Chapter 4 The Netherlands & the People's Republic of China
4.6 Recent developments
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'Demonstrations prevent our countries from having a harmonious relationship', said a Chinese official that was also aboard of the Mississippi Queen, the vessel on which Li drove through the harbor. The 'Release student leader Wang Dan' that demonstrators were shouting was already carried away by the wind (Berbers & Nysingh, February 14, 1998).
The Chinese Prime Minister didn't come to talk about politics, but to sign contracts. Namely, an agreement with Dutch Royal Shell for the construction of a petrochemical complex in Southern-China, worth of 9 billion guilders. This turned out to be the biggest foreign joint-venture in the history of China (Shell, 2004). Never so many captains of industry joined a Dutch minister, 120 in total. The offending H-word was not used again. The big damage to the economy, that was predicted by the VNO-NCW-chair Blankert, did not happen. The Netherlands was exactly in line with the European policy that decided that China would not openly be criticized anymore. According to the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs China would try to improve its human rights better than before (Trouw, February 28, 1998). How they were aiming to achieve this remained a mystery of course. Finally the long awaited visit of Queen Beatrix and Prince Claus could continue. Nothing stood in their way anymore and ten years after its initial planning, they could finally enjoy their visit in 1999.
4.6 Recent developments
In this chapter we have seen the historical development of the relation between the Netherlands and the People’s Republic of China with the four major moments of destability. In the year after the Van Mierlo’s incident, the two parties seemed to have found a balance between their mutual expectations. As long as China
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trades with the Netherlands, they in turn, will agree to solve potential problem that may arise regarding human rights violations with the magic words ‘constructive dialogue’. Especially after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the relation seems well managed by both parties. When the ambassador of human rights Renee Jones-‐Bos plans to pay a visit to the Falun Gong in Hong Kong, any risk of exacerbating the situation was tempered by both parties. First the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen symbolically cancelled his visit to China after the Chinese government asked him to cancel the ambassadors visit to the Falun Gong.
But soon after China invited him to come and van Aartsen claims that his visit was only delayed, and never cancelled. Here, the two parties still formally perform their expected roles, and are aware of the expected response. The Netherlands still shows that human rights is a major point in their foreign policy with this minor action, because it is not in accordance with the European and American policy to only treat human rights issues with China behind closed doors, but this seemingly courageous action has no real implications. On the other hand, China provides ample investment opportunities over the years. The Dutch bank ING gets one of the seven licenses that the Chinese offered to European insurers in exchange for support of the European Union in the same year (van der Heijden, 2008, p. 127).
Also in 2008, when the Chinese were preparing for the Olympics in Beijing, a potential moment of relational instability was skillfully tempered by both sides. In the Netherlands a public debate arose because several prominent Dutch public figures, like the comedian Erik van Muiswinkel openly critized the fact that the
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Olympic Committee, had agreed to the allocation of the sport festival in a country where human rights violations were part of every day policy. But since the Prime Minister of the Netherlands is the formal representative of the royalty, Jan-‐Peter Balkenende at that time, could not refuse to visit the event, unlike his European colleagues.
Over the years the interaction has remained the same, the Netherlands openly mention the words human rights and China in the same sentence to satisfy the domestic constituency, and China keeps the economic relationship healthy. On October 28th 2015, the Dutch King held a speech at the China Executive Leadership Academy. Here, without openly criticizing China, he made clear that the Netherlands and China have differences, and that these don’t have to be openly discussed, but internally, like differences among friends. He did openly talk about the virtues of a developed civil society and taught the Chinese that ‘listening to people’ is important on all levels of governance. This interaction epitomizes the intention of both parties for the time to come.
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Case Analysis
5.1 Case 1 – The Submarine Crisis (1980 – 1984)
To determine whether or not the model fits the data, we have to analyze if the values of the independent variable '(in)stability' and the dependent variable 'Objective of Dutch foreign policy' are the same as anticipated in the hypothesis.
5.1.1 Stability
The behavior of the actors in a period of stability is represented by 'congruent policy'. In the period covering the whole case, from 1980 to 1984, the point of reference that the decision-makers used to make interpretations of the relationship is defined on May 16th 1972 by the "Communiqué of 16 May 1972 concerning relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China" where both parties agreed to a mutual understanding of the nature of the relationship. In the period from 1972-1980 both sides of the relationship had congruent interpretations of this agreement.
5.1.2 Instability
The initial moment that kicked off the destabilization process was the granting of the arms export license to Taiwan in November 1980 by the Netherlands. Immediately Dutch informing actors and decision-making actors realized that it would be the Netherlands itself that would initiate the instability if the license was not retracted, indicated by the resistance and warnings coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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decision-making actors on February 20, 1981 in the Letter of the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs to the Chairman of the House of Representatives, where the Prime Minister and the Minister of General Affairs stated that the government would not retract the license, and also emphasized that it didn't consider its policy to be incongruent with the point of reference of May 16th 1972.
The confirmation of the fact that a period of instability had begun was provided by China on May 1981, when the diplomatic relations were reduced to chargé d'affaires, and thereby signaling that the interpretations of the nature of the relationship were incongruent. The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by itself it will proceed to implement policy that is characterized by 'self-restraint', either in the form of 'ontological tolerance', and/or the 'yielding of direct national interest'.
5.1.3 Stabilization
In this case, the national interest of the Netherlands is the trade with Taiwan, as indicated by the Government (especially the Ministry of Economics) and members of parliament. Given the fact that on December 28th 1983 the Dutch government after long deliberation decides to not trade with Taiwan in order to stabilize the relationship with China, the hypothesis that
Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, and when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by itself, the foreign policy will be based on
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H1: Self-restraint, in the form of ontological tolerance and/or the yielding of national interest, can be confirmed for Case #1.
5.1.4 Instability
After the stabilization process, both parties came together to determine a new point of reference for congruent policy. This point is defined by the agreement concluded on 1 February 1984, where China and the Netherlands restored full diplomatic relations and agreed on the nature of the relationship:
The representation of the Dutch government has informed the representation of the Chinese government of the decision of the Dutch government to not issue a license for the further export of weapons to Taiwan. The Chinese government appreciates the decision of the Dutch government. (...) Both parties agree to not only normalize but also intensify the relations (d'Hooghe, 1992)
With compliance of both sides, a period of stability was introduced where both sides of the relationship agreed on their common interpretations of the nature of the relationship, which increased the predictability of the other party's behavior and allowed them to be more certain of the other party's commitment to the relationship.
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5.2 Case 2 – June Fourth Incident (1989 - 1991)In case #2, the same method will be applied. To conclude if model fits the data, we look whether or not the independent variable '(in)stability' and the dependent variable 'Objective of Dutch foreign policy' are the same as anticipated in the hypothesis.
5.2.1 Stability
In order to know when the interpretations of the nature of the relationship became incongruent, we first have to determine when the interpretation was congruent. As was determined in the analysis of case #1, the last point of reference was agreed upon by both parties on February 1st 1984, but this agreement is complementary to the initial point of reference of May 16th 1972. In the period from 1984-1989 both sides of the relationship had congruent interpretations of these agreements.
5.2.2 Instability
In this case, the period of destabilization was rather short, as the relationship was destabilized by an almost instant shock. This moment was the massacre committed by the government of the People's Republic of China on June 4th 1989. One could argue that the destabilization was already anticipated earlier, when the Dutch government cancelled the state visit of the Queen and her husband four days before departure (Landsberger, 1989).
Now the observant reader can make a claim that the People's Republic of China actually deemed the relationship to be destabilized at the moment that they were sanctioned by the Netherlands, since they argued that human rights violations are a domestic affairs, which, according to the point of reference, should not be infringed upon.
This, however, does not affect the model, because the construct of 'instability' is defined
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nature of the relationship. This is the accurate, because on June 7th, the Netherlands stated that human rights violations can never be considered a domestic affairs, which makes their interpretation of the relationship different from China.
Consequently, it was instantly clear for the Netherlands who the destabilizing actor in the relation was. The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by the other, it will proceed by implementing policy that is characterized by 'symbolic action', which contains 'self-help' and 'self-restraint', as indicated by the hypothesis.
5.2.3 Stabilization
The 'self-help' was characterized by the immediate objective of the Netherlands to concert its efforts in a multilateral context to increase its effectiveness, which can be interpreted with the Balance of Power model. The multilateral sanctions were established on 27 June 1989. Bilaterally, most aspects of the relationship with China were downgraded, signaling to China that the Netherlands had a different interpretation of the conditions for a stable relationship.
In this case, the 'self-restraint' of the Netherlands concerns 'ontological tolerance'. The ontological tolerance is represented by the fact that, although the Netherlands used 'self-help' to punish China, it applied its values concerning human rights inconsistently, by retaining diplomatic contact and withholding further action while this was demanded from not also informing actors, and also several decision-making actors. This is best represented by the statement: "Right now we don't want to take actions that will hinder cooperation with China in the long run." (Blussé & van Luyn.
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This was done, in accordance with the construct of 'symbolic sanctions', to not permanently harm the relation with China, but to allow China to return to the long-term calculus of a stable relationship. This logic didn't only apply for the Netherlands, also the US did not respond to the deportation of American journalists and the Chinese critique on 'hegemonic anti-China waves coming from the US congress’. This was because president G.H. Bush didn't want the turbulence to escalate and prevent China from being able to return to the long term calculus (Blussé & van Luyn, 2008, p. 218).
Also it can be concluded that the Netherlands applied its values inconsistently by giving priority to national interest, according to the policy recommendations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs, 1979). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the decision-making actors did consider the degree of turbulence to be severe. As one of the last industrialized countries the Netherlands normalizes its relations with Beijing in the autumn of 1991, a year after the multilateral sanctions were lifted. Also the fact that the multilateral weapon embargo still remains, is a signal to China that the European Union still considers human rights not to be a domestic affair, but a universal principle that also China ought to uphold if it seeks to maintain stable relations.
Given the fact that bilaterally most aspects of the relationship were downgraded, and multilateral sanctions were established as a reaction to the destabilization, while at the same time retaining diplomatic contact with the authoritarian regime and prioritizing national interest over human rights, the hypothesis that
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Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, and when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, the foreign policy will be based on
H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of restraint and Self-help. can be confirmed for Case #2.
5.3 Case 3 – China’s Negligence (1990 - 1992)
As in the previous two analyses, we have to determine if the values of the independent variable '(in)stability' and the dependent variable 'Objective of Dutch foreign policy' are the same as anticipated in the hypothesis.
5.3.1 Instability
The period of destabilization starts in November, 1990, when for the first time in reaction to rumors that Taiwan wanted to continue to trade with the Netherlands the government states that it aims to uphold the common interpretation of the relationship that was agreed upon by the Netherlands and China on 1 February 1984. This statement causes the Netherlands to perceive China's interpretation of the relationship to be incongruent with their own, and therefore initiates the period of instability. This is because the agreement of February 1984 states that China would work on the
"intensification of trade relations", but China did not. Therefore, the Netherlands perceives China to be the destabilizer of the relationship.
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The model predicts that when destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, the foreign policy will be based on 'Symbolic sanctions', in the form of a combination of 'Self-help' and 'Self-restraint'.
5.3.2 Stabilization
In this case, the 'self-help' applied by the Netherlands in response to the instability is the threatening of trading arms with Taiwan, through parliament, the government and diplomatic ties.
The 'self-restraint' is the fact that eventually the Netherlands did not buy anything of Taiwan, which was against their national interest at the time. In retrospect, we can simply argue that it was actually in the Netherlands' direct national interest to trade with China instead of Taiwan, but that would be a fallacious statement. At the time, no concrete contracts were signed, and the decision was deemed irrational and criticized until the policy objective of diminishing the trade deficit was reached.
Given the fact that while the Netherlands threatened to trade with Taiwan, the Dutch government after long deliberation decides to yield its national interests in order stabilize the relationship with China, the hypothesis that
Hypothesis: The Dutch foreign policy towards China is aimed at stabilizing the relationship when instability occurs, and when the destabilization of the relationship is perceived to be caused by the other, the foreign policy will be based on
H2: Symbolic sanctions, in the form of a combination of restraint and Self-help, can be confirmed for Case #3.
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5.3.3 Stability
After the implementation of the policy, Minister Andriessen of the Ministry of Economic Affairs went to China in April 1992, where he signed 65 orders of a total worth of 1.6 billion dollars. The critique would only dwindle after the numbers were shown, but the from this moment on the behavior of both parties was in accordance with each other's expectations and conditions. Therefore we can conclude that a period of 'stability' had returned.
5.4 Case 4 – Van Mierlo’s Moralism (1997 – 1998)
Also for the last case, we have to analyse if the values of the independent variable '(in)stability' and the dependent variable 'Objective of Dutch foreign policy' are the same as anticipated in the hypothesis, to determine whether or not the model fits the data.
5.4.1 Stability
In the period of covering the whole case, from 1997 to 1998, the point of reference that the decision-makers used to make interpretations of the relationship is defined by the agreement "Communiqué of May 16, 1972 concerning relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the People's Republic of China" where both parties agreed to a mutual understanding of the nature of the relationship, together with the joint communiqué of 1 February 1984.
The difference in this case however, is that in April 1992, an 'unwritten' mutual understanding had developed that China would have to at least sustain the intensity of the economic relations, while at the same time the Netherlands would not openly criticize
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China's way of handling domestic affairs. In the period from 1992-1997 both sides of the relationship had congruent interpretations of this agreement.
5.4.2 Instability
In this case, the moment that initiated the period of instability is even more clearcut than the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. It was the moment that the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs used his chairmanship of the European Union, to criticize the human rights violations in China. This act was instantly denounced by China, based on an argument of intervention in domestic Chinese affairs. Immediately the visit to China of the minister Weijers of Economic Affairs was postponed. The Dutch ambassador was summoned. The visit of vice premier Zhu Rongji was cancelled. So, instantly, a period of stability changed into a period of instability.
The model predicts that when a party has determined the relationship to be 'destabilized' by itself it will proceed to implement policy that is characterized by 'self-restraint', either in the form of 'ontological tolerance', and/or the 'yielding of direct national interest'.
5.4.3 Stabilization
Given the fact that after this moral statement on human rights, the 'ontological
Given the fact that after this moral statement on human rights, the 'ontological