Chapter II. Theoretical Analysis of Classical Realism
II. i. The Principles of Classical Realism
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Chapter II. Theoretical Analysis of Classical Realism
Chapter I analyzes the works of classical realists that are pertinent to understanding the theoretical approach for this study. Amongst the classical realist authors are Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hobbes and most primarily Hans Morgenthau. Chapter I is divided into three sub-sections. The first part of the chapter focuses on the principles of classical realism that will be important for further analyzing China’s policy in the South China Sea.
The second part distinguishes the methodological importance between the classical realists and neorealists (or structural realists), from which a clearer understanding will be brought to light as to why classical realism is still relevant in the 21st century international politics.
The third and final part consists of the limitations of classical realism’s application and its criticism.
II. i. The Principles of Classical Realism
Essentially, classical realism is not a theory as such, but more of a philosophical position articulating the basic functions of our human nature and Man’s behaviour in the world.
Albeit, to explain state behaviour on the international scene, realism has been incorporated into academia to found the International Relations discipline and to subsequently put a realist narrative on past, present and future events in a theoretical understanding.
Hans Morgenthau, known as the father of modern realist theory, outlined six principles of political realism. Firstly, politics is “governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” ([1948] 2006, p.xx). This gives us the basis for understanding political realism. Relations between states is simply another (higher) level of relations between individuals in an anarchic scenario. Throughout the centuries many authors have touched upon the notion of human nature. Thomas Hobbes understood the human being as a rather dangerous figure without an assumption of authority in Leviathan, for he showed “how the dynamics of violence fall out of interactions among rational and self-interested agents”
(Pinker 2011, p. 318). This has culminated in Morgenthau’s ‘objective laws’ that govern the political world. These objective laws are manifested essentially from fear. Fear conjures up feelings of insecurity, mistrust and competitive behaviour in relative terms,
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seeking more power to make up for such insecurity in an uncertain world. The remedy for fear is power.
This leads us to Morgenthau’s second point: international politics is a “concept of interests defined in terms of power separate from other spheres of action, such as economics, ethics or religion” ([1948] 2006, p.xx). Classical realists argue that when it comes to a political decision, there is no correlation “between the quality of motives of a statesman and foreign policy in both moral and political terms” (ibid). A political decision overrides the moral precept. Moreover, when conducting a political decision, it is not directed through ideological channels, but rather what is possible to attain under the current set of circumstances. An ideology may provide a longer-term strategy, however, a more rational policy will be pursued in the short-term political decision-making process. As such, interests and power are taken into consideration first at the expense of economics, ethics, religion or ideology, when conducting a political decision.
In Morgenthau’s words, ‘it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both […] moral excess and […] political folly’ (Morgenthau 1948, p.11).
The notion of interests is insurmountable in politics. Interests navigate a nation’s foreign policy irrespective of time and place. A nation’s interests are deeply imbedded and sustained within the national mind over a longer period of time. Surely, political action will depend on the political circumstance and cultural context within which foreign policy is conducted; such conditions under which foreign policy is formulated may be altered. This works through the concept of power and causal forces.
International politics is an arena of conflict of interests spearheaded by the relativity of power. As a nation accumulates power, causal forces will be at its disposition. Only through causal forces may an agent instill a change of the circumstances; and hence, change the structures. An agent with enough accumulated power is able to divert the causal powers to shape the world in their own eyes. For example, China has accumulated enough power over the past two decades to address the political arena. China now has enough causal forces to utilize and to shape the regional political order in its favor, however, to a certain extent, yet. Now, interests are a defined ‘end’ of the political spectrum. The ‘means’ to
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attain that ‘end’ is it moral or immoral? In politics, as previously stated, morality and ethics do not necessarily correspond with a political decision.
In the universe, there must be ‘universal’ moral principles, however, human nature is not attuned with those ‘universal’ moral principles. When it comes to politics and interests, these moral principles are filtered through the state/mind apparatus; our minds filter through those moral principles and as a corollary adjust them to our own perspective or gain. This translates into a moulded form of moral principles under the circumstances of time and place. From nation to nation, the concrete moral principles will thus necessarily be different from one another. Morgenthau argues that prudence takes over as the ‘supreme virtue’ in politics. From the author’s own perspective, prudence is the result of a careful juggling between the forms of interests and power at the disposal of the causal agent. As such, realism maintains an autonomy in the political sphere, where power takes precedence above all else. The reality creates an anarchic international system, where other actors of human nature play out their role in constant exchanges of power and history plays out accordingly.
History exists for us to learn from the bountiful mistakes we have made as humanity. Alas, are mistakes not part of the historical process? Is there any certainty we will not do the same mistakes and to what extent? For many of us, history is a story of the past, and as such we put it aside and focus on the present and future. The result is we are not in control of history, and the causal forces of history have a tremendous impact on us when its effects suddenly hit us. Take the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. Retrospectively, history was in the making, and the causal forces of Great Powers have produced an ongoing conflict across the region even today. At the turn of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was forgotten as history. However, the seeds of history have been planted and the effects today are in the form of an organic multi-cell form of terrorism across the world. The same cause-and-effect relationship happened in the Iraq War and the rise of the Islamic State.
Concerning China, the gist of the historical process is that China has not forgotten its past.
In fact, China has taken full control and ownership of the historical causal forces. As an agent in the anarchical world, China thus-far enjoys its accumulation of power to be able
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to create an alternate reality from a future of infinite possibilities. Whereas at the outset of the post-Cold War era, the West has put history in its grave (Fukuyama 1992), China has enlivened the historical process.
When one seeks to understand human nature, there ought not to be a logical explanation, which is why it is relatively difficult to posit an argument along the lines of human nature.
There is a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and social sciences. We use logic and reason to experiment and thus explain what happens in the natural world.
However, we cannot use the same means in the social world; we cannot dissect a human being and understand why he did such an act, although we can understand where his kidneys are. We try to use ineffective means to explain a certain end. Language is one of those means. Whereas our statements may be logically intact, the facts remain unaltered.
Returning to the idea of terrorism, the atrocious acts were in the name of God, Allah. ‘We are liberating you in the name of God.’ Whereas such a statement may be logical for people who worship Allah and believe the act carried out is for the greater good, this does not change the fact that many innocent people died. Despite this being a rather irrational behaviour, in the social world there is a delicate dichotomy between rationality and irrationality. Whereas according to classical realism states act as rational and prudent, the nature of the social world is governed precisely by those ‘objective laws’ that Morgenthau explained in Politics Among Nations.
Classical realism extends as far as Ancient Greece to the general and author Thucydides, who depicted the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in his work History of the Peloponnesian War. The rise of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta was the trigger for a contest of power and, hence, ended in war between the two sides. As such, fear of human nature was sincerely the single major cause of conflict. Welch (2003) poses the question whether or not is it an appropriate analysis or an anachronistic application. This is quite a valid standpoint, however, perhaps Thucydides’ ‘ancient’ thought persists within the engagements of the political world. A heavily recurrent scenario throughout history has played itself out along such lines:
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In the famous Spartan debate, King Archidamus counseled patience, arguing that Sparta should watch, prepare, and play for time; but his prudence proved impotent in the face of Sthenelaidas’ hot-blooded call to action in the face of Athens’ insults and injuries (Strassler and Crawley 1998, 1.86).
In Thucydides’ quote we may see and understand prudence, in a way that this action has taken a toll on Sparta’s own interests. Indeed, a paradox as it is, for taking a prudent stance to favor our own interests at the face of a perceived foe has paradoxically been met with ever-closer tensions that would fundamentally go against one’s own interests. Thus, the interplay between prudence, interests and power is crucial to understanding the realist stance in world politics. To perhaps convolute this notion of prudence with that of the Sino-US relationship, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese had the flexibility to exercise prudent behaviour, which has sincerely put China in the spotlight on the world stage. In a globalizing and an ever-growing world economy and power politics, the case for prudent behaviour is becoming increasingly dangerous. If we take into account a growing disparity in bilateral relations, take China and Japan for example, the rivalry is ever-expanding. This has grown into fierce nationalistic perturbation, if not jingoistic behaviour. As a corollary, Xi Jinping now “seems disturbingly captive to the intense Chinese nationalism that his predecessor Hu Jintao first mobilized a decade ago” (Welch 2015, p.1).
There is a positive correlation between nationalism and revival of history. Chinese political thought has also been recognized as a Realpolitik, or pragmatic realism, mostly observed as Chinese Legalism. The driver behind this thought has been Sun Tzu and his classic The Art of War. A more pragmatic approach in Chinese political thought is adopted to try to
‘win’ before any battle has even started (Sun-tzu [6th cen. BC] 2002, chapter 4). Such is the use of a deceptively calculating and prudent ability on the side of Chinese political philosophers have history on its own side, where power and heavy nationalism have the ability to expand the boundaries of foreign policy-making.