Chapter 2. Explaining military’s withdrawal from politics …
2.3. A typology of corporate interests of the armed forces
2.3.1. Organizational interests of TNI
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reform. However, Beeson failed to specifically identify what are the interests of the armed forces. By focusing on military interests and how they interact with civilian groups’ interests and structural constraints, this research would provide additional explanation in understanding the progress of the reform.
2.3. A typology of corporate interests of the armed forces
As noted above, the concept of military corporate interests has frequently been used without clear typology. This part provides a typology of military corporate interests into three different types, i.e. national interests of the armed forces, organizational interests of the armed forces, and factional/personal interests within the armed forces.
2.3.1. Organizational interests of TNI
Employing military interests in analyzing military’s withdrawal is both challenging and difficult task. When writing on corporate interests of the armed forces, Nordlinger (1977) identified four main interests of defense establishment to include:
adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing internal affairs, preservation of their responsibility vis-a-vis other institutions, and continuity of the brass itself. What is important the most is his assertion that “the defense or enhancement of the military’s corporate interests is the most important interventionist motive” (Nordlinger, 1977, 65).
Those are basically the armed forces’ organizational interests. The armed forces can be regarded as a distinct entity and are required to have a strong sense of esprit de corps due to various reasons. Since they work with violence, they are required to have a strict regulation so that they would not use the instrument of violence at their own wish. They are, therefore, required to follow certain chain of command in deployment and the use of violence. A strict line of command becomes a main feature of the armed forces. This sense of belonging, according to Perlmutter (1977), indicated the degree of professionalism within the armed forces. It is mandatory for their survival during the war.
While the term corporate interests are relatively easy to say, it is far from easy to define what these interests actually are. In the case of TNI, scholars have argued that what matter the most for TNI and led to their involvement in politics in the past is the
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security and enhancement of their business interests (McCulloch, 2000; Kingsbury, 2003; Beeson, 2008). Within this logic of thinking, the institutional arrangements of the armed force, including their force structure and the existence of territorial command structure, are developed to support this economic quest of TNI. However, it should be noted that most scholars estimated that the share of the economic activities of the armed forces are only one-third of their overall income (McCulloch, 2000; Evans, 2001;
Gunter, 2001; Widjojo, 2002; Kingsbury, 2003; Mietzner, 2008). Considering the relatively small amount of their share, defining security and enhancement of military business activities as the main corporate interests of TNI is a little bit arbitrarily.
2.3.2. National interests of the TNI
Seldom, however, that those interests are placed in front of the normative justifications for military’s intervention. In most cases, the normative reasons would be for the greater good of the people. Hence, in addition to the real interests of the armed forces, there are also the interests of the nation involved in military’s intervention or involvement in politics. In addition to corporate interests which serve as the basis for military intervention or involvement in politics, there is also possibility of personal interests of the officers that leads to military’s intervention or involvement in politics.
The latter, however, does not necessarily conflicting with the interests of the corps.
Finer (1988) also discussed sectional interests within the armed forces in their intervention or involvement in politics, in which personal interests is only one part of it.
While national interests of the armed forces sound normative, the armed forces have a relatively strong leaning towards national interests in most of their activities. The armed forces are among one of the most nationalistic groups in a country. Huntington (1957, 65) listed “the primacy of the nation state” as one of most fundamental reasons for the armed forces’ very existence. The military conservative realism mind “accepts the nation state as the highest form of political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wars among nation state” (Huntington, 1957, 79). Hence, the armed forces must place the interests of the nation state at their very top priority. In any coup attempts, for example, reference to the interests of the nation state always existed (Huntington, 1968; Lutwak, 1968; Decalo, 1976; Horowitz, 1980). The definition of these national interests can be varied, ranging from the worsening economic situation,
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or Lutwak (1968) referred it as economic backwardness, to the absence of political legitimacy of the reigning government.
In the case of Indonesia, multiple references have been given to show the nationalistic character of TNI. For example, TNI has consistently used the term
“guardian of the nation” to refer to their role throughout the time. The new paradigm document also used the same words in their description of the main reason for adopting reform agendas. Article 3 point (c) of the law on TNI clearly states that TNI is a national military, in which, as the article goes, their loyalty should be pledged to the national interests of the people. Article 3 point (b) of the same law describes TNI as warrior soldiers in which they should, without fear and relentlessly work, to protect the state, its people, and their interests. While during the war against the Dutch re-colonization attempts the main interest of the people was to enjoy freedom from occupation, the armed forces worked hard to force the colonial power to leave Indonesia.
During the New Order, where the people was desperately needed economic stability and growth, the armed forces took the lead to maintain stability to ensure that the government could work well to create “pembangunan dan pemerataan” (development and equality), two of the most important magic words during the reign of Suharto. It was during this particular period when the armed forces developed the idea of
“kewaspadaan” (alertness) especially to those radical elements who seek to destabilize the country that potentially might distract the development program (Honna, 1999).
Within this line of argument, Sebastian (2006, 307-308) concluded that the military view of nationalism is second to none since they “were not only struggled in the Revolution to give birth to the nation but also safeguarded national unity and the national interests.” Simply put, according to TNI, their nationalistic appeal is simply undeniable.
2.3.3. Factional/personal interests within TNI
The final set of interests is factional or personal interests. While the armed forces have a strict line of command and, in most cases, can be assumed to be a solid entity with distinct esprit de corps, there are certainly divisions within the brass. Three kinds of division can be identified with regard to the armed forces, including TNI, which are: division between services within TNI, division between generations within
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TNI, and division between sectional groups within TNI. The following sub-parts explain in detail each of those divisions.
2.3.3.1.Inter-services rivalry within TNI
The first segregation is between services within the armed forces, or often referred as service rivalries. Huntington (1961) pointed out that the root of inter-service rivalries is the establishment of a unified defense organization, which in the case of the United States took place during the post-war period.47 This unification led to a competition over organizational position, strategic doctrine, and resources or funding.
Inter-service rivalries give a wider chance for civilian leadership to control the armed forces by playing of these services. In many cases, this strategy could significantly damage the civil-military relations since it would not only lead to a split within the already un-unified armed forces but also provoke intervention from the armed forces to politics due to civilian deep penetration to internal military affairs.
In the case of Indonesia, inter-service rivalries have been taken place even before there was effort to integrate the armed forces.48 As noted in the first part of this chapter, there was a time when the Army, who traditionally was the dominant service within the armed forces, and the Air Force and the Navy showed their disagreement, such as the case in the departure of Sukarno from power. During the Guided Democracy, Sukarno spent a big chunk of funds for the Air Force and the Navy as he had a vision of making Indonesia as one of the strongest countries in Asia (Sebastian, 2006, 227). A much recent case that indicated inter-service rivalries was the nomination of Nurmantyo as Panglima. Since the days of Wahid, there has been a new tradition in which the Panglima position would be rotated from one service to another. Within this pattern, when General Moeldoko was approaching his retirement age, the next Panglima should be chosen from the Air Force. The President, however, decided to nominate Nurmantyo, who then was KSAD. His decision was soon criticized by
47 The unification itself was driven by the development in military technology and the changing nature of warfare (Huntington, 1961, 40-41).
48 During the formative years of TNI, each service within TNI had their own autonomy. Prior to Suharto era, the Chief of Staff of services within TNI were members of the cabinet and the role of Panglima was simply to coordinate the three services—and in some period, this coordination included the police force as well. The unification of TNI took place as coordinated efforts during Suharto era as suggested by the work of McGregor (2007).
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observers and former officers within the Air Force to the point where Air Marshall (retired) Chappy Hakim, former KSAU, called for the disbandment of the Air Force, while the Air Force themselves remained calm with this nomination (Surianto, 2015;
Pratomo, 2015; Putra, 2015).
2.3.3.2.Inter-generational rivalry within TNI
The second type of segregation within the armed forces takes place along the generational lines. Muna (1999) and Chrisnandi (2004) differentiated generations within TNI into four different groups. The first generation refers to officers who fought during the war for independence. They depicted themselves as warrior and developed both combat and territorial functions. Sudirman and Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo were among the brightest officers of this generation. The second generation refers to those officers who involved in the war against the Dutch recolonization. These officers experienced the strained civil-military relationship during the parliamentary democracy and considered the armed forces as having a social function. Hence, they tended to consider the armed forces as an element within the society that had to collaborate with civilian elements within the society to develop the society. Nasution represented this generation and his Middle Way concept represents the ideology of this generation. The third generation refers to officer who grew up during the reign of Suharto, which, similar to the previous generation, considered themselves as warrior-soldier (prajurit pejuang). They adopted the second generation’s ideology and perfected this ideology into dual function doctrine in which the armed forces had to take the lead in developing the society by ruling and controlling civilian elements within society. The fourth generation is the transition generation which while considered the armed forces as having socio-political role decided to drop the need to rule and control. They were keen to share their role in developing the society with their civilian counterpart. Yudhoyono, Widjojo, and Wirahadikusuma represent this generation.
Kanmen and Chandra (2002) specified two different generations that fought over within the brass during the reform. Supporters of reform within the armed forces were dominated by officers who belong to Class 13 of 1973, while opposition comes from
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officers who belong to Class 10 of 1970 and Class 11 of 1971.49 They argued that this rivalry was basically rooted at monopolization of senior command positions by the latter two classes that potentially blocked the former class from upward movement within the brass. This generational gap, however, fails to explain why there were differences of opinion within the same generation. A study by Said (2013) suggests that there was not only intergenerational rivalry but also intergenerational recruitment as well within the brass. For example, he discusses how Sutrisno, who used to be Suharto’s boy, became Moerdhani’s boy.
2.3.3.3.Inter-sectional groups rivalry within TNI
The third segregation within the armed forces is based on sectional interests.
Two different categorizations can be found with regard to TNI during the reform. The first and more traditional division is between the so-called the green (kelompok hijau) versus the red-and-white (kelompok merah putih) camps. The reference to green and red-and-white basically indicate those officers which leaning toward Islamic groups or values (green) and those which leaning toward nationalistic sentiment (red-and-white).
While serious scholarly works that focus on this division has rarely been made, it has become general knowledge that rivalry between these two factions has taking place since the early establishment of TNI. As noted in previous chapter, TNI is originally consisted of different groups, including civilian militias. Among these groups, two of the most dominant groups were ex-KNIL and ex-PETA.50 These two groups shared similarity in their political affiliation towards nationalist cause.51 In addition to these two groups, other groups with significant number of combatants were various
49 Class refers to the year of their graduation from Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN).
The first class of AMN is the class of 1960. There are no classes in the year 1969 and 1979 due to a change in the length of study.
50 KNIL, stands for Koninklijke Nederlands(ch)-Indische Leger, is basically a legion of Dutch Colonial Army. Consisted of local people, this colonial army’s main duty is to maintain security and order in the Netherland Indies territory. PETA, stands for Pembela Tanah Air [Defender of the Homeland], is a voluntary militia set up by Japanese imperial power during the World War II. Members of these two groups acquired certain degree of military skills.
51 The difference between KNIL and PETA lied in their way of training. Influenced by the Western standard textbook, KNIL officers tended to hold a sort of Huntingtonian ideals of professional armed forces. In the meantime, PETA, being trained by Japanese textbook, included both politically and revolutionary ideals of armed forces (Lebra, 1975).
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based groups, including Laskar Hisbullah (Said 1991).52 Lieutenant General Bambang Triantoro, former Deputy of Political and Social Affairs Branch of the armed forces, publicly identified top officers within the brass along this line of split.53 The green faction dominated top positions within the brass during the end of Suharto era due to the President’s policy to lean toward Islamic community as effort to minimize the political power of the armed forces which had already indicated dissatisfaction toward his leadership. During the transition period, the then TNI Chief of Staff, Wiranto, was said to have sidestepping members of green faction.
The second division is between the reformers and the traditionalists. In the history of TNI, there have been several references to reformers and traditional rivalries.
While the identification for these two groups varied according to the context and time-frame, the division between these two groups revolved around the issue of military’s involvement in politics. In the case of reformers-traditionalists division during the end of Suharto era it referred to whether the armed forces should abandon dual function or not. The latter group argued that the armed forces are destined to involve in politics while the former was leaning toward the Huntingtonian ideals of professional soldier.
During the reform era, the term reformers referred to a group of officers that supported reform agendas to transform TNI into professional armed forces that do not involve in politics. These officers mostly had experience in studying abroad, either in the United States or European countries. Among these officers were Wirahadikusuma, Widjojo, and Yudhoyono.54 Members of this group, however, were split into two different camps.
Wirahadikusuma was known as the supporter of radical transformation in which the armed forces should refrain from politics as soon as possible and as far as possible.
Widjojo and Yudhoyono, on the other hand, preferred a step-by-step gradualist
52 Masyumi was a political party based on Islamic ideals. Established in 1945, Masyumi was disbanded by Sukarno in 1960 due to their allegedly involvement in PRRI rebellion.
53 Among top officers within the brass, the members of red-and-white factions were: Yudhoyono, Agum Gumelar, A.M. Hendropriyono, Imam Oetomo, Tyasno Sudarto, and Ryamizard Ryacudu. The members of green faction included: Faisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Soebagyo H.S., Syarwan Hamid, Z.A. Maulani, Prabowo Subianto, Fachrul Razi, Sjafrie Syamsudin, Yunus Yosfiah, Zacky A. Makarim, Djoko Subroto, and Syamsoel Maarif (Menggeser Jenderal Suap dan Jenderal Lembek [Removing corrupt and mushy generals] 1999).
54 These three officers went to the United States to gain both military and civilian education.
Wirahadikusumah was a graduate of Harvard University. Widojo went to George Washington University and also National Defense University. In addition, he also went into US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Yudhoyono was an alumnus of Webster University and attended US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.
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approach in disengaging the armed forces from politics. Within the reformists, there were also two different camps. Widjojo and Yudhoyono represented the gradualist within the reformist, while Wirahadikusumah represented the radical (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). The former thought that military reform should be conducted step by step to prevent disturbances within the brass. They argued that most officers within the brass had not yet prepared for a drastic change. The radicals, on the other hand, were eager for drastic transformation. The term traditionalist, on the contrary, referred to officers who opposed military’s noninvolvement in politics, either publicly or silently. Members of this group involved relatively older officers such as Subianto, and his group. Hence, Kanmen and Chandra (2002) suggested that these rivalries were actually a reflection of intergenerational rivalries.
In some cases, it would be difficult to identify those segregations according to a clear line of divisions. Scholars (Lee, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo &
Kasim, 2008; Daves, 2013-2014, chapter 4), for example, attributed the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto during the end of Suharto era and shortly after his fall as intermingling between both ideological-based and reform-based divisions. The core issue in these two officers’ rivalry was basically over the control of the armed forces.
Wiranto, as Panglima, had taken a cautious decision with regard to the role that TNI should play during a fast-changing situation. While he did not want to upset Suharto, he also did not wish to take harsh actions against his oppositions. Subianto, on the other
Wiranto, as Panglima, had taken a cautious decision with regard to the role that TNI should play during a fast-changing situation. While he did not want to upset Suharto, he also did not wish to take harsh actions against his oppositions. Subianto, on the other