Chapter 4 The Netherlands & the People's Republic of China
4.3 Case 2 -‐ June Fourth Incident (1989 -‐ 1991)
4.3.1 The massacre
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from 1988 to 1993, admitted before his death in 1998, to be the most serious mistake committed by the Communist Party in its history.
The magnitude of the incident and its impact on the domestic affairs and international relations of China was so great, that it is considered to be one of the major events in modern China. It led to a whole array of literature, songs, paintings, films, documentaries, would have a lasting effect in politics, society and popular culture, and would forever change the way how people perceive China. Still, the incident shrouds itself in mystery because of the lack of information, and many aspects of the events remain unknown or unconfirmed until this day.
4.3.1 The massacre
Ironically, since 1954 the constitution of the PRC has guaranteed certain basic political rights to its citizens. Article 35 of the 1982 constitution states that citizens of China "enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." However, the exercise of these fundamental rights has always been restricted by the Four Basic Principles, interpreted in such a way that they cannot be in conflict with ‘the socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, leadership of the party, and essence of Marxism-Leninism-Mao's Thought’. So generally speaking anomic activities had been present all the time (e.g. the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-1979) but these activities could, at the will of the party, be regarded as illegal and wiped out (Wang, 1999).
Although many agree that the seeds for the protest on Tiananmen Square were already planted in 1986, where student organized demonstrations for democracy and political reform and openly criticized the authoritarian rule of the party, Wang (1999)
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also brings forth the argument that one of the primary reasons for the student protests in 1989 was the retail price reform, initiated by Zhao Ziyang. This had generated uncontrolled inflation of more than 30% that exacerbated already existing problems like crime and widespread official corruption.
Also around this time there was a rising criticism by intellectuals and concerned party members of the party's continued authoritarian rule and monopoly on power. Writers and scholars, of which also party members, demanded the release of political prisoners. There was a rising wave of intellectual discontent and criticism of the regime.
This was the context in which the rather spontaneous, student-led mass movement emerged in April 1989. Students at Beijing University together with students from the People's University and the Central Institute for National Minorities made a plan to address the problems of inflation, neglect of workers' living conditions, and lack of improvement in education (Wang, 1999).
So, what started on April 16, 1989 as a memorial for the reformer Hu Yaobang in Beijing escalated in big protests for democratic reform. Initially only students were protesting, but soon they would get support from other groups and members of society, like journalists and laborers. The students refuse to go to class, thousands went on hunger strike and completely encampments were established on the Square of Heavenly Peace.
In May, Beijing counted over a million protestors. R. Baum (1996) describes the internal struggles among the public at the time, and mentions in his book that the students were actually internally divided and that they don't actively commit themselves to create a united front with the laborers and other sympathizers. Also he mentions that there were
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other groups that would benefit from a restoration of peace, and would like to remain the old situation.
The Chinese leaders did not want to give in. The fear for political chaos and instability was big, also under the influence of the political situation in Eastern Europe.
The party feared that democratization would mean the end of their reign. Deng Xiaoping had always believed that it was possible for the Chinese economy to modernize and implement capitalist elements without affecting the authoritarian political system. He was proved to be wrong. The ferment had grown too massive and the protests were out of control. Out of fear for total rebellion the leaders of the country decided to end the protests with harsh measures (Baum, 1996).
Initially the People's Liberation Army entered Beijing on May 20th, but were held back by the residents11. But on June 2 the decision to order the PLA into the square was made by the top party officials, i.e. Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo (Wang, 1999, p. 634). Despite the failure to take back the city on the 20th of May, this time the army remained loyal to the political authorities. On June 4th he square and the surrounding streets were being cleared without remorse. Not only did the Chinese authorities show their callous indifference to the brutal way how the army cracked down upon the civilians, the period that followed was also characterized by prosecutions, detentions and executions.
According to Amnesty International there were already over 700 people detained on June 12 (Amnesty International, 1989). The report of the Human Rights Watch that
11 Footage of the invasion of the PLA, mothers handing their babies over to the disillusioned soldiers of the PLA, and the Tiananmen Square incident in general, can be seen in several top documentaries e.g. The Gate of Heavenly Peace and The Tank Man.
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was published at the end of 1989, argues that the death toll reached up to 1000 and the amount of arrests over 10.000 (Human Rights Watch, 1989). The wave of arrests would continue for the whole year. The Chinese government encouraged people to report any 'counter-revolutionary behavior'. Also an official statement was released that during the 'counter-revolutionary rebellion' only a few 'criminals' died, while countless of soldiers of the People's Liberation Army had died (Amnesty, 1989, p. 13-14). The propaganda machine of China had clearly not suffered any malfunctions.
The international community was not fooled. A remarkable aspect at that time, was that the whole world was able to see on television the footage of Chinese protestors that were being crushed by tanks, causing a bloodbath in the streets of Beijing. The event was captured in the world famous photograph 'Tank Man', which came to symbolize the peaceful democratic disobedience of the normal man against the modernized, militarized and authoritarian power. Political repercussions were unavoidable. Member of parliament Relus ter Beek stated on June 6:
The atrocious events in the PRC, in Beijing but also elsewhere, are filling us with shock and disgust. The courageous battle of the Chinese students (...) and the cry for more freedom and democracy is being smothered with blood. On a moment like this the world, especially the civilized world cannot remain silent.
(Handelingen Tweede Kamer. June 6, 1988-1989)
He asked for a reaction from the Minister of Foreign Affairs how the Netherlands was planning to punish China for its deeds. The next day he would receive the answer when parliament would debate the issue.
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4.3.2 The reaction
The next day on June 7, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek spoke to parliament:
Right now in China there unfolds a disaster that we, some time ago, could never have imagined (...) This monday the temporary chargé d'affaires told China that human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms are a business of the international community as a whole, and can not be considered a domestic affair.
Our abhorrence is amplified by the fact that it concerns a country that we, especially the last few years, have sought to deepen our relation with.
(Handelingen Tweede Kamer. June 7, 1988-1989)
After a promising start, the flame of hope for a stable relationship with China was put out again in one blow. The Minister explained that next to bilateral action, he had also discussed a day earlier with his colleagues in the European Community (EC, since 1993 the European Union) what the course of action would be.
Most aspects of the relationship with China were downgraded. The cultural, diplomatic and economic exchanges, but also development aid support were all frozen.
The government didn't start any new projects. Projects that had already started and had no direct relation with the government could continue. The Dutch students that were studying in China were evacuated by the embassy, and the Chinese students that were studying in the Netherlands were offered amnesty. Although the French and British embassies were repatriating all their nationals residing in China, the Dutch government decided that advising Dutch nationals in China to stay inside was enough. Companies like
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Philips and Stork repatriated their employees to the Netherlands. The Nederlandse Credietverzekerings Maatschappij (NCM, also knows as Atradius) canceled the risk spread for export to China.
On that particular moment in time Van den Broek did not want to go further with taking actions. The situation in China was chaotic and it seemed like there was disunity in the army and the party top. The minister did not want to completely break relations, since holding on to relations offered him the presence of the Dutch ambassador in Beijing, which consequently provided him with information and a line of contact with the regime.
Van den Broek thought it would be better to remain in touch with the Chinese authorities.
He argued that isolation would prove to be counter effective: "Right now we don't want to take actions that will hinder cooperation with China in the long run" (Blussé & van Luyn. 2008, p. 216).
So any further concrete actions were not taken. Not everybody in parliament agreed with this strategy. Especially the decision to not withdraw the ambassador caused a lot of surprised and indignant reactions. Also, a proposal from the United States, to freeze Chinese financial credits of international institutions like the World Bank, didn't receive support from the Dutch government. According to the statutes of those organizations the provisions of loans could not have a political basis, and the Netherlands wished to uphold these principles. Furthermore, the biggest part of the projects that were financed with these loans were involved in the development in education, exactly a sector in which modernization was taking place. Also reactions to the actions of the European Community were divided. Initially the European Community made a strong statement and plead for a peaceful solution. Statement of the European Community on China:
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The Twelve, deeply shocked by the tragic developments in China, strongly condemn the violent repression used against peaceful demonstrators, which has resulted in widespread loss of life there. They note that serious unrest continues.
The Twelve urge the Chinese authorities to stop the use of force against the unarmed civilian population in Peking and elsewhere. The Twelve appeal to the Chinese leadership to engage without delay in the search for a peaceful solution to the present conflict. Such a solution cannot be attained without political dialogue.
Continuing repressive actions, in violation of universally recognized human rights principles, will greatly prejudice China's international standing and compromise the reform and open-door policies which the European Community and its member States have actively supported. The European Community and member States have already taken a number of measures, including suspension of high-level contacts, and will continue to keep developments in China under urgent review (European Community, 1989).
But in the Dutch parliament people were not satisfied that initially the European Community didn't carry out an arms embargo like the United States had done. The EC first suggested that the member states should decide for themselves how they wanted to punish China. So the Netherlands first bilaterally decided to implement a weapon embargo against China. Members of parliament Ter Beek (PvdA), Ria Beckers-de Bruijn (PPR) en Meindert Leerling (RPF) asked for more concrete sanctions, and Leerling suggested to withdraw the ambassador. The three parties CDA, VVD and D66 agreed with the minister to first await the political development before any further action. They
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agreed that the ambassador acted as an important line of communication, and an important representation in China. So the official policy of the Netherlands was similar to the rest of the European Community.
Since the media and NGO's kept on reporting news on arrests, executions and other forms of repression in the period after the massacre, also the discussion whether or not the ambassador should be repatriated, whether or not the supplying of development aid should stop, and whether or not the government should consider the implementation of stronger economic sanctions continued.
Still the minister retained his position that he didn't want to completely break ties with the regime. In this way, he argue, they could stimulate reform more effectively.
After the deliberation of the European Council in Madrid, there were concrete actions planned. The human rights situation in China would be discussed in international institutions. The visa of Chinese students would be extended and the Chinese authorities were asked to let objective observers into their prisons. The European Council of Ministers concluded that more European Community's member states had implemented arms embargoes, and agreed that the arms embargo would become part of a set of EU-wide diplomatic and economic sanctions intended to signal disapproval of Chinese actions. New cooperation projects were postponed and running projects were reduced.
Also, the European Council decided that the credits that were asked at the World Bank should be refused (European Commission, 2015).
In the reaction to the human rights violations in China the Dutch government followed several principles that were documented in several reports regarding the position of human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands. In the policy analysis of
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the Human Rights Report from 1979 (Foreign Affairs, 1979) there are several points that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take into consideration when formulating human rights policy. It was concluded that the Ministry should not lose sight of the other goals of the foreign policy; the human rights are not always the most important. In the case of Tiananmen, the government had given priority to human rights without losing sight of its own interests, namely to secure good relations with China. The Netherlands had to work carefully and not seriously harm the relations with China.
The policy report emphasized that a weapon embargo is the ideal instrument of punishment, since it only harms the regime and not the citizenry. The importance of common action was also emphasized in the document. In the case of Tiananmen, the Netherlands followed this recommendation, and not only regarding the sactions of arms trade. Multiple European forums were organized to discuss the follow-up strategy towards China. Whenever the twelve members issued a public statement, the Netherlands would follow the common policies.
With regard to development aid, the Netherlands looked carefully if the donations reached the right groups and followed the common policy that stipulated that no further development plans could be initiated. The human rights policy report (1979) did mention that the Netherlands could stop its development aid as a way of sanctioning violating countries, but the government, neither the parliament ever considered this option; the Netherlands decided to separate development aid from politics.
So most aspects of the reaction of the Netherlands neatly followed the recommendations provided by the policy report of 1979, and also the common reaction of the EC. The fact
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that the sanctions of arms trade was implemented by all the European partners and the United States had greatly increased the effectiveness.
Two years later China's position of exile changed, when British prime minister John Major came to Beijing to sign the contract for the construction of the new airport in Hong Kong. The idea was that the airfield should be finished before the transfer of the British colony to the People's Republic of China, which was scheduled for July 1st of 1997. During this exchange, Dutch dredging companies managed to attain a contract for the construction of the airfield.
As one of the last industrialized countries the Netherlands normalizes its relations with Beijing in the autumn of 1991, when Secretary of State Yvonne van Rooy of Foreign Trade visits China with a trade delegation. Its the first official visit of a Dutch delegation after the dramatic incident on the Square of Heavenly peace, and it's late, because already a year before the EC lifted the economic sanctions, with only a weapon embargo remaining (Van der Heijden, 2009, p. 92).
Regardless of the weapon embargo, human rights appear to not play an important role at all when trying to maintain good relations. For the Netherlands - and also all other industrialized nations - every time it's primarily about trade and economic profits. That's not strange when taking in regard the cutthroat competition that involves entering the Chinese market, a situation in which good friends are valuable. A Dutch diplomat describes the importance of good connections: "In a country where trade is owned by the state, good friendly relations are very important. Other countries are very active here.
They come for visits and they give credits. With an eye on our competitiveness it is good that we play along with this and secure our position." (Heijden, 1991).
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4.4 Case 3 - China's Negligence (1990 - 1992)
In June 1990 the weekly magazine 'Vrij Nederland' claimed that the Dutch government, together with Taiwanese representatives and the shipbuilding company Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM), were looking for possibilities to deliver new submarines to Taiwan. In order to prevent a response from China similar to the once in 1981, the parties were said to consider to build the submarines or in the Taiwanese harbor Kaohsiung, or to bring them to Taiwan through a diversion, for example through South-Korea or the US. 'Vrij Nederland' also revealed that a second company from Rotterdam, Van Rierschoten & Houwens, joined the negotiations for the delivery of navigation instruments made especially for submarines.
In response to the discussion Secretary of State Yvonne van Rooy resolutely declared that the Dutch government would keep its promises to China and that for the delivery of submarines, construction drawings or models with the end destination Taiwan, there would be issued no export license:
The Government has no involvement in any potential new contracts for the delivery of submarines to Taiwan. (...) The Government expects its policy regarding arms trade to be known. The Government will not deviate from this policy. (Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1990-1991, Nr. 157)
But in the meantime, the rumors persisted that Taiwan was fishing for Dutch submarines. During 1990-1991, several times van Rooy had to answer questions asked by Members of Parliament regarding the rumors that the Ministry of Economic Affairs was
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looking together with RDM for possibilities for a new delivery (van der Heijden, 2009, p.93). Every time she answered negatively:
looking together with RDM for possibilities for a new delivery (van der Heijden, 2009, p.93). Every time she answered negatively: