Chapter 5. The disbandment of territorial command structure
5.1. The importance of komando teritorial
5.1.1. The evolution of TNI’s doctrine
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Figure 5.1. Structure of komando teritorial of TNI (Adapted from Said, 1987, 7)
Note: in the current civilian bureaucratic structure, Karesidenan has no longer existed
5.1.1. The evolution of TNI’s doctrine
Since the development of TNI’s structure has a close affinity with their doctrine, the discussion in this part includes an analysis of the evolution of TNI’s doctrine. The TNI’s doctrine itself, as in the case of other states, can be differentiated into different types, ranging from defense doctrine, military doctrine and service doctrine. Those three doctrines should be coherent. In the case of Indonesia, however, the making of the doctrines has been usually in a bottom-up rather than top-down process. Hence, basically the doctrines of the three services are the first to be developed and the followed by the military doctrine and the defense doctrine. It happened twice in which the first occurrence took place when the 1966 Tjatur dharma eka karma (Cadek) was developed after the 1965 Eka sasana jaya of the Navy, the 1965 Swa buana paksa of the Air Force and the 1966 Tri ubaya cakti of the Army. The defense doctrine known as the 1966 Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional was adopted later. In the post Suharto era, the 2008 defense doctrine known as Doktrin pertahanan nasional was adopted after the military adopted Tri dharma eka karma (Tridek) in 2007. Tridek itself was developed after the Army adopted their Kartika eka paksi in 2001, the Navy adopted their Eka sasana jaya in 2001 and the Air Force adopted their Swa buana paksa in
Civilian bureacracy
National (Pusat)
Province (Propinsi) Residency (Karesidenan)
District (Kabupaten/Kota)
Sub-district (Kecamatan)
Village (Desa/Kelurahan)
Military structure
Mabes
Kodam
Korem
Kodim
Koramil
Babinsa
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would lead to a change in the organizational structure. In the case of Indonesia, however, there are no significant changes in TNI’s doctrine throughout the years and therefore no significant changes in the organizational structure are taking place as well. The evolution of TNI’s doctrine can be divided into five different phases, from the war for independence (1945-1949), RIS (1949-1950), internal warfare (1950-1959), Guided Democracy (1959-1967), New Order (1967-1998), and Reform era (1998-today) periods (Widjajanto, 2010, 2013a, 2013b).113 Widjajanto (2013a, 2013b) identified 23 different doctrines that has been adopted by TNI since 1945.114 Table 5.1 shows these 23 doctrines. These 23 doctrines, sadly, reflect a rather inwardly-orientation.Table 5.1. Indonesia’s military doctrines (Widjajanto, 2013, 6-7)
Period Doctrine
1945-1949 1. Defense doctrine 1946: Pertahanan bulat lagi teratur 2. Defense doctrine 1947: Perang rakyat semesta (total warfare) 1950-1959 3. Military doctrine 1954: Perang rakyat semesta
1960-1965 4. Defense doctrine 1960: Pertahanan semesta (total defense) 5. Navy doctrine 1965: Eka sasana jaya
6. Air Force doctrine 1965: Swa buana paksa 1966-1997 7. Army doctrine 1966: Tri ubaya cakti
8. Military doctrine 1966: Tjatur dharma eka karma
9. Defense doctrine 1966: Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional 10. Military doctrine 1970: Doktrin teritorial nusantara
11. Military doctrine 1972: Darma pusaka ‘45 12. Military doctrine 1975: Doktrin kekaryaan ABRI 13. Military doctrine 1977: Doktrin operasi sosial politik 14. Military doctrine 1980: Doktrin operasi gabungan ABRI 15. Military doctrine 1982: Dwifungsi ABRI
16. Military doctrine 1988: Catur dharma eka karma
17. Defense doctrine 1991: Doktrin pertahanan dan keamanan 18. Military doctrine 1991: Sad daya dwi bakti
1998-current 19. Air Force doctrine 2000: Swa buana paksa
112 The Army is the only service that did not change the name of their doctrine from the previous one. The content of all the services’ doctrine, however, is different from their previous doctrines.
113 Rinakit (2005) differentiated the evolution of TNI’s doctrines in five stages. The first stage is 1945-1958 which he referred as characterized by no-shared military ideology. The second stage is 1945-1958-1965 in which Jalan Tengah became the operational ideology of the armed forces. The third stage is 1965-1966 when Dwifungsi became a political ideology of the armed forces. The fourth stage is 1966-1998 in which Dwifungsi became the operational ideology of the armed forces. The final stage is post-1998 when Dwifungsi became corporate ideology of the armed forces. Rinakit emphasized the development of military’s political ideology and did not touch upon other aspects of the doctrines.
114 Widjajanto (2013a, 2013b) included both TNI’s and services’ doctrines as well as defense doctrines in his assessment.
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20. Navy doctrine 2001: Eka sasana jaya 21. Army doctrine 2001: Kartika eka paksi 22. Military doctrine 2007: Tri dharma eka karma 23. Defense doctrine 2008: Doktrin pertahanan negara Note: no new doctrine was adopted during RIS period.
To understand the logic in the making of these doctrines, a historical assessment would be made in the following paragraphs. During the early years after the declaration of independence, TNI adopted a linear defense mechanism with a clear division between enemy’s territories and their own territories.115 TNI then adopted a Wehrkreise (military regions) defense system in which each region should independently defend their territories. The change from linear defense to military region was driven by TNI’s failure to deal with the first military aggression of the Dutch in 1947 in which the latter managed to break TNI’s defense mechanism and captured several important areas of the new Republic. Following the second military aggression in 1948, after realizing the stark asymmetry in power, Sudirman added guerilla warfare to support the already established military regions command defense system. Since guerilla warfare would only be effective with the assistance from the population, TNI then developed a total warfare strategy in their war against the Dutch colonial forces.
After the transfer of power in 1949, Indonesia was transformed into RIS. The territory of RIS covered the former Dutch Indies with the exception of Papua which by that time was unsettled yet. The disbandment of RIS in 1950 led to rampant rebellions from several federal states as they rejected to full control of Jakarta. TNI was then forced to develop a new strategy to deal with these rebels. They were required to conduct joint operations that involved Navy, Air Force, and Army. In addition, the Army had to develop a mobile unit to assist the remnants of local command personnel in the areas that suffered from rebellions in crushing the rebels. With an increasing number of rebellions during the 1950s and 1960s, TNI also developed reserves training
115 During the 1945-1949, the de facto territory of Indonesia was constantly changing. Following the independence, the de facto territory of Indonesia was only covering Java and Sumatera. They retained these areas until the Linggardjati agreement with the Dutch colonial power in 1947. After the Dutch conducted military aggression in 1947, the de facto territory of Indonesia was reduced to almost a half of Java Island. It was officially concluded with the signing of the 1948 Renville Agreement brokered by the United Nations. As a consequence of this agreement, Indonesia lost Jakarta and most of Western Java areas which force the Siliwangi regional command to conduct long march to Yogyakarta, the new capital city of Indonesia. It is considered as an important event for the brass since it was basically during this period when Sudirman and Nasution managed to unify the ex-PETA and ex-KNIL officers within the brass.
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program to increase the number of personnel in case of emergency. The scale became larger when, during the Guided Democracy period, Indonesia engaged in two major military operations in Papua and Malaya.
During the New Order period, TNI remained rely on the Army territorial command structure that had been developed during the previous periods to deal with internal security problems. With regard to external threats, they developed what is now known as layered defense system which basically divided the defense in three different areas. On the outermost area, TNI relies on intelligence operations to deter the threat (deterrence strategy). On the outer area, Navy and Air Force hold the responsibility to conduct both offensive and defensive operations to prevent the enemy from entering the main islands. On the third layer, the inner areas, TNI adopts a total warfare with the Army as the main combat force. TNI’s layered defense system does not only reflects a weak-state mentality as argued by Widjajanto (2010, 2013a, 2013b), but also was adopted due to the constraints that come from infrastructural weaknesses as well (Sutarto, 2017, interview). From time to time, TNI’s capability to deal with external threats has never been sufficient. In comparison with Indonesia’s neighboring states, Indonesia is still lacking behind in term of weaponry possession as well as military preparedness. Hence, efforts to increase TNI’s capability have been an important agenda of the reform, especially in the second phase of the reform.
Finally, during the Reform era, TNI made adjustment in their doctrines by transferring the internal security assignment to police force. The current TNI’s doctrine, Tridek, was adopted by TNI according to SKep Panglima TNI No. Kep/21/I/2007. This doctrine lists the possible threats that might endanger the survival of the Republic and how to deal with them. It lies out the three strategies adopted by TNI which are deterrence, punitive, and recovery strategies with the first conducted in the outermost and outer areas of defense while the second and the third are conducted in the inner area of defense. The layered defense system is designed to deal with external rather than internal threat. In dealing with internal threats, Tridek lists the war operations and operations other than war (OMSP) depending on the required missions. Hence, while this doctrine officially transfers the maintenance of internal security to Polri, it still opens the possibility of their involvement in internal security operations.
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which in previous doctrines, for example in TNI’s 1991 Sad Daya Dwi Bakti or TNI’s 1988 Catur Darma Eka Karma (Cadek) TNI was clearly identified their engagement in defense (from external threat), (internal) security, and sociopolitical affairs. Sad and Cadek were basically a continuation of TNI’s 1982 Dwifungsi doctrine. While Dwifungsi was officially adopted in 1982, TNI’s 1966 Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional had already identified the roles of the armed forces as defense as well as sociopolitical tools. Dwifungsi itself was a redefinition of TNI’s Jalan Tengah developed by Nasution in 1958. Jalan Tengah itself was never been an official doctrine of the armed forces. Hence, the evolution of TNI’s doctrines basically suggests that there has been a changing in the nature of their relationship with politics from influencing politics to controlling politics to subtly influencing politics. Figure 5.2 below suggests the development of TNI’s doctrine from Jalan Tengah to Tridek.Figure 5.2. Evolution of TNI’s doctrine (selected main documents)
In addition to the disbandment of military’s involvement in governance (from controlling to subtly influencing), there is no significant change taken by TNI with regard to their doctrines. As suggested in Chapter 3, most regulations that were adopted during the reform period were concerned with the disbandment of military’s direct involvement in politics while efforts to professionalize the armed forces came at second in priority. In the word of Sutarto (2017, interview), the idea of reform was basically to elevate the sociopolitical function of TNI. It was not meant to completely change the
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organizational structure of the armed forces. As a result, the reform did not really disrupt TNI’s organizational structure.
5.1.2. The evolution of TNI territorial command structure
After examining the evolution of their doctrines, the following paragraphs examine into detail the evolution of TNI’s organizational structure. Following the establishment of TKR, Soemohardjo proposed to divide TKR into 4 regional commands (known as komandemen), which were West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Sumatera.
The komandemen system was heavily relied on linear defense system. However, TKR also developed mobile units within these komandemen. The existence of both linear defense system and mobile units represented the influence of both ex-KNIL (Dutch educated) officers and ex-PETA (Japanese educated) officers.116 In 1946, when TKR transformed into TRI, a new structure of the Army was introduced. TRI abandoned the komandemen system and established 10 divisions covering the Java (7 divisions) and Sumatera (3 divisions) areas. Previously, under the komandemen system, TKR was divided into 16 divisions. In 1947, when TRI was renamed into TNI, the structure was also changed. TNI had 7 divisions with no division was available in Sumatera and divisions covering Java. In 1948, Nasution, then was chief-of-staff replacing Soemohardjo who passed away due to illness, received an order from Sudirman to reorganize the armed forces to able to engage in war against the Dutch colonial forces.117 In late 1949, Nasution divided the Army, which was the backbone of TNI, into seven different military governments (known as Tentara dan Teritorium or T&T).
These seven T&T were Northern Sumatera, Southern Sumatera, West Java (including Jakarta), Central Java, East Java, Borneo, and Eastern Indonesia. When developing this
116 The rivalry was represented in the dualism of leadership between Sudirman (ex-PETA) and Soemohardjo (ex-KNIL). Sukarno was in favor of Soemohardjo as Panglima of TKR, but most regional leaders opted to choose Sudirman as Panglima. Soemohardjo was then elected as chief-of-staff by Sudirman to bridge the two rivals. The two however held different views over various issues within the brass. Sudirman, for example, was not in favor of the integration of laskar to TKR. He thought that laskar can be an independent militia whenever they wanted, while Soemohardjo thought the otherwise. For a detail explanation on this period see Said (1991).
117 Sudirman was not interested in organizational structure. It has been argued by scholars that ex-PETA officers were lacking interest in organizational structure unlike ex-KNIL officers. Nasution, on the other hand, had a keen interest in developing TNI as professional armed forces (Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985;
Said, 1991).
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structure, Nasution thought that this would be a temporary structure until they managed to defeat the Dutch colonial forces.
The T&T structure lied out the foundation for the Army territorial command structure. In 1959, the Army established Military Command Area (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) to replace T&T. The main reason for this change was that there was a significant change in the nature of threat from external threat (Dutch colonial forces) to internal threat (rebellion from separatist movements). At the beginning, there were 16 Kodam, which then became 17 with the establishment of Kodam Cendrawasih in Papua.
Those 17 Kodam were: Kodam I/Iskandar Muda (Aceh), Kodam II/Bukit Barisan (North Sumatera), Kodam III/17 Agustus (West Sumatera), Kodam IV/Sriwijaya (South Sumatera), Kodam V/Jakarta Raya (Jaya) overseeing Jakarta and its outskirt areas, Kodam VI/Siliwangi (West Java), Kodam VII/Diponegoro (Central Java and Yogyakarta), Kodam VIII/Brawijaya (East Java), Kodam IX/Mulawarman (Eastern Borneo), Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat (Southern Borneo), Kodam XI/Tambun Bungai (Central Borneo), Kodam XII/Tanjungpura (West Borneo), Kodam XIII/Merdeka (Northern and Central Celebes), Kodam XIV/Hasanuddin (Southern Celebes), Kodam XV/Pattimura (Moluccas Islands), Kodam XVI/Udayana (Bali and Southeastern Islands), and Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih (Papua). Those Kodam were established in 1957, 1958 and 1959, with the exception of Kodam Cendrawasih which was established in 1962. In 1985, the Army simplified their organizational structure and reduced the number of Kodam into 7 Kodam. These were Kodam Bukit Barisan and Kodam Sriwijaya in Sumatera, Kodam Jaya, Kodam Siliwingi, Kodam Diponegoro, and Kodam Brawijaya in Java, Kodam Tanjungpura in Borneo, Kodam Wirabuana in Celebes, Kodam Trikora (Moluccas Islands and Papua), and Kodam Udayana (Bali and Southeastern Islands).
In the post Suharto era, the Army increased the number of Kodam. In 1999, Kodam Pattimura was reestablished by the Army. The reason for this reestablishment was to deal with ethnic conflict in Moluccas Islands following the fall of Suharto. At the same time, Kodam Cendrawasih was reestablished and Kodam Wirabuana was disbanded. In 2002, the Army reestablished Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh. Kodam Iskandar Muda was reestablished to minimize the impact of GAM activities. In addition, the armed forces also afraid that efforts to make peace deal with GAM which
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had been taken place since the reign of Wahid would significantly harm their officers.
In 2010, Kodam Tanjungpura was divided into two Kodam, Kodam Tanjungpura for Western Borneo and Kodam Mulawarman for Eastern Borneo. In 2016, two other Kodam were established. Kodam Merdeka was reestablished and a new Kodam, Kodam Kasuari, was established to oversee West Papua. Hence, currently there are 15 Kodam in Indonesia, with Sumatera divided into 3 Kodam (Iskandar Muda, Bukit Barisan, and Sriwijaya), 4 Kodam in Java (Jaya, Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya), 2 Kodam in Borneo (Mulawarman and Tanjungpura), 2 Kodam in Celebes (Hasanuddin and Merdeka), 1 Kodam covering Bali and Southeastern Islands (Udayana), 1 Kodam in Moluccas Islands (Pattimura), and 2 Kodam in Papua (Cendrawasih and Kasuari).
Each Kodam has several Korem and each Korem oversees several Kodim. There are, however, several separated Kodim which are independent and directly under the supervision of Kodam. These separated Kodim are: Kodim 0201/Medan (under Kodam Bukit Barisan), Kodim 0501/Central Jakarta (under Kodam Jaya), Kodim 0618/Bandung (under Kodam Siliwangi), Kodim 0733/Semarang (under Kodam Diponegoro), Kodim 1207/Pontianak (under Kodam Tanjungpura), and Kodim 1408/Makassar (under Kodam Hasanuddin). The number of Korem in each Kodam varies (see Table 5.2 for detail).
Korem is led by either Brigadier General or Colonel while Kodim is led by Lieutenant Colonel or Major (senior) but the separated Kodim is led by Colonel. As comparison, Kodam is led by a Major General. The Army structure goes lower into the sub-district and village levels. Each Kodim oversees several Koramil, while each Koramil oversees several Babinsa at the village level. Koramil is led by Major or Captain, while Babinsa is led by Sergeant Major.
Table 5.2. The number of Korem and Kodim
Kodam Korem Kodim District
Iskandar Muda 2 14 23
Bukit Barisan 5 34 71
Sriwijaya 5 27 60
Jaya 2 8 9
Siliwangi 4 22 32
Diponegoro 4 36 40
Brawijaya 4 32 38
Tanjungpura 2 13 28
Mulawarman 2 21 28
Hasanuddin 3 26 47
Merdeka 2 12 34
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Udayana 3 26 42
Pattimura 2 9 21
Cendrawasih 2 6 29
Kasuari 2 8 13
Note: the number of Kodim listed includes the separated Kodim; the number of district refers to district in civilian bureaucracy
What is striking from this structure is the existence of Army intelligence staff in all offices from Kodam to Koramil. Each Kodam has both Asintel Pangdam (Assistant for Intelligence to the Kodam Commander) and Danden Intel (Intelligence Detachment Commander). Each Korem has Danton Intel (Intelligence Platoon Commander) and Kasi Intelrem (Head of Korem Intelligence Section), while each Kodim has Si Inteldem (Kodim Intelligence Section Officer). Finally, each Koramil has Bawanra (People’s Resistance Training NCO), Bakonsos (Social Conditions NCO) as well as Babinsa (Village NCO). The main duty of Babinsa is actually to collect information from their area of operation related to various issues. Hence, they are basically performing intelligence collection assignment.
This structure allows the Army to penetrate civilian bureaucracy. Their clear line of command allows TNI’s leaderships to gain knowledge on any significant occurrences in the country faster than the civilian bureaucracy. Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that TNI’s territorial command structure allows the armed forces to prevent any potential threats. These threats are not only coming from within the state, but also those that penetrated from abroad. TNI has been quite often referred to external penetration (or propaganda) as one of the main threats to Indonesia’s security. This view has its root on the PKI rebellion in 1948 and 1965. TNI considers PKI as being used by foreign power (the Communist camp) to bring down Pancasila.118 It is in this logic that TNI’s territorial command structure plays its defense role. There is, however, another significant consequence from this structure. Sebastian (2006) described in detail how TNI’s massive intelligence gathering system has allowed them to basically overshadow civilian bureaucracy in any dimensions. With their deep penetration into the society, it was the armed forces instead of civilian bureaucracy that basically run the country.
Moreover, prior to the Reform era, in the three lowest levels of governance, there was a Regional Leadership Committee (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida for district
118 Pancasila or the Five Pillars is the ideology of Indonesia. It has five basic tenets (belief in God, humanity, national unity, democracy, and social justice).
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