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iii. Limitations of Classical Realism

Chapter II. Theoretical Analysis of Classical Realism

II. iii. Limitations of Classical Realism

offensive realism is an off-shoot of neorealist theory. If one were to adopt this view, war would inevitably come about due to China’s rise and tilting the balance of power into its own sphere of influence, thereby seeking more power. On the other hand, classical realism does not directly advocate for war-like outcomes. Yes, war is a possibility, however since actors are rational and prudent, balance of power becomes a sensible outcome. Offensive realism argues that China will aggressively change the status quo to pursue its own reality of the regional order. The tragedy of such a notion is obvious in its own nature, enjoyed only by warmongers. Whilst neorealism tries to impose its own distortion of reality into international relations, classical realism discusses the reality thereof. As Thucydides timelessly argued in the Melian Dialogue that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, such is the distinction in the relativity of power and the resulting outcomes. But what are the limitations of classical realist thought?

II. iii. Limitations of Classical Realism

The main problem is whether the notion of human nature can be applied historically, as in past, present and future, evolutionarily (evolution of mankind), culturally (applied in various cultures and people), or even psychologically (different pathological tendencies).

The main question to pose is to what extent is classical realism applicable to account for in the 21st century world. However, I argue that the reason classical realism is a popular theory even now is its timeless wisdom and insight into human nature. Others may argue, such as neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, that classical realism is based upon very strong assumptions about human nature. Human nature is indeed a complex concept to scrutinize. Nevertheless, if one were to dissect the essence of classical, or political, realism, it would be the objective laws governing the behaviour of a human being. Politics is the act of two or more actors engaging in prudent exchange of power and interests. There would be room for compromise and diplomacy, however, when there is a strong clash of interests and a struggle for power to pursue those interests, it is indeed difficult for the political actors to fathom the magnitude of their endeavors. If politics was not based on power and interests, would there be such a need for diplomacy or compromise? Yet, it is hard to measure objectively. Hence politics remains within the realm of a subjective social science. It is

also for this reason that neorealism fails to scientifically validate realist theoretical assumptions.

The reason for later theories to envelop the international relations theory sphere is such that there is a consistency of alliances and a sense of international community, as neo-liberal institutionalism would suggest. One might argue that the 21st century society is cohesive and binded together by common standards, such as morality, cooperation and diplomacy.

Indeed, the realist theory was absorbed into the IR discipline at arguably the most tragic era in human history after suffering two total world wars. However, time after time the struggle of power is visible and real throughout history, and that has not altered in the 21st century. Albeit inter-state conflicts are at their lowest level, technological development, military efficiency and arms trade is increasing drastically, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Does this create more instability or stability, security or insecurity? It most reflects balance of power theory and how states seek alliances to balance against a stronger rival, such as China. However, aren’t the alliances just a manifestation of this counter-balance or true allies of a superpower? This limits classical realist analysis to portray the state as the single unitary actor in an anarchic world. Weak states would surely cede some form of sovereignty towards a greater goal of security provided by a stronger state, as we may observe US military bases in weaker countries.

On a ‘cultural’ note, that “elusive entity of ‘human nature’”, writes Carr, “has varied so much from country to country and from century to century that it is difficult not to regard it as an historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and conventions”

(1961, p.27). To what extent is culture and social conditions independent of human nature?

This was such enquiry by a classical realist Edward H. Carr. Indeed, the vagueness that revolves around human nature cannot go unnoticed. For we have states that do not even have a military, such as Liechtenstein, and who relies on Swiss police forces for protection.

States are run by individuals, whom the ‘human nature’ argument possesses. As such, states would act upon the international arena accordingly through human nature. The ‘human nature’ argument cannot only suppose the dark side of humanity. There are two sides of the same coin. In more advanced cultures, the role of empathy and altruistic behaviour has

seen the light and matters of the ‘darker’ side of human nature have subsided. Peace studies have been formed in the Scandinavian nations over the 20th century and the realist human nature began to take new forms, however, which were already there to be uncovered.

Certainly, not all political actions are caused by ‘human nature’ alone and there must be multifarious reasons that must be taken into account, such as geography, which cannot be manipulated by humans.

The fourth limitation is psychological, in the sense that human nature is an intricate cobweb of psychological and mental functions and which varies in each individual. Mental faculties developed in one person ought to have different repercussion on the ability of that individual to act in the world as opposed to another person’s mental faculties. In classical realism, ‘rationality’ is part of human nature and states are deemed to be rational actors, but they are lost in their own ‘rational’ logic, for as Karl Popper, in his Poverty of Historicism, argues that ‘rationality’ cannot be measured ‘in accordance with the logic of [its] situation’ ([1957] 1964, p.97), for such ‘rationality’ makes no assumptions of the

‘rationality of ‘human nature’. He argues that we cannot measure human behaviour by psychological traits or human nature.

The difficulty in psychological behaviour lies in its measurement, for its difficult to assert that such an action was caused by a specific pathological inclination. “Perfectly normal psychological pathologies”, argues Welch, “can incline people to underestimate the risks they run and overestimate the prospects of achieving what they consider a desirable or ‘just’

outcome” (2015, p.1). As we do not understand the intricacies of human nature, we identify it as the cause simply because we cannot understand it. Referring back to Popper, the complexity ensues when we engage in the decision-making process, as such that the

“awareness that the prediction might itself exert influence on events predicted is likely to have repercussions on the content of the prediction; and the repercussions might be of such kind as gravely to impair the objectivity of the predictions and of other results of research in the social sciences” ([1957] 1964, p.14-15). This understanding comes to the social sciences from quantum physics. The metaphysical quantum world is a reality thus-far unfathomable to the scientific community. One experiment on electrons suggests their

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behaviour changes once observed, whereas unobserved the electron behaves differently.

This supposes the notion that physics has a lot to say on mapping human behaviour and how attention with intention may alter reality. As a result, the concept of human nature cannot be a constant.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In sum, the chapter provided a theoretical background into classical realism, the main principles that the theory entails and a critical analysis of the human nature argument.

Moreover, the chapter distinguished between other realist theories to account for the importance of classical realism in 21st century international relations. The chapter ended with four limitations of classical realism including historical, evolutionary, cultural and psychological. The following chapter will apply classical realist understanding to China’s policy in the South China Sea.

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