1.6 Literary Review
2.1.2 US Strategic Support
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project developed by the ROC and Panama (Chen, 1997). In Honduras, Lee met with President Carlos Roberto Reina, who expressed the hope that Taiwan would help establish an Export Processing Zone and establish a Central American technology
research and development center (Chen, 1997). Lee then flew to El Salvador and attended a summit of Central American heads of state. At the summit, Taiwan reached an
agreement with the Central American states to establish a strategic alliance for cooperative development, and the Central American states welcomed Taiwan's
participation in their future Central American Community (Chen, 1997). In his final stop in Paraguay, Lee met with President Juan Carlos Wuasmosy, and signed air-rights, agricultural, and trade agreements (Chen, 1997). His 16 day trip was very productive and yielded in stronger relations in the region. It also demonstrated Taiwan’s determination for sovereignty, as it relied on its allies for support in international activities.
President Lee took his foreign visits very seriously, as they accomplished many things at once. Because Taiwan’s political status had tremendously degraded since the Cold War, Lee worked relentlessly to repair the damage. Taipei could not spare to lose its already small number of diplomatic allies to Beijing. These remaining allies were
invaluable to the island, as they supported President Lee in his endeavors for increased international space. He made a conscious effort throughout his presidency to travel abroad and endorse Taiwan’s sovereignty. This was a far cry from his predecessors, who never bothered to leave the island during their rule. Lee’s trips marked the beginning of a normative diplomatic affair in spite of Taiwan’s very unusual political situation.
2.1.2 US Strategic Support
Early into Lee’s presidency, relations with the US under Clinton were stable, but was beginning to wane. Clinton was eager to improve trade relations with the PRC, granting it Most Favored Nation status (MFN13) in 1994, while placing Taiwan on the back burner.
It seemed as if support for Taipei was slowly diminishing. As Jeffrey Bader observed,
“Taiwan was not at the forefront of US-China relations during these years” (1996, p. 3).
13 States bestowed with this status are guaranteed with equal trading opportunities. For more information, please see: http://global.britannica.com/topic/most-favored-nation-treatment
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However, by 1995, tensions between Taiwan and China increased significantly, culminating into the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis; and inevitably implicating US involvement.
The crisis originated when US congress unanimously voted to provide President Lee a visa to visit the US. This decision was a testament of American support within Washington, and made Taiwan affairs relevant again within American politics. As Natale H. Bellocchi, a former head of AIT14 noted, “The visit of President Lee to the US last summer brought many results, both good and bad, but one it surely brought to America was a greater awareness of Today’s Taiwan” (1996, p. 85). Upset by the fact that
Washington reneged on its policy, allowing Lee Teng Hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, the PRC began conducting live fire missile tests in addition to military drills;
very close to Taiwan’s shores. Beijing’s militant response came in three waves.
According to Li, Hu and Zhong, the first wave of intimidation came on July 21, 1995, when the PLA15 Second Artillery began launching multiple short-range and mobile missiles near Taiwan’s two largest harbors, Keelung and Kaohsiung (1998). The missiles all reached their designated targets, demonstrating Beijing’s military prowess and
intentionally sabotaging Taiwan’s maritime communications. The second wave began a month later, in the form of a joint naval-air force exercise south of the Taiwan Strait.
During the operations in August 1995, the PLA warplanes for the first time flew across the center-line (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 153). This proved to be a remarkable milestone for the PLA, as it gave Beijing the opportunity to tests its newest military hardware;
while simultaneously demonstrating its frustrations towards Washington for sanctioning Lee’s June 1995 US visit. The last military exercise took place nearly one year later, from March 18 to 23 1996. It was a simulation of cross-strait landing operation on the Chinese island of Pingtang; in which joint forces landing operation included ocean-crossing, establishing beachhead, and mountain operations to develop in deep (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 153). This brazen act was perfectly timed to coincide with the 1996 presidential elections, intending to dissuade Taiwanese voters from pursuing independence.
14 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is the de-facto American embassy in Taiwan, maintaining US-Taiwan relations and protecting American interests. AIT official website: http://www.ait.org.tw/en/
15 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the military force of China.
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According to Andrew Scobell, “The maneuvers and tests of March 1996 were meant to intimidate Taiwan in the lead-up to a presidential election and to chasten the incumbent, President Lee, who seemed certain to be reelected” (1999, p. 5). These three consecutive acts of intimidation sent a wave of panic throughout Taiwan. For many months thereafter, there were real concerns in Taipei of a possible attack from Beijing.
After the PLA publicized its intentions in the Taiwan Strait, Washington sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. The US Congress, meanwhile, passed a
resolution declaring “Such tests and exercises [are] potentially serious threats to the peace, security, and stability of Taiwan and not in the spirit of the three United States-China Joint Communiques” (US Congress, 1996). The resolution also recommended President Clinton “immediately consult with Congress on an appropriate United States response to the tests…” (US Congress, 1996). The US had seen the PLA’s exercises as a unilateral disturbance to the status quo, direct threatening Taiwan’s security. In a March 1996 Congressional Hearing, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega declared, “I cannot more strongly applaud and support the actions taken by the administration over the weekend. Stationing the ‘independence’ aircraft carrier group off Taiwan, with the “Nimitz” carrier group to arrive shortly, has sent a clear message to China that the government and people of the United states of America will not tolerate a military attack or missile enforced blockade of Taiwan by the PRC” (1996, p. 43). At the same hearing, Winston Lord proclaimed,
“We have reminded the PRC that US law explicitly declares any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave concern to the United States” (1996, p. 49). With the dispatch of the aircraft carriers, Washington demonstrated its opposition to PRC’s intimidating conduct. Furthermore, it was a clear sign of support for Taiwan’s democracy. However, this was most definitely not a validation of Taiwan’s boastful behavior before the crisis, as Faleomavaega noted regarding Lee’s Cornell visit in 1995, “While I supported the issuance of the Visa for Taiwan’s president Lee to speak at Cornell University, many believe that he overplayed his hand with the media, treating his visit to the US as that of a head of state” (1996, p. 43). For Taiwan, the 1996 crisis proved Clinton’s strict adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, thus solidifying US-Taiwan relations for the remainder of the 1990s.
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