1.5 Theoretical Framework
1.5.2 A Chinese Threat
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states are driven to pursue security measures to increase their capability to ward off any potential threats. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Baylis and Smith state that there is much paranoia and distrust amongst states, and as a result, increased security measures are pursued to protect themselves from one another (2005). Upon seeing its neighbors increasing their military power, more states increase their own security by obtaining more weapons, thus fueling the security dilemma. Since true security can never be attained in such a world of competing states, competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and capability accumulation continues (Herz, 1950).
The third tenet is the notion of ‘balance of power’, or ‘polarity’, which is how capability is distributed across states. There are three types of polarities: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. Unipolar occurs when there is only one significant power who holds the most capability. Bipolarity is when power is distrusted equally between two states. Multi-polarity is when power is divided equally amongst more than two states. As power is distributed more evenly across multiple states, national security becomes increasingly enhanced (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005). In bipolar or multipolar systems, stability is more easily obtained; whereas unipolar systems are more prone to insecurity. In instances of potential danger, Stephen Walt writes, “When confronted by a significant external threat, states may balance or bandwagon” (1987, p. 17). Walt defines balancing as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (1987).
1.5.2 Taiwan’s Case
1.5.2A Chinese Threat
In Taiwan’s particular situation, the perpetual insecurity that Waltz describes in his theory stems from the PRC. The threat is so significant, that it has become a permanent factor in Taiwan’s security dilemma. Beijing has continuously employed a belligerent demeanor to intimidate Taipei into eventual unification with the mainland, in accordance
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with its ‘One China Principle6’. Politically, China has blocked many opportunities for Taiwan to participate in various international organizations; claiming to represent the needs of both the mainland and Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan’s international presence is constantly at risk of being diminished.
The PRC’s numerous militant actions over the years, and relentless accumulation of modern weapons and technology in order to establish a more powerful military has also directly endangered Taiwan’s autonomy and can be seen throughout the Lee, Chen and Ma administrations.
During Lee Teng Hui’s presidency (1988-2000), China began a dramatic increase in military procurements from Russia. Martin L. Lasater explains, “Military
modernization has become a high national priority for the PRC, especially since the demonstration of advanced weaponry in the Persian Gulf War, which lasted from 1990 to 1991 (1995, p. 172). What followed was a massive accumulation of Russian arms, in hopes of modernizing the PRC military force. Chinese arms purchases included a squadron of 24 Sukhoi 27 Fighters, S-300 surface to air missiles heavy transport aircraft and Mi-17 Hip helicopters; while technological acquisitions comprised of air to air refueling capabilities, missile guidance technology, rocket technology and submarine and anti-submarine warfare technology (Van Hickey, 1994, p.80). This sudden surge in arms procurement gave Beijing a new found confidence in its military, which escalated tensions in cross-strait relations. Taiwan was extremely concerned of China’s newly acquired capabilities, and rightfully so, as demonstrated during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which began in June 1995.
Upon hearing that President Lee was allowed to visit Cornell University to give a speech, Beijing was furious. It immediately began conducting waves of live fire missile tests near the Taiwanese cities of Keelung and Kaohsiung, and continued its tests in March 1996. The three waves of exercises in March 1996 were the continuation of the series exercises the PLA carried out after Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States; But the scale and magnitude of the military exercises in March 1996 was much greater than
6 The One China Principle points to Beijing’s view that Taiwan and the mainland are two parts of a single China that is ruled by the PRC government. For information, please see:
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf
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the previous one (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 152). China also conducted a series of military exercises in which some of its most advanced aircraft and naval war ships were showcased as a testament to its capability in establishing lines of communication in the sea, blockade and protecting landing operation (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 153). These military actions sent a clear message to Taipei—that Beijing took its ‘one China principle’ seriously and was willing to use force if Taiwan continued its path towards independence.
By the end of Lee’s term, the PRC was well on its way towards improving its military capabilities. The most notable advancements were its inventory of long range missiles and naval ships. According to a 1999 US Department of Defense report, “China views its growing ballistic missile force as a potent military and political weapon to influence Taiwan's populace and their leaders. New land attack cruise missile (LACM) designs, when operational, will increase China's capability to strike regional targets accurately with conventional warheads” (US Department of Defense, 1999, p. 4). The potential power of these missiles make them a deadly weapon in modern combat. The report continued, describing China’s naval advancements, “Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has streamlined and modernized its forces by eliminating large numbers of older ships and replacing them with fewer, more modern units” (US Department of Defense, 1999, p.7). Though China was far from gaining a military advantage, its threat towards Taiwan had become increasingly daunting.
Chen Shui Bian’s ascension to presidency in 2000 changed the political landscape in the Taiwan Strait, as this was the first presidential candidate of the Democratic
Progressive Party7 (DPP), which supports Taiwanese independence, had been elected.
China was paranoid that President Chen would lead Taiwan towards independence, forever shattering hopes of unification with the mainland. Consequently, the PRC intermittently hurled verbal threats of war in hopes of coercing Chen to rethink his independence leanings. In February 2000, Beijing released a white paper exclaiming that it willing to use force against Taipei (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, 2000).
It also warned that “The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China
7 The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the major opposition party that supports Taiwanese independence. DPP official website: http://english.dpp.org.tw/
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mainland,” and that, “Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China … would only lead the Taiwanese people to disaster” (Gittings, 2000). Though this time China did not use actual military force, its verbal threats were still unnerving.
In 2003, Beijing once again unleashed a barrage of threats warning Taiwan of its growing independence movement. Vice-Minister at Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Zaixi accused President Chen Shui-bian had crossed Beijing's "red line” with his recent pro-separatist activities, and warned that war would break out if the island declared formal independence (Lam, 2003). With Chen in power, Beijing was worried their hopes of unification would be lost. In order to prevent this from happening, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law8 in March, 2005.
This law, which essentially allowed the PRC to use military force if all peaceful attempts towards unification failed, caused a wave of panic throughout Taiwan. President Chen was quick to respond to this radical change to the status quo. Just a few days before news of the law spread worldwide, the president delivered a speech in front of members of United States Congress and DPP members. On the implications of the law, he stated,
“It risks raising tensions across the Taiwan Strait and putting relations into reverse gear”
(Chen, 2005). He continued on, pleading Beijing to take a calmer stance, “The leader across the Taiwan Strait should make constructive contributions to cross-Strait relations and should not unilaterally try to change the status quo by making a law that could serve as a legal foundation to take over Taiwan by force” (Chen, 2005). It was clear that Chen took the ratification of this law very seriously. It had decimated any trust that had previously existed between the two sides and greatly distressed the status quo.
The Chinese threat during Chen’s administration was the highest Taiwan had seen since the Chinese Civil war (1927-1950). Though there had been no deliberate use of force, Beijing’s ever growing stockpile of offensive weapons kept Taiwan on high alert.
According to a 2008 US Department of Defense report, “By November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads” (US Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2).
8 For full text of the Anti-Secession Law, please see: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm
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The report described the PRC’s air capabilities, stating, “China bases 490 combat aircraft within un-refueled operational range of Taiwan, and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these aircraft are upgrades of older models;
however, newer, and more advanced, aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory” (US Department of Defense, 2008, p.5).
Furthermore, the PLA was reported to have about 1.25 million ground forces personnel at its disposal, with approximately 400,000 based in the three military regions opposite Taiwan (US Department of Defense, 2008, p.5). It was evident that the Chinese threat showed no sign of conceding, and consequently, the Chen administration had to tread carefully.
When Ma Ying Jeou was elected in 2008, cross-strait relations improved considerably as a result of Ma’s pro-China policies. Beijing was noticeably much friendlier with the Ma administration, in hopes of establishing the foundations for eventual reunification. By June 2014, 10 rounds of talks had been held, producing 21 formal agreements, three memoranda of understanding and two joint statements (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 99).
Despite warming cross-strait relations, the Chinese threat has not dissipated.
Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the major impetus for military spending.
In the annual report to Congress, the US Department of Defense reported that,
“The Second Artillery possessed more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in its inventory, and is prepared to conduct missile attacks and precision strikes against Taiwan’s air defense systems, air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and C2 [command and control] and communications facilities” (US Department of Defense, 2014).
It also stated that, “In November 2013, the Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, deployed out of area for the first time to the South China Sea, where it conducted local training near Hainan Island with surface ships” (US Department of Defense, 2014). This, along with additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within
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the first island chain as well as deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict (US Department of Defense, 2014).
Through economic and cultural agreements, Taiwan and China have established closer links with one another. Relations may seem better than ever; however, Beijing has never relented its willingness to forceful unification, nor has it halted its military buildup.
This proves that no matter what Taiwan does to attempt to alleviate cross-strait
tensions—including all the economic and cultural collaborations—the Chinese military threat will never disappear. In the eyes of Beijing, unification is the only answer.