Arms Sales Significance

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1.6.3 Arms Sales Significance

Despite the troubled process, US arms sales themselves have two major benefits in improving Taiwan’s current political dilemma: providing the island protection from a growing Chinese military threat and giving Taipei confidence in negotiating with Beijing.

With Taiwan being such a small state, it is imperative that arms sales continue in order to deter a possible attack from China. Many authors, wary of Beijing’s intentions, agree with this. As Carlyle Thayer explains, “As long as China retains the option of using force and keeps beefing up its military and ballistic missile forces across the straits in an effort to intimidate Taiwan, the US will continue to sell arms to Taiwan” (2011). The constant military Chinese threat is what fuels the continuance of arms sales to Taiwan. Thayer’s comment reflects what countless other scholars have said in the past, and are saying today. For example, in his commentary, Increase Arms Sales to Taiwan, Ted Carpenter remarks, “A well-armed Taiwan is better able to deter Beijing from contemplating the use of force to achieve reunification” (2000). Arming Taiwan with modern weapons plays an important role keeping the PRC at bay. This rhetoric cannot be stressed enough. If the determination for arms deals fades, Taiwan will directly feel the consequences.

Describing the severity of the issue, Szu Yin Ho writes, “The ROC certainly hopes that American policy statements on Taiwan security such as the one provided in the TRA will be backed up by deeds... To the ROC, American arms sales are a matter of life or death”

(Ho, 1990). It is evident that US weapons have undoubtedly become an essential factor in US-Taiwan relations.

In addition to Chinese deterrence, weapons sales also provide Taipei confidence when dealing with Beijing. Multiple authors and scholars have commented on this phenomenon. Eric Von Kessler’s study, entitled Taiwan’s Dilemma: China, The United States, and Reunification focuses partially on the impact of US arms sales on Taiwan’s perception towards reunification. On Taiwan’s confidence, he notes, “…the subsequent election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, coupled with U.S. backing, has led to Taiwan's continued defiance of China” (Von Kessler, 2008, p.41). The ‘US backing’ he mentions refers to arms sales. Here, Von Kessler subtly hints that the customary US weapons sales play a factor in Taiwan’s confidence when interacting with China. He then clarifies the

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effects of George W. Bush’s pro-Taiwan stance, “The U.S. position of continued military support and perpetual sale of strategic defense arms has thus seemed to mislead Taiwan into pushing for state independence and undermine China’s claim to sovereignty (Von Kessler, 2008, p.42). Von Kessler contends that under the Bush administration, Taiwan became overly self-assured and confused US arms sales as encouragement to be more defiant towards China.

He finds that U.S. arms sales and military support to Taiwan creates two significant problems. First, Taiwan authorities have begun relying too heavily on the United States, remaining defiant regarding talks concerning reunification; and second, the lingering uncertainty regarding a Taiwan resolution compels China to accelerate its military modernization (Von Kessler, 2008). Von Kessler observes that Taiwan has become complacent with US arms sales as its primary source of security measures.

Despite these problems, he acknowledges that US weapons has given Taiwan the confidence to stand up to China regarding unification. This defiance has upset Beijing, giving it the impetus to continue its military buildup, and fueling the perpetual insecurity in the Taiwan Strait.

The points argued by Von Kessler do have validation, and are certainly noticeable in Taiwan’s recent developments in the Taiwan Strait. However, in explaining Taiwan’s defiant behavior in cross-strait negotiations, Von Kessler puts too much of the blame on US arms sales. He provides very little narrative on the impacts of US arms sales on Taiwan’s perception of unification. Instead, he spends too much time on describing the Chinese military threat and providing historical context. His thesis’ scope is too narrow in analyzing the US-Taiwan-China relationship. Greater attention must be paid to Taiwan’s policies in congruence with arms sales, in order to understand the island’s political actions.

Meanwhile, Kok and Firestein’s report, Threading the Needle: Proposals for US and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan, presents new arguments, concepts and methodologies for analyzing the Taiwan arms sales issue” (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p.7).

The authors argue that the arms sales are a political matter, rather than military. They describe the effects of the sales, writing, “In Taiwan, arms sales from the United States provide it with the confidence to negotiate with the mainland, reassure the people of

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Taiwan that they have the capacity for self-defense, and enable Taiwan’s leaders to demonstrate to their domestic constituents that they are standing up for the latter’s interests” (Kok & Firestein, 2013). Thus, in some respects, the arms sales issue is a measuring stick for political toughness in the context of Taiwan politics vis-à-vis the mainland, and indeed, for all three sides (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p.44)”. The arms sales do more than just to provide the island with a capable defense force—they provide Taiwan with a stronger backbone when facing Chinese oppression on the international stage.

The authors determine that as long as mainland China’s political and social systems differ from Taiwan’s to the degree they currently do, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p. 47). However, they warn that arms sales is not enough, and recommend that the US should maintain unwavering commitment to Taiwan through closer multi-faceted relations. These actions, they claim, “would reassure Taiwan that any incremental modifications of U.S. policy on arms sales do not constitute a

weakening of U.S. commitment to its relationship with Taiwan” (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p. 50). Such reassurances would dissuade Taiwan’s leaders from undertaking potentially drastic measures to ensure Taiwan’s own security, which may then be construed, right or wrongly, by the mainland as attempts to contravene the one-China policy. (Kok &

Firestein, 2013, p. 50). Kok and Firestein see US arms sales as a self-confidence booster for Taiwan when facing Chinese threat and oppression, which they predict will continue if the status quo remains unchanged. In comparison to Von Kessler, Kok and Firestein’s report does a much better job at describing the political significance of US arms sales to Taiwan. However, they overlook the original purpose of the arms, which is purely

military in nature. While commenting on the ‘confidence boost’ of Taiwan, many authors like Kok and Firestein focus too much on either the strategic significance or the political symbolism behind US arms sales. It is important to remember that both connotations are true, and one must accept the dual meanings of Taiwan’s weapons purchases.

When browsing through the various literature on US-Taiwan relations, it is evident that many authors are staunch supporters of continuing weapons sales and support for Taiwan’s democracy. Nevertheless, there is a growing minority who feel Taiwan is a troubling issue for US that deserves to be abandoned.

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In recent years, one author stands out the most. In an article published in 2011, Charles Glaser argues for the abandonment of Taiwan in exchange for better US-Sino relations and increased stability in East Asia. He states, “A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war…and the US would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack” (2011, p. 6). While, this is a very real

possibility, the US would most certainly act with great caution, and would not necessarily use military force. Instead, it could use diplomatic pressure to resolve the predicament.

From the outset, it is clear that Glaser’s mindset is deeply entrenched in Realist thought. Glaser reasons that ending US military support for Taiwan would “remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come” (2011, p. 7).

This is an extremely naïve assumption. There are many flash points, outside of US-Sino relations that are just as controversial; the South China Sea territorial claims being one.

Second of all, what is to stop China from requesting more demands, and defying

Washington? Appeasing China with Taiwan would not solve anything. On the contrary, deserting Taipei would cause a deep wave of mistrust amongst Washington’s Asian allies. Glaser evidently underestimates the strategic importance of Washington’s ties with Taipei. Defending American support for Taiwan, Dennis Halpin explains, “Taiwan is a vital link in the alliance structure, formed in the crucible of the Second World War, running from the Korean peninsula and Japanese islands in the north to the Philippine islands and Australian continent in the south. Once a link in a chain fence is broken, the fence itself easily falls down” (Halpin, 2013, p. 1). Losing Taiwan would be catastrophic to America’s tactical pivot to Asia.

In response to his appeasement critics, Glaser maintains that “territorial concessions are not always bound to fail” and that “there is actually little reason to believe that it has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond”

(2011, p.7). Though China’s true intentions are hard to prove, Beijing has increasingly become aggressive since Glaser’s article. From expanding its controlled islands in the South China Sea and continued military threat towards Taiwan, China demonstrates that as it amasses greater power and influence, it will become more defiant towards its Asian

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neighbors. Glaser’s failure to comprehend Beijing’s belligerence and potential

capabilities is disappointing. In his article, he also makes an embarrassing historic error, claiming, “Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland…” (2011, p. 6).

China (PRC) has never controlled any part of Taiwan. After the Civil War, it was the Republic of China that fled to Taiwan and continued its rule there. This misunderstanding is a testament to his lack of understanding in Taiwan Strait affairs. It is very hard to take him seriously, as his views are skewed and naïve. Nevertheless, there are others like him who believe place US-Sino relations above ties with Taiwan.

This idea is nothing new. Since the 1990s, there were scholars who were opposed to Taiwan’s acquisition of US weapons. For example, when George H. Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets in 1992, some critics argued it would cause repercussions from China. Gerald Segal claimed, “The American sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan means a radical deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations. Arms sales to Taiwan raise the costs to China of unilateral action and demonstrate that there are limits to China's ability to order the balance in East Asia” (1992). Segal worried the sale would damage relations with Beijing, as well as augment China’s hostility. Derek da Cunha noted that the

proposed sale “may well be an attempt to forestall a shift in the weight of the strategic balance toward the Chinese in the western Pacific” (Richardson, 1992). With China already protective of its overwhelming presence in East Asia, the F-16 sale would

heighten tensions in the region; as Beijing would retaliate the sale with increased military spending. Scholars like Segal and Da Cunha are helpful in considering the strategic consequences of continued support of Taiwan. However, they prioritize relations with China and do not appreciate the role of US arms to Taiwan in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. They may only consider the short term outcomes of such sales, but do not realize how serious the ramifications would be if Taiwan was abandoned.