Stabilization

國

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

decision-making actors on February 20, 1981 in the Letter of the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs to the Chairman of the House of Representatives, where the Prime Minister and the Minister of General Affairs stated that the government would not retract the license, and also emphasized that it didn't consider its policy to be incongruent with the point of reference of May 16th 1972.

The confirmation of the fact that a period of instability had begun was provided by China on May 1981, when the diplomatic relations were reduced to chargé d'affaires, and thereby signaling that the interpretations of the nature of the relationship were incongruent. The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by itself it will proceed to implement policy that is characterized by 'self-restraint', either in the form of 'ontological tolerance', and/or the 'yielding of direct national interest'.

5.1.3 Stabilization  

In this case, the national interest of the Netherlands is the trade with Taiwan, as indicated by the Government (especially the Ministry of Economics) and members of parliament. Given the fact that on December 28th 1983 the Dutch government after long deliberation decides to not trade with Taiwan in order to stabilize the relationship with China, the hypothesis that

Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, and when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by itself, the foreign policy will be based on

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

H1: Self-restraint, in the form of ontological tolerance and/or the yielding of national interest, can be confirmed for Case #1.

5.1.4 Instability

After the stabilization process, both parties came together to determine a new point of reference for congruent policy. This point is defined by the agreement concluded on 1 February 1984, where China and the Netherlands restored full diplomatic relations and agreed on the nature of the relationship:

The representation of the Dutch government has informed the representation of the Chinese government of the decision of the Dutch government to not issue a license for the further export of weapons to Taiwan. The Chinese government appreciates the decision of the Dutch government. (...) Both parties agree to not only normalize but also intensify the relations (d'Hooghe, 1992)

With compliance of both sides, a period of stability was introduced where both sides of the relationship agreed on their common interpretations of the nature of the relationship, which increased the predictability of the other party's behavior and allowed them to be more certain of the other party's commitment to the relationship.

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

In case #2, the same method will be applied. To conclude if model fits the data, we look whether or not the independent variable '(in)stability' and the dependent variable 'Objective of Dutch foreign policy' are the same as anticipated in the hypothesis.

5.2.1 Stability

In order to know when the interpretations of the nature of the relationship became incongruent, we first have to determine when the interpretation was congruent. As was determined in the analysis of case #1, the last point of reference was agreed upon by both parties on February 1^st 1984, but this agreement is complementary to the initial point of reference of May 16^th 1972. In the period from 1984-1989 both sides of the relationship had congruent interpretations of these agreements.

5.2.2 Instability

In this case, the period of destabilization was rather short, as the relationship was destabilized by an almost instant shock. This moment was the massacre committed by the government of the People's Republic of China on June 4^th 1989. One could argue that the destabilization was already anticipated earlier, when the Dutch government cancelled the state visit of the Queen and her husband four days before departure (Landsberger, 1989).

Now the observant reader can make a claim that the People's Republic of China actually deemed the relationship to be destabilized at the moment that they were sanctioned by the Netherlands, since they argued that human rights violations are a domestic affairs, which, according to the point of reference, should not be infringed upon.

This, however, does not affect the model, because the construct of 'instability' is defined

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

nature of the relationship. This is the accurate, because on June 7th, the Netherlands stated that human rights violations can never be considered a domestic affairs, which makes their interpretation of the relationship different from China.

Consequently, it was instantly clear for the Netherlands who the destabilizing actor in the relation was. The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by the other, it will proceed by implementing policy that is characterized by 'symbolic action', which contains 'self-help' and 'self-restraint', as indicated by the hypothesis.

5.2.3 Stabilization

The 'self-help' was characterized by the immediate objective of the Netherlands to concert its efforts in a multilateral context to increase its effectiveness, which can be interpreted with the Balance of Power model. The multilateral sanctions were established on 27 June 1989. Bilaterally, most aspects of the relationship with China were downgraded, signaling to China that the Netherlands had a different interpretation of the conditions for a stable relationship.

In this case, the 'self-restraint' of the Netherlands concerns 'ontological tolerance'. The ontological tolerance is represented by the fact that, although the Netherlands used 'self-help' to punish China, it applied its values concerning human rights inconsistently, by retaining diplomatic contact and withholding further action while this was demanded from not also informing actors, and also several decision-making actors. This is best represented by the statement: "Right now we don't want to take actions that will hinder cooperation with China in the long run." (Blussé & van Luyn.

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

This was done, in accordance with the construct of 'symbolic sanctions', to not permanently harm the relation with China, but to allow China to return to the long-term calculus of a stable relationship. This logic didn't only apply for the Netherlands, also the US did not respond to the deportation of American journalists and the Chinese critique on 'hegemonic anti-China waves coming from the US congress’. This was because president G.H. Bush didn't want the turbulence to escalate and prevent China from being able to return to the long term calculus (Blussé & van Luyn, 2008, p. 218).

Also it can be concluded that the Netherlands applied its values inconsistently by giving priority to national interest, according to the policy recommendations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs, 1979). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the decision-making actors did consider the degree of turbulence to be severe. As one of the last industrialized countries the Netherlands normalizes its relations with Beijing in the autumn of 1991, a year after the multilateral sanctions were lifted. Also the fact that the multilateral weapon embargo still remains, is a signal to China that the European Union still considers human rights not to be a domestic affair, but a universal principle that also China ought to uphold if it seeks to maintain stable relations.

Given the fact that bilaterally most aspects of the relationship were downgraded, and multilateral sanctions were established as a reaction to the destabilization, while at the same time retaining diplomatic contact with the authoritarian regime and prioritizing national interest over human rights, the hypothesis that

‧

立 政 治 大 學

‧

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, and when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, the foreign policy will be based on

H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of restraint and Self-help. can be confirmed for Case #2.