1.6 Literary Review
1.6.2 Arms Sales Process
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earned democracy. Pressure from Beijing would surely bring Taipei closer than ever to unification with the mainland. Both the US and China are invaluable political allies to Taiwan, and disregard of either would be detrimental to the island’s security. Therefore, Taiwan has for many years attempted to maintain fairly stable relations with both nations in order not to disrupt the delicate status quo.
1.6 Literary Review
1.6.1 US Arms Sales
There has been very little research done on the impact of US arms sales on Taiwan; most of which acknowledge a positive correlation between the weapons sales and Taiwan’s confidence in negotiation with China. Much of the existing literature solely analyze US arms sales to Taiwan as a whole, and do not provide any new information regarding the ramifications of Taiwan receiving these weapons. As arms sales are such a large factor in US-Taiwan relations, the lack of abundant primary sources causes a serious problem in comprehending the role of US arms in Taiwan’s struggle to protect its sovereignty from an increasingly belligerent China.
1.6.2 Arms Sales Process
Since the ratification of the TRA in 1979, arms sales have become an integral part of the US-Taiwan relationship. Because of their common occurrence, annual meetings with Taiwanese officials were implemented in determining the weapons approved for sale to the island. This process has been utilized through successive US administrations.
However, as the situation in the Taiwan Strait is constantly changing, the arms sale procedure has drawn supporters and critics alike; all of whom are concerned for Taiwan’s security. Shirley Kan recognizes the benefits of this institutionalized practice, writing,
“The process used in determining arms sales to Taiwan has evolved into a routine where Taiwan’s evolving defense needs can be expected to be considered carefully every year
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by the United States at the highest level” (2001, p. 2). She continues, stating, “This regular process allows for more predictable planning by Taiwan authorities in charge of the defense budget and potentially reduces the chance that developments in US relations with the PRC could influence arms sales to Taiwan” (2001, p. 2). Because the meetings occur every year, the Taiwanese authorities are able to pragmatically plan specific
purchases in accordance with their defense budget, with their requests carefully reviewed by high level authorities in the US government. These factors allow weapons sales deliberation to be efficient and take Taiwan’s defensive priorities into careful
consideration. Nevertheless, Kan also identifies several shortcomings of these meetings.
She writes, “Criticisms of the arrangements might include observations on the lack of a strategic, longer-range US approach, rather than currently looking at Taiwan’s defense needs narrowly on a year-by-year, weapon-by-weapon fashion” (2001, p. 3). Kan is right to bring this problem to attention. When reviewing Taipei’s weapons requests, the Washington tends to narrow its scope in strategic foresight and only focuses on one weapons at a time. With such shortsightedness, some weapons approved for sale may only fulfill present demands, but will lack strategic significance in the future. This failure to consider Taiwan’s strategic needs as a whole is a potentially dangerous habit that needs to be fixed.
Kan also mentions that “comments both within and outside the administration criticized a perceived traditional overemphasis on selling military equipment. Some would prefer greater attention to diplomatic solutions, including efforts to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait” (2001, p. 3). Some US officials do not see arms sales as a viable solution for cross-strait issues and would like to terminate the talks altogether. In a testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Susan Shirk exclaimed,
“Neither the PRC or Taiwan would be served by overemphasis on military hardware, while neglecting the art of statesmanship” (1999).
Shirk argued that continued weapons sales would only perpetuate the problem.
Instead, she argues that increased diplomatic efforts be taken to ensure security in the Taiwan Strait. While recommendation is not without its merits, this strategy would be best pursued in congruence with military sales. The observers that prioritize diplomacy
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over weaponization most likely do not understand that the weapons acquired by Taiwan serve as an insurance policy in case diplomatic dialogue with China fails.
Another problem Kan describes is the concerns of some on Capitol Hill that multiple US presidencies have neglected a congressional role in determining arms sales as outlined in the TRA, and some are seeking to increase their voice (2001). This is indeed a true occurrence that can be seen in certain administrations. Despite great support from Congress to supply more arms to Taiwan, the White House often only considers their appeals when pressured. For example, in April 1999, chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Benjamin A. Gilman, wrote to both President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright to urge approval for the sale of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan; threatening to introduce legislation to do so if his demands were not met (Kan, 2001, p.4).
One other critic of the arms sales process is Denny Roy. In his article, U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales: The Perils of Doing Business with Friends, he laments the lack of speed and efficiency of the entire procedure, while acknowledging the concerns of Washington and Taipei during Chen Shui Bian’s presidency. Firstly, he states that some American observers are dissatisfied with Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen itself against a growing PRC military threat (Roy, 2004). With low annual defense budgets, and severe lack of initiative, Roy writes, “Indicators such as these have created suspicions among some Americans that Taiwan is avoiding domestically unpopular high defense costs by relying on the presumed protection of the USA…” (2004, p. 2). Though a low defense budget and little action in Taipei may have raised Washington’s suspicions, they do not necessarily mean Taiwan has given up its defense and taking advantage of the TRA—
there are other factors that come into play. Some in Washington have jumped to conclusions to quickly, and this could potentially damage US-Taiwan relations. Taipei must assure Washington that it is taking proper measures to continue military
procurements and buildup its defensive capabilities.
Roy notes that one common complaint was that the United States was offering weapons Taiwan had requested long ago, but Taipei was now reluctant to pay for them (Roy, 2004). In this complaint, both Taipei and Washington appear to be at fault—the US for not approving the items earlier, and Taiwan for not allowing a higher defense budget.
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Nevertheless, Washington urges that Taipei should take responsibility for this dilemma.
In a speech during the 2003 US-Taiwan Business Council meeting, Richard Lawless, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, declared, “Taiwan should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense” (Lawless, 2003). This statement accuses Taiwan for being lazy and unfairly puts the shortcomings of the arms sales procedure on Taipei. His remarks fail to include specific details as to what the US could do, though he does state, “…But there is much more that Taiwan needs to do and that we need to do together” (Lawless, 2003). Again, he attempts to divert the fault on Taiwan, only hinting that the US could possibly take on more responsibility. It is very clear that Lawless does not comprehend the domestic difficulties Taiwan faces during arms sales deliberations.
Meanwhile, in Taipei, a major grievance is the lack of sympathy for Taiwan’s economic difficulties and Washington’s impatience with the institutionalization of a truly democratic political system in Taiwan, the kind of system America has always
encouraged Taiwan’s leaders to implement (Roy, 2004, p. 2). Because the US is embroiled in so many other foreign policy issues, it is easy to forget the challenges of Taiwan’s acquisition of weapons. Roy identifies the low defense budget as a result of a serious economic downturn in 2000-2002 (Roy, 2004, p. 3). In regards to the slow process in arms deliberation, transparency, intense debate, and slow policymaking all come into play. These factors, Taiwan argues, are signs of a vibrant democracy, which the US, of all countries, should respect. Roy’s inclusion of Taiwan’s observations of the arms sale process is vital in understanding the challenges that riddle US-Taiwan security relations. It important to recognize issues that both sides need to address, to eliminate the
‘blame game’ that has taken hold between Taipei and Washington.
The current process of annual arms sales talks has come a long way. It has established a solid foundation of how arms sales should be conducted, and considers the strategic needs of Taiwan. However, the process is not without its problems and there are still many factors Washington must consider in order to have a more coherent and
prudent procedure.
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