1.5 Theoretical Framework
1.5.2 B Hedging Strategy
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
9
the first island chain as well as deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict (US Department of Defense, 2014).
Through economic and cultural agreements, Taiwan and China have established closer links with one another. Relations may seem better than ever; however, Beijing has never relented its willingness to forceful unification, nor has it halted its military buildup.
This proves that no matter what Taiwan does to attempt to alleviate cross-strait
tensions—including all the economic and cultural collaborations—the Chinese military threat will never disappear. In the eyes of Beijing, unification is the only answer.
1.5.2B Hedging Strategy
Of the three possible polarities mentioned in Neorealism, Taiwan is currently embroiled in a unipolar system. China has risen at a tremendous rate to become the superior power—not just in the Taiwan Strait, but in East Asia as well. With its formidable economic and military might, Beijing has growing intentions of expanding its influence.
Due to continuous oppression from China, Taiwan has gradually come to pursue a hedging strategy. This alternative tactic can be described as a “ set of multidimensional
‘insurance policies’ adopted by small actors in their relations vis-à-vis great powers, that avoids the choice of one side at the obvious expense of another” (Fiori & Passari, 2013, p. 1). Normally, a hedging strategy is comprised of both balancing and bandwagoning.
However, as Chinese military threat challenges both Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, the island is forced to follow a three pronged strategy.
The first tactic is to improve relations with China, in hopes of lessoning tensions and promoting stability in the region. In the past seven years, there has been much progress in this aspect. In terms of economics, the 2014 Republic of China Yearbook reported that the regulatory cap on Taiwan-based companies’ investments in mainland China has been raised from 40 percent to 60 percent of their net worth. In addition, a number of new regulations have been promulgated in line with the April 2009 joint statement on allowing mainland investment in Taiwan (p. 102).
On the tourism front, there has been a rapid increase in mainland Chinese tourists.
The 2014 Republic of China Yearbook stated that in June 2011, Taiwan opened its doors
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
10
to independent tourists from three mainland cities—Shanghai, Beijing and Xiamen—for maximum stays of 15 days per visit. This was expanded by 23 more mainland cities over the next three years, bringing the total number of eligible cities to 26 as of June 2014; and the daily arrival quota had also increased to 3,000 in 2013 (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 105).
Meanwhile in terms of education, the first batch of mainland students—928 in total—began studying at universities in Taiwan in September 2011 (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 106). The number of such students nearly doubled to 1,822 in 2013 as Taiwan recognized diplomas from more mainland colleges and universities, offered scholarships to bright students, expanded recruitment to more provinces, and streamlined the documents and certificates required for mainland students to come to Taiwan
(Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 106).
Though cross strait relations are at an all-time high, China has shown no signs of relinquishing its thousands of missiles directed at Taiwan; nor has it halted its aggressive militaristic intimidation at the island state. As a result, Taipei must continue to purchase military weapons and technology in order to establish a capable defensive force to fend off a possible attack from Beijing. The majority of weapons sales are provided by the US, which is made possible by the terms stated in the Taiwan Relations Act9 (TRA). Taiwan has amassed an impressive stockpile of modern weapons over the course of three
presidencies to hold off a Chinese attack, though it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep up with Beijing’s substantial military spending. With a persistent Chinese threat, Taiwan’s pursuit of defensive measures will continue well into the future.
In addition to military protection, Taiwan must also expand its international space to validate its existence as a separate state from China. Since its diplomatic degradation in the 1970s, the island has fought hard to maintain a presence in the world community by applying to various international organizations; proving to the world that Taiwan’s contribution is still relevant in the modern era. Applying to organizations has not come easy, however. With each effort to improve its international standing, China has gone to
9 The Taiwan Relations Act is a US Congress act that defines how the US shall conduct relations with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic recognition. One major stipulation mandates that the US must provide defensive arms to Taiwan. For more information on the Taiwan Relations Act, please read:
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
11
great lengths to deny Taiwan its proper participation in international affairs. Often, this includes pressuring countries hosting international events to change Taiwan’s
nomenclature to a more ambiguous term in order to dispel any notion of the island’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, Taipei’s struggles has yielded some advancements, and has proven to the world its humanitarian potential.
The Chinese threat is so predominant in Taiwan’s security dilemma, that Taipei is forced to pursue a hedging strategy solely to protect its sovereignty and survive as a de facto nation. Many of Taiwan’s diplomatic and strategic measures are taken in order to accomplish these two goals. Currently, it seems that the island has successfully been able to survive as an autonomous state. However, it is hard to say what will happen once China runs out of patience and demands more progress towards unification.
Taiwan’s response to its security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait is an
unconventional approach that does not conform to traditional neorealist expectations.
Typically, under neorealist ideals, a nation under overwhelming threat would either pursue a balancing or bandwagoning strategy. Balancing would require a weaker nation to heavily militarize its armed forces, and amass large quantities of weapons in order to reach an equal level of armament with its enemies. With no clear superior military force, the threat would thus be eliminated. The possibility of Taiwan successfully pursuing this tactic, considering its current situation, is infeasible. The PRC’s high military spending and weaponization of its armed forces is unsurmountable, given Taiwan’s miniscule annual military budget and small personnel. What many analysts recommend is engaging in ‘asymmetric warfare’. This entails purchasing or developing more cost efficient weapons such as small naval vessels and more surface to air missiles to provide as robust a defense as modern, expensive fighter jets could. Taiwan has been gradually altering its focus to this alternative strategy, in hopes of building up concrete defense measures.
Meanwhile, if Taipei were to follow a bandwagoning method, the status quo in Taiwan Strait would irrevocably change; with severe consequences. Wholeheartedly allying itself with the US would damage relations with China, and probably enrage Beijing to the point of a possible military intervention. This would be counterproductive to the goals of the island, which aims to maintain peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, siding with China would most likely degrade Taiwan’s autonomy and its hard
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
12
earned democracy. Pressure from Beijing would surely bring Taipei closer than ever to unification with the mainland. Both the US and China are invaluable political allies to Taiwan, and disregard of either would be detrimental to the island’s security. Therefore, Taiwan has for many years attempted to maintain fairly stable relations with both nations in order not to disrupt the delicate status quo.