as yet there is not a single way that ought to declutter the area and find common ground. This is mainly because China aspires to possess. 政治大. the totality of it all through its ‘U-shaped line’ and manage it under its own guard, dismissing international law as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of. 立. the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s historical U-shaped line is acting against the international. ‧ 國. 學. community’s wish to abide by the international law of the sea. Such ‘defiance’ will certainly not solve anything and may lead to increased tensions and a potential conflict. ‧. between China and the many other claimants, under US military protection. This is seen from the classical realist lens of international relations theory, through which this thesis is. sit. y. Nat. constructed upon.. er. io. The purpose of the study is to enrich the academic community by applying an important theoretical perspective, which is most applicable and holds a certain authenticity in today’s. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. world, as depicted by the numbers of military conflicts in many of the world’s regions.. engchi. Moreover, the study will focus on China’s ability and persistence in applying its claims to the South China Sea, and hence it is quite pertinent to try to understand the subtle meaning as posed by the research question: ‘Why China will not give up the South China Sea? Classical realism is the theory chosen to represent the reality of China’s method of applying itself in the region. The outcome of this study ought to open the minds of the keen observers to understand the conflict in a more nuanced way and look at alternate potential ideas to determine a peaceful resolution of tensions, and not give way to an impulsive clash of interests and allow ‘human nature’ play out in the form of ‘self-other’ conflict. Yet, the case of the South China Sea is widely seen as a complex issue. The purpose of this thesis is not to suggest a simplified outline of a complex situation. However, its purpose 6.

(8) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. serves to leave all the complex ideas aside and make way for a simple theoretical understanding by way of classical realism, from which these complex ideas manifested in the first place. It is the understanding of human nature, which needs to be addressed in order to truly understand China’s rationale. Another reason is to distinguish methodologically between classical realism and neorealism, which has often been misconstrued. What is driving international politics is primarily fear, however, what the author tries to point out is that in the 21st century, we should strive for understanding to find common ground, for that is the first step towards outgrowing our ‘human nature’ in the form of fear.. 政治大. “Life is not to be feared; it is to be understood.” – Marie Curie. 立. Hypothesized Proposition. ‧ 國. 學. The thesis follows the case study of the South China Sea in relation to China’s intent to control the sea. Through careful analysis of the research questions – ‘Why will China not. ‧. give up the South China Sea?’, ‘What are the reasons for China’s behavior?’, and ‘What are the potential outcomes of China’s policy?’ – and through classical-realism and the. Nat. sit. y. accompanying ‘human nature’ argument, that is, the notion that politics is governed by. al. er. io. objective laws that have their roots in human nature (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993),. n. the thesis argues that with greater power comes greater legitimacy from the point of view. Ch. i n U. v. of the actor, in this case China. Human nature is inherently flawed, and there is a correlation. engchi. between power and interests of the state, a state which is a singular political entity, leading essentially to an anarchic international arena. The actor is essentially confined to face a geopolitical struggle. However, a greater relative power may overcome such anarchic tensions.. Framework of Study The framework of the study follows a three-chapter logically-articulated structure, throughout which the methodology is consistent with that of classical realism. The chapters are divided into theoretical analysis, China’s policy in the South China Sea, and finally, potential outcomes of such a policy, from a classical realist point of view.. 7.

(9) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. The first ‘theory’ chapter, Chapter II, is sub-divided into three parts. The first part comments on the principles of classical realism and their importance primarily from Hans Morgenthau, the father of the more ‘modern’ classical realism, and subsequently Thucydides, and Machiavelli. The second part distinguishes between classical realism and neo-realism, as a few theses have previously analyzed the same topic but through neorealist theory. The third part puts forth various limitations in the application of classical realism. Chapter III scrutinizes China’s policy and how it has been able to achieve such a policy. The chapter is split into three parts. The first part analyzes China’s power, which is the first step towards a more coherent policy in the SCS. The second part follows with the analysis. 政治大 power and strategy into practice 立 in the form of China’s land reclamation.. of China’s naval strategy, a necessary outcome of China’s power. The third section puts. ‧ 國. 學. As a corollary, the Chapter IV combines the analysis of the previous two chapters to give a concise answer to the last research question: What are the potential outcomes of China’s. ‧. policy? The fourth chapter is likewise divided into three parts. The first part analyzes ASEAN’s attempts to fight for international law. The second part delves into the US. Nat. sit. y. reaction and the accompanying concept of balance of power, which the US pursues. The. io. al. n. policy in the SCS.. er. third section puts forth an idea of China’s new regional order after its potentially successful. Ch. i n U. v. Finally, Chapter V envelops the discussion and analysis into a conclusion and put forth a. engchi. final answer to the three main research questions.. Literature Review This literature review comprises three themes that are central to the premise of this thesis and that have been recurrent throughout the research for this thesis and subsequently incorporated into the argument that human nature governs the subsequent actions and policies of the actor. The three main themes encountered in the pertinent literature is China’s strategy, power and influence of geography upon policy. As such, this review will discuss the main authors and their arguments revolving around these core thematic notions. 8.

(10) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. In relation to the realist conception of power, Emmers (2010) cites Morgenthau’s words that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Emmers 2010, p. 13). This struggle for power supposes a balance of power, a recurrent concept in international relations. However, according to classical realists, as states struggle for power, this struggle does not lead to the aim of balancing, but precisely “at superiority of power in their own behalf” (ibid.). Owing to this behavioral nature of states, in an anarchical system balance of power exists, with each state overlapping the other in relative terms of power. Thus the concept of the balance of power is an essential tool of analysis in the study of realist and geopolitical theory. Emmers’ methodology is based on a theoretical analysis, which. 治政大place. South China Sea, wherein a ‘geopolitical interplay’ is taking 立. subsequently is implanted into the study of maritime territorial disputes, particularly in the. ‧ 國. 學. Starting in 2010, China has “jettisoned its erstwhile ‘low profile’ international posture and has instead become more aggressive in pushing for its own narrowly defined national interests” (Li 2014, p.135). With these words, Li Mingjiang stresses China’s evolving. ‧. policy towards the South China Sea. Despite China asserting sovereignty for many decades,. y. Nat. it is only a couple of years since it sees itself in a position to go from status quo to moulding. sit. the situation in its favor, at the expense of the other claimants. Li terms this shift as ‘non-. al. er. io. confrontational assertiveness.’ Essentially, what the author argues that China has. n. iv n C coercing its neighbors for fear it will negatively impactUits regional strategy. The author hengchi puts himself in the shoes of China’s strategic thinking and this term coincides well with. developed a substantial capacity to push its policy forward, yet at the same time not. China’s advancements. In the past years, scholars and journalists alike have labeled Chinese activities as ‘assertive’ and it has become second nature in academic circles to correlate China with an ‘assertive’ strategy. According to realists, with rising power, the actor will do whatever to utilize such power to maximize its sense of security and development alike. According to Holmes and Yoshihara (2008), in order to satisfy its naval strategy, China has turned to the maritime geopolitical thinker Alfred Mahan. Their study reflects that Mahan’s work on sea-power has provided an indispensable framework to understand. 9.

(11) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. China’s naval strategy, not to mention that China has indeed included in its defense white papers a certain phrase: ‘command of the sea’. Mahan’s theory involves command of the sea as a symbol of national greatness, from which true power comes from, whereby the agent manages trade during peace time and controls the area during wartime. Invariably, the study (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008) hypothesizes that Chinese naval strategy will be compelled to align itself along Mahan’s thought, yet, the authors contend that there is no suggestion that a positive correlation determines the outcome of China’s naval strategy. Hence, the study follows a holistic interpretive methodology. Furthermore, the study analyzes potential futures of China’s policy in the sea. One striking analysis points to a. 治政大(Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, notwithstanding the vicissitudes of international relations” 立 p.116). To a realist, “pacifying effects of economic interdependence are a fallacy” (ibid.). geopolitical, almost Hobbesian image of regional politics as “geography does not change,. ‧ 國. 學. This points to the realist notion that economic interdependence alone cannot guarantee security, and we have to count in the complex nature of politics, strategy and geography,. ‧. which do not necessarily comply with economics.. y. Nat. China’s turn to Mahan’s sea strategy has been well-noted, however, You (2006) illustrates. sit. another sea power dimension to China’s strategy. In his article ‘China’s Naval Strategy. al. er. io. and Transformation’, he alludes to the Russian strategist Gorshkov and his book Sea Power. iv n C ordered to closely study this piece on sea geopolitics. The h e n g c h i Uauthor’s methodology utilizes a comparison of the Soviet naval strategy to advocate for China’s inspiration. By nature of n. of the State, and mentions how the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been. this work, this would suggest China is sincerely building a blue water navy. A blue water navy is a navy with the capacity to monitor waters well beyond its coast and into the deep seas. The author argues that PLAN, apart from possessing a ‘prescribed geographical scope of activities’ (You 2006, p.75), the navy should go even beyond (i.e. South China Sea) to attain power projection capabilities as far as the North West Pacific. Thus, solidifying its control of the South China Sea bases is a prerequisite to attain such goal. In The Great Wall at Sea, Cole (2010) outlines China’s maritime strategy since the Cold War. As China was relatively weak following the Cultural Revolution, the navy’s role was. 10.

(12) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. primarily coastal. Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s chief reforms and economic growth, interest in increasing the navy’s capabilities increased. The ocean, not just the sea, was to be seen as its “chief strategic defensive direction” (Cole 2010, p.169). One of the navy’s strategic tasks was to safeguard its ‘water rights’. According to Cole, the ‘chief architect’ of China’s emerging naval strategy was Liu Huaqing. His vision was to divide the Western Pacific into two island chains. The first island chain goes along the periphery of Japan and the Philippines, thus encompassing the entire South China Sea. The Second island chain goes beyond into the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean. This is the geopolitical scope of China’s short-term sea strategy, since based on Mr. Liu’s geopolitical thought, China ought to. 治政大a very first in China’s history, be a global force. This is a strong continentalist perspective, 立 despite China’s regional scope. Cole’s methodology is derived from access to material very control these areas by 2020. Given China’s rising power, by 2050 PLAN should aspire to. ‧ 國. 學. close to the Communist Party, ranging to official documents to Chinese analysts such as Liu Huaqing or Zhang Lianzhong, a former PLA general and a former PLAN commander,. ‧. respectively. From the analysis, it is conceivable to suggest a realist aspiration of the PLAN to take command of the Pacific seas, but more importantly, it gives us great insight into. Nat. sit. y. potential outcomes of China’s present policy in the South China Sea.. al. er. io. In The Revenge of Geography, Kaplan (2012) discusses the geography of Chinese power. iv n C quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern h e n g c h i U nor Western” (Kaplan 2012, p.189). Kaplan urges the audience to look at China’s geography, which is one of the main n. and cites geopolitician Mackinder, who alluded to China’s potential by “building for a. sources of its economic dynamism and national assertiveness over recent decades. Furthermore, Kaplan labels China as a ‘hydraulic civilization’ which is relentless and dynamic. Its internal dynamism, coupled with “civil unrest and inefficiencies […] [and] an economic slowdown, creates external ambitions” (Kaplan 2012, p.198). He further argues that empires “are often not sought consciously” (ibid.). As states gain more power, they develop certain needs, and with needs come insecurities, thus allowing for further expansion in an organic fashion. Kaplan’s argument complements the realist notion of thought that human nature is inherently flawed and such an outcome of a state’s unconscious expansion is not only feasible, but very real. 11.

(13) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. The geopolitical aspect of the SCS is highly pertinent to the nations’ actions and behaviour in the region. According to Kaplan, “geography is paramount” and from which “strategy and geopolitics naturally emerge” (Kaplan 2014, p.1). For him, the SCS became an “anxious and complicated armed camp” (Kaplan 2014, p.1). There have been geopolitical ‘nodes’ throughout history (Tebin 2011), such as Alsace-Lorraine, which has been the center of geopolitical struggle between France and Germany for decades, from the times of Bismarck until the end of World War II. The SCS may be regarded as the ‘geopolitical node of the 21st century’ and the ‘future of conflict’ (Tebin 2011; Kaplan 2012b). The SCS provides a host of useful reserves of “untapped resources and is understood to be of. 治政大relation to each other (Kaplan the SCS shapes the way states act in relation to it and in 立 2012b). particular geopolitical significance” (Raine and Le Mière 2013, p.22). The geography of. ‧ 國. 學. In his book Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, Kane (2002) offers an argument on the basis of principles of Chinese seapower. Geography figures as one of the more. ‧. important aspect of China’s power. As a corollary, Kane’s methodology is based on. y. Nat. geopolitical grounds, assuming on every aspect of China’s power geopolitical thought of. sit. Alfred Mahan, as well as those of Julian Corbett and C.E. Callwell. Kane summarizes. al. er. io. Corbett’s argument of a ‘strategy of impeachment’, wherein a smaller navy (that of. iv n C This suggests that China’s strategy in the South China Sea h e n g c h i U is that of ‘impeachment’; to go on an ‘offensive’ to best ensure ‘defensive’ capabilities. Additionally, Callwell maintains n. China’s) utilizes a ‘strike first’ attempt to give a leeway for better defensive capabilities.. that a “sound strategy and [an] indirect approach may often allow the materially weaker side to achieve its ends” (Kane 2002, p. 50). This ties in with the ‘non-confrontational assertiveness’ idea that China pursues in the South China Sea, and may well work in favor of China. China’s government released its newest White Paper on defense last year entitled ‘China’s Military Strategy’ (State Council 2015). The English version has been released through Xinhua news agency. Whereas the text seeks to portray China as peacefully rising, the rhetoric indeed shifts light when it comes to territorial disputes. It says that hotspot issues. 12.

(14) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. such as “[…] territorial disputes […] are complex and volatile” (State Council 2015, p.1). Moreover, concerning China’s maritime goals, China pertains that: “some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests” (State Council 2015, p.1).. 治政 Furthermore, the text continues that the “Chinese Dream大 is to make the country strong” 立 (State Council 2015, p.2). As part of the Chinese Dream vision, the armed forces need to In this passage, its realist ‘human nature’ feeling reverberates in our consciousness.. ‧ 國. 學. be strengthened because without a strong military, a “country can be neither safe nor strong” (ibid.). In line with the previous authors’ arguments pertaining to China’s strategy in South. ‧. China Sea, China’s navy needs to “work hard to seize the strategic initiative in military competition” (State Council 2015, p.2). According to classical realists, the state actor will. Nat. sit. y. seek more power than the other actors in the anarchic system. This text already implies ‘military competition’, and this is not peaceful rhetoric, especially when it comes to such. io. n. al. er. a strong US navy hovering nearby and strengthening alliances with China’s neighbors.. Ch. i n U. v. When it comes to China’s actual strategy, the text mentions ‘active defense’. This goes in. engchi. line with Li’s ‘non-confrontational assertiveness’. This ‘active defense’ is the “essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought” (State Council 2015, p.3). In addition to this concept is the so-called Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS) tactic. Within the PMS strategy is “highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS” (ibid.). These two concepts of ‘active defense’ and PMS is already building foundations for a broader Chinese maritime strategy that goes beyond the regional, as previous analysis of various geopoliticians has suggested. Finally, “the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure” (State Council 2015, p.4). From these words, one can assume that South China Sea is a given 13.

(15) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. when it comes to Chinese thinking of its territorial and geopolitical capacity to ensure its security. The textual references are being reflected in reality in what is happening in the South China Sea.. Research Methodology This thesis will be tended to through interpretive analysis within a geopolitical approach, which is primarily qualitative research, utilizing primary and secondary data, such as official documents and peer-reviewed research articles and books. As this dissertation has an underlying empirical premise due to the analysis of China’s. 政治大 approach. Whilst many theoretical approaches exist, this dissertation is written following 立 the classical realist perspective. As previously mentioned, the research methods chosen. policy in the South China Sea, it is a necessary to analyze the content within a theoretical. ‧ 國. 學. throughout this dissertation is interpretive analysis within a geopolitical approach. Pertaining to the research methods of this thesis, the researcher’s job is to interpret social SCS; China’s policy in the SCS is the geopolitical response.. Nat. y. ‧. action. With regards to the proposed thesis, the social action is China’s behavior in the. io. sit. Interpretivism is one method amongst a few main methodologies in the social sciences; the. al. er. other main method being positivism. Whereas positivism is mainly based on quantitative. n. iv n C epistemology is that the researcher has an empathetic stance. The challenge here h eto nadopt gchi U data, interpretivism suits well for qualitative research. Crucial to the interpretivist. is to enter the social world of our research subjects and understand their world from their. point of view (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis 2009, p.9). Interpretivism is well suited for classical realism, which is crucially based upon the human nature aspect and allows the researcher to view the subject from its own lens and try to understand the underlying meaning behind the subject’s actions. Isaiah Berlin argues that an observer capable of ‘understanding’ people also has the “ability to ‘enter into’ their motives, their principles, the ‘inward’ movement of their spirit” (1960, p.25). “Without some ability to get into the skin of others”, Berlin argues elsewhere, “the human condition, history, what characterises one period or culture as against others – cannot be understood” ([1979] 2013, p.135).. 14.

(16) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. There are three interconnected principles that define the interpretive method. Firstly, ‘social structures’ are “considered to be little more than ‘elaborate fictions’ that we use to explain and justify our behaviour to both ourselves and others” (Sociology Central 1995, p. 4). Thus, we ourselves interpret the world and the ‘social structures’ around us, which is essentially misconstrued by our flawed human nature. Secondly, causal relationships are theoretically misguided, if people’s behaviour is conditioned by the way in which they personally interpret their world, then conditions of cause and effect would constantly change. This supposes that change is a fundamental process in life, and nothing is ever constant. Thirdly, everything in the social world is seen to be relative to everything else. 治政大interaction. Hence, these three perceive everything in relative terms when it comes to social 立 principles are the basis for understanding the interpretive researcher. When research is (Sociology Central 1995). Based on our flawed nature and the law of change, our minds. ‧ 國. 學. conducted, a certain methodology needs to be undertaken to understand from which lens the research project is viewed. This understanding of interpretive analysis fits into the. ‧. classical realist methodology. Classical realists, unlike neorealists, understand that the international system, i.e. social structure, is fundamentally an illusion conducted by the. Nat. sit. y. agents in an anarchic world. Given the notion of relativity and change, classical realists. io. al. er. understand this nature bequeaths from generation to generation.. iv n C an answer and simultaneously dismisses the ‘structuralist’ neorealists as having hengchi U methodological errors. It is not the structure that defines the behaviour of the actor, but the n. Kirshner (2010) argues that we ought to analyze China’s rise through classical realism for. actor that defines the structure. Moreover, the structure is rigid at any point in time, however, the actor is fluid and often changes through its power, resources and capabilities relative to other actors within the international arena. Classical realism tends to combine the historical and political over a larger span of time, which defines the political reality of today. This is fueled by human nature and thus actors are self-conscious of themselves over a longer period of time. This suggests China’s historical claim over the South China Sea is a product of a longer span of a self-conscious identity. This claim cannot be solidly explained by structural realists since the perception of the content in the international arena is different by, say, China and the other SCS claimants. The other claimants’ positions are 15.

(17) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. derived by international law of the sea, but for China, the claim is wholly based on historical rights, which in and of itself is legal within China’s perspective. Thus, a ‘structure’ is merely is misconstrued reality, which is often defined by a self-conscious dependency of an agent on the forces of relativity and change. Classical realism, despite being integrated into mainstream IR Theory by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau in early 20th century, dates back to even the Greek historian and general Thucydides, who through a realist lens analyzed the course of the Peloponnesian War. A few centuries later, Niccolo Machiavelli outlined how human political animals are made to conform with the established norms, laws and social conditions, but also equipped with the. 政治大 Thus, this presupposes that立 indeed human nature is fundamentally the main driver for. capability to change and alter such settings and conditioning. This is known as the ‘agency’.. ‧ 國. 學. change, and not the structure that limits or constricts the agent to act. This is not simply limited to the individual, but to the state as a single unitary actor; and political scientists have sought to treat the state as a primary unit of analysis.. ‧. Finally, interpretive studies “assume that people create and associate their own subjective. sit. y. Nat. and intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world around them” (Orlikowski and. io. er. Baroudi 1991, p.5). Interpretive researchers thus attempt to understand phenomena through accessing the meanings participants assign to them; this is an epistemological. n. al. i n U. v. understanding. Ontological understanding suggests that reality is “an inter-subjective. Ch. engchi. construction of the shared human cognitive apparatus (Walsham 1995, p.76). This is socalled internal realism, whereas an objective reality is shared amongst all the actors, i.e. states, in an anarchic international arena, a subjective reality is constantly created amongst individual actors. This may be a complementary definition of classical realism, and it is through these methodological approaches that this thesis is based upon. This thesis is essentially structured around the notion of the causal relationship. Interpretivists see the world, the promulgation of change and general relativity through causal relationships. Causal relationships encapsulate: the reasons for cause, the actual cause and the outcome of cause. The analysis brings forth the causal forces of interpretation and transformation. This correlates with the thesis’ framework. The reason for cause is 16.

(18) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. analyzed through the classical realist understanding of world politics. The actual cause, in this case study, is China’s policy in the South China Sea. Thirdly, the outcome of cause is the reaction and changes of policy this prompted by other agents involved in the South China Sea.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 17.

(19) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Chapter II. Theoretical Analysis of Classical Realism Chapter I analyzes the works of classical realists that are pertinent to understanding the theoretical approach for this study. Amongst the classical realist authors are Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hobbes and most primarily Hans Morgenthau. Chapter I is divided into three sub-sections. The first part of the chapter focuses on the principles of classical realism that will be important for further analyzing China’s policy in the South China Sea. The second part distinguishes the methodological importance between the classical realists and neorealists (or structural realists), from which a clearer understanding will be brought to light as to why classical realism is still relevant in the 21st century international politics.. 政治大. The third and final part consists of the limitations of classical realism’s application and its. 立. criticism.. ‧ 國. 學. II. i. The Principles of Classical Realism. Essentially, classical realism is not a theory as such, but more of a philosophical position. ‧. articulating the basic functions of our human nature and Man’s behaviour in the world. Albeit, to explain state behaviour on the international scene, realism has been incorporated. Nat. sit. y. into academia to found the International Relations discipline and to subsequently put a. io. al. er. realist narrative on past, present and future events in a theoretical understanding.. n. iv n C political realism. Firstly, politics is “governed by objective h e n g c h i U laws that have their roots in human nature” ([1948] 2006, p.xx). This gives us the basis for understanding political. Hans Morgenthau, known as the father of modern realist theory, outlined six principles of. realism. Relations between states is simply another (higher) level of relations between individuals in an anarchic scenario. Throughout the centuries many authors have touched upon the notion of human nature. Thomas Hobbes understood the human being as a rather dangerous figure without an assumption of authority in Leviathan, for he showed “how the dynamics of violence fall out of interactions among rational and self-interested agents” (Pinker 2011, p. 318). This has culminated in Morgenthau’s ‘objective laws’ that govern the political world. These objective laws are manifested essentially from fear. Fear conjures up feelings of insecurity, mistrust and competitive behaviour in relative terms,. 18.

(20) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. seeking more power to make up for such insecurity in an uncertain world. The remedy for fear is power. This leads us to Morgenthau’s second point: international politics is a “concept of interests defined in terms of power separate from other spheres of action, such as economics, ethics or religion” ([1948] 2006, p.xx). Classical realists argue that when it comes to a political decision, there is no correlation “between the quality of motives of a statesman and foreign policy in both moral and political terms” (ibid). A political decision overrides the moral precept. Moreover, when conducting a political decision, it is not directed through ideological channels, but rather what is possible to attain under the current set of. 政治大 policy will be pursued in 立 the short-term political decision-making process. As such, circumstances. An ideology may provide a longer-term strategy, however, a more rational. ‧ 國. 學. interests and power are taken into consideration first at the expense of economics, ethics, religion or ideology, when conducting a political decision.. ‧. In Morgenthau’s words, ‘it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both […] moral excess and […] political folly’ (Morgenthau 1948, p.11).. sit. y. Nat. The notion of interests is insurmountable in politics. Interests navigate a nation’s foreign. io. er. policy irrespective of time and place. A nation’s interests are deeply imbedded and sustained within the national mind over a longer period of time. Surely, political action will. n. al. i n U. v. depend on the political circumstance and cultural context within which foreign policy is. Ch. engchi. conducted; such conditions under which foreign policy is formulated may be altered. This works through the concept of power and causal forces. International politics is an arena of conflict of interests spearheaded by the relativity of power. As a nation accumulates power, causal forces will be at its disposition. Only through causal forces may an agent instill a change of the circumstances; and hence, change the structures. An agent with enough accumulated power is able to divert the causal powers to shape the world in their own eyes. For example, China has accumulated enough power over the past two decades to address the political arena. China now has enough causal forces to utilize and to shape the regional political order in its favor, however, to a certain extent, yet. Now, interests are a defined ‘end’ of the political spectrum. The ‘means’ to 19.

(21) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. attain that ‘end’ is it moral or immoral? In politics, as previously stated, morality and ethics do not necessarily correspond with a political decision. In the universe, there must be ‘universal’ moral principles, however, human nature is not attuned with those ‘universal’ moral principles. When it comes to politics and interests, these moral principles are filtered through the state/mind apparatus; our minds filter through those moral principles and as a corollary adjust them to our own perspective or gain. This translates into a moulded form of moral principles under the circumstances of time and place. From nation to nation, the concrete moral principles will thus necessarily be different from one another. Morgenthau argues that prudence takes over as the ‘supreme. 政治大 juggling between the forms 立 of interests and power at the disposal of the causal agent. As. virtue’ in politics. From the author’s own perspective, prudence is the result of a careful. ‧ 國. 學. such, realism maintains an autonomy in the political sphere, where power takes precedence above all else. The reality creates an anarchic international system, where other actors of human nature play out their role in constant exchanges of power and history plays out. ‧. accordingly.. Nat. sit. y. History exists for us to learn from the bountiful mistakes we have made as humanity. Alas,. io. er. are mistakes not part of the historical process? Is there any certainty we will not do the same mistakes and to what extent? For many of us, history is a story of the past, and as. n. al. i n U. v. such we put it aside and focus on the present and future. The result is we are not in control. Ch. engchi. of history, and the causal forces of history have a tremendous impact on us when its effects suddenly hit us. Take the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. Retrospectively, history was in the making, and the causal forces of Great Powers have produced an ongoing conflict across the region even today. At the turn of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was forgotten as history. However, the seeds of history have been planted and the effects today are in the form of an organic multi-cell form of terrorism across the world. The same cause-and-effect relationship happened in the Iraq War and the rise of the Islamic State. Concerning China, the gist of the historical process is that China has not forgotten its past. In fact, China has taken full control and ownership of the historical causal forces. As an agent in the anarchical world, China thus-far enjoys its accumulation of power to be able. 20.

(22) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. to create an alternate reality from a future of infinite possibilities. Whereas at the outset of the post-Cold War era, the West has put history in its grave (Fukuyama 1992), China has enlivened the historical process. When one seeks to understand human nature, there ought not to be a logical explanation, which is why it is relatively difficult to posit an argument along the lines of human nature. There is a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and social sciences. We use logic and reason to experiment and thus explain what happens in the natural world. However, we cannot use the same means in the social world; we cannot dissect a human being and understand why he did such an act, although we can understand where his. 政治大 those means. Whereas our statements 立 may be logically intact, the facts remain unaltered.. kidneys are. We try to use ineffective means to explain a certain end. Language is one of. ‧ 國. 學. Returning to the idea of terrorism, the atrocious acts were in the name of God, Allah. ‘We are liberating you in the name of God.’ Whereas such a statement may be logical for people who worship Allah and believe the act carried out is for the greater good, this does not. ‧. change the fact that many innocent people died. Despite this being a rather irrational. y. Nat. behaviour, in the social world there is a delicate dichotomy between rationality and. sit. irrationality. Whereas according to classical realism states act as rational and prudent, the. n. al. er. io. nature of the social world is governed precisely by those ‘objective laws’ that Morgenthau explained in Politics Among Nations.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Classical realism extends as far as Ancient Greece to the general and author Thucydides, who depicted the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in his work History of the Peloponnesian War. The rise of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta was the trigger for a contest of power and, hence, ended in war between the two sides. As such, fear of human nature was sincerely the single major cause of conflict. Welch (2003) poses the question whether or not is it an appropriate analysis or an anachronistic application. This is quite a valid standpoint, however, perhaps Thucydides’ ‘ancient’ thought persists within the engagements of the political world. A heavily recurrent scenario throughout history has played itself out along such lines:. 21.

(23) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. In the famous Spartan debate, King Archidamus counseled patience, arguing that Sparta should watch, prepare, and play for time; but his prudence proved impotent in the face of Sthenelaidas’ hot-blooded call to action in the face of Athens’ insults and injuries (Strassler and Crawley 1998, 1.86). In Thucydides’ quote we may see and understand prudence, in a way that this action has taken a toll on Sparta’s own interests. Indeed, a paradox as it is, for taking a prudent stance to favor our own interests at the face of a perceived foe has paradoxically been met with ever-closer tensions that would fundamentally go against one’s own interests. Thus, the interplay between prudence, interests and power is crucial to understanding the realist. 政治大 US relationship, under the leadership 立 of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese had. stance in world politics. To perhaps convolute this notion of prudence with that of the Sino-. ‧ 國. 學. the flexibility to exercise prudent behaviour, which has sincerely put China in the spotlight on the world stage. In a globalizing and an ever-growing world economy and power politics, the case for prudent behaviour is becoming increasingly dangerous. If we take into account. ‧. a growing disparity in bilateral relations, take China and Japan for example, the rivalry is. y. Nat. ever-expanding. This has grown into fierce nationalistic perturbation, if not jingoistic. sit. behaviour. As a corollary, Xi Jinping now “seems disturbingly captive to the intense. al. n. 2015, p.1).. er. io. Chinese nationalism that his predecessor Hu Jintao first mobilized a decade ago” (Welch. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. There is a positive correlation between nationalism and revival of history. Chinese political thought has also been recognized as a Realpolitik, or pragmatic realism, mostly observed as Chinese Legalism. The driver behind this thought has been Sun Tzu and his classic The Art of War. A more pragmatic approach in Chinese political thought is adopted to try to ‘win’ before any battle has even started (Sun-tzu [6th cen. BC] 2002, chapter 4). Such is the use of a deceptively calculating and prudent ability on the side of Chinese political philosophers have history on its own side, where power and heavy nationalism have the ability to expand the boundaries of foreign policy-making.. 22.

(24) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. II. ii. Distinguishing Classical and Neo-realist Methodology The second part focuses on the methodological discrepancy between classical and structural realists. The reason for distinguishing between the original realist theory and neo-realist theory, or structural realism, is to provide the rationale this thesis enthuses. The basic difference between the two schools of international relations theory is within the agent-structure problem. Whereas classical realists tend to favor the agent, neorealists favor the structure in determining the function of international politics. Power is the determinant factor in classical realism, and not the structure per se as in the. 政治大. neorealist tradition. Within classical realism, a structure in the international system does not exist as such. The ultimate deterrent is relative power and not an ‘imagined’ structure.. 立. Neorealists rather believe in such a structure created by the balance of power between state. ‧ 國. 學. actors. For classical realists, the simple yet precise balance of power determines how the anarchic international system functions. For neorealists, states adapt to a certain accepted form of a structure that binds the international system together amidst international anarchy.. ‧. As previously argued, politics is autonomous of other fields such as economics, ethics or. y. Nat. sit. religion. It is this autonomy, which suggests that in a social interaction, there cannot be. al. er. io. such a structure in an anarchic realm of politics. The argument of neorealists is thus non-. n. pervasive. The autonomous nature of politics does not condemn that there is no process of. Ch. i n U. v. socialization, such is within the world of international relations. However, the fundamental. engchi. notion that agents are not in total control of their own free will, namely states, that somehow states are constrained by a certain imposed structure is not pertinent to political reality. Yes, there are norms that exist within the social world that actors over time abide by. Moreover, states are rational and prudent actors and can only act against how their relative power coincides with the others. As soon as the balance of power is tilted towards one side, the actor will consider increasing its relative power even more. Agents have causal powers, and when one’s relative power is greater, its causal powers would have increased. The agents would invariably try to put those into practice. In the article, Tragedy of Offensive Realism, Kirshner (2010) elaborates on the notion how dangerous it is to employ the offensive realist view in explaining the rise of China, where 23.

(25) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. offensive realism is an off-shoot of neorealist theory. If one were to adopt this view, war would inevitably come about due to China’s rise and tilting the balance of power into its own sphere of influence, thereby seeking more power. On the other hand, classical realism does not directly advocate for war-like outcomes. Yes, war is a possibility, however since actors are rational and prudent, balance of power becomes a sensible outcome. Offensive realism argues that China will aggressively change the status quo to pursue its own reality of the regional order. The tragedy of such a notion is obvious in its own nature, enjoyed only by warmongers. Whilst neorealism tries to impose its own distortion of reality into international relations, classical realism discusses the reality thereof. As Thucydides. 治政大 of power and the resulting suffer what they must, such is the distinction in the relativity 立 outcomes. But what are the limitations of classical realist thought?. timelessly argued in the Melian Dialogue that the strong do what they can and the weak. ‧ 國. 學. II. iii. Limitations of Classical Realism. The main problem is whether the notion of human nature can be applied historically, as in. ‧. past, present and future, evolutionarily (evolution of mankind), culturally (applied in. sit. y. Nat. various cultures and people), or even psychologically (different pathological tendencies).. er. io. The main question to pose is to what extent is classical realism applicable to account for in the 21st century world. However, I argue that the reason classical realism is a popular theory. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. even now is its timeless wisdom and insight into human nature. Others may argue, such as. engchi. neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, that classical realism is based upon very strong assumptions about human nature. Human nature is indeed a complex concept to scrutinize. Nevertheless, if one were to dissect the essence of classical, or political, realism, it would be the objective laws governing the behaviour of a human being. Politics is the act of two or more actors engaging in prudent exchange of power and interests. There would be room for compromise and diplomacy, however, when there is a strong clash of interests and a struggle for power to pursue those interests, it is indeed difficult for the political actors to fathom the magnitude of their endeavors. If politics was not based on power and interests, would there be such a need for diplomacy or compromise? Yet, it is hard to measure objectively. Hence politics remains within the realm of a subjective social science. It is. 24.

(26) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. also for this reason that neorealism fails to scientifically validate realist theoretical assumptions. The reason for later theories to envelop the international relations theory sphere is such that there is a consistency of alliances and a sense of international community, as neo-liberal institutionalism would suggest. One might argue that the 21st century society is cohesive and binded together by common standards, such as morality, cooperation and diplomacy. Indeed, the realist theory was absorbed into the IR discipline at arguably the most tragic era in human history after suffering two total world wars. However, time after time the struggle of power is visible and real throughout history, and that has not altered in the 21st. 政治大 military efficiency and arms立 trade is increasing drastically, especially in the Asia-Pacific century. Albeit inter-state conflicts are at their lowest level, technological development,. ‧ 國. 學. region. Does this create more instability or stability, security or insecurity? It most reflects balance of power theory and how states seek alliances to balance against a stronger rival, such as China. However, aren’t the alliances just a manifestation of this counter-balance or. ‧. true allies of a superpower? This limits classical realist analysis to portray the state as the. y. Nat. single unitary actor in an anarchic world. Weak states would surely cede some form of. n. al. er. io. observe US military bases in weaker countries.. sit. sovereignty towards a greater goal of security provided by a stronger state, as we may. i n U. v. On a ‘cultural’ note, that “elusive entity of ‘human nature’”, writes Carr, “has varied so. Ch. engchi. much from country to country and from century to century that it is difficult not to regard it as an historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and conventions” (1961, p.27). To what extent is culture and social conditions independent of human nature? This was such enquiry by a classical realist Edward H. Carr. Indeed, the vagueness that revolves around human nature cannot go unnoticed. For we have states that do not even have a military, such as Liechtenstein, and who relies on Swiss police forces for protection. States are run by individuals, whom the ‘human nature’ argument possesses. As such, states would act upon the international arena accordingly through human nature. The ‘human nature’ argument cannot only suppose the dark side of humanity. There are two sides of the same coin. In more advanced cultures, the role of empathy and altruistic behaviour has. 25.

(27) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. seen the light and matters of the ‘darker’ side of human nature have subsided. Peace studies have been formed in the Scandinavian nations over the 20th century and the realist human nature began to take new forms, however, which were already there to be uncovered. Certainly, not all political actions are caused by ‘human nature’ alone and there must be multifarious reasons that must be taken into account, such as geography, which cannot be manipulated by humans. The fourth limitation is psychological, in the sense that human nature is an intricate cobweb of psychological and mental functions and which varies in each individual. Mental faculties developed in one person ought to have different repercussion on the ability of that. 政治大 realism, ‘rationality’ is part 立 of human nature and states are deemed to be rational actors, individual to act in the world as opposed to another person’s mental faculties. In classical. ‧ 國. 學. but they are lost in their own ‘rational’ logic, for as Karl Popper, in his Poverty of Historicism, argues that ‘rationality’ cannot be measured ‘in accordance with the logic of [its] situation’ ([1957] 1964, p.97), for such ‘rationality’ makes no assumptions of the. ‧. ‘rationality of ‘human nature’. He argues that we cannot measure human behaviour by. sit. y. Nat. psychological traits or human nature. The difficulty in psychological behaviour lies in its measurement, for its difficult to assert. io. n. al. er. that such an action was caused by a specific pathological inclination. “Perfectly normal. i n U. v. psychological pathologies”, argues Welch, “can incline people to underestimate the risks. Ch. engchi. they run and overestimate the prospects of achieving what they consider a desirable or ‘just’ outcome” (2015, p.1). As we do not understand the intricacies of human nature, we identify it as the cause simply because we cannot understand it. Referring back to Popper, the complexity ensues when we engage in the decision-making process, as such that the “awareness that the prediction might itself exert influence on events predicted is likely to have repercussions on the content of the prediction; and the repercussions might be of such kind as gravely to impair the objectivity of the predictions and of other results of research in the social sciences” ([1957] 1964, p.14-15). This understanding comes to the social sciences from quantum physics. The metaphysical quantum world is a reality thus-far unfathomable to the scientific community. One experiment on electrons suggests their. 26.

(28) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. behaviour changes once observed, whereas unobserved the electron behaves differently. This supposes the notion that physics has a lot to say on mapping human behaviour and how attention with intention may alter reality. As a result, the concept of human nature cannot be a constant. CHAPTER CONCLUSION In sum, the chapter provided a theoretical background into classical realism, the main principles that the theory entails and a critical analysis of the human nature argument. Moreover, the chapter distinguished between other realist theories to account for the. 政治大 with four limitations of classical realism including historical, evolutionary, cultural and 立 psychological. The following chapter will apply classical realist understanding to China’s. importance of classical realism in 21st century international relations. The chapter ended. ‧ 國. 學. policy in the South China Sea.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 27.

(29) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Chapter III. China’s Policy in the South China Sea Following the theoretical discussion of classical realism, this chapter analyzes China’s policy in the SCS. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section evaluates China’s increasing power and its implications. The second part scrutinizes China’s strategy. The third part further analyzes the combination of China’s increasing power and strategy in addressing China’s island reclamations in the SCS. Through such understanding of China’s overall policy, potential outcomes will become possible to evaluate in the fourth chapter. Firstly, it is necessary to provide a brief background of China and the SCS disputes.. 政治大 The PRC issued its first formal claim to sovereignty over islands in the SCS in 1951 立 (Yahuda 2013, p.450). Whereas China bases its claim over the SCS via ‘historical evidence’ SOUTH CHINA SEA BACKGROUND. ‧ 國. 學. as a regional hegemon during the Ming and Qing dynasties (MOFA 2000, p.1), China’s claim is also of a geopolitical and strategic nature. Through its 2009 Note Verbale and the. ‧. UN (2009), China has repeatedly claimed that China “has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction. Nat. sit. y. over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” (Raine and Le Mière. io. p.28; Samuels 1982, p.22).. al. er. 2013, p.34). As such, the PRC appears to regard the SCS as a “Chinese lake” (Taylor 1997,. n. iv n C The situation today has become the product h e nofghistorical i Uevents and their evolution. China h c has perhaps been exercising some form of ‘sovereignty’ over the SCS for centuries, having been the regional hegemon until the first Opium wars, due to which it has lost its ability to control the region for about 150 years. China is now seeking some form of revival or ‘rejuvenation’ of its past civilizational glory (The Economist 2013). For the CPC, history is not just the past; history is also the present and the future (Yu 2014, p.1; Gill and Small 2012, p.27). The PRC wants a status quo ante, to ‘recapture’ the reality under the Ming and Qing dynasties, when China ruled the SCS through a tributary system with the kingdoms and colonies of Southeast Asia, who were subjugated to China’s rule (Möller 1995, p.19).. 28.

(30) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Recent developments suggest China’s ‘assertiveness’ includes China’s deployment of its first aircraft carrier Liaoning onto the waters of the SCS as well as China’s claims on fishing rights over the entire SCS (Thayer 2014). The deployment of the Chinese aircraft carrier is a “strategic projection of power at sea” (Samuels 1982, p.145). These developments “exacerbated concerns about China’s long term strategic objectives” as China’s military expenditure exponentially increases (Russel 2014, p.1). Essentially, China seeks to “maximize its legal and political leverage, while the growth of its military and maritime assets gains physical leverage over its weaker neighbours” (EEAS 2012, p.1). Since 2010, South China Sea became a part of its core interests on par with Taiwan and. 政治大 background of the SCS disputes, 立 how can China manifest its dream of ‘national Tibet (de Castro 2015, p.5). Following this brief introduction into the nature and. ‧ 國. 學. rejuvenation’? The answer is through power. The next section analyzes China’s newlyfound power and how it will attempt to use it for its own benefit, and from its own position the benefit of the entire region.. ‧. III. i. Analysis of China’s Power. Nat. sit. y. If a state seeks to alter a perceived ‘status quo’, the change is contingent upon power. China. al. er. io. “is not a status quo power”, argues Kaplan, “for it is propelled abroad by the need to secure. n. energy, metals and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standard of. Ch. i n U. v. roughly a fifth of humanity” (2012, p.199). Classical realists then call the agent a. engchi. ‘revisionist power’. From previous analysis of power, the state with enough accumulated power has the causal forces to create the sought after change. Concerning power politics, one may discern that the post-Cold War era has been a unipolar form of power from the point of the US, until the global financial crash in 2008. Since 2010, as the global economy slowly recovers, not only have we seen a stronger China, but Russia has also risen to mark its geopolitical status. As such, the world is at present in a multipolar power setting. Much of causal powers of the US have been transferred to that of China and Russia. This notion of power supposes both hard and soft power, the overall ability of China to assert its influence and interests.. 29.

(31) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. How has China gone about an increased power? Indeed, China has come out of the financial crisis on top. Its relative power has risen to the point where China has felt comfortable to position itself in Asia-Pacific as the director, rather than an actor. In 2010, China has overcome Japan as the strongest economy in Asia, and in the same year announced the SCS as part of its ‘core’ interests. As a corollary, it needs to provide security to that ‘core’ interest. The SCS is part of a larger core interest family, although this has to do with China’s security and growth – traits of an ‘uber-realist power’ (Kaplan 2012, p.199). China’s immense financial endowment has seen it influence neighbors through infrastructure projects and trade, and also invest in a home-grown military, reducing arms. 治政大 rise has seen quite backing by CPC leaders and the public. China’s asymmetric 立 unprecedented consequences in the regional architecture. In comparison with ASEAN reliability on Russian imports. Its military growth stems from a financial clout and political. ‧ 國. 學. members contesting the SCS disputes, China dwarfs their military capabilities. Since classical realists view power in relative terms, we need to consider the regional military. ‧. situation. How do others compare to China?. y. Nat. Regional military spending has reached a total of $439 billion, with China reaching a 9.7. sit. percent increase in its military budget (Cronin 2015, p.26). Over the past decade, China. al. er. io. has invested large amounts into PLA’s military modernization. The PLA budget in 2015. n. iv n C states (Storey 2015, p.71). For comparison purposes, U h e n g c h i in the year 2000, the difference between the defense budgets of China and ASEAN was just over $2 billion. At present, the. surpassed $200 billion, six times larger than the combined budgets of ASEAN member. figure nearly surpasses $150 billion (Storey 2015, p.76). China’s two main rival claimants in the SCS, Vietnam and the Philippines, are playing their part to not lag behind China too much. Vietnam’s military spending has risen by 128 percent (SIPRI 2015, p.3) in 2015, a significant rise to boost Vietnam’s defense and naval forces. On the other hand, Philippines enjoys very limited forces available to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), since Aquino’s administration has lacked finances to pursue its modernization program (de Castro 2015). de Castro argues that the strategic imbalance between the Philippines and China “cannot be rectified in the foreseeable future” (2015, p.17). How has China managed to exponentially outmaneuver the others? 30.

(32) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. China is an agent of power. It is not that China’s accumulated economic power allows China to pursue its interests more ‘assertively’, it is precisely an improved economic capability yielded to increased political power available to China that enabled a larger political clout. China is ready to “influence the meaning, the context and the rules” in East Asia (Xiang 2009, p.175). To account for such influence, China has had an annual double digit increase in defense spending since 2006 to allow for the development of a blue-water navy (de Castro 2015, p.4). Figure 1 below shows the military might of the PLA, which now includes one aircraft carrier. For decades, China has relied on military imports from Russia. However, China is slowly homogenizing its military technology and refraining. 政治大 Figure 1: China’s Military立 Might, 2012. from external influence to internalize its research and development of military capabilities.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: WSJ (2013) China’s military research and development follows a dual track – low-cost quantity and high-end quality (Cronin 2015, p.26). Low-cost quantity allows for China’s navy to deploy coast guard and frigates into the seas to protect its interests, whereas high-end quality are precisely those missiles and radar systems to deter US influence in the region. This suggests 31.

(33) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. that China has developed precise ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at US targets in the Western Pacific and aims to control its Chinese Lake through anti-access/area denial capabilities (de Castro 2015, p.4). Such installments may be viewed on Figure 2 below. Figure 2: Chinese Detection/Defense Capabilities in the South China Sea. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2016) Moreover, the deployment of HQ-9 missile batteries and J-11 fighter jets to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the SCS has implications for PLA capabilities in the sea (Tiezzi 2016). These are the military capabilities that show China’s increasing power. Politically, China’s Hainan Island presides over the administration of the entire features in the SCS (de Castro 2015, p.7). China – militarily and politically – thus enjoys vast strategic depth and lands bases from which to achieve its goal of becoming a maritime power.. 32.

(34) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. Having analyzed China’s growing power, how does this renewed power enable China to pursue its strategy? The following section will discuss China’s naval strategy in the SCS and beyond.. III. ii. China’s Naval Strategy In recent years, there has been a steady development in China’s strategy, since its power is in constant change, thus it enables China to alter its short-term strategy. However, its longterm strategy indeed seems fixated upon ‘national rejuvenation’ and realizing the ‘Chinese dream’, pointing to the CPC’s centenary in 2049. Ever since China’s ‘opening up’ reforms. 政治大. by Deng Xiaoping, he urged China to maintain a ‘low profile’. This has been pursued well into the early 2000s. At present, China has overthrown that idea by set of new strategies to. 立. accommodate its newly-found power.. ‧ 國. 學. China has transitioned from a “hide-and-bide approach” (Cronin 2015, p.26) to a far more active and assertive phase employing the so called ‘cabbage strategy’, as low intensity. ‧. coercion. Yahuda (2013, p.447) argues that the Chinese have “begun to challenge more openly conventional interpretations of maritime international law in order to suit their own. Nat. sit. y. immediate strategic and national interests.” Saul (2013, p.197) sees China being. al. er. io. “recalcitrant”; being resistant, cautious, aggressive, opposed and prioritising in its. n. respective policies. Others (de Castro 2015) see China employing Realpolitik strategies.. Ch. i n U. v. China has a Realpolitik dating back thousands of years, often referred to as Chinese. engchi. Legalism, which can be recognized through Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Simply, China is challenging, but through low intensity coercion. Given the present conditions, China uses prudent behaviour to assert its control over what is available and possible. Realpolitik is how an actor conducts himself in a given situation, essentially bypassing its ideological, moral or ethical premises. Although ideology and morality may be integrated in a longterm strategy as an end, Realpolitik explains a rather short-term strategy, in which pragmatic politics takes precedence over all else.. 33.

(35) Vaclav Jilek 103926020. IMAS. CHINA’S LONG-TERM STRATEGY - FIRST AND SECOND ISLAND CHAIN China has incorporated a long-term strategy for the SCS through its late general Liu Huaxing’s two island chains strategy. This strategy is divided into the first and second island chains, which is depicted in Figure 3. Figure 3: First and Second Island China Strategy. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Source: Wingfield-Hayes (2014) Given China’s rising power, by 2050 PLAN should aspire to be a global force. This is a strong continentalist perspective, a very first in China’s history, despite China’s present regional scope. Cole’s (2010) methodology is derived from access to material very close to the Communist Party, ranging to official documents to Chinese analysts such as Liu Huaqing or Zhang Lianzhong, a former PLA general and a former PLAN commander, respectively. From Cole’s analysis, it is conceivable to suggest a realist aspiration of the. 34.