1.6 Literary Review
2.2.1 Pluralistic Diplomacy
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
32
2.2 Chen Shui Bian
2.2.1 Pluralistic Diplomacy
Soon after his election in 2000, President Chen initiated a more aggressive and Taiwan-centric form of diplomacy. It was a far cry from the pragmatism Lee had established. In 2002, Chen proposed a ‘One country on each side’ formula that promoted Taiwan as a sovereign state (Office of the ROC President). This gave Chen the impetus to implement such a radical diplomatic strategy. He defended this dramatic change in policy, stressing that in response to China's measures to isolate, denigrate and pressure Taiwan, the
government has had to engage in diplomatic battles with China on a daily basis (Office of the ROC President, 2007). While Chen’s new strategy was deemed too forceful, his original intentions were logical.
In a 1999 DPP white paper on Foreign Policy, the party envisioned an increased role for Taiwan, stating that, “Under an internationalist principle, Taiwan's new role will be one of the "loyal supporter of the world order" who respects the world's mainstream values…extensively participates in various levels of international affairs, instead of being a "trouble maker” (DPP, 1999). What Chen and the DPP wanted for Taiwan was active participation in the global community, and for the island state to eradicate its reputation as a cause of contention. In detailing its aspirations for the future, the white paper mentioned its goals for Taiwan, proclaiming, “The goal is to strive for the peace of humanity by allying with nations that seek peace, respecting international justice, and upholding liberal democracy” (DPP, 1999). By doing this, the DPP hoped for a sense of normality in its international status.
The white paper also discussed a new pluralistic strategy that was divided into six separate diplomacies. The first one, entitled democratic diplomacy, was aimed to
highlight the fact that Taiwan is a legitimate member of the international democratic society; and on the other hand, in contrast, it is to reveal the true nature of China as a rigid, authoritarian and aggressive state (DPP, 1999). As democracy was an effective advantage Taiwan held over China, it would be a remarkable opportunity for Taipei to
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
33
flaunt its liberalism, emphasizing the similarity between the island state and the international community.
The second form of diplomacy stressed economic and trade relations. The DPP proposed to provide assistance to less developed countries to establish domestic economic infrastructure and survive economic crises; and also to dispatch agricultural, technological, economic expert groups to developing countries (DPP, 1999). Cooperation between Taiwan and other nations would only strengthen bilateral ties, and demonstrate the island’s economic prominence.
The third tactic was defined as neighborhood diplomacy. The white paper
explained, “As an important member of Asia-Pacific regional community, Taiwan views the prosperity and stability of this area as a vital concern; therefore, it must take full advantage of its own political and economic resources to expand the relationship with these countries and create an Asian environment that is conducive to Taiwan's” (DPP, 1999). The DPP understood that Taiwan had to prove that it was a reliable and significant ally in Asia, despite its unresolved political status. There were many things Taipei could do to reassure its neighbors that it was a reliable partner, including establishing stable economic agreements and encouraging mutual trust to avoid potential points of conflict.
The next strategy was civil diplomacy. This called for an increase role for civilians in foreign affairs. As the white paper described, “Citizens' participation in diplomatic matters can facilitate the formation of public consensus and would also further the understanding and support of our diplomatic situation” (DPP, 1999). This tactic focused on people-to-people relations and recognized the vigorous efforts of Taiwan’s citizens to promote a positive image of the island state around the world. This was an effective method to garner public support for Taipei’s international expansion, as it did not need to overcome many political barriers often encountered in official governmental affairs.
The fifth type of diplomacy stipulated that, “Taiwan's foreign policy must take into concern, humanitarianism and human rights; provide substantive measures to
participate in the international community; and assist any country that needs help” (DPP, 1999). Taiwan was fully capable of delivering humanitarian aid, and it was time to show it to the world.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
34
The final form diplomacy involved environmental awareness. The DPP believed that “The government should actively take part in and abide by international
environmental treaties and regulation, so as to become an international paradigm to promote environment protection and sustainable development” (DPP, 1999). Again, this tactic was meant to prove to the world that Taiwan was willing to be a global player by adhering to established international law and guidelines. The DPP wished to advance Taiwan into a new decade of progress and advancement, and eliminate the remnants of autocracy. The party had a very bright and optimistic outlook on Taiwan’s future foreign policy.
During Chen’s presidency, he and his entourage embarked on multiple trips to visit Taipei’s diplomatic allies in Central America, Africa and Oceania. The goals of these visits were to promote the six forms of diplomacy mentioned above. On his first trip abroad in August 2000, Chen flew to Africa and Central America to promote and
strengthen bilateral ties with individual countries. In Central America, he first stopped in the Dominican Republic, to attend the inauguration of President Hipolito Mejia. The country was a staunch supporter of the ROC, and thus Chen’s visit was an affirmation of gratitude. Next, Chen flew to Nicaragua, which often voiced support for Taiwan’s international participation, to sign a joint communique with President Arnoldo Alem Lacayo (Lu, 2000). His last stop in Central America was Costa Rica, where he visited a processing zone and a vocational training center that the ROC helped to set up, as well as an orchid farm constructed by the Taiwan Sugar Corp (Lu, 2000). Chen then landed in Africa to continue his pluralistic diplomacy. In the Gambia and Burkina Faso, the
president toured the agricultural farms that Taiwan's technical missions have successfully helped to develop; which has won the admiration of humanitarian corps from other parts of the world (Lu, 2000). Taiwan’s agricultural assistance had given its African diplomatic allies much needed aid in food production. In Chad, Chen met with ROC ambassadors and medical and agricultural missions stationed there; as well as to discuss possible cooperative programs with Chadian President Idriss Deby (Lu, 2000). These countries were involved in an intense diplomatic battle between China and Taiwan; many of them having switched recognition between Taipei and Beijing multiple times. Taiwan’s
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
35
continued technical assistance in these African nations helped to secure their support for the island state in international organizations.
In May 2005, Chen made a second trip to Central America. In Paraguay, he delivered a speech to Paraguay's parliament announcing that Taiwan would double the annual quota on Paraguayan beef imports from 220 tons to 440 tons, and also expressing hope that Taiwan and Paraguay could enhance educational and cultural exchanges (Shih, 2006). Whilst there, Chen and Paraguayan President Nicanor Duarte Frutos also signed a joint communique to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening bilateral cooperation in a variety of fields (Shih, 2006). As a long-time ally of Taiwan, Chen needed to maintain its strong ties with Paraguay through new cooperative projects and exchanges. He then flew over to Costa Rica in the last leg of his trip abroad. Once there, he met with
outgoing Costa Rican President Abel Pacheco de la Espriella to talk on matters of mutual concern, and attended the May 8 inauguration of President-elect Oscar Arias (Shih, 2006). Chen’s presence at such an official event proved that relations with Costa Rica were strong. Before the inauguration, Chen talked with several Latin American presidents in his hotel room regarding free trade agreements between the ROC and Central
American allies; including Guatemalan President Oscar Berger, Haiti's Acting President Boniface Alexandre, Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolanos, Salvadoran President Elias Antonio Saca and Panamanian President Martín Torrijos (Shih, 2006). During this trip, Chen was able to meet with many of his Latin American counterparts and discuss present and future developments with Taiwan, demonstrating Taipei’s vigorous maintenance of relations in the region.
As Taipei’s diplomatic allies have significantly decreased over thirty decades, it must fight harder and harder to hold on to its remaining supporters. Meanwhile, Beijing is continuously pressuring those not yet recognizing the PRC to quickly switch sides. Even with the smallest rural nations, China does not leave any stone unturned. This diplomatic tug of war was most rampant during Chen’s presidency. As a result, he had little choice but to use monetary and humanitarian aid to maintain its shrinking international status.
To make matters worse, his diplomatic scandals and gaffes quickly tarnished the island’s reputation and heightened tensions with both the US and China. What was once a
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
36
legitimate and innovative approach to foreign affairs, was now an embarrassing strategy that was often labeled as “checkbook diplomacy” by Chen’s critics.
The 2008 scandal involving Papua New Guinea revealed just how inept Chen was at executing his pluralistic diplomacy that seemed so perfect on paper. On May 3rd, 2008, it was reported that two middlemen entrusted with almost $30 million in Taiwanese government funds as part of a secret effort to forge diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea made off with the money (Rickards, 2008). The two men were handpicked by Vice Premier Chiou I-jen, after he believed they had influence over political figures in Papua New Guinea, and consequently introduced them to the Foreign Ministry
(Rickards, 2008). The men suddenly disappeared with the money after talks with Papua New Guinea failed.
This was a major blow to Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts, as Chen was already criticized for using money to procure guarantees of recognition from its few diplomatic allies. This scandal solidified the image of the Chen administration as an inexperienced and careless one, and was an embarrassment for Taiwan, which was already struggling to expand its international space. As George Tsai exclaimed, “People feel humiliated by the government’s incompetence. It’s a joke to the outside world — how could the
government be cheated like this?” (Adams, 2008).
Ultimately, the incident resulted in the resignation of Foreign Minister James Huang, Vice Premier Chiou I-jen, and Vice Defense Minister Ko Cheng-heng. In addition to this major diplomatic gaffe, Chen’s presidency saw the end of ties with multiple nations including Senegal, Macedonia, Grenada, Liberia, Dominica, Chad and Costa Rica. Such a dramatic loss in allies caused many in Taiwan to doubt the
effectiveness of “checkbook diplomacy”. Chen’s efforts, though noble in intentions, was a disaster in execution. He made it clear that an aggressive method was not the solution to Taiwan’s political struggle.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
37
2.2.2 US Strategic Support
US-Taiwan relations fluctuated dramatically during the Chen administration. In the early years of his presidency, Chen’s ties with Washington were robust and concrete. However, as President Chen promoted increasingly pro-Taiwan policies, tensions quickly arose.
Washington often reprimanded Taipei for its brazen actions and reminded the island of its
‘One China Policy’. Despite drastic changes in overall US-Taiwan relations,
Washington’s adherence to the TRA never diminished. With George W. Bush in the Whitehouse, American commitment towards Taiwan was at its peak. Washington was unapologetic with its pro-Taipei stance, which was evident in military-to-military ties with the island state. Bush was extremely outspoken when the topic of Taiwan was discussed. For example, in an April 2001 interview with ABC News, President Bush was asked if the United States had a commitment to defend Taiwan. He responded, “"Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that” (ABC News, 2001). When asked if his
commitment would be backed up with the full force of the U.S. military, Bush replied:
"Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself" (ABC News, 2001). It was clear that the Bush administration took its support for Taiwan’s democracy very seriously. During a 2002 visit to Tsinghua University in Beijing, Bush mentioned his commitment to Taipei proclaiming, “There is [something] called the Taiwan Relations Act, and I honor that act, which says we will help Taiwan defend herself if provoked” (Whitehouse Archives, 2002). Bush’s impenitent remarks shattered Washington’s tradition of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and gave assurances to Taipei that US support was resilient.
Bush followed his statements with a noticeable increase in military-to-military exchanges between Washington and Taipei. With the memory of the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait Crisis still fresh in his mind, Bush was determined to avoid a repeat of such a devastating incident. Establishing stronger military ties would better prepare Taiwan for future Chinese intimidation.
In April 2001, President Bush announced he would drop the 20 year old annual arms talk process in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as needed basis (Kan, 2014). This created a mutual understanding between Taipei and Washington regarding Taiwan’s defensive and strategic needs. In 2002, the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
38
administration asked congress to pass legislation to authorize the assignment of personnel from US departments to AIT, resulting in the first active duty defense attaché in August 2005 with civilian clothes (Kan, 2014). This event marked a new era of high cooperation between the Taiwanese and American military.
Also in 2002, a hotline was launched between the US and Taiwan militaries to deal with possible crises (Kan, 2014). Establishing a hotline was vital in avoiding any miscommunication or misunderstanding in times of a sudden catastrophe in the Taiwan Strait. This agreement was yet another hallmark of increased military cooperation between Taipei and Washington.
Another feature of Bush’s improved military ties with Taiwan was the dispatching of American military officers to attend the annual Hankuang military exercises conducted by the island. US military officers first attended Taiwan’s Hankuang-17 military exercise in 2001, solely as observers; the first time since 1979 (Kan, 2014). The attendance of US officers was a major step in improving the strategic capability of the Taiwanese military.
The observers could provide their Taiwanese counterparts with invaluable critiques and recommendations to create a more formidable fighting force. Two years later, during the Hankuan-19 exercise in April-May 2003, about 20 US military personnel attended the drill, led by retired Admiral Dennis Blair (Kan, 2014, p. 7). Like before, these officers were only allowed to observe and analyze. Because of political pressure from Beijing, Washington strived to keep a low profile regarding military exchanges and affairs with Taiwan. Commenting on American presence at the 2003 military drill, US Defense Department East Asia spokesman Jeff Davis explained, “US activities during the exercises will be in the realm of things we do with Taiwan that are consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and appropriate for helping Taiwan meet their self-defense
capabilities” (Snyder, 2003). Bush was careful to maintain American involvement within the parameters of the TRA. On May 15, 2007 Taiwan launched the Han Kuang -23 exercise; the last one under the Chen administration. The drills were attended by a U.S.
delegation comprised of military and civilian officials serving as unofficial advisors to the Taiwanese military (Lin, 2007). The presence of American officials had become a staple of US-Taiwan military cooperation under Chen.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
39
The Chen and Bush administrations also promoted more frequent senior level military exchanges. This allowed Taiwanese military officials the opportunity to visit their American counterparts more frequently, bridging the communication and
cooperation gap closer together. During Chen’s presidency, numerous Taiwanese military officials were permitted to enter the US and attend significant meetings and events. The loosening of restrictions on military visits signified Bush’s positive sentiment towards Taiwan. In March 2002, President Bush granted a visa for Defense Minister Tang Yiau Ming to visit the United States to attend an industry conference held by the US-Taiwan Business Council in Florida (Kan, 2014). In September 2002, Deputy Defense Minister, Kang Ning-Hsiang, visited Washington and was the first senior Taiwan defense official to have meetings inside the Pentagon since 1979 (Kan, 2014). In September 2005, Deputy Minister Huoh attended a US Taiwan defense industry conference (Kan, 2014).
In July 2007, Chief of General staff, General Houh Shoou Yeh visited the United States (Kan, 2014). These increased visits by Taiwanese senior level officials symbolized the normalization of military-to-military engagement between Taipei and Washington, and set a new precedent for American support towards Taiwan’s democracy.
During his time as president, Chen Shui Bian had wanted to promote Taiwan’s sovereignty through a multi-faceted diplomacy and close ties with the US. However, his enthusiastic pro-Taiwan agenda caused much international controversy and heightened tensions between Taipei and Washington. Much to the dismay of the US, Chen’s active support for independence altered the status quo, which in turn led to increased
aggressiveness from the PRC. Chen’s rebellious behavior gave Taiwan the unwanted image of a ‘trouble maker’ in the global community.