ii. China’s Naval Strategy

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Having analyzed China’s growing power, how does this renewed power enable China to pursue its strategy? The following section will discuss China’s naval strategy in the SCS and beyond.

III. ii. China’s Naval Strategy

In recent years, there has been a steady development in China’s strategy, since its power is in constant change, thus it enables China to alter its short-term strategy. However, its long-term strategy indeed seems fixated upon ‘national rejuvenation’ and realizing the ‘Chinese dream’, pointing to the CPC’s centenary in 2049. Ever since China’s ‘opening up’ reforms by Deng Xiaoping, he urged China to maintain a ‘low profile’. This has been pursued well into the early 2000s. At present, China has overthrown that idea by set of new strategies to accommodate its newly-found power.

China has transitioned from a “hide-and-bide approach” (Cronin 2015, p.26) to a far more active and assertive phase employing the so called ‘cabbage strategy’, as low intensity coercion. Yahuda (2013, p.447) argues that the Chinese have “begun to challenge more openly conventional interpretations of maritime international law in order to suit their own immediate strategic and national interests.” Saul (2013, p.197) sees China being

“recalcitrant”; being resistant, cautious, aggressive, opposed and prioritising in its respective policies. Others (de Castro 2015) see China employing Realpolitik strategies.

China has a Realpolitik dating back thousands of years, often referred to as Chinese Legalism, which can be recognized through Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Simply, China is challenging, but through low intensity coercion. Given the present conditions, China uses prudent behaviour to assert its control over what is available and possible. Realpolitik is how an actor conducts himself in a given situation, essentially bypassing its ideological, moral or ethical premises. Although ideology and morality may be integrated in a long-term strategy as an end, Realpolitik explains a rather short-long-term strategy, in which pragmatic politics takes precedence over all else.

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CHINA’S LONG-TERM STRATEGY - FIRST AND SECOND ISLAND CHAIN China has incorporated a long-term strategy for the SCS through its late general Liu Huaxing’s two island chains strategy. This strategy is divided into the first and second island chains, which is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3: First and Second Island China Strategy

Source: Wingfield-Hayes (2014)

Given China’s rising power, by 2050 PLAN should aspire to be a global force. This is a strong continentalist perspective, a very first in China’s history, despite China’s present regional scope. Cole’s (2010) methodology is derived from access to material very close to the Communist Party, ranging to official documents to Chinese analysts such as Liu Huaqing or Zhang Lianzhong, a former PLA general and a former PLAN commander, respectively. From Cole’s analysis, it is conceivable to suggest a realist aspiration of the

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PLAN to take command of the Pacific seas, but more importantly, it gives us great insight into potential outcomes of China’s present policy in the South China Sea.

If China is to become a global naval force, it needs to gain total control of these two island chains. The purpose of the SCS becoming China’s ‘core interest’ in 2010 is to make the first steps necessary to gain control of the first island chain, of which the SCS is an integral part. By dominating the first island chain, China can extend its security perimeter and reinforce its influence over these crucial sea lanes of communication and thus develop a blue-water navy (de Castro 2015, p.4).

Concerning the first island chain, Kato (2010) suggests that in time China will be able to stave off incursions of the US navy into the area within the first island chain, encompassing the entire SCS. To make this possible, China has pursued a strategy conducting regular naval exercises that utilize modern surface combatants and even submarines with the intention to “unilaterally and militarily resolve maritime disputes” (de Castro 2015, p.5).

With its naval prowess China is convinced that it can resolve its territorial row according to its own terms (de Castro 2015, p.5).

Taking advantage of its increased relative power, since incorporating the SCS as part of its

‘core interests’ in 2010, there are numerous examples of China’s assertive behaviour in the SCS. In 2011, China encroached upon the Philippines’ EEZ to conduct oil exploration.

Moreover, the following year, Chinese ships have taken over the Scarborough Shoal within the Philippines’ EEZ. They have evicted Filipino coast guard from the area and asserted control over the shoal. These cases have been met with increased tensions from the Filipino navy and finally forced the Philippines to file a case against China to ITLOS. This is further discussed in the fourth chapter.

China has also had cases with Vietnam, and since taking over the Paracel Islands in 1974 from South Vietnam’s sovereignty at the time, there have been a number of incidents at sea between the two states. In 2014 in particular, there was a standoff at a Chinese oil rig within Vietnam’s EEZ. Moreover, China has also gone exploring within Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s EEZs. These incidents in recent years together demonstrate China’s pursuit of a more assertive strategy to extend its already strong presence in the SCS. This is part of

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its short term strategy to conduct itself to a point where it can declare substantial control over the entire features of the SCS.

These are incidents in the open seas of the SCS, but what is more important is China’s conduct on its own ‘island’ possessions in the SCS. How can China support its oil exploration and fishing adventures, and also increase its power projection in the SCS? The answer lies in its activities relating to the land reclamations in the SCS, which will be analyzed in the third section of this chapter.