Progress in the indicators of public policy area

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whether it is the election of the President or the making of the cabinet, does not involve the armed forces as well. The President is directly chosen by the people in a Presidential election as clearly regulated in the Law on Presidential election (UU No.23/2003 and then revised with UU No.42/2008). Prior to the election, TNI is customarily required to declare their neutrality, as in the case of 2004, 2009, and 2014. TNI personnel also could not use their voting right as previously has explained in the above paragraph.

Hence, their involvement in the making of the government practically does not exist.

Meanwhile, the making of the cabinet is purely the domain of the President. In fact, the appointment of Panglima is also the prerogative right of the President although, according to Article 13 point (2) of the Law on TNI.⁶²

3.1.2.2.Progress in the indicators of public policy area

On the public policy area, the progress of the reform in the establishment of normative arrangements has also indicated a relatively high degree of success, albeit not as successful as the first area. With regard to the indicator of state budgetary affair, the allocation of state budget in Indonesia is subject to DPR’s approval. With regard to defense budget, the Ministry of Defense is the one who responsible to propose the budget to DPR. Article 16 point (3) of the Law on National Defense clearly states that Minister of Defense has the authority to prepare defense planning in accordance with President’s direction and Article 16 point (6) equips Minister of Defense with the authority to allocate budget. However, Article 67 point (1) of the Law on TNI does mention that Panglima TNI can submit budget proposal to the Ministry of Defense. In 2012, Minister of Defense adopted Permenhan No.38/2012 on Defense Planning Mechanism to operationalize the principles stated on the Law on National Defense. As part of this Permenhan is the guidance on the making of defense budget which takes into account a bottom up process from TNI Headquarter to Ministry of Defense. This Permenhan, however, was withdrawn in 2015 and replaced by Permenhan No.28/2015 which had a relatively top-down process of defense planning, including on budget allocation. Hence, the new Permenhan is basically further limiting the role of TNI Panglima in budget allocation procedure.

62 This issue will further be discussed in the next section.

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The source of contention between Ministry of Defense and TNI Headquarter with regard to the issue of budget allocation is the different interpretations of Article 3 point (2) of the Law on TNI which states that “with regard to defense policy and strategy as well as administrative support, TNI is under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense.”⁶³ TNI tends to interpret the word “under the coordination” as working together with the Ministry of Defense instead of following the direction from the Ministry of Defense. They argue that this Article shall not be taken off from Article 3 point (1) which states that Panglima is directly under the order of the President. Hence, they suggest that TNI Headquarter has their own autonomy in defense planning including in allocating their defense budget. The role of the Ministry of Defense, accordingly, is simply to coordinate their policies with the policies of the Ministry. On the other hand, Article 16 point (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of the Law on National Defense clearly mention that the role of the Ministry of Defense is to make the policies.

Hence, the Ministry of Defense tends to interpret their authority as policy makers with assistances and advises from TNI Headquarter. While in the past this debate has been sometimes appeared in closed discussions, it was not until the saga over the purchase of AugustaWestland 101 (AW101) helicopter that the debate came into attention into public arena in February 2016.⁶⁴

The second indicator of the public policy area also suggests that there are no institutionalized prerogatives or informal interventions to the policy making by the armed forces. Article 5 of the Law on TNI clearly states that TNI is defense tool. Article 10 point (1) of the Law on National Defense confirms a similar statement. The role of TNI is limited to defense. However, with the consent of President and at the requests of concerned governmental bodies, TNI can provide assistance in fourteen different OMSP.

63 In the original language it is written: “Dalam kebijakan dan strategi pertahanan serta dukungan administrasi, TNI di bawah koordinasi Departemen Pertahanan.”

64 During a hearing with DPR, Panglima said that he has no knowledge on the Air Force plan to purchase AW 101 which DPR is reluctantly agreeing to. Panglima argued that he has lost the authority over defense planning and budget allocation with the release of Permenhan No. 28/2015. He accused that the purchase was made by the Ministry of Defense. In the meanwhile, Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu, said that the purchase is part of Air Force procurement. In 2015, the Secretariat of the State listed the purchase of AW 101 into their budget planning. This purchase was intended to serve as Presidential helicopter. President Joko Widodo, however, rejected this plan due to the relatively expensive price of AW 101 and asked the Secretariat of the State to drop this procurement item. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force then put the purchase of AW 101 into their procurement plan. He could do so since according to Permenhan No. 28/2015 chapter 2, the position of Chief of Staff and Panglima are equal with regard to budgetary users.

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These fourteen OMSP are: counter-insurgency operations, counter-rebellion operations, counter-terrorism operations, border patrol missions, operations to secure vital object, peace-keeping operation, missions to safeguard President, Vice President, and their immediate family members, reserves or basic military trainings, missions to assist local authority in conducting their tasks, missions to assist Polri in maintaining public order, missions to safeguard visiting foreign head of government/state, disaster relief operations, search and rescue missions, and missions to ensure safe passage and freedom of navigation including conducting counter-piracy operations.

In addition, TNI’s relationship with civilian bureaucracy has been severely disbanded as indicated with the disbandment of all sociopolitical offices of the armed forces. In fact, this was among the earliest agendas of military reform. On 10 November 1998, for example, the Minister of Defense and Security ⁶⁵ signed a Kepmenhankam/Pangab⁶⁶ No.09/P/XI/1998 to rename the Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik ABRI, Kasospol ABRI) into the Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kepala Staf Teritorial ABRI, Kaster ABRI).⁶⁷ In addition, Minister of Defense and Security also signed Kepmenhankam/Pangab No.10/P/XI/1998 to liquidate the Body for Staff Development (Badan Pembinaan Kekaryaan, Babinkar) and Officer Staff (staf karyawan, syawan) as well as all of their extra-structural organizations. The liquidation of these offices basically meant that the armed forces were no longer processing military deployment to civilian positions (practice of kekaryaan). In 1999, Minister of Defense and Security signed SK Menhankam/Pangab No.03/P/II/1999 to regulate the status of non-military assignment to military personnel, in which they have to choose between early retirements or changes of status from military personnel into civil servants. Exceptions were given to several non-military positions that required military personnel such as Military Secretary to the President (Sekretaris Militer, Sekmil), defense attaches, and others. In addition, there are also several civilian institutions in which active military officers can serve in, such as Ministry of Defense, State Intelligence Bureau, Signal Intelligence Bureau, and others (Article 47 point (1) of the Law on TNI).

65 The previous name of the Ministry of Defense.

66 During the reign of Suharto and a brief period of Habibie, the post Minister of Defense and Security was held by active military officer and this portfolio was usually given to Panglima ABRI.

67 This post (Kaster TNI) was then disbanded in 2001. Major General Agus Widjojo served as the last Kaster TNI.

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The final indicator of public policy area is whether the armed forces have an authority over civilian bureaucracy. With TNI administratively has been placed under the Ministry of Defense, as stipulated in Article 3 point (2) of the Law on TNI, the armed forces have been nowhere dominating the state structures. Habibie’s cabinet, known as Reform Development Cabinet (Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan)⁶⁸, was the last cabinet which had active military officers in it. According to Croissant, et.al (2013, 102), 2.9% of the members of Habibie cabinet were active military and 12.5% was retired military officers. The number of retired officers in Wahid’s cabinet, or National Unity Cabinet (Kabinet Persatuan Nasional), was higher in comparison to that of Habibie’s. 13.65% of the members of Wahid’s cabinet were retired officers. Retired officers in Megawati’s cabinet (Kabinet Gotong Royong) were counted for 7.2%.

During Yudhoyono’s first term (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu), only 6 from 45 members of the cabinet had military background (including police force) and during his second term (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu 2), only 4 from 55 cabinet members had military background.

Despite that progress, the armed forces maintain their territorial command structure that basically mimicking civilian bureaucracy from national to district levels.

According to ST Panglima TNI No.142/2002, the reference to the old territorial command (komando territorial) should be abandoned and a new reference of territorial command (komando kewilayahan) was then introduced.⁶⁹ It basically suggested that the sociopolitical function of territorial command structure was disbanded but the defense function of territorial command structure remain attached.⁷⁰ Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that the territorial command structure itself is important for TNI to the defense of the country and there has not yet any significant changes in the doctrine. TNI’s defense

68 It is a common practice in Indonesia where each cabinet is given a particular name. In some cases, the name reflects the particular situation when the cabinet is established, but in most cases the name reflects the hope or goal that this cabinet wants to achieve. For example, the name of Habibie’s cabinet reflects both the situation and the hope. The name Reformasi Pembangunan, according to Habibie, reflects the hope that this cabinet would be able to assist the reform agendas following the fall of Suharto. As quoted by Kompas (23 May 1998), Habibie said during the inauguration of this cabinet that "Hal ini sejalan dengan semangat dan tekad bangsa Indonesia sebagaimana tercermin dalam tuntutan reformasi konstitusional menyeluruh yang dipelopori oleh mahasiswa dan generasi muda. Maka, kabinet yang saya umumkan ini, saya beri nama Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan."

69 The words teritori and wilayah have the same meaning. It is equal to the words territory and area in English.

70 Please take note that dual function doctrine, which served as TNI doctrine, stated that TNI has two different function: defense and sociopolitical.

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strategy is basically a total warfare strategy which they called as sistem pertahanan rakyat semesta (sishanrata). In the case of war, TNI would draw the enemies to enter the main islands in the archipelago to conduct guerilla wars against them. Hence, the territorial command structure remains as important as in the past. Moreover, TNI is also equipped with non-defense assignment. With TNI’s massive territorial structure, there have been some cases where the lack of civilian bureaucracy capacity was replaced by TNI. In fact, the Minister of Defense Yusgiantoro signed Permenhan No.35/2011 to regulate this particular OMSP, especially in areas with significant sense of remoteness.

Hence, with regard to the second area, public policy area, the progress of the reform has indicated a medium to high progress in ensuring military’s withdrawal from politics. The main obstacle basically lies in local level rather than in national level. In addition, since the main problem of military withdrawal in this particular area is the existence of TNI’s territorial command structure and the relatively easy reasoning to re-engage in politics through OMSP, serious efforts are in a dire need to redefine TNI’s structure and doctrine.