第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論與貢獻
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第五章 結論與建議
本研究透過複迴歸分析與事件研究法來探討台灣上市櫃企業在每季盈餘宣告 前之融券放空行為，並區分為家族與非家族控制企業兩類別。以下根據實證結果 彙整加以說明，其次敘述研究限制，並對後續之研究提出建議。
第一節 研究結論與貢獻
本研究主要在探討台灣上市櫃企業之融券放空行為，並想要從中了解家族控 制企業內是否存在著較多私有資訊交易。我們使用每日融券放空資料來研究台灣 之家族控制企業與非家族控制企業間融券放空之行為，研究結果指出當未預期盈 餘為負時，在每季盈餘宣告前，家族控制企業相對於非家族控制企業之異常融券 放空會增加比較多；當未預期盈餘為正時，在每季盈餘宣告前，家族控制企業相 對於非家族控制企業之異常融券放空會比較少，而實證結果更進一步指出家族控 制企業融券放空之行為對於未預期盈餘為負時之規模大小相較於非家族控制企業 更為敏感，達到 2 倍之多。我們可以由此推論出家族控制企業相對於非家族控制 企業存在更多私有資訊交易。
家族特性與所有權結構是否與隱含資訊之融券放空行為有關，從實證結果我 們發現當企業創始人或具親屬關係者擔任 CEO、盈餘分配權低以及股份盈餘偏離 程度高之公司，在季盈餘(壞消息)宣告前，其融券放空行為相對於其他企業會較多。
特別是，我們觀察到家族經營型態(家族成員是否涉入經營)、盈餘分配權以及股份 盈餘偏離程度這些特性，會強化家族控制企業與融券放空間之關係。
雖然我們的資料無法使我們明確說出融券放空者為何，因為融券放空者可能 是家族內部成員，但亦有可能是企業內其他外部大股東，他們亦有管道可以事先 得知企業內部資訊，同時亦有誘因從事融券放空使自己獲利。但研究結果指出其 他類型之大股東與融券放空間並無顯著之關係，這表示當為預期盈餘為負時，在 每季盈餘宣告前之異常融券放空現象，主要是由特定類型之大股東(家族成員)所推 動，而非其他類型之外部大股東。
此外，本研究亦使用事件研究法來檢驗巨量融券是否可以提供有利之資訊來
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預測未來股票之異常報酬，研究結果指出巨量融券放空與股票未來超額報酬率間 確實具有負向關係，但在巨量融券放空後，家族控制企業之平均異常報酬率與平 均累積異常報酬率並沒有顯著小於非家族控制企業，因此我們可以推論出家族控 制企業相較於非家族控制企業並沒有提供較多有用之資訊來預測股票未來之負異 常報酬。
本研究之貢獻在於探討不同組織結構之企業融券放空行為。特別是，我們的 實證結果指出融券放空行為和家族控制企業之家族股東存在強大之關係，也就是 說，企業之組織結構在評估上市櫃企業是否有隱含資訊之融券放空行為時扮演著 極為重要之角色。另外，國內對於私有資訊交易之研究多以個別公司或是以整個 產業之公司作為研究對象，較少有研究以台灣家族控制企業與非家族控制企業為 研究對象來探討，而根據實證結果，我們證實了台灣家族控制企業相對於非家族 控制企業確實存在著較多私有資訊交易。
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議
壹、 研究限制
一、本研究之樣本期間為 2010 年 1 月至 2012 年 9 月，共 11 季，未來研究可 拉長研究期間。
二、本研究雖然探討的控制變數之數量不在少數，但仍有未考量周全之處，
除可考量其他家族控制企業定義外，亦可加入其他家族控制特性與股東類型。
三、由於目前尚未找到適合之報酬衡量模式，因此本研究採用了市場模式法 來推算累積異常報酬。如果採用其他模式來計算股價之反應，可能會產生不同之 結果。
四、本研究之股票報酬率計算未考慮證券交易之成本，例如證券交易稅、交 易手續費等。
貳、 後續研究建議
一、本研究並未檢驗不同之家族控制企業定義是否會對結論產生影響，這是
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由於家族控制企業有太多定義，其考慮之面相亦不盡相同，故採用不同之家族控 制企業定義可能會有不盡相同之結論。
二、本研究在檢驗家族特性與所有權結構是否與隱含資訊之融券放空行為有 關時，只考慮了家族經營型態(家族成員是否涉入經營)、盈餘分配權以及股份盈 餘偏離程度這些特性，然而，家族控制與所有權特性還有很多特性可以考慮之，
期望後續研究者可以針對家族特性與所有權結構更深入探討其與融券放空間之關 聯性。
三、家族控制企業中之股東類型，可能還包含了金融機構、本土企業、外國 企業持股等類型，這些不同類型之組織結構或許亦會對融券放空行為產生影響。
此外，在各行各業間都有家族企業之存在，探討不同產業與融券放空行為之關聯 亦是值得探討之議題。
四、在探討巨量融券放空是否可以預測未來股票報酬率之研究部分，或許可 以採用其他模式，例如 Fama-French 三因子與四因子模式來探討兩者間之關係。
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