This author proposes this topic following an unprecedented rise in both the material and the perceived power of China in most recent years. In an era of intensified international relations, the South China Sea (SCS), inter alia, proves a heavy burden on the international community in the face of uncertainty and regional rivalry. Amidst all the propositions to resolve this nebula of individual interests, as yet there is not a single way that ought to declutter the area and find common ground. This is mainly because China aspires to possess the totality of it all through its ‘U-shaped line’ and manage it under its own guard, dismissing international law as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s historical U-shaped line is acting against the international community’s wish to abide by the international law of the sea. Such ‘defiance’ will certainly not solve anything and may lead to increased tensions and a potential conflict between China and the many other claimants, under US military protection. This is seen from the classical realist lens of international relations theory, through which this thesis is constructed upon.
The purpose of the study is to enrich the academic community by applying an important theoretical perspective, which is most applicable and holds a certain authenticity in today’s world, as depicted by the numbers of military conflicts in many of the world’s regions.
Moreover, the study will focus on China’s ability and persistence in applying its claims to the South China Sea, and hence it is quite pertinent to try to understand the subtle meaning as posed by the research question: ‘Why China will not give up the South China Sea?
Classical realism is the theory chosen to represent the reality of China’s method of applying itself in the region. The outcome of this study ought to open the minds of the keen observers to understand the conflict in a more nuanced way and look at alternate potential ideas to determine a peaceful resolution of tensions, and not give way to an impulsive clash of interests and allow ‘human nature’ play out in the form of ‘self-other’ conflict.
Yet, the case of the South China Sea is widely seen as a complex issue. The purpose of this thesis is not to suggest a simplified outline of a complex situation. However, its purpose
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serves to leave all the complex ideas aside and make way for a simple theoretical understanding by way of classical realism, from which these complex ideas manifested in the first place. It is the understanding of human nature, which needs to be addressed in order to truly understand China’s rationale. Another reason is to distinguish methodologically between classical realism and neorealism, which has often been misconstrued. What is driving international politics is primarily fear, however, what the author tries to point out is that in the 21st century, we should strive for understanding to find common ground, for that is the first step towards outgrowing our ‘human nature’ in the form of fear.
“Life is not to be feared; it is to be understood.” – Marie Curie
Hypothesized Proposition
The thesis follows the case study of the South China Sea in relation to China’s intent to control the sea. Through careful analysis of the research questions – ‘Why will China not give up the South China Sea?’, ‘What are the reasons for China’s behavior?’, and ‘What are the potential outcomes of China’s policy?’ – and through classical-realism and the accompanying ‘human nature’ argument, that is, the notion that politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993), the thesis argues that with greater power comes greater legitimacy from the point of view of the actor, in this case China. Human nature is inherently flawed, and there is a correlation between power and interests of the state, a state which is a singular political entity, leading essentially to an anarchic international arena. The actor is essentially confined to face a geopolitical struggle. However, a greater relative power may overcome such anarchic tensions.
Framework of Study
The framework of the study follows a three-chapter logically-articulated structure, throughout which the methodology is consistent with that of classical realism. The chapters are divided into theoretical analysis, China’s policy in the South China Sea, and finally, potential outcomes of such a policy, from a classical realist point of view.
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The first ‘theory’ chapter, Chapter II, is sub-divided into three parts. The first part comments on the principles of classical realism and their importance primarily from Hans Morgenthau, the father of the more ‘modern’ classical realism, and subsequently Thucydides, and Machiavelli. The second part distinguishes between classical realism and neo-realism, as a few theses have previously analyzed the same topic but through neorealist theory. The third part puts forth various limitations in the application of classical realism.
Chapter III scrutinizes China’s policy and how it has been able to achieve such a policy.
The chapter is split into three parts. The first part analyzes China’s power, which is the first step towards a more coherent policy in the SCS. The second part follows with the analysis of China’s naval strategy, a necessary outcome of China’s power. The third section puts power and strategy into practice in the form of China’s land reclamation.
As a corollary, the Chapter IV combines the analysis of the previous two chapters to give a concise answer to the last research question: What are the potential outcomes of China’s policy? The fourth chapter is likewise divided into three parts. The first part analyzes ASEAN’s attempts to fight for international law. The second part delves into the US reaction and the accompanying concept of balance of power, which the US pursues. The third section puts forth an idea of China’s new regional order after its potentially successful policy in the SCS.
Finally, Chapter V envelops the discussion and analysis into a conclusion and put forth a final answer to the three main research questions.
Literature Review
This literature review comprises three themes that are central to the premise of this thesis and that have been recurrent throughout the research for this thesis and subsequently incorporated into the argument that human nature governs the subsequent actions and policies of the actor.
The three main themes encountered in the pertinent literature is China’s strategy, power and influence of geography upon policy. As such, this review will discuss the main authors and their arguments revolving around these core thematic notions.
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In relation to the realist conception of power, Emmers (2010) cites Morgenthau’s words that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Emmers 2010, p. 13).
This struggle for power supposes a balance of power, a recurrent concept in international relations. However, according to classical realists, as states struggle for power, this struggle does not lead to the aim of balancing, but precisely “at superiority of power in their own behalf” (ibid.). Owing to this behavioral nature of states, in an anarchical system balance of power exists, with each state overlapping the other in relative terms of power. Thus the concept of the balance of power is an essential tool of analysis in the study of realist and geopolitical theory. Emmers’ methodology is based on a theoretical analysis, which subsequently is implanted into the study of maritime territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, wherein a ‘geopolitical interplay’ is taking place.
Starting in 2010, China has “jettisoned its erstwhile ‘low profile’ international posture and has instead become more aggressive in pushing for its own narrowly defined national interests” (Li 2014, p.135). With these words, Li Mingjiang stresses China’s evolving policy towards the South China Sea. Despite China asserting sovereignty for many decades, it is only a couple of years since it sees itself in a position to go from status quo to moulding the situation in its favor, at the expense of the other claimants. Li terms this shift as ‘non-confrontational assertiveness.’ Essentially, what the author argues that China has developed a substantial capacity to push its policy forward, yet at the same time not coercing its neighbors for fear it will negatively impact its regional strategy. The author puts himself in the shoes of China’s strategic thinking and this term coincides well with China’s advancements. In the past years, scholars and journalists alike have labeled Chinese activities as ‘assertive’ and it has become second nature in academic circles to correlate China with an ‘assertive’ strategy. According to realists, with rising power, the actor will do whatever to utilize such power to maximize its sense of security and development alike.
According to Holmes and Yoshihara (2008), in order to satisfy its naval strategy, China has turned to the maritime geopolitical thinker Alfred Mahan. Their study reflects that Mahan’s work on sea-power has provided an indispensable framework to understand
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China’s naval strategy, not to mention that China has indeed included in its defense white papers a certain phrase: ‘command of the sea’. Mahan’s theory involves command of the sea as a symbol of national greatness, from which true power comes from, whereby the agent manages trade during peace time and controls the area during wartime. Invariably, the study (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008) hypothesizes that Chinese naval strategy will be compelled to align itself along Mahan’s thought, yet, the authors contend that there is no suggestion that a positive correlation determines the outcome of China’s naval strategy.
Hence, the study follows a holistic interpretive methodology. Furthermore, the study analyzes potential futures of China’s policy in the sea. One striking analysis points to a geopolitical, almost Hobbesian image of regional politics as “geography does not change, notwithstanding the vicissitudes of international relations” (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, p.116). To a realist, “pacifying effects of economic interdependence are a fallacy” (ibid.).
This points to the realist notion that economic interdependence alone cannot guarantee security, and we have to count in the complex nature of politics, strategy and geography, which do not necessarily comply with economics.
China’s turn to Mahan’s sea strategy has been well-noted, however, You (2006) illustrates another sea power dimension to China’s strategy. In his article ‘China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation’, he alludes to the Russian strategist Gorshkov and his book Sea Power of the State, and mentions how the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been ordered to closely study this piece on sea geopolitics. The author’s methodology utilizes a comparison of the Soviet naval strategy to advocate for China’s inspiration. By nature of this work, this would suggest China is sincerely building a blue water navy. A blue water navy is a navy with the capacity to monitor waters well beyond its coast and into the deep seas. The author argues that PLAN, apart from possessing a ‘prescribed geographical scope of activities’ (You 2006, p.75), the navy should go even beyond (i.e. South China Sea) to attain power projection capabilities as far as the North West Pacific. Thus, solidifying its control of the South China Sea bases is a prerequisite to attain such goal.
In The Great Wall at Sea, Cole (2010) outlines China’s maritime strategy since the Cold War. As China was relatively weak following the Cultural Revolution, the navy’s role was
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primarily coastal. Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s chief reforms and economic growth, interest in increasing the navy’s capabilities increased. The ocean, not just the sea, was to be seen as its “chief strategic defensive direction” (Cole 2010, p.169). One of the navy’s strategic tasks was to safeguard its ‘water rights’. According to Cole, the ‘chief architect’ of China’s emerging naval strategy was Liu Huaqing. His vision was to divide the Western Pacific into two island chains. The first island chain goes along the periphery of Japan and the Philippines, thus encompassing the entire South China Sea. The Second island chain goes beyond into the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean. This is the geopolitical scope of China’s short-term sea strategy, since based on Mr. Liu’s geopolitical thought, China ought to control these areas by 2020. Given China’s rising power, by 2050 PLAN should aspire to be a global force. This is a strong continentalist perspective, a very first in China’s history, despite China’s regional scope. Cole’s methodology is derived from access to material very close to the Communist Party, ranging to official documents to Chinese analysts such as Liu Huaqing or Zhang Lianzhong, a former PLA general and a former PLAN commander, respectively. From the analysis, it is conceivable to suggest a realist aspiration of the PLAN to take command of the Pacific seas, but more importantly, it gives us great insight into potential outcomes of China’s present policy in the South China Sea.
In The Revenge of Geography, Kaplan (2012) discusses the geography of Chinese power and cites geopolitician Mackinder, who alluded to China’s potential by “building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor Western” (Kaplan 2012, p.189). Kaplan urges the audience to look at China’s geography, which is one of the main sources of its economic dynamism and national assertiveness over recent decades.
Furthermore, Kaplan labels China as a ‘hydraulic civilization’ which is relentless and dynamic. Its internal dynamism, coupled with “civil unrest and inefficiencies […] [and] an economic slowdown, creates external ambitions” (Kaplan 2012, p.198). He further argues that empires “are often not sought consciously” (ibid.). As states gain more power, they develop certain needs, and with needs come insecurities, thus allowing for further expansion in an organic fashion. Kaplan’s argument complements the realist notion of thought that human nature is inherently flawed and such an outcome of a state’s unconscious expansion is not only feasible, but very real.
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The geopolitical aspect of the SCS is highly pertinent to the nations’ actions and behaviour in the region. According to Kaplan, “geography is paramount” and from which “strategy and geopolitics naturally emerge” (Kaplan 2014, p.1). For him, the SCS became an
“anxious and complicated armed camp” (Kaplan 2014, p.1). There have been geopolitical
‘nodes’ throughout history (Tebin 2011), such as Alsace-Lorraine, which has been the center of geopolitical struggle between France and Germany for decades, from the times of Bismarck until the end of World War II. The SCS may be regarded as the ‘geopolitical node of the 21st century’ and the ‘future of conflict’ (Tebin 2011; Kaplan 2012b). The SCS provides a host of useful reserves of “untapped resources and is understood to be of particular geopolitical significance” (Raine and Le Mière 2013, p.22). The geography of the SCS shapes the way states act in relation to it and in relation to each other (Kaplan 2012b).
In his book Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, Kane (2002) offers an argument on the basis of principles of Chinese seapower. Geography figures as one of the more important aspect of China’s power. As a corollary, Kane’s methodology is based on geopolitical grounds, assuming on every aspect of China’s power geopolitical thought of Alfred Mahan, as well as those of Julian Corbett and C.E. Callwell. Kane summarizes Corbett’s argument of a ‘strategy of impeachment’, wherein a smaller navy (that of China’s) utilizes a ‘strike first’ attempt to give a leeway for better defensive capabilities.
This suggests that China’s strategy in the South China Sea is that of ‘impeachment’; to go on an ‘offensive’ to best ensure ‘defensive’ capabilities. Additionally, Callwell maintains that a “sound strategy and [an] indirect approach may often allow the materially weaker side to achieve its ends” (Kane 2002, p. 50). This ties in with the ‘non-confrontational assertiveness’ idea that China pursues in the South China Sea, and may well work in favor of China.
China’s government released its newest White Paper on defense last year entitled ‘China’s Military Strategy’ (State Council 2015). The English version has been released through Xinhua news agency. Whereas the text seeks to portray China as peacefully rising, the rhetoric indeed shifts light when it comes to territorial disputes. It says that hotspot issues
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such as “[…] territorial disputes […] are complex and volatile” (State Council 2015, p.1).
Moreover, concerning China’s maritime goals, China pertains that:
“some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China's reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.
Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests” (State Council 2015, p.1).
In this passage, its realist ‘human nature’ feeling reverberates in our consciousness.
Furthermore, the text continues that the “Chinese Dream is to make the country strong”
(State Council 2015, p.2). As part of the Chinese Dream vision, the armed forces need to be strengthened because without a strong military, a “country can be neither safe nor strong”
(ibid.). In line with the previous authors’ arguments pertaining to China’s strategy in South China Sea, China’s navy needs to “work hard to seize the strategic initiative in military competition” (State Council 2015, p.2). According to classical realists, the state actor will seek more power than the other actors in the anarchic system. This text already implies
‘military competition’, and this is not peaceful rhetoric, especially when it comes to such a strong US navy hovering nearby and strengthening alliances with China’s neighbors.
When it comes to China’s actual strategy, the text mentions ‘active defense’. This goes in line with Li’s ‘non-confrontational assertiveness’. This ‘active defense’ is the “essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought” (State Council 2015, p.3). In addition to this concept is the so-called Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS) tactic. Within the PMS strategy is
“highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS” (ibid.). These two concepts of ‘active defense’ and PMS is already building foundations for a broader Chinese maritime strategy that goes beyond the regional, as previous analysis of various geopoliticians has suggested. Finally, “the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’
and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure” (State Council 2015, p.4). From these words, one can assume that South China Sea is a given
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when it comes to Chinese thinking of its territorial and geopolitical capacity to ensure its security. The textual references are being reflected in reality in what is happening in the South China Sea.
Research Methodology
This thesis will be tended to through interpretive analysis within a geopolitical approach, which is primarily qualitative research, utilizing primary and secondary data, such as official documents and peer-reviewed research articles and books.
As this dissertation has an underlying empirical premise due to the analysis of China’s policy in the South China Sea, it is a necessary to analyze the content within a theoretical approach. Whilst many theoretical approaches exist, this dissertation is written following the classical realist perspective. As previously mentioned, the research methods chosen throughout this dissertation is interpretive analysis within a geopolitical approach.
Pertaining to the research methods of this thesis, the researcher’s job is to interpret social action. With regards to the proposed thesis, the social action is China’s behavior in the
Pertaining to the research methods of this thesis, the researcher’s job is to interpret social action. With regards to the proposed thesis, the social action is China’s behavior in the