第六章、 結論
第一節、 假設的驗證
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第六章、結論
第一節、假設的驗證
根據作者之假設，一國政體的民主深化有利於內戰延續性的縮短。為佐證假 設，作者整理民主與內戰延續性之文獻（請參閱第二章），提出三個民主之所以 能減少內戰延續性時間之原因：（一）生活於民主政權下的人民，政治壓迫感較 小（Zanger, 2000; Muller & Weede, 1990; Gurr, 1970; Lichbach, 1987)；（二）民主 促進社會的重新分配（Redistributive）消弭國內之不平等狀況；（三）民主政府 能透過稅收進行公共財的施放或公共服務滿足人民(Meltzer & Richard, 1981;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001)。
因此，作者將進一步檢驗這三類論述分別於哥倫比亞與秘魯成效如何？第一 類有關於政治壓迫感的指標，作者將以Freedom House (2017)的資料對照兩國數 據並比較；第二類有關於社會的重新分配，作者以吉尼係數作為量測標準；第三 類有關於政府施放公共財的成效，作者將檢驗秘魯與哥倫比亞兩個國家的次級教 育就學率做為比較的基準。最後，對照哥倫比亞、秘魯之內戰延續性，驗證作者 之假設。
首先，有關於政治壓迫，作者引用Freedom House (2017)的數據做為參考。
圖 6-1 為哥倫比亞與秘魯兩國人民享有的「政治權利（Political Right）」量表，
此處的政治權利代表人民享有自由參加政治程序的權利，包括有在合法選舉中自 由投票權利、參政權等，且人民的代表對公共政策有影響力的；圖6-2 為哥倫比 亞與秘魯兩國人民享有的「公民自由（Civil Liberty）」量表，此處的公民自由指 人民能有言論自由、結社自由且國家不能干預法治與個人。
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圖6-1：政治權利（Political Right）量表
資料來源：Freedom house (2017)。評分數值從 1 到 7，分數越高，國民享有之政治權利越少。
圖6-2：公民自由（Civil Liberty）量表
資料來源：Freedom house (2017)。評分數值從 1 到 7，分數越高，國民享有之公民自由越少。
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
政治權利量表
Peru Colombia
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1990 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
公民自由量表
Peru Colombia
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綜觀Freedom House (2017)的資料，可發現自 1972 年至 1988 年，哥倫比亞 皆被歸類為「自由」的國家，但自1988 年開始至 2016 年，則為「部分自由」國 家。反觀秘魯，1972 年至 1974 年皆被歸類為「不自由」國家，1975 年至 1979 年進步為「部分自由」國家，1980 年甚至轉變為「自由」國家，直到 1988 年，
如同哥倫比亞，退步到「部分自由」國家，但是其在2001 年再度重回「自由」
國家，並維持至今。此兩國最大的差異點即在於兩國於雖然兩國皆在1988 年左 右退為「部分自由」國家，但秘魯於2001 年又進步成為「自由」國家，而哥倫 比亞卻一直是「部分自由」國家，不論在公民自由或是政治權利方面，皆為持續 退步的狀態。
再者，探討有關民主促進社會重新分配之議題，作者以世界銀行提供之吉尼 係數作為量測標準，吉尼係數代表收入分配的平均與否，值越高代表收入分配愈 不平均。其係數可分為五等級，低於20 代表極平均、20 到 29 代表平均、30 到 39 代表普通、40 到 59 代表不平均、60 以上則為極不平均。根據圖 6-3，秘魯國 內之收入分配較哥倫比亞平均且於2008 年後彼此差距擴大。
圖6-3：吉尼係數比較圖
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
哥倫比亞、祕魯兩國之吉尼係數
哥倫比亞 祕魯
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資料來源：World Bank Group (2015)。
最後，探討有關政府施放公共財的成效，作者將自教育層面著手檢驗哥倫比 2015, April 6)而在政府每年於教育方面花費占總政府支出的百分比方面，可發現 兩國之差異不大，但可發現祕魯政府近五年以來，於教育方面支出的百分比逐年 上升。
圖6-4：次級教育粗估就學率比較圖
資料來源：World Bank Group (2015)。
1 此處不採用初級教育就學率乃因次級教育就學率之數據較為齊全。
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
次級教育粗估就學率比較圖(%)
哥倫比亞 祕魯
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資料來源：World Bank Group (2015)。
總結，檢驗前述民主對於減少內戰延續性之三個論點，此節佐以數據資料驗
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
政府於教育方面支出占總支出比較圖(%)
哥倫比亞 祕魯
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本文以質性個案研究，挑選南美洲中的兩個國家作為研究對象，試圖以政治 制度解釋內戰延續性，並證明一國政治制度越民主、其內戰延續時間越短。然，
內戰問題不只發生於南美洲，亦發生於非洲、南亞等世界其他地方，不同地區發 生之內戰的客觀因素皆不相同，因此，未來的研究應著重於更多其他國家的個案 研究。
最後，本文著重於政治制度與一國內戰延續性的觀察，然而，有關於民主與 內戰延續性之討論於目前學術之討論有限，故，於文獻蒐集的過程中，作者加入 了民主與國際衝突延續性之文獻，並延伸至國內衝突的討論中，使內戰研究呈現 更全面廣泛性的面貌，希望未來相關研究亦能不侷限至固有的文獻，以多方面的 視角去解析內戰衝突。
第三節、政策建議
根據本文研究結果，一國的政治制度對於內戰的延續性有相當程度的影響。
由於內戰是屬於一國國內所發生的衝突，受限於國際法互不干涉內政原則，因此 聯合國主要是以採取維持和平行動（Peacekeeping Operation，以下簡稱維和行動）
作為協助終止一國國內衝突與保護當地居民的方式，(Hultman et al., 2013)維和行 動的任務狹義上包括監督停火、停戰、撤軍；協助簽訂與執行和平協議，而目前 維和行動已不侷限於前述幾項，可延伸至保護平民、協助解除武裝、幫助該國提 升人權觀念、協助重新制定法規、加速政治進步等。(United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.) 而自 1948 年首批聯合國維和行動至今，維和行動則多以失敗收場，無法阻 止發生於波士尼亞與盧安達的種族屠殺，使學者對於維和行動實際效用產生存疑
（Lipson, 2007）。爰此，作者建議，維和行動、國際組織與關鍵大國可更加重視 一國政治體制與內戰衝突延續性之間的關聯。致力於幫助衝突發生國進行政治轉 型，針對該國的政治制度規劃一完整的轉型計畫以縮短衝突持續性，加速衝突終 止。
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