“Made by Taiwan but Made in China” would be a new expression to describe the global division of labor across the Taiwan Strait driven by Taiwanese businesspeople’s direct investment in China. Over the last decade, both sides of the Strait benefited tremendously from this economic division of labor in the IT industry. For instance, from 1996 to 2003, the average annual growth rate of Taiwan’s IT products made in Taiwan was negative 0.7 percent while that in China was 39.4 percent. Taiwanese businesspeople’s investment in the IT industry in China has improved tremendously the competitiveness of their IT products through reducing input costs and accessing the Chinese market. In comparison, during the period of 1999-2001, the Taiwanese businesspeople contributed to around 60-70 percent of China’s IT hardware products. Based on the market force, this economic division of labor across the Strait in the IT and other industries would be broadened and deepened continuously in the future.
of input from the TEEMA. This shows how influential the TEEMA is in relation to the Chinese government.
During the 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 incidents, Chinese leaders never articulated any threat to impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. To the contrary, Beijing feared that the PRC military threats might have a seri- ous impact on Taiwanese investment in China. At the same time, the Chi- nese government faced tremendous and constant pressure from TIEAs who were both very anxious about cross-Strait instability and resentful of China's military threats against Taiwan. Subsequently, Taiwan's invest- ment in China was greatly reduced, at least temporarily, and TIEA leaders threatened to withdraw their capital from China if Beijing continued its military threats against Taipei. Moreover, some TIEA leaders even threat- ened to return to Taiwanand fight against China if China dared attack Taiwan. 6 4
Alongside this movement’s concerns, many people in Taiwan have reservations regarding future possible reunification with China, either voluntary or forced. Closer economic cooperation with China creates more economic dependence. However, since China’s economic power is rising across the world, one wonders how Taiwan can choose a safer way to coexist with China – especially since actual immigration from Taiwan to China has reached about two million, mostly business people and their employees. This represents nearly one-tenth of Taiwan’s total population of 23 million people, while China has a pollution of 1.3 billion people. Moreover, in 2013, a total of 2.87 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan, almost 5,000 a day. On the one hand, this creates tourist revenue for Taiwanand contributes towards Chinese people’s understanding of a democratic Taiwan; on the other hand, it also increases economic dependence on China. Put simply, when trade and business interests interact with national identity, such a dilemma cannot be resolved easily.
of political confrontation since 1995 has led Lee Teng-hui to request the business community to be jieji yongren (cautious and self-restrained ). 9
(Table 1 and 2 about here)
He nc e , Ta i wa n’ s e c onomi c pol i c i e s t owa r d ma i nl a nd Chi na ca nnot be f ul l y understood through cost-benefit analysis. Due to political risk concerns, the state has tried t o t a ke pa r t i n t hi s boomi ng ec onomi c r e l a t i ons hi p a nd “a ppl y t he br a kes ” t o pr ot e c t national security. Three official principles have been declared in regards to governing cross-Strait economic interactions. The first principle is balance between national security andeconomic benefits; the Taiwan government will open up economic interactions step by step, depending on the political situation across the Taiwan Strait. The second principle is national interest . The main concern in promoting cross-Strait economic r e l a t i ons i s Ta i wa n’ s e c onomi c a ut onomy a nd i t s c ompe t i t i ve nes s i n t he i nt e r na t i ona l market. Economicrelations with mainland China should thus enhance, rather than reduce, Taiwa n’ s e c onomi c s uper i or i t y. The t hi r d pr i nc i pl e i s s t a bi l i t y; t he l ong-term goal of Ta i wa n’ s e c onomi c pol i cy t owa r d ma i nl a nd Chi na i s t o pr omot e l ong-term political stability across the Taiwan Strait. 10 Under these basic guidelines, issues such as opening direct trade, postal, and transportation links are under consideration, but have not been realized. Some ad hoc t r e a t me nt s s uc h a s “of f -shore tran s s hi pme nt c e nt e r s ” a r e be i ng e s t a bl i s he d. A “Na t i ona l Deve l opme nt Conf e r e nc e ” c onve ne d i n l a t e 1996 a l s o ur ge d t he
"The U.S. military relationship with China is 90 percent form and 10 per- cent substance, while it is 90 percent substance and 10 percent form with Taiwan." 4
Although Taipei relies heavily on the United States for the island's military modernization, Beijing has a very broad foreign military relations program aimed at helping the PLA modernize its forces. Given Taiwan's international political status, Taipei has opted for a low-profile yet active military exchange program with several countries, especially the United States. Although not all the details are made public, the PLA sends hundreds of officers abroad annually to a growing number of countries to discuss a broad range of military issues. In addition, some PLA officers are spending from one to two years abroad as students in civilian and mili- tary schools. The PLA also hosts dozens of foreign military delegations each year, and has foreign military students studying at its National De- fense University (國防大學).
promulgated the so-called anti-session law on March 14. The law provoked strong negative reaction of the Taiwanese people and thus the Taiwanese government did not respond to Chinese proposals.
Three months later after the promulgation of the anti-session law, on June 13, the Taiwanese government appointed the TAA to contact its Chinese counterpart and arrange talks over cargo charter flights betweenTaiwanandChina, and named the Taiwan External Trade Development Council to arrange talks over Taiwan’s exports of fruit to China. On August 2, the Taiwanese government further authorized Taiwan’s Travel Agent Association to negotiate with its Chinese counterpart over China’s tourists to Taiwan. Parenthetically, Taiwan referred to the Macau model for the negotiation of all the three issues andChina showed no opposition. Despite Taiwan put priority on the negotiation of cargo charter flights across the Taiwan Strait, on August 4, Taiwan agreed to open talks with China simultaneously on cargo and passenger charter flights due to China’s insistence.
China has been increasingly using economic muscle against Taiwan. On March 10, 2000, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian revealed his list of advisors for national policies, including Stan Shih, chairman of the Acer Group; Shi Wen-lung, chairman of the Chi Mei Group; Chang Yung-fa, chairman of the Evergreen Group; and Ying Qi, president of the Continental Engineering Corporation. Couple days later, Chen was elected president of Taiwan. Zhang Zhiqun, director of Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office, soon summoned representatives of these companies in Shanghai, and expressed China’s concerns about their support for President Chen.
Since 1997, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam have made their claims and the ROC has continued to respond, based upon the 1993 Policy Guidelines and domestic laws such as the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of Chinaand the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China, both of which were promulgated in 1998. In February 1999, Taiwan began to announce its baselines of territorial sea. In January 2000, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration replaced the Marine Corps station in Taiping Island of the Spratly Islands as well as in the Pratas Islands, indicating Taiwan’s political will to lower possible tensions in the disputed area. In December 2005, the Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea were suspended. This was a political decision by then-President Chen Shui-bian, and its implication is at least two-fold:
Direct marine transportation betweenTaiwanand Mainland China was inaugurated in December 2008, which initiated a new transportation alternative for Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, and provided a direction for the development of cruise tourism between the two regions. The purpose of this study is to estimate the economic impact associated with China-Taiwan ferry-cruise traffic based on the Taiwan national Input-Output Model. Using data from onsite surveys and expert interviews, the average expenditure of ferry-cruise Chinese visitors to Taiwan is estimated to be US$1,255 per person for an average 5.6 night trip, and the per-capita spending has put Chinese ferry-cruise passenger as the third highest per-day spender among all inbound visitors to Taiwan. The estimated total spending is US$30.1 million in 2010, and the total economic impacts, including direct and indirect effects, are estimated to be US$46.26 million in direct sales, 811 non-full time equivalent jobs, US$10.66 million in personal income and US$0.57million tax dollars. Given the economic contribution demonstrated in this study, the ferry-cruise market is worth investing and developing but how to maintain the novelty of the ferry experience and their competitiveness in relation to the air carriers would become a great challenge for the shipping companies as well as those stakeholders who desire to expand this niche market.
Keywords- cross-cultural difference; trading website;
trading community; Mainland China, Taiwan 1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the rise of a global trend of e-commerce since 1997, e-commerce is receiving greater attention. A trading website provides a platform for merchants and buyers to trade on this platform. In addition, a trading website provides a credit rating system to help buyers and sellers to make decisions of transactions (Bolton et al., 2004; Dellarocas, 2003; Lin et al., 2006). The scholars in the field of e-commerce marketing and information decision-making generally contend that customer satisfaction has a considerable impact on customer loyalty (Bhattacherjee, 2001a, b; Gustafsson et al., 2005). Moreover, Lamb and Kling (2003) asserted that the studies investigating usage of information and communication technology should consider the complex social environmental factors. However, the past studies concerning trading community mainly placed emphasis on community identity and community loyalty (Farquhar
V. C ONCLUSIONS
There are thirteen key factors of trading website management induced in this study through analyzing 3,243 transaction appraisals. Moreover, based on the factors, a comparative analysis of the trading websites betweenTaiwanand mainland China is carried out. The results imply three propositions. The managerial implications are described as follows: 1. The storekeepers in Taiwan should continuously improve service quality to maintain consumer loyalty while those in mainland China should verify the product quality before sale; 2. The storekeepers in Taiwan should highly focus on customization service and customer relationship management while those in mainland China should move towards fostering long-term relationship with consumers; 3. Both storekeepers in Taiwanand mainland China should continuously improve business image to obtain consumer recognition; 4. Both managers of websites should enhance quality of system platform, such as webpage design, style, symbols, entertainment, functionality etc.
This paper divides online research sources by category of data source:
think tanks and professional associations, government sources, journal ar- ticles and conference papers, newspapers, news agencies and collections, reference materials, and online bookstores; paper sections are organized according to these categories. In addition, all reviewed websites in each category are for the most part divided into three sub-categories based on their publication base: Taiwan, China, and the United States. Unless other- wise stated below, the websites reviewed in Taiwan appear in traditional Chinese characters, those in China are in simplified Chinese, and those in the United States appear in English. An appendix provides a list of all the web addresses discussed in this paper.
This project aimed to compare the quality of concentrated Chinese medicinal preparations betweenTaiwanand Mainland China. Three brands of concentrated Chinese medicinal preparations with three different batches of Paeonia lactiflora were purchased from Taiwanand four brands from Mainland China. The preparations were subjected to heavy metals and microbiological examination. In addition, the amount of paeoniflorin in preparation was determined by high-performance liquid chromatography.
island’s citizens are not just a function of primordial factors but are also conditional on their perception of threats, i.e. the likelihood of armed intervention by the United States on Taiwan’s behalf in a cross-strait military conflict and a generally unfriendly Beijing policy toward Taiwan.” 102 His argument implies that China threat does play important role in voters’ preferences so that political parties need to consider this perception in their strategy to attract voters. Wang also notices that Taiwanese public tends to take a softer position vis-à-vis China if China takes softer policy toward Taiwan or Taiwanese public believes that the US would intervene in the case of China’s use of force. The latter signifies the importance of the strategy to cope with China threat, as forging a closer tie with the US is an option for safeguarding Taiwan security. In the case of period surrounding the referendum in 2004, the data from MAC indicated that public perception on Beijing hostilities toward Taiwan was considerably high. 103
Regarding the sharp contrast between Beijing’s rhetoric assertiveness and actual prudence, a Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing frankly stated, “The most important priority for China is economics. This is a prevailing consensus among the public and elite.
Beijing should have acted stronger against the United States, Japan, andTaiwan, but Beijing had economic interests in mind.” 59 Since Beijing was not willing to sternly respond to Washington because of economic interest concerns, Beijing had to at least rhetorically assure the Chinese people of its firm position, and then prudently minimize the impact of the incidents on U.S.-Chinarelations. In the reconnaissance plane incident, because Washington did not meet any of three initial demands Beijing raised, Beijing finally twisted the language and declared a moral victory in order to bolster its domestic position, as well as to normalize U.S.-Chinarelations.
Source of data
I collected data for three index years: 1976, 1985, and 1995. Data on income were obtained from the family income and expenditure survey, conducted by the directorate-general of budget, accounting, and statis- tics, Republic of China. The family income and expenditure survey, which aimed to address the general conditions of livelihood and to present the status of family income and expenditure in Taiwan, was conducted mainly through personal interview. In order to check the validity of results from the interview a small number of households were asked to keep accounts. The survey covered the civilian non- institutionalised population of Taiwan, with about 15 000 registered households selected through a two stage stratified random sampling in a calendar year.
Dollar α 1 Yen α 2 Euro α 3 Rmb α 4
Before the exchange rate regime reform:
The estimation over the period shows that among the nine currencies, the Hong Kong dollar and Malaysian ringgit were strict dollar peggers. The weight of the coefficient on the US dollar is almost one in the equation for the two currencies, and so is the adjusted R 2 . Apart from these two officially pegged to the US dollar, other Asian currencies were also heavily influenced by the US dollar. In the equation for the Indian rupee and Indonesian rupiah, the US dollar also has a coefficient close to one. The coefficient for the US dollar, α 1 , is around 0.9 for the Korean Won, Philippine peso and New Taiwan dollar.
capability to continue reining in the populist aspect of the nationalism and lead its zeal to the stable development of China. To achieve this end, the Taiwan issue is a ground that no one dares to compromise.
On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the formation of a Taiwanese identity developed together with the process of democratization on the island. This author has argued in another article that the Taiwanese identity is less about certain unique language, culture, or ethnicity, but has more to do with Taiwan’ sreaction under its democratic mechanism toward the island’ s international status and cross-strait tensions. Currently, two types of "Taiwanese identities" are taking shape, "native Taiwanese i de nt i t y ”(or local Taiwanese identity) and a "status quo Taiwanese identity." Both identities can be regarded as “ Taiwan-centered national identities” 19 which view Taiwan as having de facto separating and independence from mainland China. Though both groups seem to be on the same page with international politics, the two identities have different perception toward Taiwanese domestic politics and cross-strait affairs.