Chapter IV. Potential Outcomes of China’s Policy
IV. ii. US and Balance of Power
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discusses the concept of balance of power, an outcome of that rather negative view of China’s rising power.
IV. ii. US and Balance of Power
Classical realists take the concept of balance of power with great reverence and this has been at the backdrop of US’ reaction towards China’s policy. The idea is whenever a security and power equilibrium has become disrupted following an increase in power on one side, a response is followed in whatever form to balance such asymmetry in power.
China’s asymmetric rise in power in recent years has prompted the US to counteract to form a stronger alliance of nations. It is hard to fathom who has the upper hand, however the notion of the balance of power is such that it is in constant fluctuation, and whatever status quo is supposed to be is merely an illusion, as change is a natural law and both sides ought to adapt to constant changes in the international environment. What has thus-far been the US response to China’s unprecedented change?
What is the US’ response?
Following on from previous analysis, China has been increasing its capabilities and power projection in the SCS. There are several authors (Landler 2012; de Castro 2015; Jennings 2015) that have commented on what a US strategic response in the SCS may resemble. On a more assertive note, Landler (2012) urges the US to make China acknowledge America’s strength, determination and strategy. In order to do so, the US military “must invest heavily in technology to neutralize or disable China’s new asymmetric capabilities” (de Castro 2015, p.8). As part of its ‘Asian pivot’, Obama’s strategic incentive to the Western Pacific includes shifting nearly 60% of its “maritime assets […] by 2020” (ibid.), which includes a total of 6 aircraft carriers. America’s stronger presence, through its air and naval forces, will need to override China’s anti-access systems and thus neutralize China’s capability to control the air and sea around the first island chain. However, some critics, particularly Jennings (2015, p.54), have expressed lack of a concerted effort from the US’ side, citing a US investment of a mere $426 million into a maritime security initiative to provide for capacity and confidence building efforts.
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Most recently, the US has been conducting freedom of navigation exercises over the SCS in international airspace and waters. China’s notorious reactions have involved fending the US off its territory through radio transmission. However, in May 2016, China has even gone so far as to intercept a US plane with two fighter jets (BBC 2016) to show it is indeed serious against US’ incursions in its territory. Jennings furthermore argues that international coordination should take place “to sustain a pattern of military overflights and freedom of navigation naval operations, including within 12 nautical miles of disputed features” (Jennings 2015, p.59). This is in turn to balance out the power shift that is taking place in the region through the concept of balance of power. Figure 8 below illustrates such a balance of power in practice.
Figure 8: Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific
Source: Browne (2015)
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concept in the international relations domain. Following on from the analysis of the US and ASEAN reactions, it is favorable to touch upon the notion of balancing of power. The balance of power system “assumes competition between states and hence the ever-present risk of aggression and conflict” (Cook et al 2015, p.25), however at the same time it averted conflict through a stabilizing process. Furthermore, de Castro (2015, p.3) suggests the situation in the SCS is a “fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balance generated by mistrust, suspicion and rivalry between China and the US/Japan tandem over a maritime dispute.” The author further argues that the current balance of power system can become the proverbial “calm before the storm” (de Castro 2015, p.12). How does this work in practice though?As China is acting on protecting its own territorial integrity in the SCS and simultaneously pursuing a military modernization and increasing defense budgets, the US and its allies are finding ways to negate such an imbalance. For example, the Philippines and the US agreed on an updated Mutual Defense Treaty signing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). This allows for the US forces to freely operate on Filipino bases. The US once had its military base in Subic Bay, north of the Philippines, and there is still potential to re-open its base there, which is dependent on China’s further military actions in the region. Moreover, the other more significant player in the SCS, Vietnam, has had its arms embargo lifted by President Obama, which suggests closer ties between the two sides and a counterbalance towards a potential Chinese military supremacy (Spetalnick 2016).
On the peripheral balance of power scale, other ASEAN member countries are also bolstering their defense budgets in line with China’s rise. Singapore bought submarines from Sweden, Malaysia bought French submarines, Indonesia acquired South Korean submarines and Thailand paradoxically Chinese-made submarines. Vietnam has a military partnership with Russia and the Philippines additionally and more recently with that of Japan. Japan’s role has also intensified as a reaction to China’s self-imposed ADIZ over the East China Sea. Japan’s partnership with the Philippines provides capacity-building
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training for the PH coast guard on maritime security, along with defense equipment and technology to the AFP. Nevertheless, in case of conflict, the PH might find itself militarily
“ill-equipped, utterly defenseless and totally unprepared for a destructive onslaught” (de Castro 2015, p.23). One of the main reasons as to why Japan is supporting the PH is that China’s advancements in the SCS may hamper Japan’s trade, which is heavily dependent upon the connection of the South China Sea and East China Sea (Hayton 2015; Jennings 2015; Storey 2015).
The current balance of power between China and Southeast Asia requires more attention, one author suggests it is “too late to mind the gap” (Storey 2015, p.75). This prompts a re-evaluation of the military tactics in the SCS and the region beyond. However, are we being misled into thinking that an alternate reality is indeed possible or how can we act to negate the consequences of our human nature? Is such balancing of power an inevitable notion and a reflection of our human nature? According to classical realists, the balance of power is a crucial concept in the study of international politics and deeply embedded into our human nature. On the other side of the scale, some are not going along the ‘convenient’
bandwagon of US counterbalancing strategy as New Zealand has already decided that its
“economic interests with China will trump strategic activism” (Jennings 2015, p.56). Is thus the balancing of power a success or not? What is China’s response?
Success or not? China’s response?
At the hands of an ineffective response, China has “adroitly taken advantage of a window of opportunity to assert control in some key areas at a point when other countries lacked the capacity or direct interest to intervene” (Jennings 2015, p.59). This assumes a certain
‘belated’ response from the US, before which China could strategically maneuver to assert itself and establish tangible results of power in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the SCS.
This suggests that the US ‘balancing’ of military power in the Asia-Pacific could not contain China to not be able to act. As a state’s power relative to the others’ increases, the more the state acquires the ability to act according to its own wish. As such, the US
“strategic position has not stopped China from pursuing a more successfully assertive posture” (Jennings 2015, p.57).
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clouded by our inadvertent and yet prudent decision making. What would the US lose if it let China acquire the necessary grounds for security and naval expansion? Would the US allow such space for China, or would a rather more direct military approach, perhaps a military encounter try to stop China before the Chinese state acquires more power and thus more causal powers? Part of the human condition is both sides in our “inability to gauge threat accurately or to anticipate the actions of others” (Welch 2015, p.1). As such, the problem lies in “letting subjective perceptions of righteousness cloud their judgment about the likely consequences of their actions” (Welch 2015, p.1). This condition has been described by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War as the ‘The Thucydides Trap’, which is, in this case, “—a conscious calculation on the part of American leaders that war with China sooner is preferable to a war with China later (or kowtowing to Beijing once it has risen fully)— ”, but this does not become the scenario for conflict, but the more potential outcome would be one that a smaller case could ‘pull’ the two great powers into a conflict, such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan or the SCS with the Philippines or Vietnam (Welch 2015).At the root of balance of power lies mistrust and rivalry, and as such, China views US’
attempt as forging to build a coalition of states to constrain China’s expansionism (de Castro 2015). As a result of such reciprocal behaviour, this may become counter-productive from US’ point of view. Such contingencies may spearhead a Chinese move to adopt an ADIZ much quicker. Increased US military overflights and a potential new ADIZ would bring the sides closer to a conflict, or gradually reverse the seat of power into China’s favor through a new regional order without any major conflict.