i. Analysis of China’s Power

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Recent developments suggest China’s ‘assertiveness’ includes China’s deployment of its first aircraft carrier Liaoning onto the waters of the SCS as well as China’s claims on fishing rights over the entire SCS (Thayer 2014). The deployment of the Chinese aircraft carrier is a “strategic projection of power at sea” (Samuels 1982, p.145). These developments “exacerbated concerns about China’s long term strategic objectives” as China’s military expenditure exponentially increases (Russel 2014, p.1). Essentially, China seeks to “maximize its legal and political leverage, while the growth of its military and maritime assets gains physical leverage over its weaker neighbours” (EEAS 2012, p.1).

Since 2010, South China Sea became a part of its core interests on par with Taiwan and Tibet (de Castro 2015, p.5). Following this brief introduction into the nature and background of the SCS disputes, how can China manifest its dream of ‘national rejuvenation’? The answer is through power. The next section analyzes China’s newly-found power and how it will attempt to use it for its own benefit, and from its own position the benefit of the entire region.

III. i. Analysis of China’s Power

If a state seeks to alter a perceived ‘status quo’, the change is contingent upon power. China

“is not a status quo power”, argues Kaplan, “for it is propelled abroad by the need to secure energy, metals and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standard of roughly a fifth of humanity” (2012, p.199). Classical realists then call the agent a

‘revisionist power’. From previous analysis of power, the state with enough accumulated power has the causal forces to create the sought after change. Concerning power politics, one may discern that the post-Cold War era has been a unipolar form of power from the point of the US, until the global financial crash in 2008. Since 2010, as the global economy slowly recovers, not only have we seen a stronger China, but Russia has also risen to mark its geopolitical status. As such, the world is at present in a multipolar power setting. Much of causal powers of the US have been transferred to that of China and Russia. This notion of power supposes both hard and soft power, the overall ability of China to assert its influence and interests.

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How has China gone about an increased power? Indeed, China has come out of the financial crisis on top. Its relative power has risen to the point where China has felt comfortable to position itself in Asia-Pacific as the director, rather than an actor. In 2010, China has overcome Japan as the strongest economy in Asia, and in the same year announced the SCS as part of its ‘core’ interests. As a corollary, it needs to provide security to that ‘core’

interest. The SCS is part of a larger core interest family, although this has to do with China’s security and growth – traits of an ‘uber-realist power’ (Kaplan 2012, p.199).

China’s immense financial endowment has seen it influence neighbors through infrastructure projects and trade, and also invest in a home-grown military, reducing arms reliability on Russian imports. Its military growth stems from a financial clout and political backing by CPC leaders and the public. China’s asymmetric rise has seen quite unprecedented consequences in the regional architecture. In comparison with ASEAN members contesting the SCS disputes, China dwarfs their military capabilities. Since classical realists view power in relative terms, we need to consider the regional military situation. How do others compare to China?

Regional military spending has reached a total of $439 billion, with China reaching a 9.7 percent increase in its military budget (Cronin 2015, p.26). Over the past decade, China has invested large amounts into PLA’s military modernization. The PLA budget in 2015 surpassed $200 billion, six times larger than the combined budgets of ASEAN member states (Storey 2015, p.71). For comparison purposes, in the year 2000, the difference between the defense budgets of China and ASEAN was just over $2 billion. At present, the figure nearly surpasses $150 billion (Storey 2015, p.76). China’s two main rival claimants in the SCS, Vietnam and the Philippines, are playing their part to not lag behind China too much. Vietnam’s military spending has risen by 128 percent (SIPRI 2015, p.3) in 2015, a significant rise to boost Vietnam’s defense and naval forces. On the other hand, Philippines enjoys very limited forces available to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), since Aquino’s administration has lacked finances to pursue its modernization program (de Castro 2015). de Castro argues that the strategic imbalance between the Philippines and China “cannot be rectified in the foreseeable future” (2015, p.17). How has China managed to exponentially outmaneuver the others?

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China is an agent of power. It is not that China’s accumulated economic power allows China to pursue its interests more ‘assertively’, it is precisely an improved economic capability yielded to increased political power available to China that enabled a larger political clout. China is ready to “influence the meaning, the context and the rules” in East Asia (Xiang 2009, p.175). To account for such influence, China has had an annual double digit increase in defense spending since 2006 to allow for the development of a blue-water navy (de Castro 2015, p.4). Figure 1 below shows the military might of the PLA, which now includes one aircraft carrier. For decades, China has relied on military imports from Russia. However, China is slowly homogenizing its military technology and refraining from external influence to internalize its research and development of military capabilities.

Figure 1: China’s Military Might, 2012

Source: WSJ (2013)

China’s military research and development follows a dual track – low-cost quantity and high-end quality (Cronin 2015, p.26). Low-cost quantity allows for China’s navy to deploy coast guard and frigates into the seas to protect its interests, whereas high-end quality are precisely those missiles and radar systems to deter US influence in the region. This suggests

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that China has developed precise ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at US targets in the Western Pacific and aims to control its Chinese Lake through anti-access/area denial capabilities (de Castro 2015, p.4). Such installments may be viewed on Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Chinese Detection/Defense Capabilities in the South China Sea

Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2016)

Moreover, the deployment of HQ-9 missile batteries and J-11 fighter jets to Woody Island in the Paracel Islands in the SCS has implications for PLA capabilities in the sea (Tiezzi 2016). These are the military capabilities that show China’s increasing power. Politically, China’s Hainan Island presides over the administration of the entire features in the SCS (de Castro 2015, p.7). China – militarily and politically – thus enjoys vast strategic depth and lands bases from which to achieve its goal of becoming a maritime power.

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Having analyzed China’s growing power, how does this renewed power enable China to pursue its strategy? The following section will discuss China’s naval strategy in the SCS and beyond.