I
n October 2008, the US permitted the sale of 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters, 173 stinger missiles and 1000 Longbow hellfire missiles (Kan, 2014). The Apache helicopter conducts rear, close, and shaping missions including deep precision strike (Military.com, 2015). It also provides armed reconnaissance when required in day, night, obscured battlefield and adverse weather conditions (Military.com, 2015). The Apache is designed to endure front-line environments and to operate during the day or night and in adverse weather via its avionics and onboard sensors, and is capable of flying 150 knots per hour (Military.com, 2015). The stinger missiles and hellfire missiles had the ability be fitted on the Apache helicopter, making the aircraft a force to be reckoned with(Military.com, 2015).
3.5 US Major Arms Sales (Table)
173.5.1 Lee Teng Hui
Date of Notification Major Item Value of Program ($ million)
9/6/1990 (1) C-130H transport
aircraft
$45
1/7/1991 (100) MK-46 torpedoes $28
7/24/1991 (97) SM-1 Standard air
defense missiles
$55
9/13/1991 (110) M60A3 tanks $119
11/18/1991 Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense
systems
$170
5/27/1992 Weapons, ammunition,
support for 3 leased ships
$212
8/4/1992 (207) SM-1 Standard air
defense missiles
$126
17 Data taken from 2014 Congressional Research Service report by Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S.
Arms Sales Since 1990. This table only includes information regarding approved weapons sales, and not actual procured items, technology transfers or logistics support.
‧
9/14/1992 (150) F-16 A/B fighters $5800
9/14 (3) Patriot-derived
Modified Air defense (MADS) fire units
$1300
9/18/1992 (12) SH-2F LAMPS
anti-submarine helicopters
$161
6/17/1993 (12) C-130H transport
aircraft
$620
7/29/1993 (38) Harpoon anti-ship
missiles
$68
8/1993 (4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne
early warning aircraft
$700
11/4/1993 (150) MK-46 Mod 5
torpedoes
$54
11/9/1993 Weapons, ammunition, and
support for 3 leased frigates
$238
9/12/1994 MK-45 Mod 2 gun system $21
3/24/1995 (6) MK-75 shipboard gun
systems, (6) Phalanx close-In Weapon Systems
$75
5/23/1996 (465) Stinger missiles, (55) dual mounted Stinger launcher systems
$84
6/24/1996 (300) M60A3TTS Tanks $223
8/23/1996 (1299) Stinger surface to air missiles, (74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile launchers, (96) HMMWVs (Humvees)
$420
9/5/1996 (110) MK-46 MOD 5
anti-submarine torpedoes
$66
2/14/1997 (54) Harpoon anti-ship
missiles
$95
5/23/1997 (1786) TOW 2A
anti-armor guided missiles, (114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs
$81
7/24/1997 (21) AH-1W Super Cobra
helicopters18
$479
9/3/1997 (13) OH-58D Kiowa
Warrior Armed Scout helicopters
$172
18 Taiwan reportedly ordered 63 AH-1W helicopters (Defense News, March 6, 2000)
‧
1/28/1998 (3) Knox Class Frigates, 1(MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
$300
8/27/1998 (58) Harpoon anti-ship
missiles
$101
8/27/1998 (61) Dual mount Stinger
surface-to-air missiles
$180
8/27/1998 (131) MK-46 Mod 5(A) S
anti-submarine torpedoes
$69
10/9/1998 (9) CH-47SD Chinook
Helicopters
7/30/1999 (2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E
airborne early warning aircraft
$400
3/2/2000 (162) HAWK Intercept
guided air defense missiles
$106
3.5.2 Chen Shui Bian
Date of Notification Major Item Value of Program ($ million)
9/28/2000 (146) M109A5 howitzers $405
9/28/2000 (200) AIM-120C
AMRAMMs for F-16 fighters
$150
9/28/2000 (71) RGM-84L Harpoon
anti-ship missiles
$240
9/5/2001 (40) AGM-65G Maverick
air-to-ground missiles for F-16s
$18
10/26/2001 (40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems and (360) Javelin missiles
$51
9/4/2002 (54) AAV7A1 amphibious
assault vehicles
‧
10/11/2002 (290) TOW-2B anti-tank
missiles
$18 11/21/2002 (4) Kidd Class destroyers $875 3/30/2004 (2) Ultra High Frequency
Long Range Early Warning Radars
$1776
10/25/2005 (10) AIM-9M Sidewinder
and (5) AIM-7M Sparrow air-to-air missiles
$280 (This price also includes continued F-16 pilot training at Luke AFB)
2/28/2007 (218) AMRAAMs and
(235) Maverick air-to-ground missiles for F-16 fighters
$421
8/8/2007 (60) AGM-84L Harpoon
Block II anti-ship missiles
$125
9/12/2007 (144) SM-2 Block IIIA
Standard air-defense missiles for Kidd-class destroyers
$272
9/12/2007 (12) P-3C maritime
patrol/AW aircraft
$1960 11/9/2007 Patriot configuration 2
ground systems upgrade
$939
3.5.3 Ma Ying Jeou
Date of Notification Major Item Value of Program ($ million)
10/3/2008 (330) Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC)-3 missile
10/3/2008 (182) Javelin anti-armor missiles
10/3/2008 (30) AH-64D Apache
Longbow attack
helicopters, (173) Stinger air-to-air missiles, (1000)
$2532
‧
1/29/2010 (114) PAC-3 missile
defense missiles
$2810
1/29/2010 (60) UH-60M Black Hawk
utility helicopters
$3100 1/29/2010 (2) Osprey-class mine
hunting ships
$105 9/21/2011 Retrofit of 145 F-16 A/B
fighters, with (176) AESA radars, JDAMs, etc.
$5300
3.6 UN Strategy
3.6.1 Lee Teng Hui
Taiwan was still in a recovery state as Lee ascended the presidency in 1988. Just 17 years prior, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations upon the passage of Resolution 275819. This ejection dramatically tarnished Taipei’s international standing, and the island immediately began efforts in salvaging its status as a sovereign nation. Chiang Kai Shek and his son, Chiang Ching Kuo frantically lobbied for continued diplomatic support from their allies but to no avail. Meanwhile, Taiwan slipped into a political limbo, largely ignored by the international community. Observing the island’s detrimental state, Lee realized that a great deal of change was needed in order to expand Taiwan’s international status. President Lee knew that becoming an integral part of the international community was a sure way to maintain the island’s sovereignty. It also would prevent Taipei from being sidelined as a lost cause.
He knew that Taiwan needed to change its reputation from an archaic and obstinate state to a progressive one. At every opportunity, Lee fought for the island’s participation in the UN. He argued that the exclusion of Taiwan was a great injustice to humanity, and went against the ideals of the United Nations. In a written response to Asia
19 Resolution 2758, passed on October 25, 1971, stated that the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government of China, and replaced the ROC with the PRC as a permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations. For information, please see: http://www.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
69
Today, Lee explained, “The United Nations must not deny the right and the obligation of the 21 million people on Taiwan to participate in its various activities because of the Chinese communists obstructions. Doing so would violate the most fundamental principle of realism in international politics and would run counter to the concepts of
‘universality’ and human rights that the UN itself upholds (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 103)”. Because the UN had passed resolution 2758, it accepted that there was only one China, represented by the PRC; thus barring the island from an independent UN bid. In a 1993 written response to a question in Le Monde, Lee remarked, “The ROC’s participation in the UN is not only a legal issue but also a political one. The ROC government is pushing this case so as to correct misconceptions over the ROC’s
international position and stance and thereby reaffirm the reality of the ROC’s existence”
(Government Information Office, 1994, p. 142). Lee was aware of the political connotations of Taiwan’s struggle for international space. He viewed a UN bid as a resilient declaration to the world that Taiwan was a separate entity from the PRC. In Le Monde, Lee stated, “Today, the Republic of China has the strength and the desire to pay back the international community for its help in the past. While UN Resolution 2578 did solve the problem of representation for the Chinese communists, the representation for the 21 million people residing in Taiwan has been overlooked” (Government Information Office, 1994). While the UN had resolved China’s representation issues, Taiwan’s
situation remained unsettled.
Participation in the UN would also allow Taipei to demonstrate to the world of its capability of contributing to international relief efforts and other issues. In a 1993
response to a question in Asia Today, Lee stated, “The Republic of China can contribute to the international community in terms of development experience or economic power.
At this juncture, the United Nations should demonstrate its courage as a uniquely impartial international organization” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 103).
Taiwan had the potential to be a cooperative state and had the resources to make advancements in the global community. In a Forbes article, Lee maintained that, “The current population and economic power of the Republic of China on Taiwan clearly qualify us for a place within the global context. The ROC is fast approaching the world's advanced nations in the field of political democratization and also plays a constructive
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
70
role in the promotion of humanitarian, economic and technical assistance to developing nations” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 110). It was high time that Taiwan be able to participate in world affairs without being hindered by its unsettled political status.
He continued, noting that, “Western nations have long praised the ROC's progress in human rights and democracy. Today, the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan have expressed, through the process of democratization, their strong longing for fair and just treatment on the world scene, including an equal opportunity of joining in
international activities” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 110). Taiwan was still unjustly denied access to the United Nations, even with the highly praised
democratization of the island.
Lee initiated renewed application for UN participation in 1993, feeling justified in its efforts. This policy introduced an unprecedented amount of flexibility in Taiwan’s foreign affairs. This was a momentous occasion, as it was the first bid since its expulsion in 1971. In an interview with China Times, he declared, “This year the government raised the idea of our participation in the United Nations. This is the consensus of the
government and people and the direction in which we are still striving together”
(Government Information Office, 1994, p. 128). His drastic redirection in method was a great breath of fresh air for Taiwan. At an international press conference in Taipei, Lee explained, “…We had abandoned our traditional way of doing things and had started to face reality… After the Cold War ended, opposition between certain nations no longer exists; instead, peaceful development has replaced the opposition. This is the best opportunity for the ROC to promote its pragmatic diplomacy” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 47). Lee recognized that the Chiangs’ stubbornness was dragging Taiwan down, and he decisively sought to rid the island from Cold War era mentality. Lee
continued, stating, “Under this principle of peace, we have developed a peaceful method to promote our foreign relations, and the new international situation presents us with good opportunities” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 47). There was no longer a need for Taiwan to be antagonistic and uphold its anti-Communist rhetoric. Lee’s new found approach was a ground breaking milestone in Taiwan’s foreign affairs that gave the island new prospects for international space.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
71
Lee’s policy not only sought a seat in the UN main body, but also called for participation in various UN affiliated groups, and other intergovernmental organizations.
In its application, Taiwan hoped to join the international body as the ‘Republic of China’—separate from the PRC. According to Sigrid Winkler, the bid “focused on the
“[c]onsideration of the exceptional situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality and in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of divided countries at the United Nations”
(2012). Lee imagined a situation that would allow the UN to simultaneously include a PRC seat and a ROC seat. This was only possible because he had acknowledged the existence of two separate governments. In an interview with CNN, Lee clarified, “By one China, we mean the Republic of China. Perhaps the Chinese mainland means the People's Republic of China… We must understand that China is a divided nation ruled by two separate political entities” (CNN, 1996). Rather than adhering to an outdated ‘One China Policy’, Lee accepted that China was a divided nation. The PRC controlled the mainland from Beijing, while the ROC ruled over Taiwan from Taipei. Similar to the two Koreas or the two Germanys, President Lee saw the divided nation model as a viable temporary solution. Commenting on the success of other divided nations, Lee remarked, “Formerly, East Germany and West Germany were both members of the United Nations; today, both North Korea and South Korea are seated in the world body. Now that Germany has become whole again, no one can say that parallel representation for a divided nation will hinder its reunification” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 110). Seeing other nations resolve their issue of representation gave Lee hope that Taiwan could also
achieve a seat in the UN without relinquishing its sovereignty. He further argued, “If the United Nations can accommodate the wishes of the people in these two divided nations, why should it turn a deaf ear to the aspirations of the 21 million residents of the Republic of China on Taiwan?” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 110). Parallel
representation was a significant compromise on Lee’s part, but the PRC, along with the rest of the international community were not yet ready to embrace the island’s UN bid.
Beijing’s One China Principle stipulated that Taiwan was a province of China, leaving no room for discussion. This put Taiwan at odds with the PRC, forever placing them in an intense political deadlock. Lee angrily mentioned in Le Monde that, “The
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
72
Chinese communists have avoided facing the fact that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are divided and separately ruled. Instead, they still hope to use traditional conceptions of international law and politics to force other countries to oppose studying the issue of the ROC’s participation in the UN” (Government Information Office, 1994). He continued, asserting, “I personally believe that, following the end of the Cold War, the international community has entered an era during which cooperation will replace confrontation and that countries no longer must pay heed to the arbitrary reactions from the Chinese communists. Their insistence on solving current issues by using outdate concepts is fundamentally unworkable” (Government Information Office, 1994). It was clear to President Lee how much cross-strait relations affected Taiwan’s struggle for international expansion. Because of China’s veto power and influence over other nations, Taiwan was unable to gain access to the UN. However, he was hopeful that through perseverance, the two sides could achieve a solution together, proclaiming, “The two sides of the Taiwan Straits [can no longer] maintain democracy on one side and dictatorship on the other. I believe that we will be able to overcome all difficulties with confidence and
determination if we just continue working towards participation in the UN” (Government Information Office, 1994). Lee believed the island’s struggle for international space would force the two sides to come together and resolve the long unsettled issue of Taiwan’s political status. To him, it was a win-win situation. However, after three years, it became apparent that the divided nation model was not gaining as much traction as Lee had hoped. In 1996, he attempted a new, vaguer and lower-profile approach by asking for the “[c]onsideration of the exceptional situation of the inability, resulting from General Assembly Resolution 2758, of the 21.3 million people on Taiwan, Republic of China, to participate in the activities of the United Nations (Winkler, 2012). According to Winkler, this approach did not necessarily target full membership, but rather focused on a right to representation and participation in imprecisely defined UN activities (2012).
Not having much luck with the UN main body, Lee turned to other affiliated organizations in hopes of easier accession. In April 1997, Lee seeked observer status within the World Health Assembly20 (WHA), which was scheduled
20 The World Health Assembly is the decision-making body of WHO, and is attended by delegations from all WHO Member States. The main functions of the World Health Assembly are to determine the policies
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
73
for May 5th of that year (Clough, 1999, p. 77). However, the WHA rejected Taiwan’s request on the grounds that observer status was reserved for non -controversial non-governmental organizations, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (Clough, 1999, p. 77). Much of the organization’s refusal of Taiwan’s inclusion was related to Beijing’s insistence that the island did not need membership when it was already a part of China. According to Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, “China opposed Taiwan’s participation in the WHA as an observer, associate member, or NGO. Beijing welcomed Taiwan’s participation as a member of a Chinese delegation, but Taiwan declined to accept” (Chang, 2011, p. 169).
In 1997, Taiwan also applied to the WTO21 (World Trade Organization) for full membership under the title ‘Separate Customs and Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu’. The island’s membership soon appeared within reach. However, according to Ralph Clough, the PRC had applied to the
organization earlier and still faced significant obstacles (1999, p. 76). Members of the organization seemed prepared to meet the PRC’s demands that Taiwan not be admitted first (Clough, 1999, p. 76). Thus, Taiwan’s accession was placed on hiatus.
In addition to a more flexible policy, Lee knew Taiwan needed to garner support from other nations in its struggle for UN participation. Without popular support, there would be no chance of success. He acknowledged this issue, saying, “The ROC
understands that the support of UN member countries is the key to our success. For this reason, ROC government offices are explaining to different countries the true
significance of the ROC’s participation in the UN” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 143). UN member countries could vouch for Taiwan during important meetings, and bring about the island’s lack of representation as an issue up for discussion. Lee placed a lot of faith on these nations, exclaiming, “We hope that countries will consider the UN principle of universality for membership, objectively review this issue, and lend
of the Organization, appoint the Director-General, supervise financial policies, and review and approve the proposed program budget. WHA Official Website:
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/
21 Replacing the GATT in 1995, the World Trade Organization provides a forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all.
WTO Official Website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
us their support” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 143). In his mind, gathering other countries’ support was the only way to retain Taiwan’s political status as a relevant issue within the United Nations.
Upon the island’s first bid into the UN, a number of nations were very vocal regarding this issue. In a 1993 interview with China Times, Lee noted, “This time in the UN general Assembly over 20 nations declared their support for our participation. I am extremely grateful to these friendly nations for their support” (Government Information Office, 1994, p. 128). Often times, most of this support came from the Taipei’s
diplomatic allies; as a result of strong economic and political ties. This tactic was
continued in the latter two administrations, but began under Lee. According to Lung Chu Chen, the request made by seven Central American countries on August 6th 1993, to have the matter of Taiwan’s participation in the UN included in the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, gave added impetus to Taiwan’s drive for UN
membership (1997, p. 4). On that day, Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama jointly requested that the upcoming session of the General Assembly include a new agenda item entitles “consideration of the exceptional situation of the Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of universality (Chen, 1997, p. 11). The seven states pointed out that Taiwan is a ‘dynamic and progressive member of the international community and a peace loving country” that deserves membership in the UN and its related agencies (Chen, 1997, p.
11). The support of allies lasted all throughout Lee’s presidency.
In September 1996, Taiwan submitted its 4th bid in a row, in hopes of its case being discussed during the UN General Assembly. This time, 4 countries spoke in favor of Taiwan— Papua New Guinea, Nicaragua, Latvia and Costa Rica. Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Julius Chan asked the United Nations to “address the question of Taiwanese participation in institutions and processes set up to further the universal objectives of the United Nations Chart er, stressing that it is time that the ROC be granted UN membership” (Taiwan Info, 1996). Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Ernesto Leal Sanchez told member nations that, although the United Nations has entered a stage of transition and reform since it turned 50 years old last year, the ROC on Taiwan is still denied the right to participate in the world