Chapter 2. Explaining military’s withdrawal from politics …
2.4. Conclusion
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consent of Council of High Ranks and Offices (Dewan Kepangkatan dan Jabatan Tinggi, Wanjakti).56 While Subianto and his close friends were known to have intimate relationship with several radical Islamic groups, Wiranto was known as nationalist and abangan57 Muslim. Following the fall of Suharto, the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto continued until Subianto was finally released from his position in Kostrad. He even had to face disciplinary court and was discharged from TNI due to his involvement in kidnapping of pro-democratic activists. This rivalry certainly does not fall within particular distinction as suggested above.
2.4. Conclusion
While this dissertation does not neglect the existence of other variables in explaining the progress of military reform in Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, particular attention is given to military interests. Comparison between different variables might be a good option in explaining inter-cases comparison, but in a within-case comparison, such decision might not be a good option. The limitation comes from the fact that the structural condition for all of the sub-cases examined in this dissertation would be relatively similar. Hence, a structural based explanation might have merits in explaining why military reform in Indonesia has been heading toward certain direction or making comparison between the case of Indonesia and other cases in different countries. But, a structural based explanation would not logical enough to explain the variation between sub-cases within single case since they basically share similar structural factor. Agent-based explanations, on the other hand, seem to be a good option to explain this within-case variation. Hence, this dissertation examines an agent-based from military point of view to explain the variation in the progress of reform. As for the choice to focus on the armed forces’ point of view instead other actors is due to the fact that the reform is basically an internal reform. The role of other actors, however,
56 Wanjakti is a council in which its members are all high-ranking officers (depending on the position to be appointed). It is the main mechanism to propose candidates for certain positions within high-ranking officers within TNI. In many cases, to avoid friction within TNI, Wanjakti would simply propose all generals that fit the requirements for certain position. For example, to be considered as Panglima or KSAD/KSAU/KSAL, high-ranking officers need to already have three stars. Hence, Wanjakti would propose all three-star generals for those positions. There are, however, some cases where lower ranking officers get a speed-up upward ranking, which usually takes place when these officers have a very close relationship to Panglima or President.
57 Abangan refers to nominal Muslim. While they are Muslim according to their citizen identification, they do not perform religious duty and in some cases practice syncretism.
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remains crucial as their interactions with the armed forces are among the most important factors that shape the progress of the reform. Therefore, this dissertation also seeks at the other actors and their interests in its analysis.
The framework proposes in this Chapter suits the aim of this dissertation to assess the variation in the progress of military reform. The typology set up in this Chapter is sufficient to explain factors that influence the variation in the progress of the military reform from one issue to the others. As explained above, the categorization of military interests into three categories, i.e. national, organizational and factional/personal will help understanding the case of varied progresses in military reform in Indonesia. The above explanation also provides clear measurement of progress. While this measurement—both the indicators used and the way of measurement—is not completely new, the application of this measurement in the case of Indonesia is relatively new.58
58 By “relatively” it means that other scholars have used the indicators mentioned in this Chapter and the technique used to measure or to weight these indicators. These works, however, are mostly concerned with inter-cases comparison instead of intra-case comparison.
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Chapter 3
The establishment of democratic control over TNI
This chapter examines the progress in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces during the military reform in Indonesia. The progress of the reform in this issue can be considered as one of the most successful in comparison the other areas. This chapter begins with an assessment of this progress. It identifies the achievements as well as the failures of the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces using the indicators that have been set up in previous chapter. The second part of this chapter analyzes the influence of national interests in determining TNI’s decisions to execute reform agendas. The findings of this chapter suggest that national interests play a relatively dominant role in TNI’s compliance to the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. It should be noted, however, that there are other variables that play in hand in shaping their decisions including, and most importantly, their own organizational interests. Most of the successes of the reform in this particular issue take place during the early phase of the reform in which pressures from pro-democratic forces, both within and outside TNI, were at their strongest point.
The progress of the reform in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, however, begins to significantly decline during the latter phase due to several reasons. First, there has been considerable degree of resistance within TNI for further reform due to the lack of progress in other areas of reform, especially police reform. In addition, TNI consistently considers operational-technical regulations, especially in external defense and military organization areas, as military’s internal affairs so when the reform begins to touch upon these operational-technical regulations, TNI simply resists it. Finally, the lack of civilian experts to assist TNI in the making of these operational-technical regulations also contributes to the dependency of TNI in the making of these operational-technical regulations.
3.1. The progress in the establishment of democratic control over TNI
The agendas of military reform can be categorized into five different components, ranging from normative, substantive, organization, defense posture, and
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defense economics. The normative component of military reform refers to the establishment of a set of regulations to create democratic control over the armed forces.
It is part of what Cottey, Edmunds, and Foster (2002) called as the establishment of structural framework to ensure democratic control over the armed forces (see also Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). Widjajanto, et.al (2008) argued that there are at least three reasons why military reform should focus on the establishment of political regulations. First, political regulations would guarantee the obedience of the armed forces to democratic principles while at the same time they would also ensure that civilian leadership would not politicize the armed forces. Second, political regulations would also fit to the need to reposition the armed forces within the new political structure. Finally, the existence of political regulations would also ensure transparency and accountability of the armed forces, which usually lacking in military domination situation.
3.1.1. The levelling of political regulations in Indonesia
These political regulations should be comprehensive enough to include various levels of governance. They should cover both the regulations that contain general principles as well as those that contain the operational-technical aspects. It is especially important in the case of Indonesia in which its legal system contains different degrees of regulations in which the lower degree regulations shall not collide with the higher degree regulations. In the Indonesian legal system, the Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar, UUD) is the highest regulation. It is the main source of laws and other regulations in the country. In the second layer, there is MPR decree (Ketetapan MPR, Tap MPR). It should be noted, however, that since the year 2000, MPR has had no right to make regulations concerning the governing and since 2003 MPR has no longer adopted any Tap MPR.59 Prior to the Reform Era, MPR served as the highest body in Indonesian governance system and its position was above the DPR (legislative body) and the president (executive body). Currently, their position is equal with the DPR and the president. Members of MPR are basically members of DPR and members of Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). In the third layer,
59 The current role of MPR is limited to making changes to the Constitution, inaugurating the President and Vice President, and impeaching the President and Vice President. Adopted Tap MPR, however, remains considered as a source of law.
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there are laws (Undang-Undang, UU) and government regulations in lieu of laws (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Perpu). While UU requires consent from DPR to be enacted, the executive branch can also enforce Perpu to serve as UU without the consent from DPR in an emergency situation. This Perpu, however, should be brought to DPR on the latter’s next general assembly. In the case where DPR rejects the Perpu, the government is required to propose a new draft of law to revoke the Perpu. In the next layer of regulation sits government regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah, PP). Since 2007, PP has officially been replaced by presidential orders (Peraturan Presiden, Perpres) or presidential decrees (Ketetapan Presiden, Kepres).
The different between Perpres and Kepres lies in their content and function. Perpres contains a relatively general term and is subjected to the public at large while Kepres regulates a more specific term and has a limited and fixed subject. In addition, there are also ministerial level orders and decrees (Peraturan Menteri, Permen and Keputusan Menteri, Kepmen). Since the military reform is basically an internal reform, operational-technical regulations would also include those signed by Panglima TNI, either in the form of orders or decrees (usually in the form of Surat Telegram, ST or Surat Telegram Rahasia, STR). Since Panglima TNI is administratively positioned under the coordination of the Minister of Defense, therefore, Panglima’s orders or decrees can be considered in a lower position below Ministerial orders or decrees. Regulations that can be considered as general principles are Constitution, Tap MPR and laws while the rests fall within the category of operational-technical regulations.
Table 3.1. Level of regulations in Indonesia’s legal system
General principles 1. Constitution (UUD 1945) 2. MPR decree (Tap MPR) 3. Laws (UU)
4. Government regulations in lieu of laws (Perpu) Operational-technical 5. Government regulations (PP – no longer exist)
6. Presidential regulations (Perpres)
7. Presidential orders and decrees (Kepres and Inpres) 8. Ministerial orders and decrees (Permen)
9. Panglima TNI orders and decrees (ST, STR, Skep)
What matter the most with these regulations with regard to the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces is that they should be able to draw clear boundaries between civilian areas from military areas. Ahmadi (2015) proposed a set of
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laws according to military domain and police force domain, with the latter basically is civilian domain that has close relationship with the armed forces. To clearly differentiate those two types of laws, he added one specific law that regulates the system of national security. In addition, there are also laws that fall within joint domain of TNI and Polri (see Figure 3.1 below).
* The law on the System of National Security should not be confused with the Law on National Security.
The former refers to the whole arrangement of all laws related to security issues, including the Law on National Security.
Figure 3.1. Ideal type of laws arrangement (as proposed by Ahmadi) (Ahmadi, 2015, 69)
Ahmadi’s proposal reflects the dominant voice within TNI. The main source of contention of this proposal is the laws that fall within joint areas of TNI and Polri, in particular the Law on National Security (UU Keamanan Nasional). This law is intended to clearly set the boundaries between defense and security and hence set a clear distinction between the role of TNI and the role of Polri. The debate between defense and security, or in the Indonesian literatures are referred as pertahanan dan keamanan, revolves around what can be considered as defense and what can be considered as security. While traditionally defense is usually related to external threat and security has close resonance with internal threat, this distinction is no longer sufficient. The development in the concept of security, for example, has introduced the idea of human security (keamanan insani) which sparks a debate on which institution should be dealing with threats to human security. What makes matter worst is the fact that this
Constitution (UUD 1945)
Law on the System of National Security*
Law on National Defense
Law on TNI
TNI's domain
Law on National Security
Law on Military's Assistance
Joint domain
Law on Public Order and Law on Human Security
Law on Polri
Polri domain
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conceptual debate, when translated into empirical reality, is intermingling with institutional authority and share of budget. Simply put, if the threats to human security fall within the role of TNI then the share of budget to deal with these threats also belong to the TNI. On the contrary, if they fall within the task of Polri then the share of budget also falls to Polri.
While TNI consistently supports the enactment of the Law on National Security, Polri reluctantly, and often rather harshly, rejects the enactment of this law. Panglima TNI Admiral Suhartono, for example, clearly mentioned that the enactment of the Law on National Security would not curtail Polri’s authority (Kompas, 9 January 2012) to lure Polri to support the draft of this law. The draft of this law itself was prepared and proposed by the government through the Ministry of Defense, which means that it was developed by the armed forces. The first draft of this law was proposed in 2005 and consisted of 60 Articles.60 This draft, however, never reached to DPR due to resistances from both Polri and NGOs. While the former concerned with the possibility in the reduction of their authority, the latter’s main concern was the possibility of TNI’s involvement in domestic security affairs. A new draft was prepared by the Ministry of Defense in 2009 which then was discussed in Commission I of DPR who in charge of political and security affairs. DPR rejected the draft and asked the government to revise the draft to be included in the next session of meetings due to pressures from Polri and NGOs. The draft to the Law on National Security regularly appeared on DPR legislation list since then, but DPR always fails to reach agreement to pass the draft.
In addition to the distinction between regulations that contain general principles and operational-technical regulations as well as the distinction between military, civilian, and joint domains, another issue that requires clarification is the content of those regulations. As noted before, the aim of the military reform in Indonesia is first and foremost to disengage the armed forces from politics. The second larger aim of the reform is to establish professional armed forces within a Huntingtonian ideal. TNI seems to consider the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces and professional armed forces as two different projects. In 2008, Panglima TNI General
60 Within the Indonesian law system, the executive branch is the one who develops and proposes the draft of the law. Even though DPR also has that authority, they rarely propose the draft of the law to be enacted. The laws which have already been passed by DPR must gain approval from the government to be fully applied.
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Santoso said that TNI had been successfully disengaged themselves from politics and transferred their tribunal system under civilian control (Antara, 9 October 2008). In 2013, Panglima TNI Admiral Suhartono also said that TNI’s political engagement had practically been non-existence (BBC Indonesia, 16 July 2013). He then asserted that the next reform agendas should then be targeted at increasing military professionalism, something that was deemed impossible without the financial support of the state.
Recently, Panglima TNI General Nurmantyo had proudly concluded that military reform had officially completed (Liputan 6, 4 October 2015). He also said, as his predecessors had argued, that TNI should focus on defense modernization to further develop their professionalism. While those claims could be debatable, they indicate that TNI has already had a clear vision on how the reform should be conducted in the next phase.
Since the Indonesia’s military reform tends to follow Huntingtonian logic, the agendas of the reform can be differentiated into three different aspect of military professionalism. Huntington (1957) wrote that a professional soldier should have three qualities, i.e. expert in managing violence, have a solid esprit de corps, and loyal to the state (see also Janowitz, 1960; Finer, 1988; Alagappa, 2001). Based on this logic, Widjajanto, et.al (2008) identified ten different laws to regulate those three qualities as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 4.2. Defense-related regulations (Widjajanto, et.al, 2008, 9)
Military’s responsibility
Law on National Security Law on National Defense*
Law on State Secrecy Military’s corporateness
Law on TNI*
Law on Conscriptions Law on Military Tribunal
Military’s expertise
Law on State of Emergencies Law on Operations Other than War Law on Defense Resources Law on Civil Mobilization
* has been adopted
Apart from the debate over the Law on National Security, the reform has been successful in adopting the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI. Other laws,
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however, remain contested in DPR or have yet been officially proposed by the government to DPR. In 2002, DPR passed the Law on National Defense (Law No.3/2002). In 2004, DPR passed another law related to defense affairs, the Law on TNI (Law No.34/2004). In 2014, another law, the Law on Military Discipline, was also successfully adopted. The first two laws serve as a basis for military compliance to civilian authority and democratic values. Both laws provide President with full control of the military. The President is tasked with making the defense policy (Article 13 of the Law on National Defense) and his consent is required to deploy the military (Article 14 of the Law on National Defense and Article 3 of the Law on TNI). To assist the President, the Minister of Defense is authorized to enact defense-related policies, including those related to military deployment and defense cooperation, to produce defense white paper, and to allocate defense budget (Article 16 of the Law on National Defense). While President would adopt a General Policy on National Defense (Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara, Jakum Hanneg) with a Perpres. The Minister of Defense should operationalize this Jakum Hanneg into a Policy on the Management of National Defense (Kebijakan Penyelenggaraan Pertahanan Negara, Jakgar Hanneg).
In addition, the Minister of Defense also has a task to develop a National Defense Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan Nasional) and a National Defense Doctrine (Doktrin Pertahanan Negara). TNI would follow suit by adopting a TNI Doctrine (Doktrin TNI) and each services develop their own services doctrines (Doktrin Angkatan). The role of Minister of Defense goes beyond the making of defense doctrine. They also responsible
In addition, the Minister of Defense also has a task to develop a National Defense Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan Nasional) and a National Defense Doctrine (Doktrin Pertahanan Negara). TNI would follow suit by adopting a TNI Doctrine (Doktrin TNI) and each services develop their own services doctrines (Doktrin Angkatan). The role of Minister of Defense goes beyond the making of defense doctrine. They also responsible