Progress in the indicators of internal security area

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strategy is basically a total warfare strategy which they called as sistem pertahanan rakyat semesta (sishanrata). In the case of war, TNI would draw the enemies to enter the main islands in the archipelago to conduct guerilla wars against them. Hence, the territorial command structure remains as important as in the past. Moreover, TNI is also equipped with non-defense assignment. With TNI’s massive territorial structure, there have been some cases where the lack of civilian bureaucracy capacity was replaced by TNI. In fact, the Minister of Defense Yusgiantoro signed Permenhan No.35/2011 to regulate this particular OMSP, especially in areas with significant sense of remoteness.

Hence, with regard to the second area, public policy area, the progress of the reform has indicated a medium to high progress in ensuring military’s withdrawal from politics. The main obstacle basically lies in local level rather than in national level. In addition, since the main problem of military withdrawal in this particular area is the existence of TNI’s territorial command structure and the relatively easy reasoning to re-engage in politics through OMSP, serious efforts are in a dire need to redefine TNI’s structure and doctrine.

3.1.2.3.Progress in the indicators of internal security area

The next area where military’s withdrawal can be measured is internal security.

While the new professionalism school rejects the absence of military’s involvement in internal security matters as a good indicator to measure military professionalism, their involvement in internal security matters would be quite easily provided a pretext for military’s involvement in politics. The Law on TNI clearly regulates how OMSP can be conducted. There are at least two requirements that have to be completed to assign the armed forces with internal security matters. First, it has to be at the request of the government, or other governmental bodies. This request can come either from Polri or local government authorities or other security agencies in charge of internal security matters. Second, President’s consent is required for an OMSP to take place.

The main problem with the Indonesian case of OMSP is that there has been an increasing number of Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) between TNI and other bodies, both governmental and private organizations, which took place throughout the years. From 2000 to 2015, TNI has signed 37 MOUs detailing their assistances to various bodies, in which 7 of them were extension of previous MOUs. These MOUs,

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however, did not include those that were signed with local government authorities.

Those 37 MOUs were mostly internally oriented. In fact, only one MOU which can be considered as an externally-oriented mission, which was the one that they signed with UNTAET to assist the return of Timorese refugees from West Timor to Timor Leste.

While some of those MOUs can be categorized as fall within the fourteen listed missions regulated by Article 7 point (2) letter (b), some are contested. An example of the latter type of MOUs was TNI’s MOU with Ministry of Agriculture. This MOU—

firstly signed in 2012 and then extended (re-signed) in 2014—is not referring to Article 7 point (2) letter (b) since it basically stated that Army’s soldiers would serve as agricultural counsellor for farmers throughout the country, especially in remote areas.

While the armed forces have no institutionalized prerogatives in policy making and their influence is also extremely limited, they do have a say with regard to certain geographical areas. Two cases can be seen as examples. The first case is Papua. The history of Papua is relatively different from that of other areas in Indonesia. While the Dutch agreed to hand over most of the parts of the Dutch Indies to RIS in the 1949, they were unwilling to give up Papua. It was agreed during the 1949 conference that the final settlement on Papua would be made in the following year. The agreement, however, never came. After a series of military attacks by the Indonesian armed forces were failed, in early 1960 Sukarno called for a full scale war against the Dutch over Papua.

Due to the fear of massive scale war in the region, as well as the fear that Indonesia might fall to the Communist camp, in which by that time Indonesia had already established a close relationship with Soviet Union, the US managed to broker a peace deal to integrate Papua to Indonesia. In 1969, a referendum was held to determine whether Papuans wanted to be an independent country or to join with Indonesia. The referendum was in favor of integration with Indonesia, but some groups in Papua accused the Indonesian armed forces had put pressures to Papuans during the vote. As a result, those who against the integration of Papua to Indonesia started to raise arms against central government. Indonesian military’s mishandling of these Papuan movements resulted in continuous arms struggle with these groups. Military’s involvement in Papua was also intermingling with their economic activities especially with the existence of Grasberg Mine, which is known as one of the largest gold and copper mines in the world. When Wahid took power in 1999, he began to lessen

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Jakarta’s grip over Papua and introduced special autonomy region to Papua, as well as Aceh.⁷¹ While the Law on the Special Autonomy of Aceh (UU No.44/1999, then revised as UU No.18/2001) had been passed in DPR in 1999, the Law on the Special Autonomy of Papua (UU No.21/2001) was not adopted by DPR until 2001. Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) and McGibbon (2004), however, raised their pessimism that this special autonomy status would be fruitful without a change in security apparatus’

attitude toward Papuans. During the debate over the special autonomy law for Papua, the Indonesian Army decided to reestablish Military Command Area (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) in Papua (known as Kodam Cendrawasih) as part of their territorial command structure in 1999. They, however, withdrew all of Kopassus personnel from Papua. Kodam Cendrawasih took over all activities previously conducted by Kopassus.

The establishment of Kodam Cendrawasih increased the scale of military presence in Papua since, according to Syailendra (2016, 71), the ratio of army personnel to local inhabitants reached 1:168 which made Papua as one of the most militarized area in Indonesia. Their presence in Papua collided with the presence of Polri’s personnel which resulted in frequent clashes between these two agencies. To minimize the clash, the Army and Polri conducted several joint counter-separatism operations, especially since 2014. The Papuan case basically suggests that the role of TNI in policy making, especially in the operational-technical levels, remains influential.

The second case where the role of the armed forces remain significant while has indicating a declining trend is Aceh. Mietzner (in Kunkler & Stepan, 2013) suggested that prior to 2005, TNI had been the strongest supporter of military operation area (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) in Aceh and they had been quite often torpedoed any efforts to reach peace deal with the Aceh Freedom Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). While DOM had been lifted soon after the fall of Suharto, peace deal with GAM was not materialized until the reign of Yudhoyono. To be able to successfully reach a peace agreement with GAM, Yudhoyono had to make several changes within the brass, especially in the Army, by replacing conservative generals from command positions with his own loyalists. When Wahid was elected president, there was a wide-spread support to reach deal with GAM due to his close relationship with the Muslim communities, including those in Aceh. Wahid managed to set up negotiation with GAM

71 Aceh is the second example. See next paragraph for detail explanation.

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with the assistance of Henry Dunant Center (HDC). His efforts, however, were met with opposition from TNI who afraid that peace agreement with GAM would result in prosecutions of military officers for past human right abuses during the DOM era (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003; Sukma, 2004). It should be noted that Yudhoyono, who was member of Wahid’s cabinet, was known as supporter of this negotiation. Wahid’s negotiation efforts were not only met opposition from TNI but also from civilian politicians which problematized Wahid’s choice to send Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia’s ambassador for the UN in Geneva, as negotiator. They afraid such a decision could be interpreted as Indonesia’s acknowledgement of GAM as an equal partner or, other words, acknowledging GAM as an independent entity. Met with oppositions, Wahid’s negotiation process went to stall. When Megawati replaced him as president, prospect for negotiation became dark due to her strong nationalistic ideology.

Those two cases show that while normatively the armed forces had no prerogatives over internal security policy making, their influence remain strong in particular issues or geographical areas. One of the problems with the armed forces’

continued influence in internal security policy making basically comes from the lack in operational-technical regulations. While Jakum Hanneg and Jakger Hanneg have regularly been made, they only mention in glance of OMSP. In 2011, the Ministry of Defense adopted Permenhan No.5/2011 on military’s involvement in counter-separatism missions. However, by this time, counter-separatism in Aceh had been relatively settled and the settlement of Papuan case had been transferred to Polri.

The final indicator in the internal security area, the availability of institutionalized framework for civilian oversight, has exist as well. The laws on special autonomy regions clearly mention Polri as the institution that responsible for maintaining internal security in both Papua and Aceh. The appointment of Chief of Regional Police Area (Kepala Polisi Daerah, Kapolda) in both areas is made by the President with the approval of Papua and Aceh’s governors. Governors could also ask TNI to assist their activities in which the details are subject to Permenhan No.35/2011 which lists in detail the areas in which TNI could be used to assist local government, time frame of the OMSP, governor’s control over the operations and the oversighting (see the Appendix of this Permenhan).

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3.1.2.4.Progress in the indicators of external defense and military organization