Pragmatic Diplomacy

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2 Background 2.1 Lee Teng Hui

2.1.1 Pragmatic Diplomacy

Lee’s administration developed a diplomatic approach that was far more liberal in comparison to Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo’s policies. Rather than

stubbornly adhering to a ‘One China’ ideology, Lee embraced dual recognition of Beijing and Taipei as a temporary solution to the unification issue. As a result, Taiwan actively established full diplomatic relations wherever possible; while maintaining unofficial ties when a state already recognized the PRC. Even with unofficial ties, Taiwan was able to establish representative offices, both its own abroad and those set up by foreign countries in Taipei. These offices essentially performed the functions of an embassy without any official status. This so called ‘pragmatic’ method opened a whole wave of opportunities for the ROC in terms establishing itself as a sovereign nation on the international stage.

On the success of Lee’s diplomacy, Chen Jie explains, “Though these representation, agreements, and visits do not have full official status, incremental progress in the quality and quantity achieved in these areas reinforce Taiwan’s profile as a legitimate sovereign state (2002, p. 22). The Lee’s flexibility marked the beginning of a new era in Taiwan’s relations with the world. Such maneuverability was never seen before, and it gave Taipei hope in eventually achieving full sovereignty. Near the end of Lee’s presidency, the number of Taipei’s representative offices abroad increased from 58 in 39 countries in 1988, to 94 in 62 countries in 1999; while foreign institutions in Taipei increased from 31 by 26 countries in 1988, to 53 by 47 countries in 1999. (Chen, 2002, p. 30). It was clear that pragmatic diplomacy was effective.

With this novel approach, Lee was fighting for a politically resilient Taiwan that could be a productive member in the global community. In response to a question from Newsweek Magazine, he clarified that his diplomacy had three priorities. The first was to maintain strength and survival as a sovereign nation. He stated, “Based on this principle we shall consolidate and strengthen bilateral relations with nations that share diplomatic

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relations with us, bolster and raise the level of our substantive relations with nations that do not have formal diplomatic relations with us, and develop the recognition and support of our country by nations with rich potential or that are newly arising” (Government Information Office, 1997, p. 65). Bolstering ties with other nations was extremely important in Taiwan’s survival, due to the PRC’s constant encroachment. During Lee’s presidency, an all-out battle for diplomatic allies had broken out between Taipei and Beijing. The competition was so intense, that Chen Jie observed, “The principle of no stone being left unturned…sometimes assumes dramatic flavor” (Chen, 2002).

Maintaining recognition by other states demonstrated Taiwan’s existence as a nation separate from the PRC, thus justifying Taipei’s intense diplomatic competition with Beijing.

The second priority he explained, was “to build an international presence for our country” (Government Information Office, 1997). As Taiwan’s status had degraded immensely since its UN ejection, it was now vital for the island to make a return to international stage as a progressive and contributing nation. Lee stressed that, “Now that our success at democratization and economic liberalization has won international

recognition, we shall actively work to participate in international organizations and activities and shall compete to sponsor or participate in a full range of international conferences; gradually recovering an international status for our country, so that the rights, welfare and dignity of our people are safeguarded” (Government Information Office, 1997, p. 65).

In connection to his second point, the third priority was to contribute to the international community. He exclaimed, “The results of our economic development have blessed us a surplus with which to give something back to the international community.

We shall use technical cooperation to help developing nations develop their economies, and expand international cooperation by fulfilling our international obligations”

(Government Information Office, 1997, p. 65). Having benefitted from democracy and economic development, Lee recognized the importance of giving back to the global community. This benevolence would lead to future cooperation and stronger bilateral ties with many nations, which Taipei desperately needed more of.

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In implementing his foreign policy, Lee and his administration paid numerous visits to Taiwan’s official and non-official allies. His active presence abroad was a far cry from his predecessors, who never left the island during their rule. Altogether, he made 6 overseas trips, spanning 16 countries. Chen noted, “7 out of those 15 countries were not even Taipei’s diplomatic allies, and he made it to America. Thus in terms of head of state diplomacy, an isolate Taipei became far more robust than a diplomatically well integrated Taipei” (Chen, 2002, p. 37). Through unofficial means, Taiwan had re-established itself as a vibrant democracy that was capable of meaningful diplomacy.

On February 9^th 1994, Lee left for Southeast Asia to visit the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand as part of his ‘Go South’ initiative. This trip was an informal attempt to strengthen economic ties with the region. Upon meeting with Philippine President Fidel Ramos, Lee agreed to cooperate in developing the Subic Bay industrial park, where the Philippines planned to set up a duty-free export processing zone

exclusively for Taiwan investors (Sheng, 1994). In Jakarta, Lee agreed to assist Indonesia with the development of agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises; in addition to cooperating in exploiting gas and oil resources, and to improve cooperation in salt and sugar manufacturing (Sheng, 1994). In his last leg of the trip, Lee met with the Thai royal family, and Parliamentary President Marut Bunnak; and also played golf at the resort city of Phuket with Deputy Prime Minister Amnuai Wirawan (Sheng, 1994). Ultimately, the Southeast Asia visit was a success that increased Taiwan’s economic development in the area and bolstered ties amongst the regional countries.

Lee also made a high-profile trip to Central and Latin America on September 4^th 1997. This visit included stopovers in Panama, Honduras, El Salvador and Paraguay.

These four countries were old diplomatic allies of Taiwan and had been staunch

supporters of the island since Chiang Kai Shek’s presidency. The purpose of this trip was to demonstrate Taiwan’s refusal of political isolation by the PRC, as well as to improve political and economic ties. In Panama, Lee attended the Panama Canal Conference, which was a technical meeting to plan for the canal’s transferal to Panama’s control in 1999. As a major user of the canal, Lee said, Taiwan would contribute maximum effort to the sustainable management of the canal (Chen, 1997). Lee also attended a ceremony marking the opening for use of the Fort Davis Export Processing Zone, which was joint

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project developed by the ROC and Panama (Chen, 1997). In Honduras, Lee met with President Carlos Roberto Reina, who expressed the hope that Taiwan would help establish an Export Processing Zone and establish a Central American technology

research and development center (Chen, 1997). Lee then flew to El Salvador and attended a summit of Central American heads of state. At the summit, Taiwan reached an

agreement with the Central American states to establish a strategic alliance for cooperative development, and the Central American states welcomed Taiwan's

participation in their future Central American Community (Chen, 1997). In his final stop in Paraguay, Lee met with President Juan Carlos Wuasmosy, and signed air-rights, agricultural, and trade agreements (Chen, 1997). His 16 day trip was very productive and yielded in stronger relations in the region. It also demonstrated Taiwan’s determination for sovereignty, as it relied on its allies for support in international activities.

President Lee took his foreign visits very seriously, as they accomplished many things at once. Because Taiwan’s political status had tremendously degraded since the Cold War, Lee worked relentlessly to repair the damage. Taipei could not spare to lose its already small number of diplomatic allies to Beijing. These remaining allies were

invaluable to the island, as they supported President Lee in his endeavors for increased international space. He made a conscious effort throughout his presidency to travel abroad and endorse Taiwan’s sovereignty. This was a far cry from his predecessors, who never bothered to leave the island during their rule. Lee’s trips marked the beginning of a normative diplomatic affair in spite of Taiwan’s very unusual political situation.