美國軍售與入聯合國政策之比較分析:台灣 1990-2014 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis 政治. 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 美國軍售與入聯合國政策之比較分析:台灣 1990-2014 A Comparative Analysis of US Weapons Sales and UN Strategy in Taiwan from 1990-2014. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i n U. Student: e nKelvin g c h iChen Advisor: Ariel Ko. 中華民國 104 年 12 月 December 2015. v.

(2) 美國軍售與入聯合國政策之比較分析:台灣 1990-2014 A Comparative Analysis of US Weapons Sales and UN Strategy in Taiwan from 1990-2014 研究生: 陳雨耕. Student: Kelvin Chen. 指導教授: 柯惠敏. Advisor: Ariel Ko. 國立政治大學. 政治大亞太研究英語碩士學位學程立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 碩士論文. sit. y. Nat. A Thesis. n. al. er. io. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. iv. C hChengchi University National Un engchi. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement For the Degree of Master in Social Sciences. 中華民國 104 年 12 月 December 2015.

(3) Acknowledgments First, I would like to thank my family: Kai, Andrew, Terry and Jeffrey, and grandma for their unfading love and support through all my life’s endeavors; and to all my relatives in Taipei, for their endearing hospitality and compassion. They made Taiwan my home away from home.. I would also like to thank my lovely girlfriend, Muriel for seeing my true potential and never giving up on me.. Much respect and gratitude to my thesis advisor, Ariel Ko. Thank you for your guidance and invaluable advice.. 立. 政治大. And of course, I couldn’t have finished my thesis without my friends. Thanks for the memories.. ‧ 國. 學. You know who you are.. ‧. Last but not least, I would like to extend thanks to N.W.A. for telling me to “express yourself”.. y. sit. n. al. er. io. Peace Out, 政大!. Nat. These wise words will follow me wherever I go.. Ch. engchi. i. i n U. v.

(4) Abstract Taiwan’s present international status has degraded considerably since its former glory days during the Cold War era. With its ejection out of the United Nations (UN)1 and a diplomatic severance with its most vital ally, the United States, Taiwan (ROC)2 has slowly slipped into political limbo. The island has frantically strived to pull itself back into the world community since the end of martial law. However, it has struggled to maintain its sovereignty and international status in the face of constant threat from the PRC (People’s Republic of China)3. Taiwan’s leaders have sought alternative strategies to combat such adverse diplomatic conditions through increasing its membership or participation in various global organizations— particularly the United Nations, and continued arms purchases from the US. Within the span of three presidencies, there appears to be a pattern between Taiwan’s UN strategies and US approved arms sales. Upon initial research, US weapons sales appear to have an effect on UN policy. That is, the more significant the arms sale, the more aggressive Taiwan’s methods for UN participation becomes. Drawing from US and Taiwanese government records, Taiwanese presidential interviews, newspaper articles and other official documents and transcripts, this dissertation aims to examine US approved arms sales and UN strategies under three Taiwanese presidents: Lee Teng Hui, Chen ShuiBian and Ma Ying Jeou from 1990 to 2014. The findings indicate a possible indirect correlation. Considering the weapons’ strategic capability, Taiwan’s UN strategy fluctuates accordingly.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Keywords: Taiwan; US; China; US Arms Sales; United Nations; Lee Teng Hui; Chen Shui-Bian; Ma Ying Jeou. 1. The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. It is currently made up of 193 Member States. The mission and work of the United Nations are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter. For more information on the UN Charter, please see: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 2 Often referred to as Taiwan, the ‘Republic of China’ (ROC) is the official name of the island state. 3 While ‘China’ is commonly used, ‘People’s Republic of China’ (PRC) is the more accurate political term referring to the territories under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. ii.

(5) Table of Contents 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Layout ....................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Question .................................................................................................... 1 1.3 Other Factors for Consideration................................................................................ 2 1.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 2 1.5 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................. 3 1.5.1 Neorealism ......................................................................................................... 3 1.5.2 Taiwan’s Case .................................................................................................... 4 1.5.2A Chinese Threat ............................................................................................ 4. 治政大 1.6 Literary Review ...................................................................................................... 12 立 1.6.1 US Arms Sales ................................................................................................. 12 1.5.2B Hedging Strategy ......................................................................................... 9. ‧ 國. 學. 1.6.2 Arms Sales Process .......................................................................................... 12 1.6.3 Arms Sales Significance .................................................................................. 16 1.6.4 UN Strategy ..................................................................................................... 20. ‧. 1.6.5 UN Membership............................................................................................... 21. y. Nat. 1.6.6 Lee Teng Hui ................................................................................................... 22. sit. 1.6.7 Chen Shui Bian ................................................................................................ 23. al. er. io. 1.6.8 Ma Ying Jeou ................................................................................................... 24. n. 2 Background .................................................................................................................... 26. Ch. i n U. v. 2.1 Lee Teng Hui .......................................................................................................... 26. engchi. 2.1.1 Pragmatic Diplomacy....................................................................................... 26 2.1.2 US Strategic Support........................................................................................ 29 2.2 Chen Shui Bian ....................................................................................................... 32 2.2.1 Pluralistic Diplomacy....................................................................................... 32 2.2.2 US Strategic Support........................................................................................ 37 2.3 Ma Ying Jeou .......................................................................................................... 39 2.3.1 Flexible Diplomacy.......................................................................................... 39 2.3.2 US Strategic Support........................................................................................ 43 3 Analysis.......................................................................................................................... 46 3.1 US Approved Arms Sales ....................................................................................... 46 3.2 Lee Teng Hui ......................................................................................................... 47. iii.

(6) 3.2.1 Air Defense ...................................................................................................... 47 3.2.2 Naval Defense .................................................................................................. 51 3.2.3 Land Defense ................................................................................................... 53 3.3 Chen Shui Bian ....................................................................................................... 55 3.3.1 Air Defense ...................................................................................................... 55 3.3.2 Naval Defense .................................................................................................. 57 3.3.3. Land Defense .................................................................................................. 60 3.4 Ma Ying Jeou .......................................................................................................... 61 3.4.1 Air Defense ...................................................................................................... 61 3.4.2 Naval Defense .................................................................................................. 63 3.4.3 Land Defense ................................................................................................... 63. 政治大 3.5.1 Lee Teng Hui ................................................................................................... 64 立 3.5.2 Chen Shui Bian ................................................................................................ 66. 3.5 US Major Arms Sales (Table)................................................................................. 64. ‧ 國. 學. 3.5.3 Ma Ying Jeou ................................................................................................... 67 3.6 UN Strategy ............................................................................................................ 68. ‧. 3.6.1 Lee Teng Hui ................................................................................................... 68 3.6.2. Chen Shui Bian ............................................................................................... 77. y. Nat. 3.6.3. Ma Ying Jeou .................................................................................................. 86. sit. 4 Findings.......................................................................................................................... 90. al. er. io. 5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 99. v. n. 5.1 Limitations ............................................................................................................ 100. Ch. i n U. 5.2 Theoretical Relevance ........................................................................................... 100. engchi. 5.3 Implications for Future Taiwanese Administrations............................................. 102 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 105. iv.

(7) 1 Introduction 1.1 Layout In this thesis, three Taiwanese presidents will be analyzed: Lee Teng Hui, Chen Shui Bian and Ma Ying Jeou, respectively from 1990 to 2014. The reasoning behind the selection of these three presidents and specific time period is due to their common struggles of dealing with Chinese military threat, as the status quo is increasingly turning in favor of Beijing. In addition, the availability of military sales data and diplomatic. 政治大 For the purpose of 立this study, the main analysis will be divided into five main. policy information under their administrations also played an important factor.. ‧ 國. 學. chapters. The first chapter will explain the motivation for choosing this specific topic, as well as provide the methodology in research and theoretical framework. It will also include a literature review. The second chapter will then provide important context to. ‧. understand the Taiwan’s political situation during each presidency. It will focus on the. y. Nat. foreign policies of the three administrations, and three major instances of US strategic. sit. support for Taiwan’s democracy. The third chapter will be the analysis, divided into two. er. io. sections. The first section will provide a review4 of major approved US weapons sales to. al. iv n C administration. The fourth chapter will discuss the findings h e n g c h i U of the analysis and identify if there are any substantial connections between US approved arms sales and UN strategy. n. Taiwan under each president. The second section will cover the UN strategy5 of each. The concluding chapter will explain the significance of the findings and how it may be used for further research.. 1.2 Research Question. 4. The review will only cover approved weapons and upgrades. Due to lack of data, military technology and logistic support/training will be omitted. Please note that approved sales do not indicate actual purchased items, or include procurement dates. 5 In this study, UN strategy refers to the method in which Taiwan applied to the UN main body, and extends to UN affiliated organizations. 1.

(8) The primary goals for this study is to examine US approved arms sales and UN strategy under three Taiwanese presidencies (Lee Teng Hui, Chen Shui Bian, and Ma Ying Jeou), to identify any effects arms sales may have on UN policies, and also to explore the implications of the findings on Taiwan’s future. This thesis aims to answer one major question: Are there any links between US approved arms sales and Taiwan’s UN policy? By examining past events, one can identify certain trends and tendencies that can be applied to formulate new strategies or tactics that strengthen Taiwan’s international status, solidifies US-Taiwan relations, and maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. This is extremely important in safeguarding the island’s sovereignty. With the constant threat of force from mainland China, it is vital for Taiwan to establish effective government strategies to protect itself.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3 Other Factors for Consideration. The author recognizes that there other significant factors that are important when. ‧. examining possible links between US approved arms sales and Taiwan’s UN strategy. Issues such as the roles of China and the US, the power asymmetry between China and. sit. y. Nat. Taiwan, the role of the Taiwanese business community, and the three presidents’ personal ideology and preferences all come into play. However, due to a concern of a lack of. io. er. available data, and difficulty in obtaining relevant information, these possible research. al. n. iv n C U sales for analyzation due to their h e nto select The author ultimately decided g c hUSi arms. scopes were ultimately ruled out.. symbolic and strategic importance to Taiwan, as well as personal interest in strategic. security. In addition, there was an abundant collection of scholarly works and literature regarding general US arms sales to Taiwan, and Taiwan UN strategy under Lee, Chen and Ma. The relative ease of information access helped establish a strong basis for initial research.. 1.4 Methodology This dissertation will be conducted as a comparative case study. As Daniel Druckman states in Doing Research, a comparative case study is most useful when research on a 2.

(9) small number of cases is preferred and when the problem is difficult to analyze with a large number of cases (2005). Examples of such problems include deep probes into cultural practices or behaviors and problems seeking causal explanations of variation between closely matched units of analysis (Druckman, 2005). Druckman mentions that comparative case studies also use theory or concepts to guide case selection and description (2005). Furthermore, according to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, this method was originally devised to study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems (George & Bennet, 2004). Though Taiwan has witnessed the election of five presidents, analyzing all five would a tremendous and time consuming task. Given the author’s time limits, this would. 政治大 most recent three presidential administrations over a span of twenty four years. These 立 not be feasible. Therefore, the author decided to limit the research scope down to the. three presidencies all faced intimidating Chinese threat and an increasingly shrinking. ‧ 國. 學. international space. Their shared difficulties fit precisely into a neo-realist framework, causing the author to utilize this theory as the definitive perspective for this study.. ‧. Because the scope of this thesis is fairly small, and case selection was driven by a specific theory, a comparative case study is the most appropriate method in which this. y. Nat. er. io. sit. research will be conducted.. n. 1.5 Theoretical Framework a 1.5.1 Neorealism. iv l C n hengchi U. This study will be implementing a neo-realism narrative, as it best describes Taiwan’s peculiar situation. There are essentially three major tenets of Neorealism. The first is that the world is an anarchic system in which there is no higher authority to control world affairs and states are the primary actors. Only states have legitimate authority to look after themselves. According to Waltz, with no governing body, there are no need for states to adhere to any rules of conduct (1979). In such a chaotic system, perpetual insecurity, the second concept, is an inevitable dilemma in which states are constantly in fear of an attack from others. Consequently, 3.

(10) states are driven to pursue security measures to increase their capability to ward off any potential threats. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Baylis and Smith state that there is much paranoia and distrust amongst states, and as a result, increased security measures are pursued to protect themselves from one another (2005). Upon seeing its neighbors increasing their military power, more states increase their own security by obtaining more weapons, thus fueling the security dilemma. Since true security can never be attained in such a world of competing states, competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and capability accumulation continues (Herz, 1950). The third tenet is the notion of ‘balance of power’, or ‘polarity’, which is how. 政治大 and multipolar. Unipolar occurs when there is only one significant power who holds the 立. capability is distributed across states. There are three types of polarities: unipolar, bipolar. most capability. Bipolarity is when power is distrusted equally between two states. Multi-. ‧ 國. 學. polarity is when power is divided equally amongst more than two states. As power is distributed more evenly across multiple states, national security becomes increasingly. ‧. enhanced (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005). In bipolar or multipolar systems, stability is more easily obtained; whereas unipolar systems are more prone to insecurity. In instances of. y. Nat. sit. potential danger, Stephen Walt writes, “When confronted by a significant external threat,. al. er. io. states may balance or bandwagon” (1987, p. 17). Walt defines balancing as allying with. n. others against the prevailing threat, while bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (1987).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.5.2 Taiwan’s Case. 1.5.2A Chinese Threat In Taiwan’s particular situation, the perpetual insecurity that Waltz describes in his theory stems from the PRC. The threat is so significant, that it has become a permanent factor in Taiwan’s security dilemma. Beijing has continuously employed a belligerent demeanor to intimidate Taipei into eventual unification with the mainland, in accordance 4.

(11) with its ‘One China Principle6’. Politically, China has blocked many opportunities for Taiwan to participate in various international organizations; claiming to represent the needs of both the mainland and Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan’s international presence is constantly at risk of being diminished. The PRC’s numerous militant actions over the years, and relentless accumulation of modern weapons and technology in order to establish a more powerful military has also directly endangered Taiwan’s autonomy and can be seen throughout the Lee, Chen and Ma administrations. During Lee Teng Hui’s presidency (1988-2000), China began a dramatic increase in military procurements from Russia. Martin L. Lasater explains, “Military. 政治大 demonstration of advanced weaponry in the Persian Gulf War, which lasted from 1990 to 立 modernization has become a high national priority for the PRC, especially since the. 1991 (1995, p. 172). What followed was a massive accumulation of Russian arms, in. ‧ 國. 學. hopes of modernizing the PRC military force. Chinese arms purchases included a squadron of 24 Sukhoi 27 Fighters, S-300 surface to air missiles heavy transport aircraft. ‧. and Mi-17 Hip helicopters; while technological acquisitions comprised of air to air refueling capabilities, missile guidance technology, rocket technology and submarine and. y. Nat. sit. anti-submarine warfare technology (Van Hickey, 1994, p.80). This sudden surge in arms. al. er. io. procurement gave Beijing a new found confidence in its military, which escalated. n. tensions in cross-strait relations. Taiwan was extremely concerned of China’s newly. Ch. i n U. v. acquired capabilities, and rightfully so, as demonstrated during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which began in June 1995.. engchi. Upon hearing that President Lee was allowed to visit Cornell University to give a speech, Beijing was furious. It immediately began conducting waves of live fire missile tests near the Taiwanese cities of Keelung and Kaohsiung, and continued its tests in March 1996. The three waves of exercises in March 1996 were the continuation of the series exercises the PLA carried out after Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States; But the scale and magnitude of the military exercises in March 1996 was much greater than. The One China Principle points to Beijing’s view that Taiwan and the mainland are two parts of a single China that is ruled by the PRC government. For information, please see: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf. 6. 5.

(12) the previous one (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 152). China also conducted a series of military exercises in which some of its most advanced aircraft and naval war ships were showcased as a testament to its capability in establishing lines of communication in the sea, blockade and protecting landing operation (Li, Hu & Zhong, 1998, p. 153). These military actions sent a clear message to Taipei—that Beijing took its ‘one China principle’ seriously and was willing to use force if Taiwan continued its path towards independence. By the end of Lee’s term, the PRC was well on its way towards improving its military capabilities. The most notable advancements were its inventory of long range missiles and naval ships. According to a 1999 US Department of Defense report, “China. 政治大 influence Taiwan's populace and their leaders. New land attack cruise missile (LACM) 立 views its growing ballistic missile force as a potent military and political weapon to. designs, when operational, will increase China's capability to strike regional targets. ‧ 國. 學. accurately with conventional warheads” (US Department of Defense, 1999, p. 4). The potential power of these missiles make them a deadly weapon in modern combat. The. ‧. report continued, describing China’s naval advancements, “Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has streamlined and modernized its forces by. y. Nat. sit. eliminating large numbers of older ships and replacing them with fewer, more modern. al. er. io. units” (US Department of Defense, 1999, p.7). Though China was far from gaining a. n. military advantage, its threat towards Taiwan had become increasingly daunting.. Ch. i n U. v. Chen Shui Bian’s ascension to presidency in 2000 changed the political landscape. engchi. in the Taiwan Strait, as this was the first presidential candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party7 (DPP), which supports Taiwanese independence, had been elected. China was paranoid that President Chen would lead Taiwan towards independence, forever shattering hopes of unification with the mainland. Consequently, the PRC intermittently hurled verbal threats of war in hopes of coercing Chen to rethink his independence leanings. In February 2000, Beijing released a white paper exclaiming that it willing to use force against Taipei (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, 2000). It also warned that “The only future for Taiwan is reunification with the China. 7. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the major opposition party that supports Taiwanese independence. DPP official website: http://english.dpp.org.tw/ 6.

(13) mainland,” and that, “Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China … would only lead the Taiwanese people to disaster” (Gittings, 2000). Though this time China did not use actual military force, its verbal threats were still unnerving. In 2003, Beijing once again unleashed a barrage of threats warning Taiwan of its growing independence movement. Vice-Minister at Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Zaixi accused President Chen Shui-bian had crossed Beijing's "red line” with his recent pro-separatist activities, and warned that war would break out if the island declared formal independence (Lam, 2003). With Chen in power, Beijing was worried their hopes of unification would be lost. In order to prevent this from happening, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law8 in March, 2005.. 政治大 attempts towards unification failed, caused a wave of panic throughout Taiwan. President 立 This law, which essentially allowed the PRC to use military force if all peaceful. Chen was quick to respond to this radical change to the status quo. Just a few days before. ‧ 國. 學. news of the law spread worldwide, the president delivered a speech in front of members of United States Congress and DPP members. On the implications of the law, he stated,. ‧. “It risks raising tensions across the Taiwan Strait and putting relations into reverse gear” (Chen, 2005). He continued on, pleading Beijing to take a calmer stance, “The leader. y. Nat. sit. across the Taiwan Strait should make constructive contributions to cross-Strait relations. al. er. io. and should not unilaterally try to change the status quo by making a law that could serve. n. as a legal foundation to take over Taiwan by force” (Chen, 2005). It was clear that Chen. Ch. i n U. v. took the ratification of this law very seriously. It had decimated any trust that had. engchi. previously existed between the two sides and greatly distressed the status quo. The Chinese threat during Chen’s administration was the highest Taiwan had seen since the Chinese Civil war (1927-1950). Though there had been no deliberate use of force, Beijing’s ever growing stockpile of offensive weapons kept Taiwan on high alert. According to a 2008 US Department of Defense report, “By November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads” (US Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2). 8. For full text of the Anti-Secession Law, please see: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm 7.

(14) The report described the PRC’s air capabilities, stating, “China bases 490 combat aircraft within un-refueled operational range of Taiwan, and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these aircraft are upgrades of older models; however, newer, and more advanced, aircraft make up a growing percentage of the inventory” (US Department of Defense, 2008, p.5). Furthermore, the PLA was reported to have about 1.25 million ground forces personnel at its disposal, with approximately 400,000 based in the three military regions opposite Taiwan (US Department of Defense, 2008, p.5). It was evident that the Chinese threat showed no sign of conceding, and consequently, the Chen administration had to tread carefully.. 政治大 considerably as a result of Ma’s pro-China policies. Beijing was noticeably much 立 When Ma Ying Jeou was elected in 2008, cross-strait relations improved. friendlier with the Ma administration, in hopes of establishing the foundations for. ‧ 國. 學. eventual reunification. By June 2014, 10 rounds of talks had been held, producing 21 formal agreements, three memoranda of understanding and two joint statements. ‧. (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 99).. Despite warming cross-strait relations, the Chinese threat has not dissipated.. y. Nat. al. er. io. spending.. sit. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the major impetus for military. n. In the annual report to Congress, the US Department of Defense reported that,. Ch. i n U. v. “The Second Artillery possessed more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). engchi. in its inventory, and is prepared to conduct missile attacks and precision strikes against Taiwan’s air defense systems, air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and C2 [command and control] and communications facilities” (US Department of Defense, 2014). It also stated that, “In November 2013, the Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, deployed out of area for the first time to the South China Sea, where it conducted local training near Hainan Island with surface ships” (US Department of Defense, 2014). This, along with additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within. 8.

(15) the first island chain as well as deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict (US Department of Defense, 2014). Through economic and cultural agreements, Taiwan and China have established closer links with one another. Relations may seem better than ever; however, Beijing has never relented its willingness to forceful unification, nor has it halted its military buildup. This proves that no matter what Taiwan does to attempt to alleviate cross-strait tensions—including all the economic and cultural collaborations—the Chinese military threat will never disappear. In the eyes of Beijing, unification is the only answer.. 1.5.2B Hedging Strategy. 立. 政治大. Of the three possible polarities mentioned in Neorealism, Taiwan is currently embroiled. ‧ 國. 學. in a unipolar system. China has risen at a tremendous rate to become the superior power—not just in the Taiwan Strait, but in East Asia as well. With its formidable economic and military might, Beijing has growing intentions of expanding its influence.. ‧. Due to continuous oppression from China, Taiwan has gradually come to pursue a. y. Nat. hedging strategy. This alternative tactic can be described as a “ set of multidimensional. sit. ‘insurance policies’ adopted by small actors in their relations vis-à-vis great powers, that. er. io. avoids the choice of one side at the obvious expense of another” (Fiori & Passari, 2013,. al. n. iv n C However, as Chinese military threat bothU h echallenges i Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, h n c g the island is forced to follow a three pronged strategy.. p. 1). Normally, a hedging strategy is comprised of both balancing and bandwagoning.. The first tactic is to improve relations with China, in hopes of lessoning tensions and promoting stability in the region. In the past seven years, there has been much progress in this aspect. In terms of economics, the 2014 Republic of China Yearbook reported that the regulatory cap on Taiwan-based companies’ investments in mainland China has been raised from 40 percent to 60 percent of their net worth. In addition, a number of new regulations have been promulgated in line with the April 2009 joint statement on allowing mainland investment in Taiwan (p. 102). On the tourism front, there has been a rapid increase in mainland Chinese tourists. The 2014 Republic of China Yearbook stated that in June 2011, Taiwan opened its doors 9.

(16) to independent tourists from three mainland cities—Shanghai, Beijing and Xiamen—for maximum stays of 15 days per visit. This was expanded by 23 more mainland cities over the next three years, bringing the total number of eligible cities to 26 as of June 2014; and the daily arrival quota had also increased to 3,000 in 2013 (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 105). Meanwhile in terms of education, the first batch of mainland students—928 in total—began studying at universities in Taiwan in September 2011 (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 106). The number of such students nearly doubled to 1,822 in 2013 as Taiwan recognized diplomas from more mainland colleges and universities, offered scholarships to bright students, expanded recruitment to more provinces, and streamlined. 政治大 (Republic of China Yearbook, 2014, p. 106). 立. the documents and certificates required for mainland students to come to Taiwan. Though cross strait relations are at an all-time high, China has shown no signs of. ‧ 國. 學. relinquishing its thousands of missiles directed at Taiwan; nor has it halted its aggressive militaristic intimidation at the island state. As a result, Taipei must continue to purchase. ‧. military weapons and technology in order to establish a capable defensive force to fend off a possible attack from Beijing. The majority of weapons sales are provided by the US,. y. Nat. sit. which is made possible by the terms stated in the Taiwan Relations Act9 (TRA). Taiwan. al. er. io. has amassed an impressive stockpile of modern weapons over the course of three. n. presidencies to hold off a Chinese attack, though it is becoming increasingly difficult to. Ch. i n U. v. keep up with Beijing’s substantial military spending. With a persistent Chinese threat,. engchi. Taiwan’s pursuit of defensive measures will continue well into the future. In addition to military protection, Taiwan must also expand its international space to validate its existence as a separate state from China. Since its diplomatic degradation in the 1970s, the island has fought hard to maintain a presence in the world community by applying to various international organizations; proving to the world that Taiwan’s contribution is still relevant in the modern era. Applying to organizations has not come easy, however. With each effort to improve its international standing, China has gone to. 9. The Taiwan Relations Act is a US Congress act that defines how the US shall conduct relations with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic recognition. One major stipulation mandates that the US must provide defensive arms to Taiwan. For more information on the Taiwan Relations Act, please read: http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. 10.

(17) great lengths to deny Taiwan its proper participation in international affairs. Often, this includes pressuring countries hosting international events to change Taiwan’s nomenclature to a more ambiguous term in order to dispel any notion of the island’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, Taipei’s struggles has yielded some advancements, and has proven to the world its humanitarian potential. The Chinese threat is so predominant in Taiwan’s security dilemma, that Taipei is forced to pursue a hedging strategy solely to protect its sovereignty and survive as a de facto nation. Many of Taiwan’s diplomatic and strategic measures are taken in order to accomplish these two goals. Currently, it seems that the island has successfully been able to survive as an autonomous state. However, it is hard to say what will happen once. 政治大 Taiwan’s response to its security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait is an 立. China runs out of patience and demands more progress towards unification.. unconventional approach that does not conform to traditional neorealist expectations.. ‧ 國. 學. Typically, under neorealist ideals, a nation under overwhelming threat would either pursue a balancing or bandwagoning strategy. Balancing would require a weaker nation. ‧. to heavily militarize its armed forces, and amass large quantities of weapons in order to reach an equal level of armament with its enemies. With no clear superior military force,. y. Nat. sit. the threat would thus be eliminated. The possibility of Taiwan successfully pursuing this. al. er. io. tactic, considering its current situation, is infeasible. The PRC’s high military spending. n. and weaponization of its armed forces is unsurmountable, given Taiwan’s miniscule. Ch. i n U. v. annual military budget and small personnel. What many analysts recommend is engaging. engchi. in ‘asymmetric warfare’. This entails purchasing or developing more cost efficient weapons such as small naval vessels and more surface to air missiles to provide as robust a defense as modern, expensive fighter jets could. Taiwan has been gradually altering its focus to this alternative strategy, in hopes of building up concrete defense measures. Meanwhile, if Taipei were to follow a bandwagoning method, the status quo in Taiwan Strait would irrevocably change; with severe consequences. Wholeheartedly allying itself with the US would damage relations with China, and probably enrage Beijing to the point of a possible military intervention. This would be counterproductive to the goals of the island, which aims to maintain peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, siding with China would most likely degrade Taiwan’s autonomy and its hard 11.

(18) earned democracy. Pressure from Beijing would surely bring Taipei closer than ever to unification with the mainland. Both the US and China are invaluable political allies to Taiwan, and disregard of either would be detrimental to the island’s security. Therefore, Taiwan has for many years attempted to maintain fairly stable relations with both nations in order not to disrupt the delicate status quo.. 1.6 Literary Review. 1.6.1 US Arms Sales. 治政 There has been very little research done on the impact大 of US arms sales on Taiwan; most 立 of which acknowledge a positive correlation between the weapons sales and Taiwan’s ‧ 國. 學. confidence in negotiation with China. Much of the existing literature solely analyze US arms sales to Taiwan as a whole, and do not provide any new information regarding the. ‧. ramifications of Taiwan receiving these weapons. As arms sales are such a large factor in US-Taiwan relations, the lack of abundant primary sources causes a serious problem in. Nat. sit. y. comprehending the role of US arms in Taiwan’s struggle to protect its sovereignty from. io. er. an increasingly belligerent China.. n. a. l C 1.6.2 Arms Sales Process. hengchi. i n U. v. Since the ratification of the TRA in 1979, arms sales have become an integral part of the US-Taiwan relationship. Because of their common occurrence, annual meetings with Taiwanese officials were implemented in determining the weapons approved for sale to the island. This process has been utilized through successive US administrations. However, as the situation in the Taiwan Strait is constantly changing, the arms sale procedure has drawn supporters and critics alike; all of whom are concerned for Taiwan’s security. Shirley Kan recognizes the benefits of this institutionalized practice, writing, “The process used in determining arms sales to Taiwan has evolved into a routine where Taiwan’s evolving defense needs can be expected to be considered carefully every year 12.

(19) by the United States at the highest level” (2001, p. 2). She continues, stating, “This regular process allows for more predictable planning by Taiwan authorities in charge of the defense budget and potentially reduces the chance that developments in US relations with the PRC could influence arms sales to Taiwan” (2001, p. 2). Because the meetings occur every year, the Taiwanese authorities are able to pragmatically plan specific purchases in accordance with their defense budget, with their requests carefully reviewed by high level authorities in the US government. These factors allow weapons sales deliberation to be efficient and take Taiwan’s defensive priorities into careful consideration. Nevertheless, Kan also identifies several shortcomings of these meetings. She writes, “Criticisms of the arrangements might include observations on the lack of a. 政治大 needs narrowly on a year-by-year, weapon-by-weapon fashion” (2001, p. 3). Kan is right 立 strategic, longer-range US approach, rather than currently looking at Taiwan’s defense to bring this problem to attention. When reviewing Taipei’s weapons requests, the. ‧ 國. 學. Washington tends to narrow its scope in strategic foresight and only focuses on one weapons at a time. With such shortsightedness, some weapons approved for sale may. ‧. only fulfill present demands, but will lack strategic significance in the future. This failure to consider Taiwan’s strategic needs as a whole is a potentially dangerous habit that. y. Nat. sit. needs to be fixed.. al. er. io. Kan also mentions that “comments both within and outside the administration. n. criticized a perceived traditional overemphasis on selling military equipment. Some. Ch. i n U. v. would prefer greater attention to diplomatic solutions, including efforts to ease tensions. engchi. in the Taiwan Strait” (2001, p. 3). Some US officials do not see arms sales as a viable solution for cross-strait issues and would like to terminate the talks altogether. In a testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Susan Shirk exclaimed, “Neither the PRC or Taiwan would be served by overemphasis on military hardware, while neglecting the art of statesmanship” (1999). Shirk argued that continued weapons sales would only perpetuate the problem. Instead, she argues that increased diplomatic efforts be taken to ensure security in the Taiwan Strait. While recommendation is not without its merits, this strategy would be best pursued in congruence with military sales. The observers that prioritize diplomacy. 13.

(20) over weaponization most likely do not understand that the weapons acquired by Taiwan serve as an insurance policy in case diplomatic dialogue with China fails. Another problem Kan describes is the concerns of some on Capitol Hill that multiple US presidencies have neglected a congressional role in determining arms sales as outlined in the TRA, and some are seeking to increase their voice (2001). This is indeed a true occurrence that can be seen in certain administrations. Despite great support from Congress to supply more arms to Taiwan, the White House often only considers their appeals when pressured. For example, in April 1999, chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Benjamin A. Gilman, wrote to both President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright to urge approval for the sale of long-range early warning radars to. 政治大. Taiwan; threatening to introduce legislation to do so if his demands were not met (Kan,. 立. 2001, p.4).. One other critic of the arms sales process is Denny Roy. In his article, U.S.-. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan Arms Sales: The Perils of Doing Business with Friends, he laments the lack of speed and efficiency of the entire procedure, while acknowledging the concerns of. ‧. Washington and Taipei during Chen Shui Bian’s presidency. Firstly, he states that some American observers are dissatisfied with Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen itself against a. y. Nat. sit. growing PRC military threat (Roy, 2004). With low annual defense budgets, and severe. al. er. io. lack of initiative, Roy writes, “Indicators such as these have created suspicions among. n. some Americans that Taiwan is avoiding domestically unpopular high defense costs by. Ch. i n U. v. relying on the presumed protection of the USA…” (2004, p. 2). Though a low defense. engchi. budget and little action in Taipei may have raised Washington’s suspicions, they do not necessarily mean Taiwan has given up its defense and taking advantage of the TRA— there are other factors that come into play. Some in Washington have jumped to conclusions to quickly, and this could potentially damage US-Taiwan relations. Taipei must assure Washington that it is taking proper measures to continue military procurements and buildup its defensive capabilities. Roy notes that one common complaint was that the United States was offering weapons Taiwan had requested long ago, but Taipei was now reluctant to pay for them (Roy, 2004). In this complaint, both Taipei and Washington appear to be at fault—the US for not approving the items earlier, and Taiwan for not allowing a higher defense budget. 14.

(21) Nevertheless, Washington urges that Taipei should take responsibility for this dilemma. In a speech during the 2003 US-Taiwan Business Council meeting, Richard Lawless, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, declared, “Taiwan should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense” (Lawless, 2003). This statement accuses Taiwan for being lazy and unfairly puts the shortcomings of the arms sales procedure on Taipei. His remarks fail to include specific details as to what the US could do, though he does state, “…But there is much more that Taiwan needs to do and that we need to do together” (Lawless, 2003). Again, he attempts to divert the fault on Taiwan, only hinting that the US could possibly take on more responsibility. It is very. 政治大. clear that Lawless does not comprehend the domestic difficulties Taiwan faces during. 立. arms sales deliberations.. Meanwhile, in Taipei, a major grievance is the lack of sympathy for Taiwan’s. ‧ 國. 學. economic difficulties and Washington’s impatience with the institutionalization of a truly democratic political system in Taiwan, the kind of system America has always. ‧. encouraged Taiwan’s leaders to implement (Roy, 2004, p. 2). Because the US is embroiled in so many other foreign policy issues, it is easy to forget the challenges of. y. Nat. sit. Taiwan’s acquisition of weapons. Roy identifies the low defense budget as a result of a. al. er. io. serious economic downturn in 2000-2002 (Roy, 2004, p. 3). In regards to the slow. n. process in arms deliberation, transparency, intense debate, and slow policymaking all. Ch. i n U. v. come into play. These factors, Taiwan argues, are signs of a vibrant democracy, which. engchi. the US, of all countries, should respect. Roy’s inclusion of Taiwan’s observations of the arms sale process is vital in understanding the challenges that riddle US-Taiwan security relations. It important to recognize issues that both sides need to address, to eliminate the ‘blame game’ that has taken hold between Taipei and Washington. The current process of annual arms sales talks has come a long way. It has established a solid foundation of how arms sales should be conducted, and considers the strategic needs of Taiwan. However, the process is not without its problems and there are still many factors Washington must consider in order to have a more coherent and prudent procedure.. 15.

(22) 1.6.3 Arms Sales Significance Despite the troubled process, US arms sales themselves have two major benefits in improving Taiwan’s current political dilemma: providing the island protection from a growing Chinese military threat and giving Taipei confidence in negotiating with Beijing. With Taiwan being such a small state, it is imperative that arms sales continue in order to deter a possible attack from China. Many authors, wary of Beijing’s intentions, agree with this. As Carlyle Thayer explains, “As long as China retains the option of using force and keeps beefing up its military and ballistic missile forces across the straits in an effort to intimidate Taiwan, the US will continue to sell arms to Taiwan” (2011). The constant. 政治大 comment reflects what countless 立 other scholars have said in the past, and are saying. military Chinese threat is what fuels the continuance of arms sales to Taiwan. Thayer’s. ‧ 國. 學. today. For example, in his commentary, Increase Arms Sales to Taiwan, Ted Carpenter remarks, “A well-armed Taiwan is better able to deter Beijing from contemplating the use of force to achieve reunification” (2000). Arming Taiwan with modern weapons plays an. ‧. important role keeping the PRC at bay. This rhetoric cannot be stressed enough. If the. y. Nat. determination for arms deals fades, Taiwan will directly feel the consequences.. sit. Describing the severity of the issue, Szu Yin Ho writes, “The ROC certainly hopes that. er. io. American policy statements on Taiwan security such as the one provided in the TRA will. al. iv n C (Ho, 1990). It is evident that US weapons have undoubtedly h e n g c h i U become an essential factor in US-Taiwan relations. n. be backed up by deeds... To the ROC, American arms sales are a matter of life or death”. In addition to Chinese deterrence, weapons sales also provide Taipei confidence when dealing with Beijing. Multiple authors and scholars have commented on this phenomenon. Eric Von Kessler’s study, entitled Taiwan’s Dilemma: China, The United States, and Reunification focuses partially on the impact of US arms sales on Taiwan’s perception towards reunification. On Taiwan’s confidence, he notes, “…the subsequent election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, coupled with U.S. backing, has led to Taiwan's continued defiance of China” (Von Kessler, 2008, p.41). The ‘US backing’ he mentions refers to arms sales. Here, Von Kessler subtly hints that the customary US weapons sales play a factor in Taiwan’s confidence when interacting with China. He then clarifies the 16.

(23) effects of George W. Bush’s pro-Taiwan stance, “The U.S. position of continued military support and perpetual sale of strategic defense arms has thus seemed to mislead Taiwan into pushing for state independence and undermine China’s claim to sovereignty (Von Kessler, 2008, p.42). Von Kessler contends that under the Bush administration, Taiwan became overly self-assured and confused US arms sales as encouragement to be more defiant towards China. He finds that U.S. arms sales and military support to Taiwan creates two significant problems. First, Taiwan authorities have begun relying too heavily on the United States, remaining defiant regarding talks concerning reunification; and second, the lingering uncertainty regarding a Taiwan resolution compels China to accelerate its. 政治大 become complacent with US arms sales as its primary source of security measures. 立. military modernization (Von Kessler, 2008). Von Kessler observes that Taiwan has. Despite these problems, he acknowledges that US weapons has given Taiwan the. ‧ 國. 學. confidence to stand up to China regarding unification. This defiance has upset Beijing, giving it the impetus to continue its military buildup, and fueling the perpetual insecurity. ‧. in the Taiwan Strait.. The points argued by Von Kessler do have validation, and are certainly noticeable. y. Nat. sit. in Taiwan’s recent developments in the Taiwan Strait. However, in explaining Taiwan’s. al. er. io. defiant behavior in cross-strait negotiations, Von Kessler puts too much of the blame on. n. US arms sales. He provides very little narrative on the impacts of US arms sales on. Ch. i n U. v. Taiwan’s perception of unification. Instead, he spends too much time on describing the. engchi. Chinese military threat and providing historical context. His thesis’ scope is too narrow in analyzing the US-Taiwan-China relationship. Greater attention must be paid to Taiwan’s policies in congruence with arms sales, in order to understand the island’s political actions. Meanwhile, Kok and Firestein’s report, Threading the Needle: Proposals for US and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan, presents new arguments, concepts and methodologies for analyzing the Taiwan arms sales issue” (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p.7). The authors argue that the arms sales are a political matter, rather than military. They describe the effects of the sales, writing, “In Taiwan, arms sales from the United States provide it with the confidence to negotiate with the mainland, reassure the people of 17.

(24) Taiwan that they have the capacity for self-defense, and enable Taiwan’s leaders to demonstrate to their domestic constituents that they are standing up for the latter’s interests” (Kok & Firestein, 2013). Thus, in some respects, the arms sales issue is a measuring stick for political toughness in the context of Taiwan politics vis-à-vis the mainland, and indeed, for all three sides (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p.44)”. The arms sales do more than just to provide the island with a capable defense force—they provide Taiwan with a stronger backbone when facing Chinese oppression on the international stage. The authors determine that as long as mainland China’s political and social systems differ from Taiwan’s to the degree they currently do, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 政治大 enough, and recommend that the US should maintain unwavering commitment to Taiwan 立 will continue (Kok & Firestein, 2013, p. 47). However, they warn that arms sales is not. through closer multi-faceted relations. These actions, they claim, “would reassure Taiwan. ‧ 國. 學. that any incremental modifications of U.S. policy on arms sales do not constitute a weakening of U.S. commitment to its relationship with Taiwan” (Kok & Firestein, 2013,. ‧. p. 50). Such reassurances would dissuade Taiwan’s leaders from undertaking potentially drastic measures to ensure Taiwan’s own security, which may then be construed, right or. y. Nat. sit. wrongly, by the mainland as attempts to contravene the one-China policy. (Kok &. al. er. io. Firestein, 2013, p. 50). Kok and Firestein see US arms sales as a self-confidence booster. n. for Taiwan when facing Chinese threat and oppression, which they predict will continue. Ch. i n U. v. if the status quo remains unchanged. In comparison to Von Kessler, Kok and Firestein’s. engchi. report does a much better job at describing the political significance of US arms sales to Taiwan. However, they overlook the original purpose of the arms, which is purely military in nature. While commenting on the ‘confidence boost’ of Taiwan, many authors like Kok and Firestein focus too much on either the strategic significance or the political symbolism behind US arms sales. It is important to remember that both connotations are true, and one must accept the dual meanings of Taiwan’s weapons purchases. When browsing through the various literature on US-Taiwan relations, it is evident that many authors are staunch supporters of continuing weapons sales and support for Taiwan’s democracy. Nevertheless, there is a growing minority who feel Taiwan is a troubling issue for US that deserves to be abandoned. 18.

(25) In recent years, one author stands out the most. In an article published in 2011, Charles Glaser argues for the abandonment of Taiwan in exchange for better US-Sino relations and increased stability in East Asia. He states, “A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war…and the US would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack” (2011, p. 6). While, this is a very real possibility, the US would most certainly act with great caution, and would not necessarily use military force. Instead, it could use diplomatic pressure to resolve the predicament. From the outset, it is clear that Glaser’s mindset is deeply entrenched in Realist thought. Glaser reasons that ending US military support for Taiwan would “remove the. 政治大. most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come” (2011, p. 7).. 立. This is an extremely naïve assumption. There are many flash points, outside of US-Sino. ‧ 國. 學. relations that are just as controversial; the South China Sea territorial claims being one. Second of all, what is to stop China from requesting more demands, and defying Washington? Appeasing China with Taiwan would not solve anything. On the contrary,. ‧. deserting Taipei would cause a deep wave of mistrust amongst Washington’s Asian. y. Nat. allies. Glaser evidently underestimates the strategic importance of Washington’s ties with. io. sit. Taipei. Defending American support for Taiwan, Dennis Halpin explains, “Taiwan is a. er. vital link in the alliance structure, formed in the crucible of the Second World War,. al. n. iv n C islands and Australian continent h in the south. Once e n g c h i aUlink in a chain fence is broken, the running from the Korean peninsula and Japanese islands in the north to the Philippine. fence itself easily falls down” (Halpin, 2013, p. 1). Losing Taiwan would be catastrophic to America’s tactical pivot to Asia. In response to his appeasement critics, Glaser maintains that “territorial concessions are not always bound to fail” and that “there is actually little reason to believe that it has or will develop grand territorial ambitions in its region or beyond” (2011, p.7). Though China’s true intentions are hard to prove, Beijing has increasingly become aggressive since Glaser’s article. From expanding its controlled islands in the South China Sea and continued military threat towards Taiwan, China demonstrates that as it amasses greater power and influence, it will become more defiant towards its Asian. 19.

(26) neighbors. Glaser’s failure to comprehend Beijing’s belligerence and potential capabilities is disappointing. In his article, he also makes an embarrassing historic error, claiming, “Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland…” (2011, p. 6). China (PRC) has never controlled any part of Taiwan. After the Civil War, it was the Republic of China that fled to Taiwan and continued its rule there. This misunderstanding is a testament to his lack of understanding in Taiwan Strait affairs. It is very hard to take him seriously, as his views are skewed and naïve. Nevertheless, there are others like him who believe place US-Sino relations above ties with Taiwan.. 政治大. This idea is nothing new. Since the 1990s, there were scholars who were opposed to Taiwan’s acquisition of US weapons. For example, when George H. Bush approved. 立. the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets in 1992, some critics argued it would cause repercussions. ‧ 國. 學. from China. Gerald Segal claimed, “The American sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan means a radical deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations. Arms sales to Taiwan raise the costs to China of unilateral action and demonstrate that there are limits to China's ability. ‧. to order the balance in East Asia” (1992). Segal worried the sale would damage relations. y. Nat. with Beijing, as well as augment China’s hostility. Derek da Cunha noted that the. sit. proposed sale “may well be an attempt to forestall a shift in the weight of the strategic. er. io. balance toward the Chinese in the western Pacific” (Richardson, 1992). With China. al. n. iv n C heighten tensions in the region; as retaliate the sale with increased military hBeijing e n gwould chi U already protective of its overwhelming presence in East Asia, the F-16 sale would. spending. Scholars like Segal and Da Cunha are helpful in considering the strategic. consequences of continued support of Taiwan. However, they prioritize relations with China and do not appreciate the role of US arms to Taiwan in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. They may only consider the short term outcomes of such sales, but do not realize how serious the ramifications would be if Taiwan was abandoned.. 1.6.4 UN Strategy. 20.

(27) There is a large collection of literature regarding the UN strategies of the Lee, Chen and Ma administrations. However, the UN issue is often reviewed as a subset of their foreign policy. This is not to say that UN strategy and foreign policy are vastly different—rather that it is rarely considered as an independent topic. As a result, there is little comprehensive work that critiques the approaches. Most authors stress the significance of joining the UN main body and describe the technical alternative methods of doing so; instead of evaluating what the presidents have actually done and weighing their pros and cons. There are some helpful literature, but not enough. There is also no emphasis on analyzing the disparities between the three administrations’ UN strategies—covering all three approaches in one study. This dissertation singles out Taiwan’s UN issue and. 政治大 reasons for variations in UN strategy. 立. examines it as an independent subject, separate from foreign policy; and explores the. ‧ 國. 學. 1.6.5 UN Membership. ‧. Taiwan has struggled for UN membership for decades, but its attempts have not gone. y. Nat. sit. unnoticed. There is massive support amongst academics and government officials alike.. al. er. io. Remarking on the exclusion of Taiwan, Jean Henckaerts writes, “There seems to be a. n. wide consensus that Taiwan fulfills all requirements to gain admission to the UN and that. Ch. i n U. v. its bid is legitimate because its 21 million people are currently unrepresented” (1996, p.. engchi. 248). The isolation of Taiwan is a diplomatic tragedy that denies the island state from demonstrating its humanitarian potential and needs to be resolved. Lung Chu Chen also vents out his frustrations exclaiming, “It is high time for the people concerned with the future of Taiwan in the world community to work together, with vision, understanding and good will, to achieve the common good for all. The people of Taiwan … deserve the strong support of every member of the world community” (1996, p. 203). Acknowledging Taiwan’s already resolute endeavors, Chen expresses his hopes for a united international effort to push for Taiwan’s UN membership. Without widespread support from the international community, Taiwan’s UN efforts will never progress. Dennis Hickey also recognizes the unjust treatment of Taiwan, stating, “It is clear that the 21.

(28) time has arrived for the international community to work together to find some way for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in the UN, WHO10 and other IGOs. As a multi-party democracy that also happens to be one of the world’s largest traders, Taiwan deserves a voice in the global community” (2008, p. 29). There is no doubt amongst academics that Taiwan ought to have membership in the UN in order to contribute more, and let its voice be heard on the international stage. Noting what Taiwan has done so far in terms of humanitarian and diplomatic efforts, it is only right to allow the island to join the organization to make further positive impacts on the world. The only issue is how Taipei should go about it.. 1.6.6 Lee Teng Hui. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Under Lee, Taiwan began a UN campaign in 1993. This new method called for applying to the organization under the name ‘Republic of China’. This tactic focused on a dual. ‧. representation ideology. According to Sigrid Winkler, “UN participation alongside China eventually became a viable policy option, even under continued rule by the Kuomintang11. y. Nat. sit. (KMT), the Chinese Nationalist party” (2012). This was due to Lee’s pragmatic policies.. al. er. io. It was clear that Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo’s stubborn interpretation of. n. ‘One China’ did very little in helping Taiwan’s international status, thus leading to a. Ch. change within the KMT’s mindset.. engchi. i n U. v. “Membership in the UN”, Dennis Hickey explains, “would augment the ROC’s security and legitimacy by undermining the argument that only an independent ‘Republic of Taiwan’ could reintegrate successfully into the global community” (1997, p. 1037). Hickey argues that maintaining the title ‘Republic of China’ would disprove beliefs that only by changing the country name to a more assertive one would garner UN membership. The ROC is a less controversial nomenclature that avoids unwanted 10. The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international UN affiliated body whose primary role is to direct and coordinate international health within the United Nations’ system. 11 The Kuomintang (KMT), formally known as the Chinese Nationalist Party, was formerly the sole ruling party of Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War. It currently holds the presidency under the Ma administration, and focuses on eventual unification with Mainland China. Official KMT website: http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/index.aspx 22.

(29) resistance from the international community for allowing the island to join the organization. With Lee’s less confrontational approach, many expected some progress on the UN issue—but he failed to do so. Winkler explains, “China’s opposition, in combination with the ‘one China’ policy of the majority of the UN member states, prevented the Taiwanese bids from even being treated properly in the UN. Apart from a few of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, no country was ready to give consideration to Taiwanese representation in the UN” (2012). He is correct to mention China’s role in the issue. Because of Beijing’s overbearing influence over the global community, Taipei’s efforts under Lee failed to garner support.. 1.6.7 Chen Shui Bian. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. During Chen’s administration, Taiwan’s UN struggle became more aggressive. After initially continuing Lee’s practice of applying under the title ‘Republic of China’, Chen decided to change tactic. In 2007, he began a new campaign using the name “Taiwan”;. ‧. and the next year, he initiated a national referendum12 regarding UN membership. This. y. Nat. was a radical change in approach, and was met with supporters and critics alike. In. sit. support of the name change, Henckaerts states, “Taiwan as Taiwan rather than as the. er. io. ROC on Taiwan may have more chance to gain international public support to obtain a. al. iv n C of the old ‘Republic of China’ that was brought by the h e n g c h i UKMT party after the Chinese Civil War. Lung Chu Chen also stresses the name change, declaring, “Taiwan must establish n. UN seat” (1996, p. 248). Her belief may be because a change in name dispels any notion. clearly its national identity as Taiwan, not as a truncated China. This is imperative if Taiwan is to obtain external support and to forge internal unity” (1996, p. 197). Chen hints that the name change gave Taiwan an opportunity to start anew in its UN campaign, and that it symbolizes a separate Taiwanese identity. The referendum that Chen implemented in that last year of his presidency caused greater controversy, upsetting Washington. Despite protests from the US, Chen refused to halt the referendum. Protesting Chen’s approach, Alan Romberg writes, 12. This referendum was initiated in March 2008, during the Taiwanese Presidential election. It asked voters whether or not the island should apply to the UN under the title ‘Taiwan’. 23.

(30) “President Chen obviously does not want to bring tragedy down on the heads of the people of Taiwan…But the course that the DPP has chosen with regard to the UN referendum runs just that risk” (2007, p.26). Romberg is at odds with observers like Henckaerts and Lung Chu Chen, who support the name change. Chen’s radical UN policy was a risky one that was met with much resistance because of the name change and the accompanying referendum. It also caused a great disturbance to the status quo, which was of great concern to the US. Romberg continues, stating, “It is hard for me to understand the logic that leads him to continue on a course that so clearly upsets the United States and that drives a wedge deeper and deeper between Washington and Taipei” (2007, p. 26). Chen Shui Bian was so adamant on promoting a separate. 政治大 Washington. Ultimately, his attempts were fruitless. 立. Taiwanese identity that he sacrificed relations with the US, angering many observers in. ‧ 國. 學. 1.6.8 Ma Ying Jeou. ‧. With Ma’s presidential victory came a renewed sense of pragmatism that was originally brought about by Lee Teng Hui. During his term, Ma Ying Jeou engaged in a flexible. y. Nat. sit. approach that halted application to the UN main body altogether. Instead, he vied for. er. io. increased meaningful participation in UN affiliated organizations. This alternative hoped to expand Taiwan’s international space through less confrontational channels. It also. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. decreased tensions within cross-strait relations. Ma realized China’s influence over the. engchi. UN issue and attempted to befriend Beijing by stopping to apply. Dennis Hickey had recognized China’s importance long ago, recommending that, “Taiwan could use cross strait dialogue and explain why the Taiwanese people deserve a voice in the UN. At some point in the future, Beijing may revisit the Taiwan representation issue” (1997, p.1043). Because of China’s seat in the UN Security Council, and its strict adherence to its ‘One China Principle’, it controls the fate of Taiwan’s international participation. Vincent WeiCheng Wang notes, “A prerequisite of Taiwan’s UN bid is for it to improve relations with Beijing. Without Beijing’s acquiescence, Taipei’s quest for international identity will continue to be extremely problematic” (1997, p.27). This is an undeniable fact when. 24.

(31) deliberating the best course of action for Taiwan. Fortunately, President Ma realizes this and has been eagerly engaging in dialogue with the PRC. On the future of Taiwan’s struggle for UN participation, Kaocheng Wang observes, “The people in Taiwan still highly desire to see their nation play a greater role in international organizations and activities. For this reason, the Ma administration hopes to take advantage of the cross-strait détente to increase Taiwan’s international participation through pragmatic measures” (2010, p. 3). Authors unanimously agree that it is hard to deny what Ma’s flexible tactic has accomplished. It accepts the reality of China’s influence, and has the potential to pave the way for a brighter future for Taiwan’s international presence.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 25. i n U. v.

(32) 2 Background 2.1 Lee Teng Hui 2.1.1 Pragmatic Diplomacy Lee’s administration developed a diplomatic approach that was far more liberal in comparison to Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Ching Kuo’s policies. Rather than stubbornly adhering to a ‘One China’ ideology, Lee embraced dual recognition of Beijing and Taipei as a temporary solution to the unification issue. As a result, Taiwan actively. 政治大 when a state already recognized the PRC. Even with unofficial ties, Taiwan was able to 立 establish representative offices, both its own abroad and those set up by foreign countries established full diplomatic relations wherever possible; while maintaining unofficial ties. ‧ 國. 學. in Taipei. These offices essentially performed the functions of an embassy without any official status. This so called ‘pragmatic’ method opened a whole wave of opportunities. ‧. for the ROC in terms establishing itself as a sovereign nation on the international stage. On the success of Lee’s diplomacy, Chen Jie explains, “Though these representation,. y. Nat. sit. agreements, and visits do not have full official status, incremental progress in the quality. er. io. and quantity achieved in these areas reinforce Taiwan’s profile as a legitimate sovereign state (2002, p. 22). The Lee’s flexibility marked the beginning of a new era in Taiwan’s. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. relations with the world. Such maneuverability was never seen before, and it gave Taipei. engchi. hope in eventually achieving full sovereignty. Near the end of Lee’s presidency, the number of Taipei’s representative offices abroad increased from 58 in 39 countries in 1988, to 94 in 62 countries in 1999; while foreign institutions in Taipei increased from 31 by 26 countries in 1988, to 53 by 47 countries in 1999. (Chen, 2002, p. 30). It was clear that pragmatic diplomacy was effective. With this novel approach, Lee was fighting for a politically resilient Taiwan that could be a productive member in the global community. In response to a question from Newsweek Magazine, he clarified that his diplomacy had three priorities. The first was to maintain strength and survival as a sovereign nation. He stated, “Based on this principle we shall consolidate and strengthen bilateral relations with nations that share diplomatic 26.