Inter-sectional groups rivalry within TNI

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officers who belong to Class 10 of 1970 and Class 11 of 1971.⁴⁹ They argued that this rivalry was basically rooted at monopolization of senior command positions by the latter two classes that potentially blocked the former class from upward movement within the brass. This generational gap, however, fails to explain why there were differences of opinion within the same generation. A study by Said (2013) suggests that there was not only intergenerational rivalry but also intergenerational recruitment as well within the brass. For example, he discusses how Sutrisno, who used to be Suharto’s boy, became Moerdhani’s boy.

2.3.3.3.Inter-sectional groups rivalry within TNI

The third segregation within the armed forces is based on sectional interests.

Two different categorizations can be found with regard to TNI during the reform. The first and more traditional division is between the so-called the green (kelompok hijau) versus the red-and-white (kelompok merah putih) camps. The reference to green and red-and-white basically indicate those officers which leaning toward Islamic groups or values (green) and those which leaning toward nationalistic sentiment (red-and-white).

While serious scholarly works that focus on this division has rarely been made, it has become general knowledge that rivalry between these two factions has taking place since the early establishment of TNI. As noted in previous chapter, TNI is originally consisted of different groups, including civilian militias. Among these groups, two of the most dominant groups were ex-KNIL and ex-PETA.⁵⁰ These two groups shared similarity in their political affiliation towards nationalist cause.⁵¹ In addition to these two groups, other groups with significant number of combatants were various

49 Class refers to the year of their graduation from Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN).

The first class of AMN is the class of 1960. There are no classes in the year 1969 and 1979 due to a change in the length of study.

50 KNIL, stands for Koninklijke Nederlands(ch)-Indische Leger, is basically a legion of Dutch Colonial Army. Consisted of local people, this colonial army’s main duty is to maintain security and order in the Netherland Indies territory. PETA, stands for Pembela Tanah Air [Defender of the Homeland], is a voluntary militia set up by Japanese imperial power during the World War II. Members of these two groups acquired certain degree of military skills.

51 The difference between KNIL and PETA lied in their way of training. Influenced by the Western standard textbook, KNIL officers tended to hold a sort of Huntingtonian ideals of professional armed forces. In the meantime, PETA, being trained by Japanese textbook, included both politically and revolutionary ideals of armed forces (Lebra, 1975).

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based groups, including Laskar Hisbullah (Said 1991).⁵² Lieutenant General Bambang Triantoro, former Deputy of Political and Social Affairs Branch of the armed forces, publicly identified top officers within the brass along this line of split.⁵³ The green faction dominated top positions within the brass during the end of Suharto era due to the President’s policy to lean toward Islamic community as effort to minimize the political power of the armed forces which had already indicated dissatisfaction toward his leadership. During the transition period, the then TNI Chief of Staff, Wiranto, was said to have sidestepping members of green faction.

The second division is between the reformers and the traditionalists. In the history of TNI, there have been several references to reformers and traditional rivalries.

While the identification for these two groups varied according to the context and time-frame, the division between these two groups revolved around the issue of military’s involvement in politics. In the case of reformers-traditionalists division during the end of Suharto era it referred to whether the armed forces should abandon dual function or not. The latter group argued that the armed forces are destined to involve in politics while the former was leaning toward the Huntingtonian ideals of professional soldier.

During the reform era, the term reformers referred to a group of officers that supported reform agendas to transform TNI into professional armed forces that do not involve in politics. These officers mostly had experience in studying abroad, either in the United States or European countries. Among these officers were Wirahadikusuma, Widjojo, and Yudhoyono.⁵⁴ Members of this group, however, were split into two different camps.

Wirahadikusuma was known as the supporter of radical transformation in which the armed forces should refrain from politics as soon as possible and as far as possible.

Widjojo and Yudhoyono, on the other hand, preferred a step-by-step gradualist

52 Masyumi was a political party based on Islamic ideals. Established in 1945, Masyumi was disbanded by Sukarno in 1960 due to their allegedly involvement in PRRI rebellion.

53 Among top officers within the brass, the members of red-and-white factions were: Yudhoyono, Agum Gumelar, A.M. Hendropriyono, Imam Oetomo, Tyasno Sudarto, and Ryamizard Ryacudu. The members of green faction included: Faisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Soebagyo H.S., Syarwan Hamid, Z.A. Maulani, Prabowo Subianto, Fachrul Razi, Sjafrie Syamsudin, Yunus Yosfiah, Zacky A. Makarim, Djoko Subroto, and Syamsoel Maarif (Menggeser Jenderal Suap dan Jenderal Lembek [Removing corrupt and mushy generals] 1999).

54 These three officers went to the United States to gain both military and civilian education.

Wirahadikusumah was a graduate of Harvard University. Widojo went to George Washington University and also National Defense University. In addition, he also went into US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Yudhoyono was an alumnus of Webster University and attended US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

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approach in disengaging the armed forces from politics. Within the reformists, there were also two different camps. Widjojo and Yudhoyono represented the gradualist within the reformist, while Wirahadikusumah represented the radical (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). The former thought that military reform should be conducted step by step to prevent disturbances within the brass. They argued that most officers within the brass had not yet prepared for a drastic change. The radicals, on the other hand, were eager for drastic transformation. The term traditionalist, on the contrary, referred to officers who opposed military’s noninvolvement in politics, either publicly or silently. Members of this group involved relatively older officers such as Subianto, and his group. Hence, Kanmen and Chandra (2002) suggested that these rivalries were actually a reflection of intergenerational rivalries.

In some cases, it would be difficult to identify those segregations according to a clear line of divisions. Scholars (Lee, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo &

Kasim, 2008; Daves, 2013-2014, chapter 4), for example, attributed the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto during the end of Suharto era and shortly after his fall as intermingling between both ideological-based and reform-based divisions. The core issue in these two officers’ rivalry was basically over the control of the armed forces.

Wiranto, as Panglima, had taken a cautious decision with regard to the role that TNI should play during a fast-changing situation. While he did not want to upset Suharto, he also did not wish to take harsh actions against his oppositions. Subianto, on the other hand, then was still the son-in-law of Suharto, was keen to protect Suharto’s position as he considered himself as the future replacement for his father-in-law. As part of his effort to protect Suharto, Subianto who then held a position of Commander of Army Special Force (Komandan Jenderal Komando Pasukan Khusus, Danjen Kopassus) conducted covert operations to kidnap members of opposition camps without the consent of Panglima. While this move had made Wiranto angry, he remained calm in responding to it. The rivalry between these two officers was further heated with Subianto appointment as Pangkostrad.⁵⁵ This appointment was made without the

55 In the meanwhile, his position as Commander of Kopassus was replaced by his good friend, Major General Muchdi. In addition, his other good friend, Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin was appointed as Regional Commander of Jakarta Area (Pangdam Jaya). It basically a move, made by Suharto, to provide full protection of his position when oppositions decided to take further actions. Kostrad is the largest combat unit of the Army and Kopassus’s largest personnel is based in Cijantung, an outskirt area of Jakarta.

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consent of Council of High Ranks and Offices (Dewan Kepangkatan dan Jabatan Tinggi, Wanjakti).⁵⁶ While Subianto and his close friends were known to have intimate relationship with several radical Islamic groups, Wiranto was known as nationalist and abangan⁵⁷ Muslim. Following the fall of Suharto, the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto continued until Subianto was finally released from his position in Kostrad. He even had to face disciplinary court and was discharged from TNI due to his involvement in kidnapping of pro-democratic activists. This rivalry certainly does not fall within particular distinction as suggested above.