Chapter 5. The disbandment of territorial command structure
5.2. TNI’s corporate interests at stake
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Indonesian Air Force also has a relatively simple structure.119 TNI AU has two regional commands (Komando Operasi Angkatan Udara, Koops AU), one is based in Jakarta (Koops AU I) and the other is based in Makassar (Koops AU II). Koops AU I has three combat squadrons and 3 transport and logistic squadrons, while Koops AU II has 5 combat squadrons and 3 transport and logistic squadrons. Each Koops AU is led by Air-Vice Marshal.
5.2. TNI’s corporate interests at stake
As suggested in previous part, an important progress in the disbandment of TNI’s territorial command structure is the abandonment of their sociopolitical roles, especially the one previously conducted by the Army. Chapter 3 has examined in detail the documents that would ensure the abandonment of these sociopolitical roles, including the abandonment of kekaryaan doctrine. Currently, TNI’s officers are only allowed to hold certain positions within civilian bureaucracy which have close affinity with national security issues. The abandonment of these sociopolitical roles, however, was not accompanied by a change in TNI’s organizational structure. TNI’s structure remains the same mostly due to resistance from the brass which considers the existing structure as vital for the defense of the state. It should be noted that TNI believes that the main source to the security of the state is basically coming from internal rather than external and hence the TNI’s organizational structure should be aiming at enabling them to detect possible threat as early as possible. In addition, the lack in TNI’s weaponry system does not allow TNI to engage external threats in the outermost areas of defense.
It further complicates the efforts to redirect TNI’s orientation from an inward-looking to an outward-looking. The combination of those two problems has led TNI to maintain their internal-oriented military culture, while, on the other hand and supposedly, a non-political TNI is expected to focus on their defense assignment and hence should have an external-oriented military culture.
To bridge the gap between the current TNI’s internally-oriented military culture and the ideal externally-oriented military culture, efforts have been done to redefine TNI’s organizational structure through various channels. At least two channels are
119 For comparison of Army, Navy, and Air Force territorial command structure and their areas of operation, see maps in Appendix.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
worth examining. The first is the defense modernization program and the second is the making of joint defense zone. Defense modernization program is intended to make TNI to focus on increasing their skills in weapon-management. It is expected that TNI would grow their (Huntingtonian) professional attitude and focus on their defense assignment rather than on politics. The latter effort, the creation of joint defense zone, has two objectives: to reduce the reliance to the Army and its structure as well as to increase inter-services unity. Sutarto (2017, interview), however, criticized those efforts as an
“American-wannabe” attitude and considered that it did not match with the Indonesian situation. According to him, it would take hundreds of years for Indonesia to match the US military structure. Indonesia, on his view, did not have enough capital to pursue this dream. He contended that the government should instead invest on increasing people’s needs instead of building a strong military. It was a matter of priority. He further argued that there is no point of having a strong military but the people lives in poverty. He used North Korea as comparison. On personal note, he also stated that he would love to see a powerful TNI and that the government should work relentlessly to achieve modern and well-equipped military but not at the stake of people’s welfare. Human Right Watch (2006) also criticized the massive defense modernization program since it, at the same time, also opens the chance for massive corruption. According to their report, the practice of marking up the price of weaponry system has been one of the most common practices that takes place during weapon procurement. In 1999, Minister Sudarsono acknowledged that this practice was extremely difficult to be fought due to the involvement of various parties in the process (Wall Street Journal, 8 December 1999).
Prasetyono (2017, interview) and Widjajanto (2017, interview) also confessed that this practice did take place in most of weapon procurement process. The case of Brigadier General Hernayadi, as explained in Chapter 4, confirmed the existence of this practice.
Another case that suggest the existence of this practice of marking up are the Scorpion tank case in 2004 (Detik, 16 December 2004) and the Sukhoi case in 2012 (Kompas, 1 March 2012).
The Indonesian defense modernization program started with the adoption of the Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025 (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang 2005-2025, RPJP 2005-2025). This document laid out, among others, defense planning program that Indonesia would take to ensure its security. The RPJP was then adopted as
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Law No.17/2007 to provide legal justification for the allocation of state’s budget. The Ministry of Defense followed suit by adopted Permenhan on Defense Development Plan (Permenhan No.3/2010; Permenhan No.26/2012120). In addition, Minister of Defense also adopted Permenhan on Minimum Essential Force which outlines the Indonesian defense planning (Permenhan No.2/2010; Permenhan No.19/2012;
Permenhan No.78/2014; Permenhan No.39/2015).121 This planning, however, was failed to be fulfilled due to budget constraint. Figure 5.3 below shows the gap in Indonesia’s defense budget from 2003 to 2011.
Figure 5.3. The gap in Indonesia’s defense budget, 2003-2011
Sources: Sebastian & Gindarsah in Rulland, Manea & Born, 2013; Permenhan No.19/2012 (Appendix) The number is in trillion rupiahs
As part of this defense planning, the government allocated defense budget to purchase new weaponry systems for all three services, despite the fact that these purchases were not taking place as planned. With regard to the Navy, for example, TNI was aiming at developing a green-water navy in the next two decades. The MEF document laid out the procurement plan in detail up to 2024 including the plan to purchase 8 submarines of various classes from South Korea, the Netherlands, France, and Russian Federation—with the first two were planned as joint development project.
Indonesia signed a contract with South Korea for developing three Chang-Bogo class submarines which was scheduled to be delivered in 2015, 2016 and 2018. The first-two would be fully built in South Korea, while the third would be built in Indonesia. Due to
120 The latter is a revised version of the former.
121 The MEF document focused on defense planning, while the Defense Development Plan document was a broader defense-related planning.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Plan Realization
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
financial and technical problems, the plan was rescheduled and the first submarine was finally delivered in March 2017. In 2010, TNI AL reached an agreement with the Dutch’s Damen Schelde to build Sigma-class destroyer—which is actually a light frigate rather than a destroyer—by 2017/2018. Three year later, another agreement was signed to build the second ship. One of the most successful progresses with regard to the Navy’s procurement program takes place in the purchase of small patrol boats and fast attack guided-missile boats. The Navy managed to secure a deal with local company—
PT PAL—to build 60 patrol vessels and 24 guided-missile fast attack KCR-40. TNI AL also managed to reach a deal with China for developing their 120-kilometre range C-705 surface-to-surface missiles for their KCR-40. So far, the modernization plan of the Navy remained lacking behind and scholars remain skeptical that TNI AL would be able to accomplish their goal by 2024 (Schreer, 2013; Koh, 2016). With regard to the Air Force, in 2011, Indonesia requested 24 F-16/D fighters from the US and 6 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 from Russia. The latter were delivered in 2015. Indonesia and South Korea also reached an agreement to build the fourth-generation KFX/IFX in 2012, but the project was then postponed to an unclarified time-frame in 2013. In 2011, the two countries also successfully signed an agreement on the purchase of T-50 Golden Eagle jet-trainers from South Korea. In addition, the Indonesian Army has also secured the purchase of 103 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks from Germany as well as 50 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles and 10 support vehicles. 50 of these Leopard MBTs were delivered in May 2016.
The Indonesia’s defense modernization program, in conclusion, has yet to achieve the intended purpose. Figure 5.4 shows the gap in the Indonesian main defense systems. Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that the lack in the Indonesian weaponry systems have been so deep to the extent that, with the exception of the Army, it would need huge resources to actually fulfill the minimum requirement. He further said that what really happened in the Navy and the Air Force was that while they had two command areas, the weaponry systems were only enough to cover one area. When discussed the Navy, he said that when Koarmabar conducted an operation in their area, Koarmatim could not conduct similar activities and vice versa. The failure of this defense modernization program brings a dire consequence to the disbandment of TNI’s territorial command structure. The defense modernization program was actually aiming
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
at creating an outwardly oriented culture within the brass to provide rationale for the restructuring of TNI’s territorial structure. With the defense modernization program stalled due to the lack of funding, this rationale has been put on hold.
Figure 5.4. The gap in Indonesian weapon systems (selected systems) Adopted from various sources by the author
The second effort to reorganize TNI’s organizational structure is by introducing a joint defense zone known as Komando Gabungan Wilayah Pertahanan (Kogabwilhan). In 2010, President Yudhoyono adopted Perpres No.10/2010 on the Organization of TNI which served as the basis for the establishment of Kogabwilhan.
The plan was to establish three Kogabwilhan—the Western Command, the Central Command, and the Eastern Command. Detail on the plan, however, has yet available.
Sutarto (2017, interview) criticized the plan since it basically has no use whatsoever. He thought that this plan would only create complication to the already established territorial structure. Widjajanto (2017, interview), on the other hand, argued that this plan would provide the armed forces to conduct special defense missions unlike the usual activities conducted by territorial forces. Since the plan to establish Kogabwilhan has yet available, operational details of it has also unavailable.
While defense modernization as well as the incomplete plan to establish Kogabwilhan fails to lead to the reorganization of TNI’s structure, the armed forces also register their own resistance. The armed forces consistently point out the need to retain
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Actual Minimum requirement
‧
the current territorial command structure due to their importance in defending the state from possible threats, either internal or external threats. There is, however, other reason that stems from their own resistance to completely disengage from politics. As suggested in Chapter 1 that the initial aim of the reform was basically to reposition the role of TNI in politics from controlling to indirectly influencing. In doing so, the armed forces released some of their previous roles to civilian groups. The removal of the sociopolitical roles of TNI’s territorial command structure, or the Army territorial command structure to be exact, does not guarantee that military would not involve in daily politics in all levels of governance. In the Army Headquarter publication (2014, 40) on the transformation of Army’s territorial roles (pembinaan teritorial, binter), it was clearly stated that territorial command is being prepared to persuade, to influence, to assist, and to drive to the establishment of resiliency in national ideology, politics, economy, social, and psychology. Its further explanation led to the conclusion that the Army’s territorial command structure is aiming at preserving stability within the society, which has no correlation at all with its defense function. It did argue that the reason for that is due to a high possibility of separatism and terrorism. This document confirms the fear of civilian society that the disbandment of TNI’s sociopolitical roles without the abandonment of their territorial command structure is meaningless. To conclude, Figure 5.4 provides a simple tracing of the failure in the disbandment of TNI’s territorial command structure.
Figure 5.5. Tracing for the disbandment of TNI’s territorial command structure Split within the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
5.3. Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, the above explanation suggests three findings. First, the issue of territorial command structure has a close relationship with the adopted doctrine. Hence, a change in the structure would also require a change in the doctrine.
Since these two are usually considered as the domain of the armed forces, where intervention from civilian should be kept limited, efforts to change both TNI doctrines and structure become difficult. Second, changes in both TNI’s doctrines and structure would face opposition since they are closely related with the interests of the armed forces. Changes in these two components might harm or significantly curtail the role played by TNI in decision making. Finally, two additional problems also contribute to the failure to reorganize TNI’s structure. These two are the lack of proposed alternatives to the current structure and the lack of financial support to professionalize TNI—with the latter is required to force TNI to be outwardly-oriented armed forces.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 6 Conclusion
To complete the analysis provided in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, this chapter aims at two things. First, it compares the findings in those three chapters to answer the main question posted in Chapter 1: why has the reform progressing differently from one issue to another. In order to do so, this chapter employs a simple Mill’s method of difference.
In addition to the variable of military interests, other variables that have been assessed by other scholars as suggested in Chapter 2 are also taken into consideration. It suggests that the other variables are all present in the three cases without variation. Hence, they could not be used to explain the variation of the progress of military reform in Indonesia.
Second, this chapter also ends with recommendations for further research in the topic of military reform, in particular the armed forces’ withdrawal from politics. In addition, while it is not intended to provide generalization, lessons learned are also drawn from the Indonesian case. The analysis in this dissertation suggests that a successful armed forces’ withdrawal from politics, as well as successful military reform, depends on the interests of the armed forces.