1.6 Literary Review
2.3.1 Flexible Diplomacy
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The Chen and Bush administrations also promoted more frequent senior level military exchanges. This allowed Taiwanese military officials the opportunity to visit their American counterparts more frequently, bridging the communication and
cooperation gap closer together. During Chen’s presidency, numerous Taiwanese military officials were permitted to enter the US and attend significant meetings and events. The loosening of restrictions on military visits signified Bush’s positive sentiment towards Taiwan. In March 2002, President Bush granted a visa for Defense Minister Tang Yiau Ming to visit the United States to attend an industry conference held by the US-Taiwan Business Council in Florida (Kan, 2014). In September 2002, Deputy Defense Minister, Kang Ning-Hsiang, visited Washington and was the first senior Taiwan defense official to have meetings inside the Pentagon since 1979 (Kan, 2014). In September 2005, Deputy Minister Huoh attended a US Taiwan defense industry conference (Kan, 2014).
In July 2007, Chief of General staff, General Houh Shoou Yeh visited the United States (Kan, 2014). These increased visits by Taiwanese senior level officials symbolized the normalization of military-to-military engagement between Taipei and Washington, and set a new precedent for American support towards Taiwan’s democracy.
During his time as president, Chen Shui Bian had wanted to promote Taiwan’s sovereignty through a multi-faceted diplomacy and close ties with the US. However, his enthusiastic pro-Taiwan agenda caused much international controversy and heightened tensions between Taipei and Washington. Much to the dismay of the US, Chen’s active support for independence altered the status quo, which in turn led to increased
aggressiveness from the PRC. Chen’s rebellious behavior gave Taiwan the unwanted image of a ‘trouble maker’ in the global community.
2.3 Ma Ying Jeou
2.3.1 Flexible Diplomacy
In the wake of Chen Shui Bian’s problematic, unyielding foreign policy, President Ma Ying Jeou knew a change had to be made to prevent further damage to Taiwan’s
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reputation. In an essay regarding Taiwan’s new soft power, Ma wrote, “In the past, the ROC engaged in diplomatic competition with mainland China, the result of which caused both sides to be criticized by the international community. This undermined goodwill and negated the accomplishments of several decades of the government’s foreign aid work, which I found quite distressing” (2010). Ma sought to repair the damage with a far less aggressive method. Commonly known as “flexible diplomacy”, the basis of this strategy was to amend cross-strait relations. During a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ma explained, “The idea of flexible diplomacy is aimed at improving our
international standing and increasing the cost-effectiveness of our diplomatic budget. The cornerstone of this ‘flexible diplomacy’ is a certain degree of mutual trust across the Strait, which could later be extended to the international arena” (2008). Ma’s strategy saw the connection between cross-strait relations and Taiwan’s international status.
Though the Chen administration realized this as well, their pro-Taiwanese policies and eagerness for independence were tremendous roadblocks for rapprochement with China.
In order to regain a strong foothold in the global community, Taipei had to first engage with Beijing with amicable dialogue. Ma remarked, “Flexible diplomacy does not require Taiwan to be at loggerheads with the mainland in each and every international
encounter…it actually encourages the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to…create
rapprochement or win-win results” (2008). By keeping the PRC at bay, the island would be able to prevent political isolation from Beijing and continue vying for increased participation in international bodies.
It would also put an end to the intense diplomatic battle between Taipei and Beijing. As Ma stated, “Both sides should be committed to not wasting national resources in a vicious cycle to win over diplomatic allies from the other side” (2008). With only 23 small nations recognizing Taipei at the time16, it was vital to retain every last ally. Ma’s strategy was essentially a truce with China that still holds today; in the hopes that improved cross-strait relations would dissuade Beijing from interfering with Taipei’s international space and diplomacy. “If diplomatic truce can be achieved, then we can conduct a meaningful review of our foreign aid programs” (2008). Now nearing the end of his term, Ma has used the diplomatic truce as a political ‘broom’ to sweep away any
16 Taiwan currently has only 22 diplomatic allies, after the loss of The Gambia in 2014.
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remnants of the previous president’s wasteful foreign policies. The truce allowed the President Ma to focus on eliminating ineffective or insignificant elements in Taiwan’s foreign relations. Early in his administration, he proclaimed, “We will take into consideration the standards set by certain international organizations with regard to foreign aid. As long as we no longer engage in inappropriate foreign aid activities, we will be less likely to corrupt ourselves” (2008). Flexible diplomacy aimed to steer Taiwan towards a brighter political future, in conjunction with improved cross-strait relations.
In regards to maintaining bilateral relations with official and non-official allies, flexible diplomacy would re-instill their confidence in Taiwan. Ma explained, “We must jettison our past image of a troublemaker, refurbish our international credibility, and re-establish mutual trust with these countries—especially between high-echeloned officials”
(2008). In order to progress, Taiwan had to prove to the international community that it was accountable and pragmatic in its actions. As Ma succinctly explained, “By weaning itself of the troublemaker image, Taiwan can regain its soft power as a lighthouse for other countries’ political development. We firmly believe that democracy contributes to world peace” (2008). He also indicated that, “As a member of the global village, Taiwan must be involved in the development of the international community” (2010). From the start, the Ma administration’s new liberal policy was a welcomed changed. It was a simple, broad approach; but within the past 7 years, it resulted in many positive results.
Like the previous two presidents, Ma also embarked on multiple trips abroad to consolidate support and bolster bilateral ties amongst Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. On his first journey as president, he went to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic in August 2008. He first landed in Asunción, and metwith Paraguayan President Nicanor Duarte Frutos, guaranteeing that Taiwan would continue to strengthen its relations with Paraguay and ensure that cooperation between the two nations become even closer (Office of the President [ROC], 2008). According to the Office of the President (ROC), “Ma also had a discussion with the President-elect Fernando Lugo, promising that relations between Taiwan and Paraguay would continue to improve and that bilateral cooperation would be enhanced. In response, President-elect Lugo said he would strive to strengthen Taiwan-Paraguay relations” (Office of the President [ROC], 2008).
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On August 15th, Ma attended the inauguration ceremony of President Fernando Lugo, his main reason for visiting the nation. Later that day, he flew over to the
Dominican Republic and met with President Manuel Zelaya of the Republic of Honduras and other government leaders (Office of the President [ROC], 2008). President Ma also had an opportunity to meet with Haitian President René Préval and exchange views on issues of mutual concern to their two countries (Office of the President [ROC], 2008). On August 16th, He attended the presidential inauguration ceremony of Leonel Fernández.
Back at his hotel, President Ma talked with President Elías Antonio Saca González from the Republic of El Salvador regarding future bilateral exchanges and cooperation (Office of the President [ROC], 2008). Finally, on the evening of the 16th, Ma visited President Fernández at the National Palace to congratulate him once again on his inauguration and emphasized that the ROC wished to continue its cooperation with the Dominican
Republic and strengthen the friendship between the two countries (Office of the President [ROC], 2008). The Ma administration never passed an opportunity to pay their
diplomatic allies a visit whenever possible. Especially now that there was a diplomatic truce with Beijing, it was imperative that Taipei solidified its ties with those nations.
On April 7th 2012, President Ma embarked on a 12 day journey to Africa. His first stop was in Burkina Faso, where Taiwan was providing medical assistance. He visited Blaise Compaoré National Hospital, where he inspected the modern facilities and witnessed training sessions set up by Taiwan medical missions at the hospital (Office of the President [ROC], 2012). He also signed a joint communique with President
Compaoré, announcing that the ROC government is providing Burkina Faso with one million Euros to help it cope with an influx of refugees from Mali (Office of the President [ROC], 2012). On April 11th, he then stopped in The Gambia to meet with President Jammeh. He visited the Mackay Memorial Hospital medical mission in Serrekunda Hospital to better understand the impacts of bilateral medical cooperation on Gambia (Office of the President [ROC], 2012). He also signed a joint communiqué with President Jammeh, strengthening the friendly and cooperative ties between the two governments and peoples (Office of the President [ROC], 2012).
His last leg of the trip was to Swaziland. Whilst there, he paid a visit to Raleigh Fitkin Memorial Hospital, where he commended the doctors and nurses of the Taiwan
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medical mission for their strenuous efforts (Office of the President [ROC], 2012). He also sign a joint communiqué with King Mswati III to strengthen cooperation between the two governments and peoples (Office of the President [ROC], 2012). It was vital for Ma to maintain strong ties with its African allies, as Taiwan needed their support in
international bodies. As Adams Bodomo explains, “Africa has a lot of U.N. votes—more than 50—and they often vote en bloc, these African nations. Beijing is trying to woo them. Taiwan wants to hold onto them. So it's a fight, a major struggle” (Broadhead, 2012). In spite of the ‘diplomatic truce’ with Beijing, Ma’s foreign policy has failed to prevent further loss of its allies.
In November 2013, The Gambia broke ties with Taiwan rather unexpectedly. In the 18 years of their relationship, the Republic of China had put forward and
implemented a variety of programs in The Gambia that have enhanced the livelihood of the Gambian people (Office of the President [ROC], 2013). At the same time, The Gambia had long been a staunch supporter of the Republic of China in the international arena (Office of the President [ROC], 2013). Despite such cordial relations, The Ma administration could not pinpoint the cause for such a sudden break of diplomatic relations; and President Jammeh failed to explain his reasoning.
The loss of Gambia was a devastating blow to Ma’s seemingly perfect diplomatic strategy, revealing just how flawed it really was. What Ma had overlooked was that the truce with China did not guarantee that Taiwan’s allies would continue recognizing Taipei. Instead, it was just a temporary solution to the island’s chronic international isolation. This political impasse was the perfect moment for Taiwan to rethink its diplomatic strategy and strengthen its ties with its official and non-official allies alike;
which the Ma administration strived to do. However, the long lasting results of this flexible diplomacy still remain to be seen.
2.3.2 US Strategic Support
The Ma administration has seen a steady improvement in overall US-Taiwan relations as a result of decreased cross-strait tensions. US support for Taiwan’s democracy has also progressively increased since President Ma took office. Having jettisoned its former
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troublesome international image, Taiwan has created deeper mutual trust between Taipei and Washington. Military exchanges are still a normal occurrence, as a US State
Department report commented, “The unofficial military-to-military relationship is deep and active, encompassing billions of dollars annually in the sale of arms and services and dozens of military exchanges and visits” (US Department of State, 2012, p. 15). Many exchanges initiated under the two previous administrations are still in existence today, and are continuing to expand in other capacities. For example, the training of Taiwanese F-16 pilots in the US has expanded to Apache and soon, Blackhawk helicopter pilots (UPI, 2014; Pan, 2015). As of 2013, 61 pilots have been sent to the US for Apache helicopter training (CNA, 2013). Meanwhile, 32 Taiwanese pilot instructors are to be sent learn to fly the Black Hawk helicopter (Pan, 2015).
In terms of military drills, a US presence is still maintained, though rather
intermittently. According to Shirley Kan, Defense Minister Chen Chao-min announced a reduction in the frequency of Han Kuang’s live fire field exercises in 2008; changing them from annual to biennial exercises (2014, p. 7). This raised doubts on Taiwan’s military readiness and sustained strategic communication with Washington. In June 2009, Han Kuang 25 was observed by a small US military group, led by Retired Admiral Robert Natter (Kan, 2014, p. 7). However, for the 2009 Yushan crisis management
exercise, President Ma changed the name to Chunghsing, altered the scenario from a PLA attack to domestic disasters, and did not invite US officials to observe (Kan, 2014, p. 7).
In 2013, Taiwan’s military announced that the Han Kuang 29 exercise would continue use of live ammunition for the first time since 2008 (Kan, 2014, p. 7). Ma’s sporadic decisions in maintaining and conducting military drills has raised doubts on his commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that there have been recent efforts to promote strategic cooperation between Taipei and Washington, quelling some security concerns.
In June 2015, it was announced that sister units would be established between Taiwanese contingents and their American counterparts. According to a Liberty Times report, Taiwan’s Aviation Special Forces 601st Brigade, based in Taoyuan, has formed a sister-unit relationship with the Hawaii-based US Army 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (Pan, 2015). Meanwhile, the Psychological Warfare Battalion Headquarters of the ministry’s
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Political Warfare Brigade has also formed a sister-unit relationship with the US 7th Psychological Operations Group (Pan, 2015).These closer ties are sure to enhance communication and support between the military units, and consequently improve their combat effectiveness. Ministry spokesperson Major General David Lo praised the developments, saying: “The defense ministry welcomes the arrangement, since these exchanges can boost the capability of our armed forces” (Pan, 2015). Though certain aspects of Taipei’s military cooperation with Washington are still problematic, it has steadily been expanding under the Ma administration; in the form of various exchanges.
These type of exchanges only deepen US-Taiwan military ties and are a testament to persistent American support for the island’s democracy.
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