Chapter IV. Potential Outcomes of China’s Policy
IV. iii. China’s New Regional Order and Legitimacy
clouded by our inadvertent and yet prudent decision making. What would the US lose if it let China acquire the necessary grounds for security and naval expansion? Would the US allow such space for China, or would a rather more direct military approach, perhaps a military encounter try to stop China before the Chinese state acquires more power and thus more causal powers? Part of the human condition is both sides in our “inability to gauge threat accurately or to anticipate the actions of others” (Welch 2015, p.1). As such, the problem lies in “letting subjective perceptions of righteousness cloud their judgment about the likely consequences of their actions” (Welch 2015, p.1). This condition has been described by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War as the ‘The Thucydides Trap’, which is, in this case, “—a conscious calculation on the part of American leaders that war with China sooner is preferable to a war with China later (or kowtowing to Beijing once it has risen fully)— ”, but this does not become the scenario for conflict, but the more potential outcome would be one that a smaller case could ‘pull’ the two great powers into a conflict, such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan or the SCS with the Philippines or Vietnam (Welch 2015).
At the root of balance of power lies mistrust and rivalry, and as such, China views US’
attempt as forging to build a coalition of states to constrain China’s expansionism (de Castro 2015). As a result of such reciprocal behaviour, this may become counter-productive from US’ point of view. Such contingencies may spearhead a Chinese move to adopt an ADIZ much quicker. Increased US military overflights and a potential new ADIZ would bring the sides closer to a conflict, or gradually reverse the seat of power into China’s favor through a new regional order without any major conflict.
IV. iii. China’s New Regional Order and Legitimacy
A classical realist analysis does not necessarily end in major power conflict. Classical realists try to outline the flaw of our human nature and the resulting actions caused by such a flaw in terms of power, interests, security and balance of power. Analysts and scholars may seek and identify such terms and the interplay when looking at the rise of China and a US shift in policy as a result. Following such an interplay of our human nature, there are
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two results, or outcomes: either a major conflict or a more or less peaceful transition of power. Whereas the balance of power analysis does not call for a major power conflict, — a Sino-American war—, but it does perhaps find potential in a lesser smaller confrontation as power and interests interplay. The more potential outcome, especially in the SCS, would be an accommodation of China’s rise in power, acknowledgement of such power (relative to others), and an establishment of a Chinese regional order, in a cautious manner exploited alongside the US naval forces.
Here, it is important to re-state China’s more recent military strategy: moving the PLAN from an offshore water defense role to one of open seas protection. China is playing a game of weiqi (Go), whereas US plays chess. The Americans focus “too much on military technology whereas China can outmaneuver the US through political, economic, human and psychological competition” (Cronin 2015, p.29-30). Moreover, the international community cannot undermine China’s power and its effects. From a military point of view, Chinese aircraft carriers will have an effect on the region’s psychology about the future balance of power (Cronin 2015, p.28). In addition to the region’s psychology, in the past two decades, especially under Hu Jintao and his rhetoric of a ‘harmonious world’ plays well with popular nationalist sentiment. Under Xi Jinping, such nationalist sentiment has been strengthened through the ‘Chinese dream’. China’s actions and results further build on its own right to pursue such re-invigoration of China and its society.
China is building its ‘islands’ in the SCS because it can, and because such an “assertion of strength is welcomed by a people schooled in the history of China’s weakness and mistreatment by international powers” (Jennings 2015, p.51). Moreover, China has worked hard to make sure that ASEAN member states “struggle to hold and articulate a common position” on the SCS, use economic pressure to secure diplomatic leverage (Jennings 2015, p.53). Claimant states have “solid reasons not to want to risk their broader China relationships even as their positions are being eroded by the growth of a stronger Chinese presence on the disputed features” (ibid.). In short, ASEAN has more to gain by engaging China rather than confronting it from a military and strategic point of view. From China’s point of view, Beijing “calculates that nothing it has done establishes a red line that China
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cannot afford to cross” (Jennings 2015, p.57). China has continuously been noting its legitimacy, and perhaps so in the near future, such legitimacy may extend beyond China’s circle of thinking and establish itself, if not in the international community, then at least in the regional community.
Concept of Legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy is a “crucial analytical instrument with which to investigate political behavior in human history” (Hsu 2007, xviii). Throughout historical empires, dynasties and even republics, legitimately governing a cohesive human society was based on the Divine rule and will. Law has been defined by divinity, and has been the predominant factor in establishing claims of legitimacy. The notion of law depicts how various entities ought to work. As such, law creates institutions – institutions such as governments, ministries, and even rules, customs, beliefs and many more. Hence, legitimacy and institutions are directly interchangeable and influence one another.
Institutional change thus implicitly proposes a shifting legitimacy. Although the “forces of legitimacy do not always bring about institutional change” (Gilley 2008, p.261), institutional change is often a response to those forces, especially over the long term.
There are various conceptualizations of the term ‘legitimacy.’ Hsu (2007, xv) proposes that
“legitimacy…with its etymological root of lex, indicates an institution related to laws or to established conventions or customs that guide the rule of succession of the governing person or the effective function of the government.” If one looks at the Chinese word for politics, which means ‘justified order’, this indicates civilized order that “determines the common fortune of all peoples” (Zhao 2012, p.46). The Chinese perception of legitimacy is deep-rooted in its historical and political traditions (Guo 2013, p.22). Another interesting interpretation lies within the realm of psychology; political order is always psychological and deals with a “cognitive activity in the minds of the governed” (So 2007, p.28).
Moreover, Beijing has “legislated many internal maritime laws to justify its maritime activities including” (Ota 2014, p.78):
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1996 Public Relation Marine Science ResearchAdministrative Regulation
1998 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
1999 Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China
2001 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas
2003 Desert Island Protection Usage
Administrative Regulation
2009 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Island Protection
2010 National Mobilization Law
2012 Maritime Observation Forecast
Administrative Regulations
As China’s power grows, China’s world view shifts as well as world’s view of China. This in and of itself brings about cognitive institutional change in the form of how everyone views China. The paradox comes in where China readily suggests its historical tradition of a great Chinese nation finds strong meaning in China’s conduct of politics and law. As such, the “government’s implicit argument is that a self-proclaimed ‘tradition’ trumps international law” (China vs the rest 2016, p.30). With a growing ability to assert itself, China’s conduct of politics will become more reflected in international politics, as has been previously done with the US conduct of politics and its acceptance thereof. Such power would institute a form of a legitimate Chinese order in the SCS and beyond, as China looks to the open seas according to its own laws, as depicted in the above table.
Certainly, opponents of China’s policy have called it an „ominous act of Chinese expansionism” (de Castro 2015, p.4). The condition of our human nature is to fear the uncertain future, and as such when we feel our power and control is threatened, we would
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call on the ‘perpetrator’ to halt its action or ‘policy’ of expansionism, whereas it is only a natural and relative exchange of power. If one resists such a change, conflict would almost become inevitable. The only source of conflict is resistance to change. But our human nature is not fixed and may acquire a ‘new face’ if we are to embrace change. This is crucial more than ever in today’s world, where change plays a part of daily life in terms of work, business, science, relationships and politics.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In sum, the chapter looked at various outcomes of China’s more ‘assertive’ policy in the SCS. Firstly, the ASEAN fight for international law under UNCLOS has been an ongoing process, however, it has thus-far not been able to keep China at bay, as China looks out for its own version of maritime law. The US balance of power, according to many scholars, has either come ‘late’ or has been ‘ineffective’ to a certain extent. China has been able to freely manouever in the SCS and establish bases in order to attain control over the seas in a potentially ‘new regional order’ under the power of China.
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foreign reserves able to possess a financial clout over the economy and development, but China also possesses political power that translates into realization of interests. The South China Sea became a part of China’s ‘core’ interests in 2010, a year that may be marked as a leap forward in China’s relative and perceived power. Since then, China has been able to achieve a large military budget that would enable it to extend its muscles beyond its borders; and went east and south to the seas.The thesis’ main premise was to account for China’s policy in the South China Sea, particularly through the lens of classical realism. It sought to answer the main research questions: ‘Why will China not give up the South China Sea?’, ‘What are the reasons for China’s behavior?’, and ‘What are the potential outcomes of China’s policy?’ Because of our inherently flawed human nature, accumulated power will want us to pursue our interests. As such, the SCS even became China’s core interest and is incorporated into China’s long-term strategy of becoming a global naval force, this is why China will not give in to the pressures of the international community and will seek its own way forward.
The reasons for China’s more ‘assertive’ behavior lie in its accumulation of power. Not only has this enhanced its stance in the anarchic international arena, but it perceives on its own that China has the material capabilities and psychological ability to move forward with its long-term strategy. Power provides the pavement for China’s ‘national rejuvenation’ and the ‘Chinese dream’ vision. As ASEAN and the US urge for a status quo through international law and balance of power, China is revising the regional modus operandi, by erecting artificial islands that would be capable of providing China with the necessary installments and infrastructure to control the first island chain.
The US has had tremendous influence over the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War order.
However, two decades following the collapse of the bipolar world order, China has become the second highest economy in the world and is more willing to pursue its interests. The relative powers are progressively shifting. As China accumulates more power, the world has yet another ‘great power’ struggle, presently seen within the South China Sea. One can