Chapter 5. The disbandment of territorial command structure
6.1. Within-case comparison analysis
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
To complete the analysis provided in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, this chapter aims at two things. First, it compares the findings in those three chapters to answer the main question posted in Chapter 1: why has the reform progressing differently from one issue to another. In order to do so, this chapter employs a simple Mill’s method of difference.
In addition to the variable of military interests, other variables that have been assessed by other scholars as suggested in Chapter 2 are also taken into consideration. It suggests that the other variables are all present in the three cases without variation. Hence, they could not be used to explain the variation of the progress of military reform in Indonesia.
Second, this chapter also ends with recommendations for further research in the topic of military reform, in particular the armed forces’ withdrawal from politics. In addition, while it is not intended to provide generalization, lessons learned are also drawn from the Indonesian case. The analysis in this dissertation suggests that a successful armed forces’ withdrawal from politics, as well as successful military reform, depends on the interests of the armed forces.
6.1. Within-case comparison analysis
This dissertation argues that military interests can serve as good predictor to the progress of military’s withdrawal from politics. Using the case of Indonesia, it shows that other variables that previously have been assessed by scholars were somehow lacking in explaining why there has been variation in the progress of the reform from one issue to another. Table 6.1 below shows that all variables as listed in Chapter 2 present in the Indonesian case of military reform. There are, however, no differences in variable threat environment, political legitimacy and military culture.
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Table 6.1. Mill’s method of difference in analyzing the progress of the reform
Threat
Constant Constant Constant Varies Varies
The threat environment to the Indonesian security has mostly been dominated by internal rather than external threats. The Indonesian defense white papers (Mabes TNI, 2003, 2008, 2015) were all listed various kinds of internal threat as the main source to Indonesia’s security. While those documents also listed several external threats, both military and non-military threats, the documents also wrote that the possibility of those threats to occur is highly unlikely. In facts, the same documents also suggested that the possible flashpoints that TNI would have to deal with in the future are foreign intervention to domestic-related issues. The Indonesian defense white papers identified five different scenarios of possible flashpoints, ranging from: cross-border assistances to domestic separatist movements, border clashes and skirmishes, foreign interventions to maintain access to Indonesia’s energy resources, foreign interventions to sustain free navigation in Indonesian waters, and foreign interventions in counterterrorism missions.
Only one of those five possible flashpoints are directly related to external threats, which is border clashes and skirmishes.
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Table 6.2. Possible threats as listed in defense white papers
External Internal
Military Aggression or border incursion,
disruption to maritime security Separatism
Non-military
Foreign political intervention, energy crisis, global warming, global
economic crises
Acts of terror, radicalism and Communism, communal conflicts,
natural disasters
With regard to the variable of political legitimacy, there has been an increasing trust from the society to democratic governance. As suggested by scholars, the democratization process in Indonesia has been suggesting an increasing trend toward democratic consolidation. Croissant and Bunter (Croissant & Bunte in Croissant &
Bunte, 2011) claimed that Indonesia can be regarded as one of the most well performed new democracies in Southeast Asia. Similarly, Bunte and Ufen (2009, 22) wrote that according to Dahl’s framework, “without a doubt, Indonesia can be described as a democracy.” Similarly, when constitutional democracy is the standard, Indonesia can also be included as an example of democratic society (Croissant & Bunte in Croissant &
Bunte, 2011, p. 252). Freedman (2006, 138-139) also concluded that Indonesia has already met the criteria of Linz and Stepan’s consolidated democracy standard. Others, however, criticized the transition in Indonesia which created predatory democracy (Robison, 2002) or patrimonial democracy (Webber, 2006). Regardless of the debate, since the beginning of transition period, Indonesia has experienced four party turnovers and three peaceful direct presidential elections. With regard to legislative elections, Figure 6.1 shows the result of legislative elections in Indonesia since the Reform era (only national level elections are listed). The figure shows that the winner of the election is always changing from election to election. In 1999, PDIP won the election only to be defeated by Golkar party in 2004 election. In 2009, PD won the election, but their position was soon replaced by PDIP in 2014 election.
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Figure 6.1. Result of legislative elections in Indonesia’s post Suharto
(Note: in 1999 election, PKS participated as PK; PD did not participate in 1999 election; Gerindra was not participated in 1999 and 2004 elections)
The third variable, military culture, also suggests that the culture of Indonesian armed forces remain internally-oriented. Chapter 5 has provided a clear explanation on the Indonesian military culture. It basically concludes that there has been no significant change in Indonesian internally oriented defense culture since the establishment of the Republic. The Indonesia internally-oriented strategic culture of TNI has been shaped by its history of guerilla warfare (the war against far stronger Dutch colonial forces), rampant separatist movements, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, and the lack of military capability. While the doctrine has been constantly changing, the main characteristic of those doctrines is total warfare which reflects those three shaping factors.
Mill’s method of difference basically suggests that two occurrences are significantly influenced by a certain independent variable when this variable varies in both occurrences while the other independent variables remain as constant. While Mill’s method of difference requires a condition of “equifinality” which is highly unlikely in real life circumstance, and hence Bennet (in Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004, 31-32) suggested to use Mill’s method of difference with other methods, it still useful in determining which independent variable has the dominant influence on a dependent
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variable over the other independent variables. Table 6.3 shows a simple explanation of Mill’s method of difference. Using this method, as suggested in Table 7.1, this dissertation concludes that the variable of military interest is the only independent variable under investigation that actually varies. The variation in the dependent variable, hence, is a result of the variation in this independent variable since other variables remain constant.
In addition, another issue that needs further explanation is the impact of split within the armed forces as defining variable to influence progress of reform. Previous works on Indonesian military reform have suggested that the split within the armed forces contributed to the progress of the reform (Kanmen & Chandra, 2002; Mietzner 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). However, this dissertation that split within the armed forces has constantly been taking place and only when these groups’ interests overshadow either the national interests of the brass or, more importantly, the corporate interests was the split within the armed forces influenced the progress of the reform.
6.2. Lesson learned, recommendation and current progress
Hence, several lessons learned can be drawn from the Indonesian case. First, since the progress of the armed forces has a close affinity with the interests of the armed forces, putting their interests in the equation is mandatory to have a successful reform.
This is especially crucial when the reform takes place within transition towards democracy characterized by transplancement in which the old elites, including the armed forces, still has strong influence within the political arena. In such a situation, the interests of the old elite groups remain as an important factor for successful transformation.
Second, the main problem of military reform and the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics basically lies in the establishment of detail arrangements as well as the changing of behavior towards a more democratic attitude. These two problems fall within the second “non-structural arrangement” phase of the reform. Hence, to successfully disengage the armed forces from politics, a different term could be a good option. Successful reform, therefore, requires the making of structural arrangement of military reform and defense modernization which focuses closely on detail arrangement and the changing of behaviors. The case of Indonesia suggests that with regard with
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territorial command structure, which has a huge impact on military’s departure from politics, the failure in defense modernization program was one of the reasons for the failure in the disbandment. Even within what is most-considered as successful withdrawal, the establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces, the problem of detailing the general principles remains lingering.
Third, the pattern of military’s withdrawal in the case of Indonesia suggests that they both serve as partner or spoiler to the civilian authority depending on which role their interests the best. During the early period of the reform, while accepting the call for the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, TNI maintained their oppositional position in certain issues, such as the peace deal with GAM or rapprochement with proponents of Papuan freedom movement. In addition, the armed forces did agree to engage in the making of general principles regulations such as the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI but remained critical to any passages within these laws that might endanger their interests. In the latter phase of the reform, the armed forces showed limited resistance to the taking over of their formal business activities, but retained their informal business activities. In addition, they also managed to influence the taking over of their formal business to Ministry of Defense in which they remained as powerful stakeholder.
In addition to those lessons learned, several theoretical and methodological lessons learned could also be drawn from this research. First, this dissertation has shown the evolution or transformation of “a military as government” to “a military as stakeholder” roles that takes place along with military reform within the context of democratization process in the case of Indonesia. It suggests that the armed forces can actually transform themselves in their withdrawal from politics. In addition, while the role of the armed forces remains influential in politics, the institutionalization of that role within the political arrangement has been an important factor in limiting their re-intervention into politics in the near future. There are, off course cases of retired military officers, especially those within the leadership positions, which are keen to get into politics by benefiting from their previous leadership position.
Second, this dissertation provides alternative mechanism in examining the military interests, rather than providing a list of interests. By differentiating military interests into national, organizational, and factional interests, this dissertation further
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clarifies the influence of the so-called military interests to their involvement or non-involvement in politics. It does not engage in a long list of interests. It identifies that organizational interests of the armed forces is basically the most important interest of the armed forces in which their involvement and non-involvement would be a function of it. In particular, it also suggests that military autonomy is on the top list of those organizational interests. The degree of their autonomy varies from country to country and from time to time. From the three cases examined in Chapter 3, 4, and 5, the corporate interests of the armed forces tend to be constant in the case of territorial command structure, tend to be limited in the disbandment of military business activities, and tend to be limited in the establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces only when such an effort is directly touching upon the details.
Third, while this dissertation conducts a careful mapping on the split within the armed forces and how they manage their inter-rivalries over time to serve as a better basis for understanding military interests and their withdrawal from politics, it does not provide similar mapping within the civilian groups. Hence, future research should also include the latter’s mapping of interests to provide a better understanding of successful pattern of military’s withdrawal. The weaknesses of the agency-related approach applied in this research is that it does not deeply examine the other agents and is only committing to the main agent under observation. This research, however, takes into account the relationship between agents as well as between the main agent under observation and larger structural circumstances.
Finally, a comparison between cases could serve as a good basis to make generalization. This dissertation focuses on a single within-case comparison and hence the power of generalization is somehow limited. This dissertation has its own strength in explaining the variation within a single case. It manages to provide an alternative mechanism to explain military’s withdrawal from politics and points out the most probable explanan to that withdrawal. Taking the case of Indonesia, which represents one of the most successful cases in the Third Wave Democratization, it shows the importance of examining military interests over the other variables. However, cross-cases comparison focusing on military interests would offer a better basis for making generalization.
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To end this dissertation, few words on the current situation is also important to assess future development of military reform in Indonesia. The change in power from President Yudhoyono, who himself is retired Army general, to Presiden Widodo, who off course is civilian with limited ties to the armed forces, places the reform on trial.
The departure of Panglima Army General Moeldoko and the appointment of the new Panglima Army General Gatot Nurmantyo in 2014 was met with critics. While the changing of Panglima position between two generals from the same service has been depicted as the practice of the Suharto regime, the new Panglima has managed to keep the unity of the armed forces. The handing-over of the armed forces leadership position in 2017 once again suggests that there has been strong degree of institutionalization with the departure of Army General Gatot Nurmantyo and the arrival of Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto. Those two cases of transfer of top leadership within the armed forces basically suggests that the control of the civilian authority over the armed forces has been strongly established.
It does not mean, however, that there are absence of ups and downs in the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces. The relationship between retired Army General Moeldoko and President Widodo was said to strain after the former departure from TNI leadership. Moeldoko was not even considered to hold political portfolio after his retirement, which was not a common practice in Indonesian politics since the role of retired generals are still relatively strong. As Moeldoko struggled to get into politics, his activities following his retirement was practically unheard. It was not until 2017 when he was appointed to represent President Widodo in the wedding of the President’s daughter to give speech on his behalf. In Javanese tradition, representative of the host, in this case the bride’s family, is a symbol that the appointed person is someone who is dearly at the heart of the bride’s family. It was a coincidence that this appointment came when the relationship between President Widodo and the then current Panglima Army General Nurmantyo was tense. General Nurmantyo had been involved in a series of political debacle due to his keen involvement in day-to-day politics especially surrounding the local election in Jakarta. His decisions and behaviors have been under critics from NGOs activists that finally led them to call for early retirement of General Nurmantyo from his post. He was in fact replaced from his position few months before his retirement age, a practice that is uncommon in Indonesia.
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As also noted in this dissertations, several scandals involving high-level of the armed forces leadership or the armed forces as an organization also suggests the ups and downs in civilian control over the armed forces. The case of the purchase of AW101 suggests that when it comes to their organizational needs and plans, the armed forces can be very stubborn in following orders from civilian leaderships. While this cannot be simply seen as a sign of insubordination, this off course can be interpreted as resistance.
Hence, to end this study, this dissertation has shown that the progress of the military reform has its limitation on the interests of the armed forces.
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