Progress in the indicators of elite recruitment area

but “it would be misleading to interpret the decline of TNI’s veto powers as evidence of the successful establishment of full democratic civilian control over the Indonesian armed forces.” To provide a clear picture of how far has TNI disengaging themselves from politics, the following paragraphs employ the framework proposed in Chapter 2 by looking at the already established political regulations in various levels of governance.

The findings are presented the Table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4. Findings in the establishment of democratic control over TNI

Areas Results Category

of result Elite

recruitment

- No military representation in political bodies

- Military has no influence on the selection of political decision makers

- Active duty officers are not eligible for political office

- No military influence on the making and breaking of governments

High

Public policy - No military participation in allocation of state expenditures - No institutionalized prerogatives or informal intervention in policy

making

- Military assists civilian bureaucracy in certain geographical areas and in addition, the armed forces retained their territorial command structure which mimicking civilian bureaucracy despite the fact that they had already taken off the sociopolitical function of this structure

Medium- high

Internal

security - While there are no institutionalized prerogatives given to the armed forces in policy making, the armed forces do have strong influence especially in some specific issue or geographical areas - While there is strict separation of military’s involvement in

missions, the armed forces gain an upper hand position in some specific issue or geographical areas

- There are institutionalized frameworks for civilian oversighting

Medium

External

defense - Military personnel occupy important position within the defense bureaucracy

- Civilians in all branches of government are able to monitor military activities

Medium

Military organization

- Military remains dominant players in the making of decisions over military organization issues, but civilian has full right of the making of policy

- Civilians are able to monitor and audit military activities

Medium

3.1.2.1.Progress in the indicators of elite recruitment area

With regard to the first area, elite recruitment, the established regulations in both general principles and operational-tactical levels have clearly suggested that the armed forces have no political representation in political bodies, either in legislative, judicative, or executive branches. With regard to TNI’s involvement in the legislative branch, STR

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

Kasum TNI⁶¹ No.1062/2004 clearly said that the assignment of military personnel to sit in DPR and DPRD will be ended when the 2004-2009 elected-members of DPR and DPRD were inaugurated. It basically means that their representation in all levels of legislative branch will be put to an end in 2004. According to Article 5 point (4) of the Tap MPR/VII/2000, TNI personnel lost their political rights but in exchange their representation in legislative bodies is granted until 2009. The STR Kasum TNI No.1062/2004, therefore, concluded the withdrawal of TNI from legislative bodies five years earlier than the original schedule. In an interview with General Endrieartono Sutarto (2017), he proudly said that this was part of TNI’s willingness to sacrifice for the interest of the whole nation. He, however, also said that this should be seen as temporary condition and that one day the political right of soldiers should be given back to them. There is a stark difference between TNI’s (involvement) in politics and soldiers’

political right (between politik TNI and politik prajurit). While the former should never be granted, the latter should be. Recently, General Nurmantyo also pointed out the need to give back soldiers’ political right but, according to his own assessment, not within the next one or two years (Kompas, 4 October 2016).

The non-existence of soldiers’ political right also indicates that the armed forces practically have no power in the selection of political leaders. It also means that the armed forces as an institution also lose their influence in selection of political leaders.

Sutarto (2017, interview) mentioned that this is an important issue since military personnel, especially those at the lower levels officers, could be very easily using their position to support certain candidate upon and impose that preference to their subordinates. Hence, the absence of personnel’s political right, including the right to vote and to campaign for certain candidate, is seen as a better option to guarantee TNI’s neutrality in politics. He, however, clearly mentioned that while TNI personnel lost their political rights, they would remain loyal to the democratically elected government.

TNI’s neutrality in politics, especially in elections, has been regularly publicly stated and ensured.

61 Kasum or Kepala Staf Umum (General Chief of Staff) is a second highest position non-commanding position within the armed forces. The main task of Kasum is to coordinate to communicate the policies of Panglima. This position is held by a three-star general (Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral, or Vice Air Marshal).

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

With regard to the third indicator of elite recruitment area, TNI’s personnel are not only losing their voting right but also their right to be elected as political leaders.

TNI’s personnel are required to take early retirement if they want to run as candidate.

Article 39 point (4) of the Law on TNI clearly states that military personnel are not allowed to run as candidate for either legislative member of executive leaders in both national and local levels. The Law on the Election of Governors, Mayors, and Regents (UU No.1/2014, replaced by UU No.1/2015, replaced by UU No.8/2005, replaced by UU No.10/2016) and the Law on the Elections of Members of DPR, DPD, and DPRD (UU No.8/2012) also mentioned that military personnel who want to run as candidate in local election must resign from their service. As a follow up of those regulations, on 9 August 2016, General Nurmantyo published ST Panglima TNI No.983/2016 (to replace STR No.222/2005 and STR No.546/2006) which listed six details on TNI personnel’s early resignation to run as political candidates, including: the personnel are required to offer early retirement prior to the candidacy, this retirement is subject to their superiors’

approval, it cannot be cancelled under any circumstances, when they are not elected they cannot re-join the brass, during the campaign they must not use TNI’s attributes, and they will be discharged from TNI with honors.

The last indicator of elite recruitment area, the military’s veto power over the making and breaking of governments is also non-existence. According to the Constitution, President can only be impeached from his position if he or she has committed treason, engaged in corruption and bribery, conducted criminal activities, or due to any other reasons could not perform his task as President as stated in Article 7 letter (a). Article 7 letter (b) lies out the mechanism for the impeachment. DPR must first seek legal decision from the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) which states the would-be-impeached President has indeed violated any of the items listed in Article 7 letter (a). After receiving decision from MK, DPR then sends request to MPR to hold a special session to discuss the impeachment. After listening to inputs from various factions within MPR, they then make decision whether they should impeach the President or not. In the history of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, there is only one case when the President has successfully been impeached from his position.

Since the armed forces no longer have representation in the MPR as well as DPR, their involvement in this process, therefore, does not exist. The making of the government,

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

whether it is the election of the President or the making of the cabinet, does not involve the armed forces as well. The President is directly chosen by the people in a Presidential election as clearly regulated in the Law on Presidential election (UU No.23/2003 and then revised with UU No.42/2008). Prior to the election, TNI is customarily required to declare their neutrality, as in the case of 2004, 2009, and 2014. TNI personnel also could not use their voting right as previously has explained in the above paragraph.

Hence, their involvement in the making of the government practically does not exist.

Meanwhile, the making of the cabinet is purely the domain of the President. In fact, the appointment of Panglima is also the prerogative right of the President although, according to Article 13 point (2) of the Law on TNI.⁶²