Chapter III. China’s Policy in the South China Sea
III. iii. China’s Island Building
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its short term strategy to conduct itself to a point where it can declare substantial control over the entire features of the SCS.
These are incidents in the open seas of the SCS, but what is more important is China’s conduct on its own ‘island’ possessions in the SCS. How can China support its oil exploration and fishing adventures, and also increase its power projection in the SCS? The answer lies in its activities relating to the land reclamations in the SCS, which will be analyzed in the third section of this chapter.
III. iii. China’s Island Building
What has China been doing?
In what has been dubbed by the head of the US Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, the
‘Great Wall of Sand’ (Johnson and De Luce 2015), China has been reclaiming land on reefs within the conglomeration of the Spratly Islands, and turning them into actual islands for many purposes, not to mention military facilities. On 7 locations, including the Fiery Cross Reef (see Figure 4 below), China has been “erecting buildings, deploying troops, building harbors and airstrips, installing radar and surveillance systems” (Glaser 2015, p.31). Ashton Carter, US Secretary of Defense, said that China has reclaimed over 2000 acres of land, which is more than all of the other claimants combined, and China has achieved this feat only in the past two years (Dung and Minh 2015, p.66). Figure 4 below provides a graphic of China’s land reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands.
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Figure 4: China’s Land Reclamation
Source: Reclamation marks. (2015, February 28th). The Economist. p.29 What are the reasons for land reclamation?
In her report, Glaser (2015) of the CSIS has outlined a number of reasons why China is pursuing such an extensive land reclamation. Firstly, the reclaimed islands with the necessary technology would satisfy China’s sense of security. From previous analysis, there is a strong bond between power, interests and security. Classical realists argue that accumulated relative power enables the agent to pursue its interests and perhaps discover a new set of interests, as China included the SCS a part of its ‘core interests’ in 2010. With increased power and a new set of interests, China needs to protect those interests. Land reclamation would provide a tangible surface from which to operate that security and satisfy China’s relative position in the disputes. Land reclamations would tip the scale in favor of China as time moves forward.
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In particular, the improved infrastructure of the islands would enhance China’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (Glaser 2015, p.35-6). In fact, from its military strategy, China will be able to assert control of the sea, subjugating all other actors within the periphery of the islands. Furthermore, China’s power would be upheld by military infrastructures such as surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles and aircraft based on the islands, with the ultimate goal of increasing anti-access/area denial capabilities to support its power projection vis-à-vis the US Pacific Command. Land reclamation is such first step to take full control over China’s destiny, be it controlling the first island chain in the near future. Figure 5 shows China’s reclamation on one of its largest artificial islands, the Fiery Cross Reef.
Figure 5: Land Reclamation on Fiery Cross Reef
Source: Hardy (2015)
Thirdly, the enhanced islands would provide support of China’s oil and fishing exploration in the region. The islands are “intended for thousands of China fishing ships to rest and refuel” (Glaser 2015, p.33). This is China’s ‘smart’ power move, combining the ‘softer’
efforts of oil and fishing exploration with China’s ‘harder’ coast guard and frigate protection of Chinese fishermen at sea. There have been occasions when Chinese fishermen
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unprecedentedly Chinese ‘warships’ appeared to free the fishermen. As a corollary, the islands will allow China more capability to defend its oil rigs and fishing exploration (Glaser 2015, p.35). The China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) would directly be supported to continue rigging in the open seas, inasmuch as it may cross the boundaries of rival claimants’ territorial waters.What are the effects?
The produced effects of such a policy towards the SCS have been rather tumultuous coming from the international community, namely the rival claimants, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, and the US. This will further be discussed in the fourth chapter, the potential outcomes of China’s policy.
China’s island building ‘binge’ (Glaser 2015, p.27) has the potential to make its nine-dash line a de facto reality. The process for attaining such a reality is gaining leverage over the neighbors through “non-kinetic forces” such as informational, legal and psychological (ibid.). As previously analyzed, China’s power enables it a privilege of having the ability to use causal forces to its advantage. Increased power enables China to pursue its interests with more rigor. As such, land reclamation would effectively affect the other actors psychologically in such a way that prudent behaviour on their side would have produced a missed opportunity to act against China. Perhaps from China’s own view, building islands would increase its legal foundation on its claim, although it is not necessarily according to the UNCLOS. Moreover, land reclamation and newly built infrastructure already had such a proportional effect that China could readily control the flow of information in the SCS, especially through its new radar systems.
With this in mind, some authors (de Castro 2015; Glaser 2015; Jennings 2015; Dunh and Minh 2015) wrote about the possibility of the establishment of another Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This would not be China’s first attempt at consolidating its littoral territory. In November 2013, China unilaterally imposed an ADIZ over the East China Sea. This has caused outrage from Japan and the US, with the US testing the aerial zone moments after China’s imposition. However, a rather restricted response from the
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side of the US and Japan, no further protests have taken place. This gives China more leverage on imposing an ADIZ over the SCS, which is perhaps more complicated of an issue given the vast area, large amounts of natural resources, and a plethora of maritime claimants.
Given China’s accelerated land reclamations over the past two years, debates about a potential ADIZ have surfaced not with the questions of if, but when? Glaser (2015, p.38) argues that China’s three newly built 10 000 feet-long airstrips could help China enforce an ADIZ. Yet, unlike an immediate security threat coming from Japan, China does not readily feel a such a threat emanating from ASEAN nations and is generally optimistic with its neighbors (ibid.). Perhaps this may be a part of China’s prudent behaviour on de-escalating the tensions and reservations about China’s land reclamation works, but at the same time, a PLA expert suggests that an ADIZ over the SCS is necessary for China’s long-term policy in the region (Chan 2014). As such, China’s island building is seen as a building block for consolidating China’s power, strategy and security in the region.
CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In sum, the chapter first analyzed China’s asymmetric growth in power over recent years.
China’s ability to gauge further interest in the SCS and adjacent waters is precisely because of such a large accumulation in material wealth, which turns into its growing relative power over other actors. China’s power enables it to pursue its long-term strategy in attaining control over the first and second island chains with the hope of marking the CPC’s centenary in 2049. China’s island building is the result of short-term strategy and power gains over others is a necessary step if China seeks to control the first island chain. The following chapter IV will discuss the outcomes of China’s policy in the SCS.